Hon'ble Saurabh Lavania,J.
(Per-Saurabh Lavania,J.) Heard.
By means of this writ petition, a challenge has been made to the judgment and order dated 05.02.2021 passed by the State Public Service Tribunal (in short "Tribunal")/Opposite party No.2, in Claim Petition No.1951 of 2019 (Ashutosh Tiwari vs. State of U.P. & Ors.) as also to the minor punishment Order No.Da-55 of 2017, undated passed by the Opposite party No.5/Superintendent of Police, Amethi awarding punishment of fine of 15 days' salary. Challenge has also been made to the Appellate order dated 03.06.2018 passed by the Opposite party No.4/Deputy Inspector General of Police (Now Inspector General of Police), Ayodhya Range, Ayodhya and Revisional Order dated 13.02.2019 passed by Opposite party No.3/Additional Director General of Police, Lucknow Zone, Lucknow.
Relevant brief facts of the case, as appears from the record, are that petitioner was recruited on 16.01.2011 on the post of Constable and while he was posted at District Amethi he was assigned duty in Police Response Vehicle (in short "PRV")-2774. On 07.04.2017 while petitioner was in PRV-2774 alongwith Head Constable Ram Nagina Yadav at village Ambarpur, District Amethi, an information, at 13:24 Hours, was given to PRV-2774 by District Control Room regarding an incident of fracas/ scuffle at village Gobardhanpur and PRV-2774 was directed by the District Control Room to promptly reach/ rush to the village Gobardhanpur.
On the same day i.e. 07.04.2017 at 13:27 Hours. a direction was given by District Control room to PRV-2775 to promptly reach/rush to village Chhachha (NkNk). This direction was also given by District Control Room on information of murder which had been received.
As per direction, the PRV-2774 was required to reach village Gobardhanpur and PRV-2775 was under obligation to reach village Chhachha (NkNk). However, contrary to the direction of District Control Room, the PRV-2774 on its own volition changed the destination from Gobardhanpur to Chhachha (NkNk), which, as per direction of District Control Room, was the destination of PRV-2775 and on account of this, police personnel of P.S. Sangrampur were compelled to reach village Gobardhanpur for taking necessary action in the matter, which was taken by them.
In regard to aforesaid, in compliance of order dated 22.04.2017 of Superintendent of Police, District Amethi, a preliminary enquiry was conducted by Circle Officer, Amethi. After conducting the preliminary enquiry, Circle Officer, Amethi submitted his report dated 13.06.2017. In the enquiry report, Enquiry Officer observed that the petitioner and Head Constable Ram Nagina Yadav are guilty of dereliction of their duties. The findings given by the Enquiry Officer on reproduction read as under:-
ßmYys[kuh; gS fd vkondksa }kjk Mk;y ua0 100 ij nh x;h lwpuk ds ftyk fu;aa=.k d{k ls bos.V uEcj 4380 le; 1324 cts xzke xksc/kZuiqj esa ekjihV dh lwpuk Fkkuk laxzkeiqj dh ih0vkj0oh0 la[;k 2774 dks nh x;h FkhA ftyk fua;=.k d{k ls lwpuk feyus ij okgu ij ekStwn izHkkjh gs0dk0 ¼izks0½ jke uxhuk ;kno o vkj{kh vk'kqrks"k frokjh dk nkf;Ro Fkk fd rRdky ekSds ij igaqpdj vko';[email protected]/kd dk;kZokgh djrs fdUrq gs0dk0¼izks0½ jke uxhuk ;kno ,oa dk0 vk'kqrks"k frokjh }kjk xzke xkso/kZuiqj u tkdj nwljh ihvkjoh la[;k 2775 dks le; 13&27 cts ftyk fu;a=.k d{k ls nh x;h lwpuk ds ekSds ij xzke NkNk pys x;sA bl izdkj ih0vkj0oh0 ua0 2774 ds izHkkjh gs0dk0 izks0 jke uxhuk ;kno o vkj{kh vk'kqrks"k frokjh dk mDr d`R; drZO; ikyu esa cjrh x;h ykijokgh ,oa mnklhurk dk |ksrd gS ftlds fy, og nks"kh gSaAß It further reflects from the statement of Head Constable (P) Ram Laut, Incharge PRV-2775, as mentioned in preliminary enquiry report, that PRV-2775 was about 25 Km. away from its destination i.e. village Chhachha (NkNk) and it reached the place of incident within 25 minute, where they found PRV-2774 though the destination of PRV-2774, as per direction, was Gobardhanpur and thereafter, on saying of petitioner that your route chart is of the side on which Gobardhanpur is situated as such take note of the event at Gobardhanpur, PRV-2775 proceeded to attend the event at Gobardhanpur, which was assigned to PRV-2774.
