JUDGMENT D.K. Seth, J.
1. The petitioner has been suspended by an order dated 13.6.1997, being Annexure T to the writ petition. Learned counsel for the petitioner assails the said order on the ground that it does not appear from the said order that the inquiry is contemplated. Under rule 49A the suspension order can be issued only when inquiry is contemplated or is pending. Therefore, according to him the order of suspension is bad and is liable to be quashed. He also contends that the order of suspension has been passed malafide.
2. Learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel Sri D. R. Chaudhary, contends that the very expression used presupposes that the inquiry is contemplated though in so many words, it has not been specified. The absence of the words that inquiry is contemplated would not render the order void. According to him this is purely technical defect which should not be given much importance. It is the substance of the order which is to be looked into and decided as to whether the inquiry is contemplated or not.
3. After perusal of the order, it appears that on the basis of certain charges, the petitioner has been suspended with immediate effect. A plain reading of the said order rather can be construed as order of punishment inasmuch as the expression used in the order shows that on the ground of certain charges the petitioner is being suspended. The question is not the question on technicalities. The rule prescribes that in contemplation of inquiry, one can be suspended. Whether inquiry is contemplated or not, and even if it is in the mind of the employer suspending an employee, it is to be expressed in the order itself. Even if specific expression is not used, the same can be gathered from the text or substance of the order itself. After having read whole of the order, it does not appear that there is anything in existence, from which it is established that any inquiry is contemplated. Neither any charge-sheet has been proposed or directed to be issued and it is also not the case that charge-sheet has already been issued. Nor any inquiry officer has been appointed. Therefore, it is very difficult to construe the said order to be an order of suspension in contemplation of inquiry. The mind of the authorities has to be expressed in the order itself. The same cannot be substituted or supplemented by means of any other documents or affidavits unless the same is issued simultaneously with the order of suspension itself.
4. In the case of Nurul Hassan v. Superintendent of Police. 1985 UPLBEC 1329, it has been held that order of suspension cannot be passed unless departmental proceeding is contemplated or pending. Initiation of preliminary or fact-finding enquiry is not a departmental enquiry for the purpose of suspension.
5. In that view of the matter, the order of suspension cannot be sustained and is accordingly quashed. This order will, however, not prevent the respondents from issuing a charge-sheet and holding any inquiry. It will also not prevent the respondents from issuing order of suspension, if any enquiry is contemplated, if it is so advised, in accordance with Rule 49A. This writ petition is thus allowed.
6. There will be, however, no order as to costs.