JUDGMENT Verma, J.
1. This is a defendant's appeal and arises out of a suit for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 307-12-9 principal together with Rs. 292.3.3 as interest total Rs. 600. Both the Courts below have agreed in decreeing the suit for the recovery of the principal amount alone, viz. Rs. 307-12-9. There is no cross-objection before us on behalf of plaintiff's firm with regard to the dismissal of its claim for interest. The case of the plaintiff was that there were dealings between the plaintiff and the defendant from 11th December 1926 to 11th March 1929, as the result of which the sum of Rs. 307-12-9 was found to be the balance due to the plaintiff from the defendant. These dealings consisted, on the one hand, of the purchase on the defendant's part of the sugar and other goods belonging to the plaintiff and on the other, of the sale of 246 bags of Gur belonging to the plaintiff through the defendant acting as the agent of the plaintiff. There is no dispute as to the figures, and the only point argued before us is one of limitation. It was admitted by the plaintiff in the Courts below and is also conceded before us, that If a letter dated 27th July 1928, admittedly written and signed by the defendant to the plaintiff, does not amount to an acknowledgment of liability within the meaning of Section 19, Limitation Act, the suit, which was filed on 5th May 1931, would be barred, except in respect of two items of Rs. 62-3-0 and Rs. 13-13-3. It is urged by the learned Counsel for the defendant-appellant that this letter does not amount to an acknowledgment of liability. The letter in question, as quoted in the judgment of the Court below runs as follows:
Seth Kishan Lal Babu Lal ji jog likhi harhia se Ram Chancier lea jai gopal banchna age rupaiya bis Ka Masit Khan se money order kara diya hai. Rupaiya do char din men ham bhi bhejte hain. Rupaiya rakh Lena. Miti Sawan phele sudi Ekam Sambat 1986.
2. It is common ground that the sambat year given in this letter is incorrect and that it should be 1985. Learned Counsel for the appellant contends, firstly that here there is no acknowledgment of liability at all, and secondly, that in any case it is necessary that there should be an acknowledgment of liability in respect of each particular item debited to the defendant in the accounts. In our opinion there is no force in the argument of the learned counsel. As the Court below has pointed out, Masit Khan was a debtor of the plaintiff and the defendant begins by informing the plaintiff that he had arranged with Masit Khan that the money due from him be despatched by money order. After that the defendant says : "I too am sending money in two or four days." It is clear that in this sentence the defendant was speaking of his own liability to the plaintiff and was intimating to the latter that he would be making a remittance on account thereof within two or four days. In our opinion the defendant in this sentence clearly acknowledges that on the date on which this letter was written he owed money to the plaintiff. We also consider that the acknowledgment was in respect of the total liability of the defendant to the plaintiff on the date on which the letter was written, and it was not necessary for the defendant to specify any particular item. Reference may in this connexion be made to Expln. 1, to Section 19, Limitation Act, which provides:
For the purposes of this Section an acknowledgment may be sufficient though it omits to specify the exact nature of the property or right...
3. So the mere fact that the defendant did not specify any particular item is of no importance. The defendant acknowledges that money was due from him to the plaintiff and the acknowledgment will take effect in respect of the total liability of the defendant on that date. No other point has been urged. For the reasons given above we dismiss this appeal with costs.