R IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU ON THE 2ND DAY OF AUGUST, 2019 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAVI MALIMATH AND THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE H.P.SANDESH CRIMINAL APPEAL No.12 OF 2019 BETWEEN:
ASIM SHARIFF SON OF LATE ANWAR SHARIFF AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS RESIDING AT No.6/1, 1ST MAIN S.K. GARDEN BENSON TOWN POST BENGALURU-560 046. ... APPELLANT (BY SRI. S. BALAKRISHNAN, ADVOCATE AND SRI. MOHAMMED TAHIR, ADVOCATE) AND:
STATE BY NIA HYDERABAD REPRESENTED BY SPECIAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT COMPLEX BENGALURU-560 001. ... RESPONDENT (BY SRI. P. PRASANNA KUMAR, SPECIAL STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR) THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 21 OF THE NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY ACT, 2008, PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER REJECTING HIS BAIL PETITION BY THE HON`BLE XLIX ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE (SPECIAL COURT FOR TRIAL OF NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY CASES) AT BENGALURU IN SPL.C.C.No.181/2017 DATED 03.12.2018 AT ANNEXURE-A AND MAY BE PLEASED TO ALLOW THE APPEAL ORDERING TO RELEASE HIM ON BAIL IN CRIME No.124/2016 ON THE FILE OF COMMERCIAL STREET POLICE STATION, RC.04/2016-17 ON THE FILE OF NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY FOR THE ALLEGED OFFENCES PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTIONS 120B, 302 READ WITH SECTION 34 OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE AND SECTIONS 16(1)(a), 18 AND 20 OF THE UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES (PREVENTION) ACT, 1967.
THIS APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR JUDGMENT ON 10.07.2019 COMING ON THIS DAY, H.P. SANDESH J., PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:-
JUDGMENT This appeal is filed by accused No.5 challenging the order dated 3rd day of December 2018 passed in Special C.C. No.181/2017 on the file of 49th Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge (Special Court for trial of NIA cases) at Bengaluru rejecting the bail application filed under Section 439 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and to release him on bail.
2. The brief facts of the case are that, on the complaint of one Sri Jayaram, a case was registered at the first instance against two unknown persons for having committed the brutal murder of one Rudresh on 16.10.2016 near Srinivasa Medical Store, Shivajinagar. Later, it is the case of the prosecution that the accused Nos.1 to 4 conspiring with accused No.5 came on two motor bikes, accused No.2 being the pillion rider of Pulsar Motor bike hacked Rudresh with a sharp lethal Machate on right side of the neck and fled away. As a result, Rudresh succumbed to injuries. Subsequently, on 27.10.2016, accused Nos.1 to 4 have been arrested. At the first instance, Crime No.124 of 2016 was registered for the offences punishable under Sections 302, 201 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (for short, ‘the IPC’). Based on the statement of accused No.4, this appellant, who is accused No.5, was arrested on 02.11.2016. The Union of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Internal Security-I Division, North Block, New Delhi, in their order No.1101/33/2016-IS-IV dated 07.12.2016 entrusted the investigation to the National Investigation Agency (for short, ‘the NIA’) as per the power conferred under Section 6(5) read with Section 8 of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008. In pursuance to the aforesaid order, the NIA., Hyderabad branch, has registered the case in R.C.04/16-NIA-HYDERABAD under Sections 120B, 109, 150, 153A, 302, 201 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, under Sections 3 and 27 of the Arms Act, 1959, and under Sections 15, 16, 17, 18 and 20 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the UAP Act’, for brevity). The NIA after conducting the investigation, filed the charge-sheet for the above offences citing 117 witnesses and produced 90 documents.
3. The appellant/accused filed an application under Section 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, (‘Cr.P.C.’, for brevity) before the Court below contending that: he was in custody from the date of his arrest; he had no criminal antecedents; he being innocent has been unlawfully implicated based on certain phone calls and he is ready to obey the conditions that would be imposed on his release. The Court below after giving an opportunity to the State, heard the matter and rejected the said application. Hence, he has filed this appeal seeking bail.
