JUDGMENT
1. This is the plaintiffs' appeal in the suit out of which First Appeal No. 167 of 1910, decided by us yesterday, arose. The Court below has dismissed a part of the claim on the ground that Musammat Makhana Kunwar made a gift of the property of which she stood possessed in favour of Baldeo Singh, with the consent of the reversioners who were alive at the time of the gift, and the plaintiffs are not entitled to this property. As regards the property which passed to Chhab Nath Singh and from him to his daughter, Dulari Kunwar, the claim has been dismissed on the ground that the relinquishment alleged to have been made by Dulari Kunwar in favour of the plaintiffs and others was invalid, because, in the opinion of the learned Subordinate Judge, the deed was not properly registered inasmuch as it did not contain a sufficient and specific description of the property to which it related.
2. This appeal has been preferred by the plaintiffs in regard to the part of the claim which, as stated above, has been dismissed by the Court below. In our opinion, the appeal must prevail. No doubt, the transfer to Baldeo Singh by Musammat Makhana Kunwar must be deemed to be a gift. Bhawani Singh was alive at the time when the gift was made. He was the next reversioner to the estate, and, having regard to all the circumstances, we must assume that he assented to the gift, and so did Musimmat Sukha, the other widow of Ishri Singh. This transfer cannot be deemed to be a relinquishment of the rights of Makhana Kunwar in favour of the next reversioner, so as to hasten the succession of the reversioner, because it is manifest that Baldeo Singh was not the next reversioner at the time of the transfer, the next reversioner being his father, Bhawani Singh. He could only take the property after the death of Bhawani Singh, and then only jointly with his brother, Sheo Dayal. Therefore, the transfer by Musammat Makhana Kunwar can only be deemed to be a gift by her to one possible reversioner with the consent, of the persons who would have taken the Estate it she had died at the time. The Court below in support of its view has relied on the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Bajrangi Singh v. Manokarnika Bakhsh Singh 30 A. 1 : 6 C.L.J. 766 : 12 C.W.N. 74 : 9 Bom. L.R. 1348 : 17 M.L.J. 605 : 35 I.A. 1. This decision was considered by this Court in two subsequent cases, namely, Bakhtawar v. Bhagwana 32 A. 176 : 5 Ind. Cas. 270 : 7 A.L.J. 121; Abdulla v. Ram Lal 8 A.L.J. 1318 : 34 A. 129 : 12 Ind. Cas. 601. The ruling of their Lordships was distinguished, and it was held that it would not apply to the case of a gift by a widow with the consent of the next reversioner. We feel ourselves bound to follow these later rulings, and we must hold that the transfer by Musammat Makhana Kunwar cannot deprive the plaintiff of their reversionary right to the property which was the subject of the transfer. The Court below was, therefore, wrong in dismissing this part of the claim.
3. As to the decision of the lower Court in regard to the transfer made by Dulari Kunwar of her interests in her father's estate, we are also unable to agree with that Court. Dulari Kunwar, in fact, sold her rights to the plaintiffs and others for a consideration. Had the sale-deed been refused registration on the ground that there was not a clear specification within the meaning of Section 21 of the Registration Act of 1877, it might well be said that the action of the Registrar was correct. But we have the fact that the document has been registered, and we are asked to hold that this registration must be deemed to be a nullity. We cannot accept this contention, the document being registered is admissible in evidence, and there is no difficulty whatever in ascertaining the property it deals with. A document of a similar nature was admitted in evidence in the case of Ram Sidh Pande v. Balgotind A.W.N. (1887) 15 : 9 A. 158. It is true that in that case other, matters were considered by the Court, but the sections of the Registration Act were not lost sight of, and the Court did not reject the document on the ground that it had not been duly registered.
4. The result, therefore, is that the Court below ought to have decreed the whole of the plaintiffs' claim as prayed for in the plaint, and it ought to have directed an inquiry as to mesne profits in regard to the whole of the property claimed. We, accordingly, allow the appeal and vary the decree of the Court below to this extent that we also decree that part of the plaintiffs' claim which was dismissed by the Court below. We direct that the inquiry as to mesne profits ordered by the Court below should also extend to the property in regard to which the claim was dismissed by that Court but has been decreed by us. The defendants will be liable for mesne profits in respect of that portion of the property only which is in the possession of each of them. The appellants will get their costs in this Court and in the Court below.