It also reflects from the preliminary enquiry report that on its own volition the PRV-2774 in which the duty was assigned to Head Constable Ram Nagina Yadav and Constable Ashutosh Tiwari, the petitioner, changed the destination from Gobardhanpur to Chhachha (NkNk), which was in violation of direction issued by District Control Room, and the explanation has been given that destination was changed as PRV-2774 was nearer to Chhachha (NkNk) and in this regard PRV-2775 had been informed.
After conducting the preliminary enquiry, on 04.12.2017 a show cause notice was issued by the opposite party No.5, to which petitioner submitted his reply on 23.12.2017. This show cause notice was issued under Section 14 of U.P. Police Officers of the Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991 (in short "Rules, 1991"), wherein procedure has been provided for imposing minor punishment. Thereafter, opposite party No.5 passed the impugned order of minor punishment imposing monitory punishment equal to 15 days' salary. The order No.Da-55 of 2017, undated was challenged by the petitioner by preferring departmental appeal, which was dismissed by opposite party No.4-Deputy Inspector General of Police (Now Inspector General of Police), Ayodhya Range, Ayodhya on 03.06.2018. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a revision petition which was dismissed vide order dated 13.02.2019 by the Additional Director General of Police, Lucknow Zone, Lucknow/Opposite party No.3.
Being aggrieved by the Orders aforesaid, petitioner filed Claim Petition No.1951 of 2019 (Ashutosh Tiwari vs. State of U.P. & Ors.). After exchangement of pleadings and hearing the learned counsel for the parties the Tribunal dismissed the claim petition with following observations:-
";kph us dkj.k crkvks uksfVl ds vuqikyu esa viuk foLr`r Li"Vhdj.k fnukad 23-12-2017 izsf"kr fd;k gSA ;kfpdk esa Lohdkj fd;k x;k gS fd dkj.k crkvks uksfVl fnukad 04-12-2017 e; izkjfEHkd tkap vk[;k fnukad 13-06-2017 dh fuxZr dh x;h FkhA ;kph }kjk dkj.k crkvks uksfVl dh ftu&ftu fcUnqvksa ds vk/kkj ij pqukSrh nh x;h gS mlls ;g Li"V gS fd ;kph dks tkap vk[;k esa mfYyf[kr rF;ksa dk iw.kZ Kku FkkA tkap vf/kdkjh us tkap vk[;k esa ;g Hkh mYys[k fd;k gS fd ftyk fu;a=.k d{k ls lwpuk feyus ij okgu ij ekStwn ;kph dk nkf;Ro Fkk fd rRdky ekSds ij igqapdj vko';[email protected] fof/kd dk;Zokgh djrs] fdUrq ;kph xzke xksc/kZuiqj u tkdj nwljh ihvkjoh la[;k&2775 dh ftyk fu;a=.k d{k ls nh x;h lwpuk ij xzke NkNk pys x;sA bl izdkj ihvkjoh ua0 2774 ds vkj{kh ;kph dk mDr dk;Z drZO; ikyu esa cjrh x;h ykijokgh ,oa mnklhurk dk |ksrd gS ftlds fy, ;g nks"kh gSaA tgka rd ;kph dk ;g dFku fd n.Mkns'k veq[kfjr o dkj.k jfgr gS] bl fcUnq ij vfHkys[k dk voyksdu fd;k x;k rks ;g rF; izdk'k esa vk;k fd ;kph }kjk dbZ vfHkdFkuksa ds vk/kkj ij dkj.k crkvks uksfVl vikLr fd;s tkus dh ;kpuk dh gS ftl ij vuq'kklfud vf/kdkjh us n.Mkns'k esa fo'ys"k.k djrs gq, viuk Li"V :i ls vfHker izLrjokj