JUDGMENT Krishna Murari, J.
1. This is an application filed under Chapter IX Rule 14 of the High Court Rules read with Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure for review of the judgment dated 5.5.2005 dismissing the writ petition.
2. Shorn of unnecessary details, the facts in short are that during consolidation proceeding plot in dispute was earmarked as 'bachat' land for public purposes. Though the petitioner claims the plot in dispute to he his original holding but no objection was filed either by him or by any other person at the stage of Section 9 challenging the reservation of the disputed plot as 'bachat' land. After the adjudication of a title dispute between the respondent No. 3 and one Ram Sagar, a reference was prepared by the Consolidation Officer and certain area of disputed plot was allotted in the chak of respondent No. 3 in order to adjust the valuation to which he was found entitled in the title dispute. The petitioner, aggrieved by the same, filed a revision before the Deputy Director of Consolidation with a prayer that plot in dispute may be allotted in his chak. The Deputy Director of Consolidation found that revision was barred by time and cause show for delay was not sufficient, yet instead of dismissing the revision as time barred he considered it on merits. Having found that petitioner never filed any objection at the stage of Section 9 against inclusion of the plot in dispute as 'bachat' land in statement of principles and 'sehan' and 'abadi' of the petitioner do exist on the plot in dispute as claimed by him the Deputy Director of Consolidation dismissed the revision. The writ petition tiled by the petitioner challenging the rivisional order was dismissed mainly on the ground that petition is concluded by finding of facts recorded by the Deputy Director of Consolidation and since the petitioner did not file any objection at the stage of Section 9 of the Act as such his claim for allotment of the plot in dispute in his chak stands barred by virtue of Section 11-A of the Act.
3. Review of the aforesaid judgment has been sought on the following grounds:
1. Because the order of the Hon'ble Judge is a mistake and error apparent on the face of the record in as much as the Joint Director of Consolidation has dismissed the revision of the petitioner and decided the dispute on merit, so did the Hon'ble Judge ignoring the Supreme Court judgment cited before him (Ram Kali Devi (Smt.) v. Manager, Punjab National Bank, Samsabad and Ors.
2. Because the petitioner has challenged the order of the Joint Director of Consolidation on the ground that it was manifestly erroneous inasmuch as there was only 4 days delay in filing the revision by the petitioner and fully explained the cause of delay but instead of taking liberal view as held by several judgments of this Hon'ble Court as well as the Supreme Court, he illegally rejected the revision as time barred and went on deciding the case on merit and similarly, the Hon'ble Judge did not condone the delay and decided the writ petition on merit, which is an apparent error on the face of the record.
3. Because the Joint Director of Consolidation has got a statutory duty to correct the records yet he decided the case on merit on a finding which was contrary to record, is apparent from the discovery of the evidence to that effect now which has been annexed as annexures along with the stay application and the review is sought against the order of this Hon'ble Court.
4. Because the Joint Director of Consolidation has failed to consider that the land in dispute was an old 'abadi' and there was no justification to assess the same for valuation and keep it as 'Bachat' land although the Joint Director of Consolidation has himself rightly held the land having been kept as 'Bachat' land was unjustified and illegal, yet he approved of the same and the learned Judge has also ignored this material aspect of the matter while dismissing the writ petition resulting into miscarriage of justice.
5. Because in the basic year 'Khatauni' the aforesaid plot No. 3965 area 11 biswa was recorded as old 'abadi' and was settled with the petitioner under Section 9 of the U.P.Z.A, & L.R. Act over which the petitioner has got his house constructed and the remaining part was appurtenant to house being used as Sahan by the petitoner and the same could not be assessed for valuation and be kept as 'Bachat' land and the same has been affirmed by the Hon'ble Judge resulting into miscarriage of justice.
