JUDGMENT Anjani Kumar, J.
1. By means of this writ petition-tenant challenges the order passed by the trial Court whereby the suit for eviction filed by the respondent-landlord has been decreed. Aggrieved thereby the petitioner-tenant preferred a revision under Section 25 of the U.P. Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 which was dismissed by the revisional Court affirming the order of the trial Court.
2. The facts leading to filing of the writ petition are that the respondent-landlord filed a suit after determining the tenancy of the petitioner-tenant on the ground that the petitioner is the tenant of the accommodation in question, which is non-residential accommodation at the rent of Rs. 600/- per month and Rs. 50/- per month as electricity charges. Since the tenant has not paid the rent with effect from 5.3.1996, his tenancy has been terminated by notice dated 4.9.1998. Thereafter the suit was filed. It has been specifically pleaded that the building in which the accommodation in question is situated, was constructed by U.P. Awas Vikas Parishad and allotted to the respondent-landlord on 12.6.1984 and handed over to the respondent-landlord by U.P. Awas Vikas Parishad on 18.8.1984. On the basis of the aforesaid facts the tenant has taken up the plea that in view of the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 building will come within the purview of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 only after ten years of the completion of its construction, therefore, the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 are applicable to the tenancy in dispute. The landlord denied the aforesaid allegations and specifically pleaded that according to Section 2 (1) proviso U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 will not apply as the price payable by the landlord to the Parishad was in installments within, 15 years therefore, according to the landlord the Act will not apply from the date of handing over the possession for a period of 15 years in terms of the proviso to Section 2 of the Act which is reproduced below:
(2) Exemption from operation of Act (Provided that where any building is constructed substantially out of funds obtained by way of loan or advance from the State Government or the Life insurance Corporation of India or a bank or a co-operative society or the Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vikas Parishad, and the period of repayment of such loan or advance exceeds the aforesaid period of ten years then the reference in this sub-section to the period of ten years shall be deemed to be a reference to the period of fifteen years or the period ending with the date of actual repayment of such loan or advance (including interest), whichever is shorter.)
3. It has also been denied by the tenant that the rent was Rs. 600/-. According to him it was Rs. 300/- per month and it was regularly paid to the landlord and the landlord has never issued any receipt for it. So far as the electricity charges are concerned, it is stated by the tenant that there was a sub-meter and according to the reading of the sub-meter, the electricity charges were payable. The further defence was that there was no default therefore, the suit is liable to be dismissed. It is further stated that since the landlord is a person employed in the police department, he forcibly wants to get the shop vacated by the tenant. A complaint to this effect was also made by the tenant with the Superintendent of Police, Meerut. The parties adduced the evidence in support of their pleadings in order to prove their respective case but the tenant has not been able to prove that he is regularly paying the rent which was 300/- and not Rs. 600/- as alleged by the landlord in the plaint allegation. He placed reliance on a Photostat copy of the ledger and cash-book which he used to maintain in the normal course of business wherein the entry was of Rs. 300/- per month. According to learned Counsel for petitioner this entry is admissible under the provisions of Evidence Act. On the strength of the aforesaid evidence it has been submitted by learned Counsel for the petitioner that there was no default, as alleged by the landlord and the suit was liable to be dismissed and in fact, the trial Court committed error in decreeing the suit and revisional Court also committed an error in affirming the decree passed by the trial Court. So far as the applicability of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 is concerned, as already stated that in view of the proviso to Section 2, the Act will apply only after 15 years of completion of construction of the building and as admitted by the tenant himself that the building was handed over to the landlord by U.P. Awas Vikas Parishad in the year 1984, the Act will apply to the building in the year 1999, therefore, for the purposes of the present suit the accommodation cannot be said to be governed by the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. So far as the question of relying upon the ledger and cash-book is concerned, it has not been proved by either producing the original thereof or by producing the person who has written the same and therefore, the trial Court has held that a photostat copy of this document is not admissible under the Act.
4. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon as he has relied upon before the revisional Court the case reported in AIR 2003 4548: 2002 SCFBRC 280, R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami and V.P. Temple and Anr. wherein according to the Counsel for petitioner account maintained in the regular course of business and entries therein cannot be disbelieved on the ground that the person who has entered the entries, has not been produced. The revisional Court has given its reasons for not accepting the aforesaid document to the effect that the law laid down by the Apex Court is not disputed but in the very decision itself, the Apex Court has ruled that wherein the revisional Court has held even assuming that the said evidence could not have been rejected, the same was with regard to the rate of rent and if the reason given by the trial Court is admitted, then the position in law cannot be as if there is no evidence, on the basis of which, the trial Court has arrived at the rate of rent, therefore, the revisional Court has ventured into after the assessment of the evidence and the law laid down by this Court reported in 2001 (2) ARC 316, Ali Hasan Shaifi v. Satish Kumar and after looking into the entries and after considering the evidence including the entries arrived at the conclusion that in view of the pleadings of the respective parties the case of the tenant that the rent was Rs. 300A per month, cannot be accepted in view of the evidence of PW2 who also supported the version of the landlord that the rent was Rs. 600/- per month, which has been disputed by the tenant. The revisional Court has relied upon a Full Bench decision of this Court reported in 2000 (1) ARC 653 Gokaran Singh v. Ist Additional District and Sessions Judge, Hardoi and Ors. wherein the Full Bench ruled that initially the burden of proving the rent is on the landlord and when the landlord discharges his burden by producing the evidence then the burden is shifted on the tenant to prove his version. The revisional Court therefore, relied upon the witness of PW2 who is plaintiff's witness and when the revisional Court comes to the conclusion that the rent was Rs. 600/- per month, this finding is unassailable.
5. It is well settled that this Court do not sit-in appeal over the findings recorded by the trial Court and affirmed by the revisional Court. This proposition of law is reiterated by the Apex Court in its recent decision reported in (2003) 6 SCC 675: 2003 SCFBRC 512, Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chancier Rai and Ors. wherein this Apex Court ruled as under:
"38. Such like matter frequently arise before the High Courts. We sum up our conclusion in a nut shell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder: (1), (2), (3) and (4)...........................
(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied: (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.
(6) A patent error is an error which is self evident i.e. which can be perceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or completed argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.
(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act less a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasioned. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdiction is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis.
(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character.
(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercised by the High Courts in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdiction. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annual or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the subordinate Court as to the manner in which it would act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.
6. In view of the Full Bench of this Court Gokaran Singh v. Ist Additional District and Sessions Judge, Hardoi and Ors. reported in 2000 (1) ARC 653 and decision of the Apex Court in Surya Dev Rai's case (supra). I do not find any error in the order passed by the trial Court and affirmed by the revisional Court so as to warrant interference by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
7. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed.