JUDGMENT B.S. Chauhan, J.
1. This writ petition has been filed by an Assistant Executive Engineer of the Indian Telephone Industries whose services stood terminated vide order dated 31st August, 1981 for a declaration that Clause (1) of Rule 36 of the Indian Telephone Industries (Conduct, Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as the 1975 Rules) be struck down and the respondents be directed to pay the arrears of salary and other benefits to the petitioner with effect from 1st September, 1981.
2. The termination order dated 31st August, 1981 was also challenged by the petitioner by filing Original Suit No. 83/1982, which was dismissed by the trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 10th March, 1986. First Appeal No. 10/95 filed before this Hon'ble Court against the said judgment of the trial Court was also dismissed by a detailed judgment and order dated 29.4.1998. The review petition filed by the petitioner against the said judgment was also rejected by this Court vide order dated 9.4.2001. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 29.4.1998 of this Court in First Appeal No. 10/1991, the petitioner I filed Special Leave Petition No. (C) 1662/1991 which was dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court vide order dated 25.10.1999 and subsequently, even his review petition was dismissed by the apex Court vide order dated 19.1.2000.
3. This petition has now been filed by the petitioner for a declaration that Rule 36 (1) of the Rules 1975 be struck down as it is violative of principles of natural justice and also against the order of termination of his services without giving any opportunity of hearing to the employee by giving merely one month notice or salary in lieu thereof.
4. This writ petition has been filed for challenging the validity of Rule 36 (1) of the Rules, 1975 on the ground that an employee cannot be terminated, by the employer without assigning any reason, if his services are no more required by the Company by giving thirty days' notice or by payment of salary at the rate of pay plus D.A. for a like period in lieu of notice. Further relief has been sought that once the rule is struck down, petitioner is entitled for all the consequential benefits including salary, seniority and promotions etc.
5. A preliminary objection has been raised by the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents that this Court does not have the competence to disturb the finality of the decision, wherein the correctness of his termination has already been adjudicated upon in the suit and the same has been affirmed in the first appeal by this Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court, therefore, even if the rule is struck down, petitioner cannot claim any relief in respect of his termination. Thus, deciding such a writ petition would amount an exercise in futility and the writ Court is not supposed to examine and decide the academic questions and that too after 22 years of passing the impugned order.
6. Petitioner in person has submitted that the Hon'ble Supreme Court dismissed his Special Leave Petition as well as the review petition in limine. Thus, the same orders do not come in his way for filing the writ petition even at such a belated stage as he can challenge the validity of the Rules any time and once the said rule is struck down, he becomes entitled for all consequential benefits automatically.
7. We have considered the rival submissions made on behalf of the parties and perused the record.
8. It is evident from the record that the petitioner had filed ten other suits before the trial Court and five of them were after his dismissal from service in the year 1981, details and particulars thereof have been taken note of by this Court while deciding First Appeal No. 10/1991. It is further evident that against the judgment and decrees passed in the suits, first appeals and petitions had also been filed before this Court and all of them stood dismissed as the cases related to seniority, promotion, revision of pay scales and suits had, been filed subsequent to the termination of his services. It may also be pertinent to mention here that after dismissal of the Special Leave Petition and Review Petition by the Hon'ble Supreme Court vide orders dated 25.10.1999 and 19.1.2001 respectively, petitioner filed Writ Petition No. 33077/2001, challenging the termination order dated 31.8.1981, however, the same was also dismissed. Review application against the judgment and decree of the Court dated 29.4.1998, was pending inspite of the fact, the petitioner has approached the Hon'ble Supreme Court by filing Special Leave Petition as well as Review Application and the said Review Application was dismissed vide order dated 9.4.2001. Petitioner even after meeting his Waterloo at every stage did not give up the case and claimed from the respondents company the back wages and other benefits with effect from 1.9.1981 on the ground that his termination was illegal. As the said demand was not met by the respondents, petitioner filed another writ petition which was dismissed. Petitioner filed Contempt Petition No. 2848/2002, contending that the orders of the Court were not complied with by the respondents. The said contempt petition was dismissed vide order dated 11.9.2002, observing that no order had ever been passed by the Court to grant any relief to the petitioner. Subsequently, he filed this writ petition challenging the validity of the Rule 36 (1) of the Rules, 1975.
9. There may be some substance on the submissions of the petitioner in person so far as the validity of the rule is concerned. Terminating the services of a permanent employee may not be permissible in a manner as provided under the said rule, but the question does arise as to whether this Court should determine the controversy in this respect at all.
10. Undoubtedly, the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dismissing the Special Leave Petition in limine does not have any binding effect, but the judgment of this Court in First Appeal has attained finality and cannot be disturbed by entertaining this writ petition. No explanation has been furnished as why the petitioner could not challenge the validity of the rule in question at an early stage.