6. Because the order of the Hon'ble High Court staying the operation of the order of the Joint Director of Consolidation dated 25.7.1980 and the order of Consolidation Officer, Koraon, Allahabad dated 24.5.1980 was stayed in the writ petition by his lordship order dated 11.3.1981 yet the consolidation authorities order was carried out in the records giving the plots at the end of the record dividing it into two numbers and giving the fresh numbers under C.H. Form-41 and C.H. Form-45 without waiting for the judgment of this Hon'ble Court, was the result of the collusion of the consolidation authorities with opp. party No. 3 which could not be placed in absence of documentary evidence.
7. Because in C.H. Form-11 plot No. 3965/1 measuring area 1 biswa and plot No. 3965/2 measuring area 10 biswa has been shown to be general 'abadi' and as such the same could not be assessed for valuation on or for allotment of chak to a person as 'Udan' Chak in front of the Sahan of the petitioner by the subordinate consolidation authorities in collusion with opp. Party No. 3.
8. Because the land in dispute being general 'abadi' there was no need for the petitioner to file an objection inasmuch it was the duty of the Joint Director of Consolidation to correct the same and the mistake committed by the Joint Director of Consolidation was also not noticed by the Hon'ble Judge and illegally affirmed the order of the Joint Director of Consolidation resulting into miscarriage of justice and as such the present review application is being filed.
4. I have heard Sri Swaraj Prakash, learned Counsel for the applicant-petitioner and Sri C.K. Rai, learned Counsel for the respondents.
5. It has been urged by learned Counsel for the petitioner-applicant that the illegality committed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation in proceeding to decide the revision on merits even after holding it was time barred has not been considered in the judgment under review. It has also been urged that case law reported in JT 1998(9) SC 529 relied in support of the aforesaid contention has also been ignored. It has next been submitted that delay in filing the revision was only four days which was liable to be condoned in view of the explanation submitted by him.
6. I have considered the aforesaid two submissions raised by learned Counsel for the petitioner-applicant.
7. It is no doubt correct that Deputy Director of Consolidation found that explanation submitted by the petitioner for delay was not sufficient but as a matter of fact he did not dismiss the revision as time barred but proceeded to consider the same on merits. Though the Deputy Director of Consolidation has not specifically mentioned in the order that delay is being condoned, the fact that he considered the revision on merits gets to show that delay stood condoned by implication, The petitioner has himself stated that delay was only of four days and it was liable to be condoned. Once his revision has been dismissed on merits it does not lie in his mouth to say that it could not have been considered on merits without condoning the delay. In any case if the delay as stated by the petitioner was liable to be condoned and would have been condoned the revision would have proceeded on merits. No prejudice can be said to have been caused to him by such decision even in the absence of specific order condoning the delay.
8. The judgment of the Apex court in the case of Ram Kali Devi (Smt.) v. Manager, Punjab National Bank (Supra) relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner has no application to the facts of the present case. In the said case the appeal was dismissed by the District Judge on the ground of limitation without touching the merits of the case. When the matter came to the High Court the case was decided on merits without considering whether the District Judge rightly or wrongly dismissed the appeal on the ground of limitation. In such circumstances, the Hon'ble Apex Court remanded the case back to the High Court to give a final judgment on all points including the point of limitation. The facts of the present case are entirely different. In this case the order passed by the Consolidation Officer accepting the reference was challenged in revision before the Deputy Director of Consolidation on merits.
9. Reference, by sub-ordinate consolidation authorities are covered by Sub-section (3) of Section 48 and by virtue of Sub-section (2) the power conferred by Sub-section (1) of the said Section is exercisable by the Deputy Director of Consolidation in case of reference made under Sub-section (3). Section 48(1) of the Act runs as follows:
The Director of Consolidation may call for and examine the record of any case decided or proceedings taken by any subordinate authority for I he purpose of satisfying himself as to the regularity of the proceedings; or as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any order other than interlocutory order passed by such authority in the case of proceedings and may, after allowing the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard, make such order in the case of proceedings as he think fit.
