ORDER Kendall, J.
1. The question that has arisen in this application for revision is whether a civil Court to which an issue has been sent by the Revenue Court for decision under Section 271, Agra Tenancy Act, 1926, and which has decided that issue ex parte has any jurisdiction to entertain an application for the setting aside of the ex parte decision and to decide the issue on its merits. The facts are fully given in the order of the learned Munsif. He has come to the conclusion that the civil Court has jurisdiction under the provisions of Section 141, Civil P.C., and Order 9, Schedule 1.
2. It has been argued for the applicant by Mr. P.M.L. Verma that Section 141 has no application, and he has cited the cases of Thakur Prasad v. Fakirullah (1895) 17 All. 106. In this case their Lordships of the Privy Council held that this section of the Civil Procedure Code, or rather the equivalent section of the old Code, had no application to execution proceedings, so that there is no real analogy between that and the present case. My attention has however been called to the remarks of their Lordships in that judgment on p. Ill in which they say:
that the proceedings spoken of in Section 647 include original matters in the nature of suits such as proceedings in probates, guardianships and so forth and do not include executions.
3. In the case of Sarat Chandra Bose v. Bisweswar Mitra A.I.R. 1927 Cal. 534 at p. 411 (of 54 Cal.) a Bench of the Calcutta High Court in discussing the above case interpreted the expression "so forth" as meaning proceedings ejusdem generis and the expression "original matters" as matters which originate in themselves and not those which spring up from a suit or from some other proceedings or arise in connexion therewith.
4. The issue with which we have to deal in the present case is a question of title, and it goes to the very root of the suit which was before the Revenue Court. It seems to me quite clear that it must be held to be a matter which originates in itself and not as one which "springs from a suit or from other proceedings or arises in connection therewith." If we turn to the wording of Section 141, Civil P.C., we find that the procedure of the Code is to be followed "in all proceedings in any Court of civil jurisdiction," and therefore Order 9 will apply unless there is soma ex. press provision of law or some authoritative decision to prevent it. There is nothing in the passages which I have quoted or to which I have been referred to show that an issue referred to a civil Court for decision by a Revenue Court is not such an original matter in the nature of a suit, as is referred to in the judgment of their Lordships of the Privy Council. My conclusion therefore is that the decision of the learned Munsif is perfectly correct and that the present application has no force. It is therefore dismissed with costs.