fn;k gSA of.kZr izdj.k laonsu'khy gS rFkk iqfyl cy tSls vuq'kkflr foHkkx esa dk;Zjr deZpkjh dk drZO;fu"B ,oa vuq'kkflr gksuk vfuok;Z gSA vuq'kklfud vf/kdkjh us leLr rF;ksa dks n`f"Vxr j[krs gq, n.Mkns'k ikfjr fd;k gS] vr% ;g dguk fd vkns'k eq[kfjr ,oa dkj.k lfgr ugha gS] ekuus ;ksX; ugha gSA ;kph }kjk vk{ksfir n.Mkns'k ds fo:} foHkkxh; vihy ;ksftr dh x;h gS tks fnukad 03-06-2018 dks vLohdkj dh x;hA ;kph dk ;g dFku gS fd mlds }kjk ;ksftr vihy eseksa esa mfYyf[kr fcUnqvksa ij fcuk fo'ys"k.k fd;s euekus rjhds ls vLohdkj dh x;h gSA esjh jk; esa] vihyh; vkns'k ds voyksdu ls ;g izrhr gksrk gS fd ;kph ds mDr dFku esa dksb cy ugha gSA esjh jk; esa izLrqr ekeys ds leLr rF;ksa ,oa ifjfLFkfr;ksa ij fopkj ds mijkUr ;g lkfcr gS fd ;kph ds izdj.k esa mls dkj.k crkvks uksfVl ds lkFk izkjfEHkd tkap vk[;k dh izfr iznku dh x;h rFkk mldh vksj ls izLrqr Li"Vhdkj.k esa mfYyf[kr fcUnqvksa ij fo'ys"k.k djrs gq, n.Mkns'k ikfjr fd;k x;k gS ftlesa dksbZ voS/kkfudrk ;k izfdz;kRed =qfV ugha gS] rn~uqlkj ;kfpdk vLohdkj ;ksX; ik;h tkrh gSA"
Learned counsel for petitioner, while assailing the impugned orders, submitted that Tribunal ignored the fact that the impugned minor punishment is non-speaking, unreasoned and based on defective enquiry. The petitioner being Constable followed the direction of Head Constable and discharged his duties as such he can not be held guilty of any misconduct, however, this aspect has not been considered by any of the Authorities as also by the Tribunal. Tribunal also failed to consider the reply of petitioner, which was submitted before the Disciplinary Authority while passing the impugned minor punishment.
Learned counsel for petitioner also submitted that in the training of Dial-100, it had been taught by the Authorities that if several information/ events are received at the same time, then, as per seriousness of the event, the Official, after applying his mind, should decide where to approach first. In this case two information i.e. one of murder and another of simple "Maarpeet" were received, as a result, PRV-2774 decided to reach at the place where information of murder was given after asking PRV-2775 to attend the incident at Gobardhanpur and giving information at Control Room, as such, there is no negligence or dereliction in discharging the duties either by the petitioner or by his team. It is also stated that the Opposite party No.5 without considering the reply to the show cause notice submitted by petitioner passed the impugned order imposing monitory punishment equal to 15 days' salary.
The impugned minor punishment was passed without proving the bad intention/ ill motive/ misconduct of petitioner and without giving any reason. Opposite party No.5 while passing the impugned minor punishment has ignored this fact that the petitioner was discharging his duties as per instructions of the Incharge of PRV-2774 and he did not disobey the instructions of his Incharge.