10. In view of the aforesaid provisions the Director of Consolidation while deciding a reference is vested with the power to call for and examine the record and thereafter, after allowing the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard, make such order as he may deem fit. The question whether after the record has been called for by the Deputy Director of Consolidation under Section 48 of the Act it is open to him to dismiss the revision on some technicalities such as limitation or that necessary party has not been impleaded or the like has been subject matter of adjudication by a full bench of our court in the case Rama Kant v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and Ors. , The question was answered by the bench in following words:
After the record has been called for by the Deputy Director of Consolidation under Section 48 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act he should examine the record to decide whether it was a fit case for exercise of rivisional jurisdiction suo moto. Such opinion shall have to be form even where the application in revision moved by a party is defective having been made beyond the prescribed period of limitation or all the necessary parties have not been impleaded.
11. In view of the aforesaid interpretation of the rivisional power of the Deputy Director of Consolidation, once the record was summoned by him he rightly proceeded to decide the revision filed by the petitioner on merits. Though not specifically mentioned in the case law relied upon by learned Counsel for the petitioner but from the facts narrated therein it appears that the said case was arising out of suit filed under the provision of Code of Civil Procedure, However, in the present case the dispute was under Consolidation of Holdings Act. The power to be exercised and procedure for adjudication is prescribed by the Act itself and is quite distinct from the procedure prescribed under the Code of Civil Procedure and as such also the case law is clearly distinguishable and is of no help to the petitioner.
12. In view of the above there is no force in the aforesaid two arguments raised by learned Counsel for the petitioner and the same are not liable to accepted.
13. Even otherwise also, in effect by raising aforesaid two arguments, the petitioner-applicant has tried to contend that grounds taken up in the writ petition have not been correctly decided. This can hardly be a ground for seeking review of the judgment. The scope of review is very limited. The jurisdiction does not extend for substituting a view taken by the court on merits or otherwise on all the contentions raised before the court on the facts and circumstances of the case. The applicant-petitioner is essentially praying before the court that view taken by the court on facts of the case - legally and factually -should be substituted primarily because another view was possible.
14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner-applicant has raised certain other arguments which are. in effect, repetition of ground Nos. 3 to 8 which have already been quoted above. These grounds were not taken in the writ petition nor argued. Even the documents filed along with review petition were not there in the writ petition. It is not the case of the petitioner-applicant that the documents now being relied upon were not within his knowledge or could not be produced earlier even after exercise of due diligence.
15. The scope of review is very limited and has been explained by Hon'ble Apex Court in several decisions. Reference may be made to the case of Meera Bhanja (Smt.) v. Nirmala Kumar Chaudhury (Smt.), wherein it has been observed as follows:
It is well settled that the review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47, Rull 1. C.P.C, In connection with the limitation of the powers of the Court under Order 47, Rull 1 while dealing with similar jurisdiction available to the High Court while seeking review of the orders under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court, in the case of Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma () speaking through Chinnappa Reddy, J., has made the following pertinent observations (SCC p. 390, para 3).
It is true as observed by this Court in Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab, there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude the High Court from exercising the power of review which is inherent in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; that may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a Court of appeal. A power of review is not to he confused with appellate power which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate Court.
16. Thus it is well settled that review proceedings have to be strictly confined to the ambit and scope of Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A judgment may be open to review inter-alia if there is a mistake or an error of apparent on the face of record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be deducted by a process of reasoning can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of record justifying the court to exercise its power of review. It is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be reheard and corrected in exercise of power of review. A review petition has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be an appeal in disguise.
17. An error which is not self-evident and has to be deducted by a process of reasoning can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of record. This principle has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in a number of decisions. Reference may be made to the latest decision in the case of Lilly Thomas v. Union of India and Ors. AIR 2000 SC 1650 wherein it has been observed that in exercise of power of review the court may correct the mistake but can not substitute the view and mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for review.
18. The intent of the petitioner-applicant is to press before the court for rehearing of the matter on the ground taken up in the writ petition and even the grounds which have not taken in the writ petition, which is not permissible.
19. From the aforesaid discussions, it is clear that the application for review moved by the petitioner-applicant is beyond the purview of Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure and must fail and is. accordingly, dismissed.