JUDGMENT J.C. Gupta, J.
1. Heard petitioner's counsel and learned standing counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2.
2. This petition has been filed with a prayer that the respondents be directed to make payment of the salary to the petitioner from 1.7.1991 and also pay him regular salary month to month as and when the same falls due. It has also been prayed that respondent No. 1 be directed to decide the petitioner's representation dated 20.5.1991, Annexure-4 to the petition and that a writ of certiorari be issued quashing the order dated 13.5.1994, Annexure-6 to the petition passed by the respondent No. 1. Admittedly, the college in question is governed by the provisions of U. P. Intermediate Education Act and the Payment of Salary to the Teacher and other Employees Act, 1971.
3. According to the petitioner, he was appointed as an Assistant Teacher in L. T. grade on a sanctioned post under the resolution of the Committee of Management dated 30.6.1991 and in pursuance of the same, he was issued an appointment letter on 1.7.1991 and he joined the duty on the same day. On 5.7.1991 the Manger of the Institution submitted papers before the respondent No. 1 for according financial approval. The question of approval remained pending before the respondent No. 1 and when no final decision was taken, the petitioner filed writ petition before this Court which was disposed of on 20.10.1992 and respondent No. 1 was directed to decide the question of payment of salary to the petitioner within a specified time. Thereafter the respondent No. 1 by his order dated 13.5.1994 (Annexure-6 to the writ petition) rejected the petitioner's representation and refused to accord approval to his appointment on the ground that the alleged appointment of the petitioner was not made against any sanctioned post and, therefore, he could not be paid salary under the Payment of Salaries Act of 1971.
4. The prayer of the petitioner for a direction to respondent No. 1 to decide his representation has become infructuous inasmuch as the said representation has been already decided by the order dated 13.5.1994 passed by respondent No. 1. So far as the order dated 13.5.1994 is concerned, first of all it may be mentioned here that the petitioner slept over the matter for more than three years and no plausible explanation has been put forward to explain this inordinate delay. Secondly, a perusal of the order would indicate that the D.I.O.S. has come to a categorical finding that the appointment of the petitioner was not made on any sanctioned post and it was not the case of the petitioner or of the Committee of Management that the petitioner was appointed in a vacancy on a sanctioned post occurring on account of death or promotion. Since it has been found as a fact that the petitioner's appointment was made on a post which was not a sanctioned post, the respondent No. 1 cannot be compelled to make payment of the salary under the provisions of Payment of Salary to Teacher and other Employees Act, 1971.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged before the Court that the impugned order, dated 13.5.1994 is liable to be quashed as having been passed in violation of the principles of natural Justice. This argument of the learned counsel has no legs to stand. Firstly, a perusal of the impugned order would indicate that the petitioner was afforded a reasonable opportunity of being heard and secondly the authority concerned has applied its mind to the controversy involved and to the facts appearing in the case. It has been held by the Apex Court in the case of Union of India v. M/s. Jesus Sales Corporation, JT 1996 (3) SC 597, that under different situations and conditions the requirement of compliance of the principles of natural Justice vary. The Courts cannot insist that under all circumstances and under different statutory provisions personal hearing have to be afforded to the person concerned. If this principle of affording personal hearing is extended in all cases, it shall lead to chaotic conditions. Quasi-judicial authorities are expected to apply their mind over the grievances made by the appellant or applicant concerned but it cannot be held that before reaching to a conclusion in all events, the quasi-judicial authorities must hear in person the appellants or the applicants. It was further observed that when principle of natural Justice requires any opportunity of being heard before an adverse order is passed, it does not in all circumstances mean a personal hearing and the requirement is complied with by affording an opportunity to the person concerned to present his case before such quasi-judicial authority who is expected to apply his judicial mind to the issues involved. Any order passed after taking into consideration the points raised in the application/representation, shall not be invalid merely on the ground that no personal hearing had been afforded.
6. The order dated 13.5-1994, therefore, does not call for any interference at such a belated stage.
7. For the reasons stated above, this writ petition is dismissed in limine.