JUDGMENT S.N. Srivastava, J.
1. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2. Petition in hand is directed against the judgment and order dated 31.3.1999 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation (Annexure-7 to the writ petition) by which Revision No. 1076 preferred by Kapil Deo was allowed and chafes allotted at the stage of Consolidation Officer between the parties were re-arranged. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the revisional court has passed orders on the ground that chaks in question were the original holdings of the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 and in consequence, interfered with the arrangement made at the level of Consolidation Officer and re-allocated the same to the respondents and those of the respondents to the petitioners. It is further submitted that from a perusal of C.H. Form No. 23, the finding recorded by the Deputy Director of Consolidation is impaired and wears the taint of perversity. The learned counsel next submitted that by this order, plot Nos. 383, 624 and 625 comprising in the original holding of the petitioners were assigned to respondents and those of the respondents, to the petitioners and, therefore, the conclusions arrived at by the Deputy Director, Consolidation are not informed with reasons as to how the demand of the revisionist carried substance. He also assailed the order on the ground that there is not a vestige of finding in vindication of the observation that the order passed by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation suffered from the blemish of illegality. In opposition, Sri Aditya Narain learned counsel appearing for the opposite parties tried to justify the order stating that it was rightly passed and was in accordance with law. He further tried to whittle down the submission by stating that the petitioners have been allotted plots in the propinquity of their residential house while the respondents have been assigned chaks far removed from their residences and this arrangement has not prejudiced the interest of the petitioners in any way and that merely wrongs done to the respondents have been undone in revision by the Deputy Director of Consolidation. Ultimately, it is submitted that the arrangement made by the Deputy Director of Consolidation was strictly in accordance with the provisions as contemplated in Section 19 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act.
3. Having considered the submissions made across the bar and upon a perusal of the order impugned herein, it is eloquent that the D.D.C. has not recorded any one reason to prop up his conclusion thereby holding the demand of the petitioners as genuine. The solitary ground which can be perceived from the order appears to be that the Deputy Director of Consolidation was swayed by consideration to hold that the demand was plausible on the premises that the plots in question had earlier comprised in the original holding of the respondents. It is well-settled in law that where it appears that the Deputy Director of Consolidation has not applied its mind to evidence on record and has decided the matter without the merit being sifted or dealt with, the order is manifestly erroneous and suffers from not being a judicial order. It would appear that contentions of the parties have not been discussed nor is there any indicia to indicate that the Deputy Director of Consolidation relied upon any documents filed by the parties in support of their respective contentions or he sifted or dealt with the merits of the respective contentions. Under the provisions of Section 48, the Deputy Director of Consolidation is enjoined to satisfy himself as to the regularity of the proceedings or as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any order after allowing the parties an opportunity of being heard. It is not eloquent from the order that the Deputy Director of Consolidation observed any of the postulates contained in the aforestated section in compliance. The pith of the observation made by the Apex Court in Sheshmani v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Basti, 2000 (2) AWC 1136 (SC) : 2000 RD 213, is that in the amended Section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, power of Deputy Director Consolidation is not circumscribed to mere error of jurisdiction but it now extends to satisfying himself as to the regularity, correctness, legality and propriety of any order other than interlocutory order but the said power cannot be equated with the power of the appellate court. It is further observed that in considering correctness, legality and propriety of the order, the Deputy Director of Consolidation has to consider whether legally admissible evidence has been considered by the authority in recording a finding of fact or law and conclusion reached by them are based on evidence or patent illegality or impropriety has been committed or error in procedural legality which goes to the roots of the matter. It is further observed that notwithstanding the fact that Section 48 has been couched in wide terms, it only permits interference with the finding of the appellate court in the sense that they are not supported by evidence on record and they are against the law or against the scheme in the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act or are suffering from the vice of procedural irregularities. In the ultimate analysis, it has been postulated that in order to arrive at a conclusion, he has to consider the material on record and record reasons. The Apex Court has also reckoned into consideration with approval the case of Ram Dular v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Jaunpur, 1994 RD 290 and two other cases. The above observations find its echo in the case of Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad, 2001 (1) AWC 344 (SC) : 2001 ALR 226 as well. The cryptic order that has been passed in the instant case, cannot be given the veneer of a judicial order and, therefore, it does not commend to me for being sustained.
4. What are the material ingredients to constitute a finding received consideration of the Apex Court as also this Court in a catena of decisions and position is now well-settled that the finding includes materials considered, reasons recorded and then conclusions. The impugned order contains conclusions and not reasons. Therefore, the impugned order detracts from being a judicial order containing reasoning and is liable to be quashed. I would not shrink from observing that expeditious disposal is a desirable thing but it should not be preferred at the alter of requirements consisting in a judicial order.
5. In the conspectus of the above discussion, the petition is allowed and the impugned order dated 31.3.1999 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation contained in Annexure-7 to the writ petition, is quashed. The matter is relegated to the Deputy Director of Consolidation for decision afresh in observance of the mandatory provisions of Section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act.