Heard Mr.Sanjay Prajapati, learned advocate for the petitioner.
Issue notice, returnable on 17th September 2009.
At the stage of issuance of notice this Court is not inclined to grant ad-interim relief staying the impugned order of detention. However, taking judicial notice of the orders of detention which are subject matter of challenge before this Court, most if not all of which, are in contravention of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Piyush Kantilal Mehta v. Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad City and another, 1989 Supp. (1) SCC 322 and the decision rendered by a Division Bench of this Court on 22nd August 2000 in Ashokbhai Balabhai Makwana v. State of Gujarat, Letters Patent Appeal No.223 of 2000, it is directed that prior to executing the impugned order of detention, the Detaining Authority shall keep in mind the principles laid down in the decisions cited hereinabove. The attention of the Detaining Authority is also invited to the decision of the Apex Court in Baradakanta Misra v. Bhimsen Dixit, (1973) 1 SCC 446, wherein the Court has held thus :
Just as the disobedience to a specific order of the Court undermines the authority and dignity of the court in a particular case, similarly the deliberate and mala fide conduct of not following the law laid down in the previous decision undermines the constitutional authority and respect of the High Court. Indeed, while the former conduct has repercussions on an individual case and on a limited number of persons, the later conduct has a much wider and more disastrous impact. It is calculated not only to undermine the constitutional authority and respect of the High Court, generally, but is also likely to subvert the Rule of Law and engender harassing uncertainty and confusion in the administration of law.
16. Our view that a deliberate and a mala fide conduct of not following the binding precedent of the High Court is contumacious does not unduly enlarge the domain of contempt.
Mr.K.L.
Pandya, learned Assistant Government Pleader, waives service of notice on behalf of respondent No.1.
Direct service is permitted qua respondent No.2.
(Harsha Devani, J) Aakar Top