JUDGMENT Binod Kumar Roy, J. and B.K. Sharma, J.
1. The prayer of the petitioner is to command respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 (District Magistrate, Mahamaya Nagar, Senior Superintendent of Police, Mahamaya Nagar and Station Officer Incharge, Police Station, Hathras Junction, Mahamaya Nagar) to provide protection to Him and his property including lands measuring 0.408 Hectare of Gata No. 90 and .17 Hectare of Gata No. 433/2 appertaining to Chak No. 484 I and II situate in Village Parsara, Tehsil Hathras, District Mahamaya Nagar from forcible grabbing by the respondent No. 4 Chote son of Kallu resident of Village Marthara, District Etah, and his henchmen.
2. His further prayer is to command the aforesaid respondents to take action against Chote and his hencemen who are trying to take forcible possession of grabbing the lands aforementioned.
3. The petitioner asserts, inter alia, that the lands in question were purchased by him from his own aunt Smt. Moola (Dayadhikarini) widow of late Ashik Ali, resident of Village Parsara, Tehsil Hathras, District Mahamaya Nagar (formerly Aligarh) for a consideration of Rs. 80,000/- by a registered sale deed dated 30-1-1995 (Xerox copy of the sale deed has been appended as Annexure-1 to the writ petition); Moola Devi was issueless; Respondent No. 4 is visiting his village every day and is giving threats almost every day to use of muscle and money power in connivance with some persons and is trying to grab his lands; it was with a great difficulty the petitioner could save his land from respondent No. 4 and 15 other persons on 21-6-1998 when they came armed with lethal weapons intending to take forcible possession; on the same day the petitioner went to lodge a first information report with the Police Station, Hathras Junction, which however refused and thereafter he went to the District Magistrate, Mahamaya Nagar and Senior Superintendent of Police, Mahamaya Nagar and submitted applications before them; no protection was provided to him nor even any police personnel or any person from the District administration visited the village; under Articles 19, 21 and 300-A of the Constitution, he has valid right over his lands and cannot be dispossessed therefrom except in accordance with the procedure established by law and hence this writ petition.
4. Mr. Mahesh Gautam, the learned Counsel of the petitioner submitted that Article 300-A of the Constitution protects dispossession of the petitioner and in the facts and circumstances, it is a fit case in which the desired relief be granted. He placed reliance in support of his contention on the following eight decisions :--
Kharak Singh v. State of U. P., 1964 (1) SCR 322 : (AIR 1963 SC1295); Smt. Sharda Chauhan v. District Magistrate, Allahabad, 1990 (2) All Rent Cas 116; Manoj Kumar Yadav v. Kumari Shobha Bos, 1993 (1) ARG 393; Smt. Pushpa Devi Saraf v. Union of India, 1994 (2) ARC 176; Jai Prakash Vashisth v. Addl. District Magistrate (E) (Delegated Authority), Meerut, 1995(1) CRC 623; Smt. Chtan Atma Govil v. Rent Control & Eviction Officer, Saharanpur, 1995 (1) ARC 514; Mohan Lal Mehra v. State of U. P., 1995 (1) ARC 553; and Smt. Chetan Atma Govil v. Rent Control & Eviction Officer, Saharanpur, (1995) 2 CRC 871.
5. We do not feel persuaded by the submissions made by Mr. Gautam to hold that it is such a case in which this Court should exercise its discretionary jurisdiction to issue a high prerogative writ like Mandamus in terms as prayed for.
6. In Kharak Singh case (AIR 1963 SC 1295) (supra) before the Apex Court the constitutional validity of Chapter XX of the U. P. Police Regulations was under challenge on the ground that they violate the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 19(1)(d) and 21 of the Constitution. Right to property which was earlier a fundamental right falling under Chapter II of the Constitution of India is no longer a fundamental right though no doubt it is a constitutional right as envisaged under Article 300-A of the Constitution which reads as follows :--
"No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law."
To our mind this provision save any person from deprivations of his property by State Government as well as Central Government and/or their authority except in accordance with law. It is not the case of the petitioner that he was ever attempted to be deprived of his properties by the U.P. Government or its officers respondent Nos. 1 to 3. In the remaining cases cited by Sri Gautam this Court intervened when under the purported exercise under U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent & Eviction) Act, 1972 the Authorities have illegally became party to deprive House owners or Tenants of their Houses/ tenanted Houses under political pressure or otherwise.
7. After going through the pleadings of the petitioners and his alleged registered letter dated 24-6-1998 jointly sent to Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 it appears to us that the grievance of the petitioner was against the acts of threatening by Respondent No. 4 and his henchmen whose names were not disclosed by him. He has also not disclosed therein the witness of the alleged occurrence. Though the petitioner claims that he has sent this letter by registered post but he has not appended either the registration memo or the acknowledgment which is expected to be returned by the addressee to prima-facie prove that he had infact sent this letter to Respondent Nos. 1 and 2. It was not the case of the petitioner that he ever moved the District Magistrate or any other Magistrate of Mahamaya Nagar in Court for initiating proceedings under Sections 107/ 116 or 114 or 145, Cr.P.C. against Respondent No. 4 and his henchmen. It is not his case that on refusal to register F.I.R. by the Superintendent of Police he moved any competent Magistrate by lodging a criminal complaint under Section 200, Cr.P.C. against Respondent No. 4 for the offences allegedly committed by him and his henchmen.
8. True it is that this Court is empowered to give protection to persons whose right to life guaranteed under Article 21 is sought to be violated by any one under its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the constitution of India but here we do not know with certainty nor has any public document been brought on the Record by the petitioner in the form of any Revenue Record showing that his name was also mutated by the State and he paid rent to it. The question as to why the petitioner had not moved a competent Magistrate or Civil Court by filing a suit for grant of injunction against Respondent No. 4 and his henchmen, has also not been explained by the petitioner in this writ petition. We are of the view that if the petitioner really thinks that he own be deprived of his valid right, title, interest and possession allegedly acquired on the strength of the sale deed in question he can still move a competent Civil Court for protection of his right, title, interest and possession by suing Respondent No. 4 and others.
9. The decisions relied upon by Sri Gautam do not apply to the facts of the instant case. This Constitutional Court cannot convert itself as an ordinary civil Court to exercise functions under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure or of a Magistrate to exercise his functions under Sections 107, 116, 144, 145 or 200/202, Cr.P.C. to pass orders against Respondent No. 4 and his alleged unnamed henchmen.
10. For the reasons aforementioned, we dismiss this writ petition in limine.