JUDGMENT
1. This appeal arises out of a suit in which the plaintiff-respondent claimed possession of a house purchased by him from two persons, namely, Musammat Shamo and Khunni Lal. He purchased half the house from Musammat Shamo and the other half from Khunni Lal on different dates. There is no dispute in this appeal in respect to the half share purchased from Musammat Shamo. As regards the half share purchased from Khunni Lal the facts are these: The share in question belonged toBhagga Lal and after his death, was apparently in the possession of his daughter-in-law, the widow of a predeceased son. Upon her death, the appellant Barati Lal made an application in the Revenue Court for the entry of his name as the heir of Bhagga Lal and the owner of his property. This application was resisted by Musammat Mohan Dei, the daughter of Bhagga Lal, who asserted that her father was separate and that she was entitled to succeed to the property. The dispute resulted in the execution of a document on the 24th of May 1911 by Barati Lal which purported to be a deed of relinquishment. By that document, Barati Lal, for a consideration of Rs. 5,000 and on receipt of certain immoveable property, abandoned all his claim to the estate of Bhagga Lal, and recognized the title of Musammat Mohan Dei as absolute owner. Musammat Mohan Dei being dead, the property passed to her husband Khunni Lal who sold it to the plaintiff. Barati Lal's contention was that the transaction of the 24th of May 1911 was a sale by him of his reversionary rights and was, therefore, invalid under the provisions of Section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act. This contention found favour in the Court of first instance, but was overruled by the lower Appellate Court which decreed the claim of the plaintiff. In our opinion, the decision of the lower Appellate Court is correct. The* learned Judge held that the transaction of the 24th of May 1911 was in fact and substance a settlement of disputed claims. We agree with this view. There was a claim put forward by Barati Lal to the property of Bhagga Lal as the person entitled to it upon the death of Bhagga Lal's daughter-in-law. That claim was denied by Musammat Mohan Dei. One party approached the other and upon receipt of consideration from Musammat Mohap Dei, Barati Lal abandoned his claim to the property. This was not a mere transfer of reversionary rights within the meaning of Section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act. The case is very similar to that of Mohammad Hashmat Ali v. Kaniz Fatima 27 Ind. Cas. 701 : 13 A.L.J. 110. In this view, the appeal must fail, and it is unnecessary to consider the question of estoppel which was argued with great ability on behalf of the appellant. We dismiss the appeal with costs including fees on the higher scale.