4. In the appeal memorandum, it is stated that the Court below has failed to take note of the fact that out of 90 voluminous documents produced by the prosecution, except document Nos.13, 25, 30, 31, 37, 70, 77, 79, 80 and 81, there is no material evidence against the appellant. The prosecution relied upon the disclosure statement of the appellant and 10 documents / objects i.e., Xolo mobile phone, Haier mobile phone, HDFC., bank pass book, HDFC., bank cheque book, Allahabad bank pass book, telephone index diary, which were recovered and subject to PF No.105 of 2016 on 04.11.2016. Even though the prosecution relied upon those documents, it failed to connect the appellant with the offences alleged against him. The disclosure statement of accused Nos.1 to 4 also does not connect the appellant with the offences alleged against him. The prosecution has relied upon document No.31 in order to connect this appellant to the allegation of conspiracy and place of conspiracy, which is pointed out by accused Nos.1 to 4, wherein mahazar was drawn and attested by C.Ws.48 and 49. Document No.37 is the seizure mahazar dated 12.12.2016 under which one SDPI banner showing the photos of all the accused and subject to P.F. No.114/2016.
5. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant contended that the prosecution has placed reliance only on the phone calls made by accused Nos.3 and 4 to the appellant to charge him for the aforesaid offences. Based on the aforesaid documents, the allegation made against this appellant is that he conspired with accused Nos.1 to 4 to commit the murder of deceased. The prosecution has alleged that the appellant is the president of Popular Front of India (for short, ‘PFI’) and has relied upon the statements of C.W.45, C.W.54, C.W.77, C.W.87, C.W.93, C.W.97, C.W.105 and C.W.113. Except the call details, no material is placed before the Court. Learned counsel further contended that only on imaginary grounds, this appellant has been implicated, there is no material on record and the alleged voluntary statement of accused Nos.1 to 4 is also hit by the provisions of Sections 25 and 26 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Even the said statement of accused Nos.1 to 4 also does not show anything about the involvement of this appellant. The prosecution has given a communal colour to the incident and in order to give communal colour, there is no material on record. The material collected by the prosecution is insufficient to connect this appellant to the crime. Hence, there are grounds to enlarge the appellant on bail. Learned counsel contended that the appellant has been in custody from the last two and half years and in respect of the offences invoked under Sections 15, 18 and 20 of the UAP Act also, there is no material to connect this appellant.
6. Learned counsel for the appellant in support of his arguments, has relied upon the judgment rendered by Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad for the States of Telengana and Andhra Pradesh in the case of DEVENDAR GUPTA AND ANOTHER v. NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY reported in (2014) 2 Crimes 106 and brought to the notice of this Court the observations made in para No.20 of the said judgment with reference to introduction of Section 43-D of the UAP Act by the Parliament. Learned counsel also referred to para No.23 of the said judgment, wherein it is observed by Division Bench as under:
“The expression of the opinion in this behalf must be in such a way that, it does not have any bearing upon the trial. The purpose for which the Parliament employed the expression “prima facie’’ must be borne in mind. If, at the time of considering the application of bail, the Court takes the view that the accusation is not true, the prosecution will suffer a serious dent. Similarly, if the Court takes the view that the accusation is true, the Court can be accused of, pre-judging the charges. The Court has to adopt what is known as “Marjala Kishora Neethi” (The care which a cat is expected while carrying the kitten in its mouth from one place to another). The formation of opinion must be, for the limited purpose of considering the application for bail.”
Further, in para No.24 of the said judgment, Division Bench has discussed the meaning of the words “prima facie”. It is stated that “prima facie” is a latin expression and its English equivalent is, “at first appearance”. The expression “prima facie” in criminal cases, means proof beyond all reasonable doubt. Hence, learned counsel for the appellant would contend that in the case on hand, there is no prima facie material to connect the appellant to the crime and he is entitled for bail.
