JUDGMENT Bennett, J.
1. This is an application under Section 115, Civil P.C., by one Triloki Nath, who was employed as a Cane Manager, in the Lord Krishna Sugar Mills Ltd., Saharanpur, this company being the opposite party in the application. It appears that the applicant made an application under the provisions of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, to the Commissioner appointed by the Provincial Government under that Act. The District Magistrate was so appointed by the Provincial Government to hear and decide all claims arising out of deductions from wages, or delay in the payment of wages of persons employed or paid in the area concerned. The District Magistrate rejected the application on the ground that B. Triloki Nath, though Cane Manager of the Lord Krishna Sugar Mills Ltd., Saharanpur, was not an employed person within the meaning of Section 15, Payment of Wages Act and, therefore, was not eligible to apply to the District Magistrate for a direction under Sub-section (3) of that section. The only question which we have considered is whether an application in revision lies under Section 115, Civil P.C., against the District Magistrate's order.
2. If an appeal lay against the District Magistrate's order an application in revision would not lie. On the question whether an appeal lies or does not we have been referred to a decision of the Sind Court, namely Mohammad Haji Umar v. Divisionl Superintendent N.W. Railway ('41) 28 A.I.R. 1941 Sind 191, in which it was held that an appeal lies both against a direction of refund and also against an order refusing refund. A contrary view was taken by a learned single Judge of this Court in Khema Nand v. E.I. Ry. ('43) 30 A.I.R. 1943 All. 243. We do not, however, think it necessary in the present case to express any opinion on this question. Assuming that an appeal did not lie, we are still unable to hold that an application in revision does lie. It is not, in our opinion, possible to hold upon the language of the Act in question that the authority appointed under Section 15 is for this purpose subordinate to this Court. Section 18 of the Act provides that the authority appointed shall have all the powers of a civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure for the purpose of taking evidence and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and compelling the production of documents, and every such authority shall be deemed to be a civil Court for all the purposes of Section 195 and of chap. XXXV, Criminal P.C. There is no other provision in the Act which would indicate that such authority shall be deemed to be a civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure for other purposes. We do not think that such authority can be considered subordinate to this Court for the purpose of Section 115, Civil P.C.
3. We were referred to certain cases to support the argument that an application in revision lies, but on consideration of them we do not think that they are relevant. In Arvind Mills Ltd. v. K.R. Gadgil ('41) 28 A.I.R. 1941 Bom. 26 two revision applications were considered which arose out of orders passed under Section 15, Payment of Wages Act, but in those cases there were appeals against these orders to the Assistant Judge and the revision applications to the Bombay High Court were from orders of the Assistant Judge passed in appeal. There can be no doubt that the applications in revision lay as they were against orders of a Court subordinate to the High Court. The view which we take that no application in revision lies was taken by the Nagpur High Court in Turabali v. V. Sorabji ('44) 31 A.I.R. 1944 Nag. 288. It is true that a different view was taken by another learned Judge of the same Court in the following year in Shrinivas Laxmanrao v. Supdt. Government Printing Press ('45) 32 A.I.R. 1945 Nag. 94 but that case was decided on a consideration of the provision in Sub-section (2) of Section 17, Payment of Wages Act, whereby it is provided that Save as provided in Sub-section (1), any direction made under Sub-section (3) or Sub-section (4) of Section 15 shall be final.
The attention of the learned Judge appears to have been directed solely to this point, and following certain authorities he held that a provision to the effect that such direction shall be final does not exclude an application in revision. In our opinion, this provision is irrelevant in the circumstance of the present case. We have to consider primarily the provisions of Section 115. It is clear that no revision would lie if an appeal lay, and, on this point, the view taken by this Court hitherto is that no appeal does lie, but, as we have said, even if an appeal does not lie, we are not prepared to hold that an application in revision lies because, in our opinion, the authority from whose order this application has been preferred is not a Court subordinate to this Court within the meaning of Section 115. Holding accordingly that no application in revision lies, we dismiss this application with costs.