It is stated that findings of the enquiry report have not been mentioned in the impugned order of minor punishment and what was found in the enquiry as well as in the statement, has not been disclosed, as such, the impugned minor punishment is non-speaking and unreasoned. There was no bad intention on the part of the petitioner as he only followed the instructions of his Incharge of PRV-2774, as such, the act of petitioner is bonafide and does not come in the category of misconduct.
He further submitted that aggrieved by the order of minor punishment, petitioner filed an appeal, which was dismissed vide order dated 03.06.2018 and thereafter, revision was preferred before the Revisional Authority, which was also dismissed vide order dated 13.02.2019. The Appellate Authority as also the Revisional Authority had failed to appreciate the facts stated in the appeal as also in the revision, respectively, particularly that the petitioner followed the direction of his In-charge as also that the decision to reach Chhachha (NkNk) was taken as that event was of murder and PRV-2774 was nearer to that place in comparison to the destination assigned i.e. Gobardhanpur, for which, the direction was issued by District Control Room. Further stated that the Tribunal also did not consider the aforesaid aspect of the case and dismissed the claim petition of the petitioner vide impugned order dated 05.02.02021.
Per contra, learned counsel for State submitted that the orders passed by the Departmental Authorities as also by the Tribunal, are just and proper as the petitioner and his In-charge failed to comply with the direction issued by the District Control Room and on their own volition they reached the destination i.e. Chhachha (NkNk) to attend the event, which was assigned to PVR-2775. He also stated that the procedure as prescribed under Rule 14 of Rules, 1991 for imposing the minor punishment was followed and as such proper opportunity was given.
Regarding contention of learned counsel for petitioner that taking note of seriousness of events, the option to choose to attend one event vests in the concerned Official, as informed during training, the learned counsel for the State submitted that in this matter only one event of Gobardhanpur was assigned to PRV-2774 of which, the petitioner was a member, as such, he was having no choice except to reach the destination as directed by the District Control Room. In the instant case, the admitted position is that he has not reached the destination assigned i.e. village Gobardhanpur. In these circumstances, the petition is liable to be dismissed.
Considered the facts and circumstances of the case and perused the record.
This is a case of departmental proceeding. The scope of judicial review is limited. This Court under its power conferred by Article 226 of Constitution of India of Tribunal, can interfere in the matter of disciplinary proceedings if the disciplinary/enquiry proceedings were conducted in violation of manner prescribed, against Principles of Natural Justice, if the order of concerned authority is non speaking and unreasoned and if the decision making process is in violation of Rules the judicial review in the matter of departmental proceedings is permissible with respect to decision making process and not against the decision itself unless it is shown that the decision is without any evidence or suffers from malafide or malice or harsh or without jurisdiction. The aforesaid can be deduced from the following pronouncements of the Hon'ble Apex Court.
In the case of Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. vs. Ashok Kumar Arora, (1997) 3 SCC 72; the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under :-
"20. At the outset, it needs to be mentioned that the High Court in such cases of departmental enquiries and the findings recorded therein does not exercise the powers of appellate court/authority. The jurisdiction of the High Court in such cases is very limited for instance where it is found that the domestic enquiry is vitiated because of non-observance of principles of natural justice, denial of reasonable opportunity; findings are based on no evidence, and/or the punishment is totally disproportionate to the proved misconduct of an employee. There is a catena of judgments of this Court which had settled the law on this topic and it is not necessary to refer to all these decisions. Suffice it to refer to a few decisions of this Court on this topic viz. State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao [(1964) 3 SCR 25 : AIR 1963 SC 1723 : (1964) 2 LLJ 150] , State of A.P. v. Chitra Venkata Rao [(1975) 2 SCC 557 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 349 : (1976) 1 SCR 521] , Corpn. of the City of Nagpur v. Ramchandra [(1981) 2 SCC 714 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 455 : (1981) 3 SCR 22] and Nelson Motis v. Union of India [(1992) 4 SCC 711 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 13 : (1993) 23 ATC 382 : AIR 1992 SC 1981] "
In the case of State of Lalit Popli vs. Canara Bank, (2003) 3 SCC 583; the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under :-
"17. While exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution the High Court does not act as an appellate authority. Its jurisdiction is circumscribed by limits of judicial review to correct errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice. Judicial review is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellate authority.
18. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India [(1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80 : (1996) 32 ATC 44] the scope of judicial review was indicated by stating that review by the court is of decision-making process and where the findings of the disciplinary authority are based on some evidence, the court or the tribunal cannot reappreciate the evidence and substitute its own finding.
19. As observed in R.S. Saini v. State of Punjab [(1999) 8 SCC 90 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 1424] in paras 16 and 17 the scope of interference is rather limited and has to be exercised within the circumscribed limits. It was noted as follows: (SCC p. 96) "16. Before adverting to the first contention of the appellant regarding want of material to establish the charge, and of non-application of mind, we will have to bear in mind the rule that the court while exercising writ jurisdiction will not reverse a finding of the inquiring authority on the ground that the evidence adduced before it is insufficient. If there is some evidence to reasonably support the conclusion of the inquiring authority, it is not the function of the court to review the evidence and to arrive at its own independent finding. The inquiring authority is the sole judge of the fact so long as there is some legal evidence to substantiate the finding and the adequacy or reliability of the evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the court in writ proceedings.
17. A narration of the charges and the reasons of the inquiring authority for accepting the charges, as seen from the records, shows that the inquiring authority has based its conclusions on materials available on record after considering the defence put forth by the appellant and these decisions, in our opinion, have been taken in a reasonable manner and objectively. The conclusion arrived at by the inquiring authority cannot be termed as either being perverse or not based on any material nor is it a case where there has been any non-application of mind on the part of the inquiring authority. Likewise, the High Court has looked into the material based on which the enquiry officer has come to the conclusion, within the limited scope available to it under Article 226 of the Constitution and we do not find any fault with the findings of the High Court in this regard."
In the case of State of Karnataka and Another vs. N. Gangaraj, (2020) 3 SCC 423; the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under :-
"9. In State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao [State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723] , a three-Judge Bench of this Court has held that the High Court is not a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. It is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. The Court held as under : (AIR pp. 1726-27, para 7) "7. ... The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant : it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence."
10. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India [B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80] , again a three-Judge Bench of this Court has held that power of judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eyes of the court. The court/tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as an appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. It was held as under : (SCC pp. 759-60, paras 12-13) "12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of the Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case.
13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has co-extensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel [Union of India v. H.C. Goel, (1964) 4 SCR 718 : AIR 1964 SC 364] , this Court held at p. 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued."
11. In High Court of Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil [High Court of Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil, (2000) 1 SCC 416 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 144] , this Court held that interference with the decision of departmental authorities is permitted if such authority had held proceedings in violation of the principles of natural justice or in violation of statutory regulations prescribing the mode of such enquiry while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. It was held as under : (SCC p. 423, para 16 "16. The Division Bench [Shashikant S. Patil v. High Court of Bombay, 1998 SCC OnLine Bom 97 : (2000) 1 LLN 160] of the High Court seems to have approached the case as though it was an appeal against the order of the administrative/disciplinary authority of the High Court. Interference with the decision of departmental authorities can be permitted, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution if such authority had held proceedings in violation of the principles of natural justice or in violation of statutory regulations prescribing the mode of such enquiry or if the decision of the authority is vitiated by considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case, or if the conclusion made by the authority, on the very face of it, is wholly arbitrary or capricious that no reasonable person could have arrived at such a conclusion, or grounds very similar to the above. But we cannot overlook that the departmental authority (in this case the Disciplinary Committee of the High Court) is the sole judge of the facts, if the enquiry has been properly conducted. The settled legal position is that if there is some legal evidence on which the findings can be based, then adequacy or even reliability of that evidence is not a matter for canvassing before the High Court in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution."
