JUDGMENT Dalal, J.
1. I agree with the opinion of the lower appellate Court on the point of law. It has been held that an application for execution dated the 6th January 1925 was beyond time on the ground that an intermediate application of 25th September 1924, made by the decree-holder for execution of the decree was not in accordance with law. It is admitted that the present application would be beyond time if the September application should be put out of consideration.
2. In the September application certain details as required by Order 20, Rule 11 were wrongly given whereupon the executing Court directed the applicant to rectify those errors. Time was given repeatedly up to the 1st of November 1924 when the Court being tried of the disregard paid to its orders dismissed the application. It is clear that the decree-holder flouted the authority of the Court and if such conduct were held to be legal the executing Court would lose control of execution proceedings. An execution application is admitted under Order 21, Rule 17(2) only when directions given by the execution Court are complied with and the application is amended. In the present case the September application was not admitted by the executing Court so it was not an application in accordance with law. The learned Counsel for the appellant quoted the ruling in the case of Jamilunnissa Bibi v. Mathura Prashad AIR 1921 All 208. In that case, however, the defective application for execution was admitted by the executing Court, so the application became one according to law. The judgment-debtor pointed out certain defects in the application when a subsequent application for execution was filed and this Court naturally held that such defects when once the application was admitted by the execution Court could nor rencer the application illegal. In the present nt case admission was specifically refused by the executing Court because its orders were disregarded by the decree holder. Obviously the decree-holder desired to put in a bogus application merely for the purposes of saving limitation had little care to proceed there wing. Such conduct if permitted would result in an abuse of the process of the Court and an application where there has been such an abuse cannot be consider one in accordance with law.
3. I dismiss this appeal.