11. Even otherwise, correctness of the decision given in the First Appeal by this Court, cannot be examined nor is finality can be disturbed in writ jurisdiction, therefore, the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court dismissing his Special Leave Petition in limine does not have any bearing on the merit of the case.
12. It is settled proposition of law that even if the order impugned is quashed or Rule is struck down and if the petitioner does not get any benefit from the said quashing, the writ Court should not interfere at his behest. [Vide Dr. Rai S. Bahadur v. Governing Body of the Nalanda College Bihar Sharif and Ors., AIR 1962 SC 1210 ; Kumari Chitra Ghosh v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 1970 SC 35 ; Dr. N.C. Singhal v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 1980 SC 1255 and Khalid Hussain v. Commissioner and Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu, Health Department and Ors., AIR 1987 SC 2074].
13. Courts are not supposed to decide the academic questions. The Courts are meant to determine the real and living issues and the academic questions are not to be decided. [Vide Loknath Padhan v. Birendra Kumar Sahu, AIR 1974 SC 505 ; Sanjeev Coke Mfg. Co. v. Bharat Cooking Coal Ltd. and Anr., AIR 1983 SC 239 ; R. S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay, AIR 1984 SC 684 ; Harsharan Verma v. Charan Singh and Ors., (1985) 1 SCC 162 ; Rajasthan Adult Education Association and Anr. v. Ashoka Bhattacharya (KM) and Anr., (1998) 9 SCC 61 ; State of Rajasthan and Ors. v. Vatan Medical and General Store and Ors., AIR 2001 SC 1937 ; Basant Kumar v. State of Rajasthan and Ors., (2001) 7 SCC 201 and Arnit Das v. State of Bihar, (2001) 7 SCC 657].
14. It is not permissible for any person to claim the relief indirectly which is not permissible to be sought directly. It is settled proposition of law that what cannot be done "per directum is not permissible to be done per obliquum", meaning thereby, whatever is prohibited by law to be done, cannot legally be affected by an indirect and circuitous contrivance on the principle of "quando aliquid prohibetur, prohibetur et omne perquod devinetur ad illud".
15. In Jagir Singh v. Ranbir Singh and Ors., AIR 1979 SC 381, the apex Court has observed that an authority cannot be permitted to evade a law by "shift or contrivance". While deciding the said case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court placed reliance on the judgment in Fox v. Bishop of Chester, (1824) 2 B & C 635, wherein it has been observed as under :
"To carry out effectually the object of a statute, it must be considered as to defeat all attempts to do, or avoid doing in an indirect or circuitous manner that which it has prohibited or enjoined."
16. Thus when a thing is prohibited, everything by which it is reached is also prohibited. Similar view has been reiterated by the apex Court in M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath and Ors., AIR 2000 SC 1997, wherein it has been held that even the Supreme Court cannot, achieve something indirectly which cannot be achieved directly by resorting to the provisions of Article 142 of the Constitution, which empowers the Court to pass any order in a case in order to do "complete justice".
17. In the instant case, the petitioner is seeking the relief of quashing the termination order indirectly without challenging the same which is not permissible. Correctness of a judicial order, which has attained finality cannot be examined in a writ jurisdiction. [Vide Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1967 SC 1 ; Chief Secretary to Government of Andhra Pradesh and Anr. v. V.J. Cornelius etc., AIR 1981 SC 1099 ; Cotton Corporation of India Ltd. v. United Industrial Bank Ltd., AIR 1983 SC 1272; Khoday Distilleries Ltd. and Anr. v. Registrar General, Supreme Court of India, (1996) 3 SCC 114 ; A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak and Anr., AIR 1988 SC 1531 ; State of West Bengal and Ors. v. Debdas Kumar and Ors., 1991 Supp (1) SCC 138 and Krishna Swamy v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 1407].
18. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Krishna Swami (supra) further explained that Article 32 petition filed in Antulay's case (supra) challenging the decision of the Supreme Court was dismissed and it was only in an appeal filed subsequently by A.R. Antulay against an order of the Bombay High Court made during trial, the relief was granted to him. While dismissing the earlier writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution filed by Antulay, the Supreme Court had observed as under :
"...it is the decision and not the reasons in support thereof, even if there is additional material that was subsequently discovered, it would be little avail to assail the correctness of the judgment....0 The writ petition challenging the validity of the order and judgment passed by this Court as nullity or otherwise incorrect, cannot be entertained...."
19. Similar view has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in P. Ashokan v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 1998 SC 1219.