12. In State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya [State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya, (2011) 4 SCC 584 : (2011) 1 SCC (L&S) 721] , this Court held that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be ground for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. The Court held as under : (SCC pp. 587-88, paras 7 & 10) "7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. The courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous considerations. (Vide B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India [B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80] , Union of India v. G. Ganayutham [Union of India v. G. Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1806] and Bank of India v. Degala Suryanarayana [Bank of India v. Degala Suryanarayana, (1999) 5 SCC 762 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 1036] , High Court of Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil [High Court of Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil, (2000) 1 SCC 416 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 144] .)
10. The fact that the criminal court subsequently acquitted the respondent by giving him the benefit of doubt, will not in any way render a completed disciplinary proceeding invalid nor affect the validity of the finding of guilt or consequential punishment. The standard of proof required in criminal proceedings being different from the standard of proof required in departmental enquiries, the same charges and evidence may lead to different results in the two proceedings, that is, finding of guilt in departmental proceedings and an acquittal by giving benefit of doubt in the criminal proceedings. This is more so when the departmental proceedings are more proximate to the incident, in point of time, when compared to the criminal proceedings. The findings by the criminal court will have no effect on previously concluded domestic enquiry. An employee who allows the findings in the enquiry and the punishment by the disciplinary authority to attain finality by non-challenge, cannot after several years, challenge the decision on the ground that subsequently, the criminal court has acquitted him.
13. In another judgment reported as Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran [Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 554] , this Court held that while reappreciating evidence the High Court cannot act as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings. The Court held the parameters as to when the High Court shall not interfere in the disciplinary proceedings : (SCC p. 617, para 13) "13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not:
(i) reappreciate the evidence;
(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law;
(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based.
(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;
(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience."
Taking note of aforesaid settled principles, now we proceed to consider the facts of the present case.
In the instant case, the departmental proceedings were initiated under Rules 14 of Rules, 1991, for awarding the minor punishment and show cause notice was given to the petitioner after holding preliminary inquiry, which is the only requirement in the Rule 14 of Rules, 1991, and the same was replied by the petitioner and thereafter, the disciplinary authority passed the order of punishment. In this view of the matter, the procedure as required under the law, was adopted prior to imposing minor punishment.