7. Learned counsel for the appellant also relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of STATE OF KERALA v. RANEEF reported in AIR 2011 SC 340 and would contend that the Apex Court while considering the application under Section 439 of the Cr.P.C., has held that those who join an organization but do not share its unlawful purposes and who do not participate in its unlawful activities surely pose no threat either as citizens or as public employees - It rests on the doctrine of guilt by association, which has no place. Hence, the bail is not to be denied. Learned Counsel referring to this judgment further contends that merely because the appellant is a member of the Popular Front of India (PFI) does not take away his right to bail. No sufficient material is placed to show that he is the president of the PFI. Hence, the right and liberty of the appellant cannot be curtailed on the ground that he is the president of the PFI. Learned counsel for the appellant also brought to our notice para Nos.9 and 12 of the said judgment, wherein the Apex Court has referred to the averments made in the counter affidavit of the respondent therein that the Popular Front of India (PFI) or the Social Democratic Party of India (SDPI) are not militant or terrorist organizations. There is no history of crimes against the party or its workers and that they are not banned organizations. Learned counsel contended that this Court cannot deny bail in favour of the appellant on the ground that he is a member of the PFI.
8. Learned counsel for the appellant also relied upon the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case of KAILASH GOUR AND OTHERS v. STATE OF ASSAM reported in (2012) 2 Supreme Court Cases 34. By referring to this judgment, learned counsel would contend that a communal colour has been given to the incident without any basis. Learned counsel would contend that the Court below has failed to consider the material on record and no material is available on record to connect the appellant to the crime and to reject his application for bail. Hence, he prayed the Court to set aside the impugned order and enlarge the appellant on bail.
9. Per contra, the learned Special State Public Prosecutor (SPP) appearing for the NIA., in his argument, vehemently contended that the appellant has sworn to affidavit before the lower Court that he is the President of PFI and now, he cannot contend that he is not the President of the said organization. Learned counsel also would contend that Section 2(l) of the UAP Act defines “terrorist gang” and in the light of the said definition, the appellant is a member of the terrorist gang. Section 15 of the UAP Act deals with terrorist act and persons indulged in terrorist acts by using lethal weapons to cause injury or death to any person. Hence, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that invoking of the UAP Act against the appellant is erroneous cannot be accepted. Learned Special SPP., would contend that page No.802 of the charge sheet material clearly discloses that prior to and after the incident, the appellant – accused No.5 was in contact with accused Nos.3 and 4. The mobile phone numbers of accused No.4 are 9066864362 and 9986092884.The mobile phone numbers of accused No.5 are 9900584923 and 9686618754 and the said mobile phones were seized from the custody of accused No.5. The fact as to whether those SIMS were not standing in the name of accused No.5 is immaterial. From perusal of page No.798 containing CDR analysis report of accused No.5, it can be gathered that accused No.3 also was in touch with the appellant-accused No.5. Hence, there is sufficient material to show that the appellant has conspired with accused Nos.1 to 4 in committing the murder of deceased. Learned counsel has referred to the provisions of Section 43D of the UAP Act, and would contend that there is a clear bar to grant bail and the very purpose of introducing 43D of the UAP Act was to take note of the gravity of the offences that become triable under the provisions of the said Act. Learned counsel would contend that on perusal of the proviso to Section 43D(5) of the UAP Act, it is clear that the Court while dealing with the case shall not grant bail to any person, if, on perusal of the case diary, or the charge-sheet, it is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is prima facie true. This is an extraordinary phenomenon and a deviation from the ordinary Criminal Law. Naturally, the approach to it, is required to be cautious and careful.
10. Learned Special SPP., in support of his arguments, has relied upon the judgment of the Hon`ble Supreme Court in the case of NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY v. ZAHOOR AHMAD SHAH WATALI reported in (2019) 5 Supreme Court Cases 1 and he has referred to para Nos.21 to 24, 26 and 46 of the said judgment. The Apex Court in para No.21 of its judgment has restated the settled legal position about matters to be considered for deciding an application for bail in the following terms:
“(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence;
(ii) nature and gravity of the charge;
(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction;
(iv)danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail;
(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused;
(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;
(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail. (State of U.P. v. Amarmani Tripathi (2005) 8 SCC 21 ) ”.