20. Thus it is neither permissible nor desirable to disturb the judgments and decrees which have attained finality.
21. Filing successive petitions without any sense of responsibility for the same cause of action amounts to abuse of the process of the Court. It is shocking that inspite of dismissal of the Special Leave Petition as well as the Review Application by the Hon'ble Supreme Court vide orders dated 25.10.1999 and 19.1.2000 respectively, his review petition was entertained by this Court and was dismissed on merit. Though, such a. review application could not be maintainable in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble apex Court in M/s. Kabari (P) Ltd. v. Shivnath Shroff and Ors., AIR 1996 SC 742, wherein it has been held that no superior Court could be approached for the same self relief before filing the review petition.
22. In Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm and Anr. v. K. Santha-kumaran and Ors., (1998) 7 SCC 386, the Hon'ble Supreme Court deprecated the practice of hearing the review application after dismissal of the Special Leave Petition by the Hon'ble apex Court by observing as under :
"The High Court was aware that the SLPs against the orders dated 7.1.1987 had already been dismissed by this Court. The High Court, therefore, had no power or jurisdiction to review the self-same order, which was the subject matter of challenge in the SLPs in this Court after the challenge had failed. By passing the impugned order on 7.4.1994, judicial propriety has been sacrificed. After the dismissal of the special leave petitions by this Court, on contest, no review petitions could be entertained by the High Court against the same order. The very entertainment of the review petitions, in the facts and circumstances of the case, was an affront to the order of this Court. We express our strong disapproval and hope there would be no occasion in the future when we may have to say so. The jurisdiction exercised by the High Court, under the circumstances, was palpably erroneous. The respondents who approached the High Court after the dismissal of their SLPs by this Court, abased the process of the Court and indulged in vexatious litigation. We strongly deprecate the manner in which the review petitions were filed and heard in the High Court after the dismissal of the SLPs by this Court."
23. In the instant case, admittedly, review petition had been decided subsequent to the dismissal of the special leave petition as well as the review application by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. It is not apparent from the order or review application dated 9.4.2001, as to whether the petitioner had ever disclosed the fact of approaching the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the review application as there is no reference to the orders of their Lordships therein. Petitioner seems to be guilty of suppressing material fact from the Court.
24. In Nooruddin v. Dr. K.L. Anand, (1995) 1 SCC 242, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under :
"... Equally, the judicial process should never become an instrument of oppression or abuse or a means in the process of the Court to subvert justice."
25. In Dr. Buddhi Kota Subbarao v. K. Parasaran and Ors., AIR 1996 SC 2687, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under :
"No litigant has a right to unlimited drought on the Court time and public money in order to get his affairs settled in the manner he wishes. However, access to justice should not be misused as a licence to file misconceived and frivolous petitions."
26. Similar view has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in T. Arivandandam v. T. Satyapal and Anr., AIR 1977 SC 2421; Tamil Nadu Electricity Board and Anr. v. N. Raju Reddiar and Anr., AIR 1997 SC 1005 ; Ramniklal N. Bhutta and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., AIR 1997 SC 1236 ; K.K. Modiv. K.N. Modi and Ors., (1998) 3 SCC 573 ; Sabia Khan and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors., (1999) 1 SCC 271 ; Abdul Rahman v. Prasoni Bai and Anr., 2003 AIR SCW 14 ; and Sopan Sukhdeo Sable and Ors. v. Asstt. Charity Commissioner and Ors., (2004) 3 SCC 137.
27. Thus, it is clearly a case wherein petitioner considers himself to have a licence to abuse the process of the Court. In view of the above, it is apparent that services of the petitioner stood terminated vide order dated 31st August, 1981 and he left no stone unturned to get the said order quashed. He filed suits, appeal, Special Leave Petitions and Review Applications, as well as the writ petition. The order of termination was not interfered by the Courts and thus, the judgment and decree in this regard attained finality. Petitioner has filed eleven suits and large number of them had been filed after termination of his service against the respondents herein and thus, it appears that he had kept himself busy only in filing cases against the department. It is beyond our imagination, as to under what circumstances the order of termination which had ultimately attained finality can be reopened in a writ petition after twenty two years of the passing of the said order by challenging the validity of the rule under which his services had been terminated. Petitioner has claimed all consequential benefits including the salary etc., which cannot be granted unless the judgment and decree of the trial Court affirmed by this Court in First Appeal is reopened. This is not permissible in law. As no relief can be granted to the petitioner, entering into the issue of the validity of the rule would be a futile exercise.
28. The petitioner has been consistently and persistently misusing and abusing the process of the Court and such a practice deserves to be deprecated. In such a case, petitioner deserves to be dealt with heavy hands, but as he lost his job in 1981 and since then he has made repeated unsuccessful attempts in getting the reliefs by filing litigations in the manner he liked, we are not inclined to impose any cost.
29. Petition lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed.