IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 12TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2017 BEFORE THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAGHVENDRA S.CHAUHAN W.P. No.41426/2017 (L – KSRTC) BETWEEN BABUSINGH S/O NARAYANASINGH AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS R/A HOUSE NO.129 MALLIKARJUNA ROAD TANDUR GALLI HUMANABAD – 585 330 BIDAR DISTRICT (By SRI M. C. BASAVARAJU, ADVOCATE) AND THE DIVISIONAL CONTROLLER NEKRTC BIDAR DIVISION BIDAR – 585 401 …PETITIONER …RESPONDENT THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 17.02.2014 VIDE ANNEXURE – A TO THIS W.P. PASSED BY THE INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL AT BANGALORE BY REMANDING THE MATTER TO THE INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL AT BANGALORE FOR FRESH CONSIDERATION BY PERMITTING THE PETITIONER TO FILE HIS ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF OBJECTION AND CONTEST THE CASE ON MERITS OF THE CASE AND ETC., THIS WRIT PETITION COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING, THIS DAY THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:
ORDER The petitioner has challenged the legality of the order dated 17.02.2014, passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Bangalore, whereby the learned Tribunal has allowed the application filed by the N.E.K.R.T.C. under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (‘Act’ for short).
2. Briefly, the facts of the case are that on 02.07.1990, the petitioner was appointed as a Driver- cum-Conductor with the respondent-Corporation. During the course of service, on 07.03.2012, he was dismissed from his service. The petitioner had challenged his dismissal before the Labour Court, Gulbarga, in KID No.38/2012. By order dated 25.09.2012, the Labour Court dismissed the dispute. However, as ID No.148/2005 was pending before the Industrial Tribunal, Bangalore, the respondent- Corporation had filed an application under Section 33(2) (b) of the Act for approval of the order of dismissal passed by the respondent-Corporation. In order to substantiate the application, the respondent-
Corporation examined two witnesses, and submitted five documents. However, the petitioner, after receiving the notice, merely filed his objection, but did not contest the application by appearing before the learned Tribunal. Therefore, by the impugned order, the learned Tribunal allowed the application of the respondent-Corporation filed under Section 33(2) (b) of the Act. Hence, the present petition before this Court.
3. Mr. M. C. Basavaraju, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has strenuously, argued that the petitioner should have been given a chance to contest the application. Therefore, the case should be remanded to the learned Tribunal. However, he has conceded, and in view of this Court rightly so, that it is true that the petitioner had filed his objection and had initially appeared through a Counsel, but later on did not contest the application. Once the said admission is made, the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be allowed to claim that an opportunity of hearing should be provided to the petitioner by the learned Tribunal.
4. A bare perusal of the impugned order clearly reveals the charges leveled against the petitioner were that he had mis-appropriated the monies of the respondent-Corporation. A thorough departmental enquiry was carried out, wherein the petitioner was given ample opportunities to defend himself. Since, the Enquiry Officer had found the petitioner guilty of the mis-conduct, the petitioner’s services were terminated by order dated 07.03.2012. Although the said order was challenged before the Labour Court, Gulbarga, the claim statement was rejected. Thus, according to the learned Tribunal, ample opportunities have been given to the petitioner to defend his case before the Labour Court and even before the learned Tribunal opportunity was given to the petitioner to contest the application filed by the respondent-Corporation. But for the reasons best known to the petitioner, he chose not to contest the same. Therefore, no further opportunity can be given to the petitioner by this Court. After all, it is a settled position of law that a litigant who is lax in defending his right, cannot subsequently claim that he was denied the opportunity of hearing. It was the duty of the petitioner to defend his right and to contest the application. In case he has slept over his rights, the petitioner has himself to blame.
5. For the reasons stated above, this Court does not find any illegality or perversity in the impugned order. The petition, being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed.
Sd/- JUDGE mv