JUDGMENT Anjani Kumar, J.
1. Heard Sri M.K. Gupta, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner and Sri P.K. Jain, learned counsel for the respondent. Both the counsel for the parties are agreed that the matter may be heard on merits, as it relates to the pure question of law. In these circumstances, it is not necessary to invite any counter-affidavit.
2. The sole argument advanced on behalf of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner is that the amended provision of the Code of Civil Procedure, Order VIII, Rule 1 by which the proviso has been added by the Act of 1999, which says that no time for filing the written statement shall be granted after the Court is adjourned beyond 90 days in terms of the above Order VIII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which is reproduced below :
"Order VIII. Rule 1 . Written statement.--The defendant shall, within thirty days from the date of service of summons on him. present a written statement of his defence :
Provided that where the defendant fails to file the written statement within the said period of thirty days, he shall be allowed to file the same on such other day, as may be specified by this Court, for reasons to be recorded in writing, but which shall not be later than ninety days from the date of service of summons."
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a decision in Nachipeddi Ramasamy v. P. Buchi Reddy, AIR 2003 AP 409, by which Andhra Pradesh High Court interpreted the Order VIII. Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, particularly paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 which read as under :
"6. A reading of Rule 1 of Order VIII, C.P.C. does not support the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. The normal requirement of law is that the defendant shall within 30 days from the date of service of summons, present the written statement of his defence subject to other Rules contained in Order VIII. This Rule is not inflexible or rigid. This is made clear by the proviso to Rule 1 of Order VIII as amended by Act 22 of 2002. It stipulates that it is competent for the Court to specify the time beyond 30 days and in any case the same shall not be later than 90 days from the date of service of summons. It is also interesting to note that Rules 8A, 9 and 10 in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 were omitted by Act 46 of 1999 but again they were reintroduced after Act 22 of 2002. Rule 10 of Order VIII reads as under :
Procedure when party Jails to present written statement called for by Court.--Where any party from whom a written statement is required under Rule 1 or Rule 9 fails to present the same within the time permitted or fixed by the Court, as the case may be, the Court shall pronounce judgment against him, or make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit and on the pronouncement of such judgment a decree shall be drawn up.
7. A plain reading of the above would show that if a defendant fails to present the written statement within the time permitted or fixed by the Court, the Court has to pronounce judgment and make such order relating to the suit as it thinks fit. The very fact that the Parliament which chose to delete Rule 10 of Order VIII, C.P.C. again decided to reintroduce it by Act 22 of 2002 would show that Order VIII, Rule 1, C.P.C. as amended by Act 22 of 2002 cannot be interpreted in strict terms. Further, to my mind, Rules 1, 1 (a) and 10 of Order VIII together would show that though a defendant is required to file written statement within 30 days after receipt of summons and though the Court can extend the time till 90 days, the Court is not divested of power to fix further time for filing the written statement. It is well settled that this cardinal principle of interpretation of law with an enactment has to be read as a whole and then the entire section has to be read and thereafter the act has to be interpreted section by section. One Rule or one Section in the enactment cannot be a guiding factor for arriving at the intendment of the Legislature. The very fact that Rule 10 is reintroduced by Act 22 of 2002 by the Parliament would show that the Parliament never intended the Civil Court to pronounce Judgment immediately after the failure on the part of the defendant to file written statement within 90 days.
8. Further, Section 148, C.P.C. empowers the Court to enlarge the time. In addition to this, we must not forget that the Civil Court being a Court of equity, justice and good conscience is also vested with inherent powers under Section 151, C.P.C. to avoid miscarriage of justice. It is always open to the Civil Court to exercise inherent powers provided such exercise is not totally derogatory to the main provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder."
4. Further decision relied upon by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner is in A.V. Purushottam v. N.K. Nagari, AIR 2003 Kar 417, particularly paragraph 9, which is reproduced below :
"9. It is also relevant to note at this Juncture that the Legislature in its wisdom has not stated decisively what consequences would follow in the event of the written statement not being filed within the period stipulated. In other words, in the absence of expressly stating what the penal consequences would be when the written statement is not filed within the stipulated period, notwithstanding the use of the word 'shall' in Order V, Rule 1, Order VIII, Rule 1, Order VIII, Rule 9 and Order VIII, Rule 10, it cannot be said that the said provisions are mandatory."
5. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent has relied upon a decision of this Court in support of his contention in Waqf Mausooma Syed Husain and Anr. v. Daleep Kumar Jain and Ors., 2003 (5) AWC 3494 : 2003 (1) ARC 556, wherein the learned single Judge of this Court has held "provision of Order VIII, Rule 1 requiring the written statement to be filed within 30 days from the date of service of summons and confers power upon the Court for reasons to be recorded to extend time for filing the written statement to a day not later than 90 days from the date of service of summons. This provision has been made inapplicable to pending suits by virtue of the provisions of Section 15B of Act 22 of 2002. The scheme of the amended provisions which has been discussed above indicates that in the matter of time for filing the written statement the amended provisions of Order VIII, Rule 1 would not be applicable to pending suits and although the provision is procedural retrospectively as textually inadmissible."
6. In view of what has been discussed above and in view of the case relied upon by learned counsel for the respondents, this writ petition deserves to be allowed and the order impugned in the present writ petition dated 10th March, 2004, passed by Additional District Judge, Court No. 18, Meerut deserves to be set aside.
7. In view of what has been stated above, this writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The order impugned in the present writ petition dated 10th March, 2004, passed by Additional District Judge, Court No. 18, Meerut is quashed. So far as the order passed by the trial court is concerned, the trial court is directed to proceed with the hearing of the suit expeditiously, preferably within a period of one year from the date of production of a certified copy of this order before him.