The Apex Court referring to Section 43-D of the UAP Act in para No.46 of the said judgment has observed as under:
“In the present case, however, we are called upon to consider the prayer for bail in the context of the purport of the proviso to Section 43-D(5) of the 1967 Act which mandates that the accused person involved in the commission of offence referable to Chapters IV and VI of the 1967 Act shall not be released on bail or on bond. However, the Court may release such accused on bail only if it is of the opinion, on perusal of the case diary and/or the report made under Section 173 Cr.P.C. that there are “no reasonable grounds” for believing that the accusation against such person is prima facie true.”
In para No.47 of the said judgment, it is observed that the fact that there is a high burden on the accused in terms of the special provisions contained in Section 43-D(5) of the UAP Act to demonstrate that the prosecution has not been able to show that there exist reasonable grounds to show that the accusation against him is prima facie true, does not alter the legal position expounded in K. VEERASWAMI v. UNION OF INDIA ((1991) 3 SCC 655), to the effect that the charge-sheet need not contain detailed analysis of the evidence. It is for the Court considering the application for bail to assess the material / evidence presented by the investigating agency along with the report under Section 173 Cr.P.C., in its entirety, to form its opinion as to whether there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against the named accused is prima facie true or otherwise.
11. Learned Special SPP., relying upon the said judgment in National Investigation Agency’s case (referred supra) would contend that there is a specific bar under Section 43-D of the UAP Act, and in the case on hand, sufficient material is collected by the NIA. The learned Special SPP., also contended that the petition filed by the appellant under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, has been dismissed by this Court and the same has been confirmed by Hon’ble Supreme Court. Hence, there are no grounds to set aside the order of the Court below and to enlarge the appellant – accused No.5 on bail.
12. After the matter was reserved for judgment, learned counsel for the appellant filed memo dated 16.07.2019 along with copy of the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court dated 09.07.2019 passed in Criminal Appeal No.1006 of 2019 contending that the dismissal of petition filed under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., cannot be the reason for rejecting the application for bail. He further contended that dismissal of discharge application also cannot be a ground to reject the bail application.
13. Having heard the arguments of learned counsel for the appellant and learned Special SPP., the point that arises for our consideration in this appeal is:
Whether the appellant has made out ground to set aside the order of the Court below and to enlarge him on bail ?
14. Having considered the contentions of both the learned counsel for the appellant and learned Special SPP., for the NIA, this Court has to analyze the material available on record. No doubt in view of the principles laid down in the judgment rendered by the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad in Devendar Gupta’s case referred supra and also the judgment of the Apex Court in National Investigation Agency’s case referred supra, it is clear that after filing of the chargesheet under Section 173 of the Cr.P.C., this Court has to consider the material on record and ascertain whether there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against the accused person is prima facie true and if it is not, then the Court can exercise its discretion and also there is a rider that the burden is high on the accused in terms of the special provisions contained in Section 43-D(5) of the UAP Act to demonstrate that the prosecution has not been able to show that there exist reasonable grounds to show that the accusation against him is prima facie true, does not alter the legal position to the effect that the charge sheet need not contain detailed analysis of the evidence. Keeping in view the principles laid down in the judgments referred supra, this Court has to examine the material on record.
15. No doubt, at the first instance, case was registered against two unknown persons and the incident had taken place on 16.10.2016. On 27.10.2016, accused Nos.1 to 4 were arrested. The appellant – accused No.5 was arrested on 02.11.2016 based on the voluntary statement of accused No.4. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant would contend that accused Nos.1 to 4 does not say anything about the involvement of the appellant – accused No.5 and there is no material on record except the alleged phone calls to connect the appellant to the crime.
16. It is to be noted that the voluntary statement of an accused is not admissible in evidence except in case where there is recovery. Learned Special SPP., appearing for the NIA., brought to the notice of this Court that accused No.4 - Mohammed Mujeeb Ulla @ Mujeeb @ Maula in his voluntary statement, has mentioned his mobile number. Accused No.3 - Mohammad Sadiq @ Mohammad Mazar @ Mazar and accused No.1 – Irfan Pasha have stated that they are the members of the PFI.
17. The appellant also filed an application before the trial Judge invoking Section 227 Cr.P.C., seeking discharge from the case and the same was rejected. The same was challenged before this Court and this Court also dismissed the same. The appellant thereafter approached the Apex Court and the same was dismissed. The Apex Court in para No.23 of its judgment dated 01.07.2019 passed in Criminal Appeal No.949/2019 (arising out of SLP(Crl.) No.1253 of 2019) while considering the discharge application on merits, has observed as under:
“That apart, we have also gone through the relevant record and extract of the charge- sheet placed on record for perusal, the fact reveals that the accused appellant is the President of Bengaluru unit of Popular Front of India(PFI) and the other accused Nos. 1 to 4 are also the members of PFI. It reveals from the charge-sheet that there was frequent telephonic / mobile conversation between appellant (accused No.5) with other accused persons (accused Nos.1 to 4) prior and subsequent to 16th October, 2016 (the alleged date of incident) which persuaded the Court to arrive to a conclusion that there is a prima facie material of conspiracy among the accused persons giving rise to sufficient grounds of subjective satisfaction of prima facie case of alleged offences of conspiracy being hatched among the accused persons and truth & veracity of such conspiracy is to be examined during the course of trial.”
18. The main contention of the appellant’s counsel is that except the telephonic calls, which have been attributed against the appellant, there is no sufficient material on record and only based on the telephonic calls, the accused could not be kept in custody. It requires proof with regard to the allegation as held by the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad in Devendar Gupta’s case referred (supra). It is the duty cast upon the Court to see the prima facie material and the same must be borne in mind and the words “prima facie” in criminal cases, means proof beyond all reasonable doubt. Hence, the appellant is entitled for bail.
19. Keeping in view the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned Special SPP., this Court also would like to refer to the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case of SAJU v. STATE OF KERALA reported in (2001) 1 SCC 378, wherein it has explained the principles of Section 10 of the Evidence Act, 1872. The Apex Court in the judgment rendered in the case of MOHAN SINGH v. STATE OF BIHAR reported in (2011) 9 Supreme Court Cases 272 has referred to the judgment rendered in Saju’s case referred supra and has held as follows:
“37. If we apply the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case it is clear that there is enough evidence to furnish reasonable ground to believe that both the appellant and Laxmi Singh had conspired together for committing the offence.”
20. The Apex Court in the said judgment has discussed with regard to the phone calls between the parties and held that the fact that the name of the registered allottees of the SIM cards of the mobiles could not be traced was not relevant and the same had to be considered to ascertain whether the same connected the accused to the crime or not. The appellant’s counsel vehemently contended that the said mobile number is also not in the name of accused No.5. At this stage, the Court cannot go into all the details, but the fact remains that mobile was seized at the instance of accused No.5. The Apex Court also observed in the judgment rendered in Criminal Appeal No.949/2019 filed by the appellant herein that there were phone calls between the appellant and the other accused persons.
21. We would like to refer to the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case of SIDHARTHA VASHISHT ALIAS MANU SHARMA v. STATE (NCT OF DELHI) reported in (2010) 6 Supreme Court Cases 1, wherein it is held that a close association among the accused is a very important piece of evidence in the case of circumstantial evidence. The evidence of phone calls is a very relevant and admissible piece of evidence. Further, it is observed in para No.226 of the said judgment that the phone call details provided in the said case showed that the accused were in touch with each other, which resulted in destruction of evidence and harbouring. Further, the Apex Court in the judgment rendered in the case of PRASHANTH BHARTI v. STATE (NCT OF DELHI) reported in (2013) 9 Supreme Court Cases 293 regarding details of mobile phone calls, held that it is conclusive in nature and mobile data helps in connecting the accused to the crime.