On the plea raised by learned counsel for petitioner that the order of Disciplinary Authority is non-speaking and the Appellate Authority as also Revisional Authority had failed to appreciate the facts of the case particularly that the petitioner followed the direction of his In-charge as also that the decision to reach Chhachha (NkNk) was taken as that event was of murder and PRV-2774 was near to that place in comparison to the destination i.e. Gobardhanpur, for which the direction was issued by the District Control Room, we have perused the impugned order(s) before the Tribunal and it appears therefrom that though the impugned Order No.Da-55 of 2017, undated, is not happily worded, however, from the order of the Appellate Authority as also order of the Revisional Authority it appears that both the Authorities have considered the version of the petitioner in their orders dated 03.06.2018 and 13.02.2019, respectively. For convenience, operative portion of the order dated 13.02.2019 passed by the Revisional Authority/Opposite Party No.3 on reproduction reads as under:-
"i=koyh ds vfHkys[kksa ds ijh{k.k ,oa ifj'khyu ls ;g ik;k x;k fd tu lquokbZ ly f'kdk;r izdks"B tuin vesBh dks vkosfndk Jherh ikoZrh nsoh fuoklh xkso/kZuiqj HkkSflagiqj Fkkuk laxzkeiqj] tuin vesBh }kjk izLrqr izkFkZuk i= eas vafdr vkjksi dh tkap Jh th0Mh0 feJ {ks=kf/kdkjh] tuin vesBh }kjk dh x;hA mDr tkap esa iqujh{k.kdrkZ }kjk Lo;a ds c;ku esa ;g mYys[k fd;k x;k gS fd ;g ekg uoEcj 2017 ls ihvkjoh 2774 ij fu;qDr gSA fnukad 07-04-2017 dks le; 13%24 cts ftyk fu;U=.k d{k }kjk izkIr bZosUV ua0 4380] lEidZ ua0&7800786790 ls izkIr gqvk ftl le; iqujh{k.kdrkZ xzke vEcjiqj esa ekStwn FkkA xzke vEcjiqj ls xkso/kZuiqj dh nwjh djhc 14 fd0eh0 gS tcfd laxzkeiqj dh ihvkjoh 2775 ls xzke xkso/kZuiqj dh nwjh 02 fdeh Fkh vkSj blh ihvkjoh ds :VpkVZ esa gh xzke xkso/kZuiqj vkrk gSA iqujh{k.kdrkZ }kjk ihvkjoh 2775 ds izHkkjh ls lEidZ dj izkIr lwpuk dh tkudkjh eksckby ls le; 13%26 cts eSlst ds ek/;e ls QkjoMZ dj nh x;hA dqN le; i'pkr Fkkuk laxzkeiqj dh ihvkjoh 2775 ds izHkkjh us iqujh{k.kdrkZ dks Qksu dj ;g lwpuk nh dh muds ,eMhVh ij ,d eSlst gS] ftldk bZosUV ua0 4211] eksckby uEcj 9721355410 vtqZu iq= jketl fuoklh NkNk efLtn ds ikl eMZj dh lwpuk gS tks mudh gh ihvkjoh 2774 ds :V pkVZ ij gS] dks og Lo;a ns[k ys]a ftl dze esa iqujh{k.kdrkZ }kjk Lo;a dh ihvkjoh ij izkIr bosUV ij u tkdj xzke NkNk tk;k x;k tgka eMZj dh izkIr lwpuk xyr ik;h x;hA iqujh{k.kdrkZ dh ihvkjoh xzke NkNk esa ekStwn Fkh fd rHkh ogka ihvkjoh 2775 Hkh vk x;h rFkk ihvkjoh 2775 ds izHkkjh us iqujh{k.kdrkZ dks ;g tkudkjh nh fd dUVªksy :e ls eMZj dh lwpuk ds vk/kkj ij igy xzke NkNk igqapus dks dgk x;k gS] ftlds ckn ihvkjoh 2775 xzke NkNk ls xzke xkso/kZuiqj ds fy, jokuk gks x;hA iqujh{k.kdrkZ ds c;ku ls Li"V gS fd mudh ihvkjoh&2774 dks izkIr bosUV LFky xzke xkso/kZuiqj ij rRdky ugha tk;k x;k] ftlls yM+kbZ&>xM+s dh fLFkfr mRiUu gqbZA iqujh{k.kdrkZ }kjk iqujh{k.k;kfpdk esa ;g mYys[k djuk fd mlds }kjk dksbZ ykijokgh ugha cjrh x;h Lohdk;Z ugha agS D;ksafd iqujh{k.kdrkZ dh fnukad 07-04-2017 dks ihvkjoh 2774 ij fM;wVh ds nkSjku gh Jherh ikoZrh nsoh iRuh gksflykizlkn }kjk nh x;hA mDRk lwpuk ij xzke xkso/kZuiqj u tkdj nwljh ihvkjoh&2775 dks le; 13%27 cts ftyk fu;U=.k d{k }kjk nh x;h lwpuk ds ekSds ij xzke NkNk pys x;sA blh dkj.k izkjfEHkd tkap esa iqujh{k.kdrkZ Lo;a ds drZO;ikyu esa ykijokgh cjrus ds nks"kh ik;s x;sA rF;ksa ds ijh{k.kksijkUr ik;k x;k fd iqujh{k.kdrkZ }kjk Lo;a ds cpko gsrq rF; vafdr fd;s x;s gSaA iqujh{k.kdrkZ dks ftyk fu;U=.k d{k ds }kjk izkIr lwpuk ds vk/kkj ij rRdky xzke xkso/kZuiqj tkuk pkfg, Fkk ijUrq iqujh{k.kdrkZ }kjk u rks xzke xkso/kZuiqj tk;k x;k vkSj u gh xkso/kZuiqj u tkus dh lwpuk ftyk fu;U=.k d{k dks nh x;hA muds }kjk Fkkuk laxzkeiqj dh nwljh ihvkjoh&2775 ij izkIr lwpuk ds vk/kkj ij bosUV LFky xzke NkNk tk;k x;k tks iqujh{k.kdrkZ ds vius dk;ksZ ds izfr f'kfFkyrk ,oa mnklhurk dks iznf'kZZr djrk gSA mijksDr lHkh rF;ksa ds ijh{k.k ,oa ifj'khyu ls ;g Li"V gksrk gS fd iqujh{k.kdrkZ }kjk iqujh{k.k ;kfpdk esa vius cpko gsrq vUkZxy rF; vafdr fd;s x;s gSaA tc fd iqujh{k.kdrkZ ds }kjk mDr laosnu'khy ekeys esa Lo;a dh ihvkjoh&2774 ij izkIr lwpuk ij rRdky bosUV LFky xkso/kZuiqj u tkdj nwljh ihvkjoh&2775 ij izkIr lwpuk ij xzke NkNk tkus ds lEcU/k esa cjrh x;h ykijokgh ,oa f'kfFkyrk ds n`f"Vxr iqujh{k.kdrkZ vkj{kh vk'kqrks"k frokjh nks"kh ik;s x;s gaS] tks vfHkys[kh; ,oa tkap ds dze esa vU; lk{;ksa ls Hkh izekf.kr gksrs gSaA"