22. Learned Special SPP., also relied upon the judgment rendered by Division Bench of which one of us is a member in Criminal Appeal No.1085 of 2010 in the case of ABDUL KAREEM TELGI v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA with regard to the conspiracy and held that the accused, who was in custody, continued his illegal activity of sale and circulation of stamp papers through his association, who have been arrayed as accused Nos.2 and 3. It was further observed that in case of conspiracy, Section 10 of the Evidence Act sets out an exception to the general rule and renders the acts or statements of any person, who was a party to the conspiracy relevant.
23. Having taken note of the principles laid down in the judgments referred supra, no doubt the main allegation against this appellant is that he conspired with accused Nos.1 to 4 to eliminate the deceased. The main contention of the appellant’s counsel is that except the phone call details, there is no sufficient material and the said phone calls also do not point proximity to the incident. This aspect is to be tested in trial, but not at the stage of considering the matter for releasing the accused on bail.
The offences invoked against the accused are under the UAP Act and also under the Indian Penal Code and there is a specific bar under Section 43-D of the UAP Act, special law, to grant bail and it is stipulated that while considering the bail petition, the Court has to take note of the gravity of the offences alleged against the accused and also consider the fact as to whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence and severity of the punishment in the event of conviction. In the case on hand, the primary allegation against accused Nos.1 to 4 is that they have committed murder of the victim, which is brutal in nature and that the appellant – accused No.5 conspired with the other accused to commit the murder, shows that a prima facie exists against the accused.
24. It is relevant to note that the Apex Court in National Investigation Agency’s case referred supra has categorically held that the Court has to take note as to whether there is prima facie material against the accused.
Further, it is important to note that in case of offence invoked under the special enactment, the burden is on the accused in terms of the special provisions contained in Section 43-D(5) of the UAP Act to demonstrate that the prosecution has not been able to show that there exist reasonable ground to show that the accusation against the accused is prima facie true. Admittedly, in the case on hand also, charge sheet has been filed against the appellant – accused No.5. The specific case of the prosecution is that the other accused persons have revealed in their statement that the murder was at the instance of the appellant and the prosecution also collected the material with regard to the fact that the appellant was in contact with the other accused, particularly accused Nos.3 and 4. When prima facie material is placed before the Court and there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against the accused is prima facie true, we are of the opinion that this is not a fit case to set aside the order of the trial Judge. This Court has to take note of the gravity of the offences alleged against the appellant and also severity in its nature and chance of the appellant fleeing away from justice. Apart from that, the main charges levelled against the appellant – accused No.5 is that he has conspired with accused Nos.1 to 4 to eliminate the deceased. The appellant is the mastermind in committing the murder of deceased. The case of the prosecution is that this accused conspired with accused Nos.1 to 4 in order to eliminate the deceased and also in support of the case of the prosecution, the prosecution collected the telephonic conversations between the appellant and accused Nos.3 and 4. The conspiracy lies within the minds of the persons who conspires each other and there cannot be any direct evidence to prove the same and it requires trial.
25. It is also relevant to note that the Apex Court in the judgment dated 01.07.2019 passed in Criminal Appeal No.949/2019 (referred supra) arising out of the order of dismissal of writ petition filed by the appellant herein, whereby the order passed by the trial Judge dismissing the application filed by the appellant herein under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C., seeking his discharge from the case for the aforesaid offences was confirmed, has observed that there were telephonic conversations between the appellant herein and the other accused. No doubt dismissal of the petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C., and discharge application cannot be a ground by itself to reject the bail petition.
26. Perusal of all the material on record discloses that there is sufficient material against the appellant. A prima facie case exists against the accused No.5. Hence, there is no merit in this appeal to set aside the order dated 03.12.2018 passed by the Court below in Spl.C.C. No.181/2017 rejecting the application of the appellant herein for bail or to grant him bail.
27. In view of the discussion made above, we pass the following:
ORDER The Appeal is dismissed.
Sd/- Sd/-
JUDGE JUDGE sma