It also transpires from the appeal (annexed as Annexure No.8 to the petition) filed against the order of minor punishment and from the Memo of revision (annexed as Annexure No.9 to the petition) that the plea of non-recording of reasons was taken and from the above quoted portion of the order of Revisional Authority, it is evident that Revisional Authority has recorded the reasons for coming to conclusion, as such, the defect, if any, in the order of punishment passed by the Disciplinary Authority stands cured and being so, the argument of the petitioner which is to the effect that the order of minor punishment is non-speaking, has no force.
So far as the order of Tribunal is concerned the Tribunal in its judgment and order dated 05.02.2021 has considered the relevant facts and thereafter, Tribunal has recorded finding(s) to the effect that (i) show cause notice was given to the petitioner alongwith the copy of Preliminary Inquiry Report (ii) the petitioner changed the destination from Gobardhanpur to Chhachha (NkNk) and (iii) petitioner is a member of the disciplined force and as such he is under obligation to discharge his duties in disciplined manner and not otherwise. Thus, Tribunal, not being an Appellate and Revisional Authority, in our view, has rightly decline to interfere with the impugned orders before it.
It is undisputed rather admitted that petitioner was in PRV-2774 and he was assigned the destination of village Gobardhanpur, however, this event was not attended and on its own choice/volition PRV-2774, of which, the petitioner was the member, changed the destination and reached the destination i.e. Chhachha (NkNk), which was assigned to PRV-2775. In these circumstances, we are of the view that the petitioner being the member of a police force is guilty of dereliction of duties. A member of a disciplined force, which in this case is Police Force, is required to perform his duties as have been assigned. Moreover, in the Preliminary Enquiry Report, the Enquiry Officer has given adverse finding against the Incharge of PRV-2774, Head Constable Ram Nagina Yadav and it has neither pleaded nor alleged that he has not been punished.
With regard to the contention of learned counsel for petitioner that in training of Dial-100 it had been taught by the Authorities that when several information/ events are received at the same time then as per seriousness of the event, the Official after applying his own mind should decide where to approach first and in the instant case, two information i.e. one of murder and another of simple Maar-peet were received and taking note of seriousness of event of murder at destination Chhachha (NkNk), the PRV-2774, of which the petitioner was the member, decided to reach the said place first, as such, there is no negligence or dereliction in discharging the duties by the petitioner or by his team, in our view, this argument has no force as only one destination i.e. Village Gobardhanpur was assigned to PRV-2774, of which the petitioner was the member, and the destination of Chhachha (NkNk) from where the information of murder was received was assigned to PRV-2775.
Considering the entire conspectus of facts and for the reasons recorded hereinabove, we are of the view that writ petition has no merit and is accordingly dismissed.
Order Date :-12.08.2021 Vinay/-