JUDGMENT B.L. Yadav, J.
1. The present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is directed against the order dated 2nd March, 1988 (Annexure 11 to the petition), directing that the employer can put such questions in cross-examination which are germane to the controversy and which have already been taken in the pleadings and not beyond that.
2. The factual matrics are these. A complaint was filed by the workman concerned under Section 6(f) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1967, (for short 'the Act'), alleging that he has been dismissed on the charges framed, and on that, notices were issued to the petitioner Corporation, which has filed objection. On behalf of the petitioner 5 witnesses were examined, whereas on behalf of complainant M.P. Singh, respondent No. 2, appeared and made his statement in the examination-in-chief. He was called for cross-examination by the petitioner on 2nd March, 1988 on the points averred by him in his affidavit. The questions in the cross-examination were put on behalf of the petitioner not in respect of the charges framed or the controversy germane to the dispute under Section 6(f) of the Act, rather it was directed in respect of initial appointment of respondent No. 2, when he has actually stated that he was appointed as a handicapped person. The cross-examination about the nature of employment at the intital stage was not allowed by respondent No. 1. Hence an application was filed by the petitioner and on that application the impugned order was passed indicating that only such questions can be put in the cross-examination which were germane to the charges and not about the matters pertaining to initial stage of appointment of respondent No. 2.
3. Sri J.N. Tewari, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, urged that by not permitting the cross-examination on the points sought on behalf of the petitioner, the petitioner was deprived of the opportunity of hearing, and thus the principles of natural justice were violated. Reliance was placed mainly on State of Kerala v. K.T. Shaduli Grocery Dealer (AIR) 1977 S.C. 1627, and Shankar Chakravarty v. Britannia Biscuit Co. Ltd and Anr. (1979-II-LLJ-194).
4. Sri A.P. Singh, appearing for respondent No. 2, on the other hand, urged that the relevant questions were not put to respondent No. 2 while he was in the witness box, and that the principles of natural justice or the right to cross-examine a witness does not connote that irrelevant questions may be put in cross-examination which were not germane to the controversy involved.
5. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, the point for determination is very short, and it is as to whether the petitioner can be permitted to put any question to respondent No. 2 while he is in the witness box and has to be cross-examined, or he must put only such questions which are germane to the controversy? In the instant case, whether the service conditions of respondent No. 2 were changed during the pendency of the proceedings before the Labour Court or the Tribunal, was the question for determination. In that connection respondent No. 2 filed an affidavit making averments about certain facts which were not relevant, and as he made a statement that he was appointed as a handicapped person and that was intended to be refuted by the petitioner by referring the matter to the Chief Medical Officer and trying to prove that respondent No. 2 was not appointed as handicapped person. Even though these facts were stated in the affidavit, but it does not mean that each and every word of the affidavit has to be controverted by the petitioner or the employer. It is only this fact which was germane to the controversy under Section 6(f) of the Act, which could have been denied by the petitioner or which could have been put in cross-examination while respondent No. 2 was in the witness box. But as the question sought to be put in the cross-examination on behalf of the petitioner did not pertain to the controversy which could have been agitated and decided in a complaint under Section 6(f), hence respondent No. 1 correctly objected to those questions being put to respondent No. 2 while he was in the witness box. It is obvious that the opportunity of hearing or the principles of natural justice does not mean an opportunity to prove irrelevant facts. In the present case what the petitioner wanted to prove was irrelevant to the controversy involved, hence respondent No. 1 was justified in not permitting the petitioner to put those questions to respondent No. 2 while he was in the witness box.
6. Shankar Chakravarty v. Britania Biscuit Co. Ltd. (supra), was a case where the enquiry conducted was found to be in violation of the principles of natural justice and the employer did not ask for opportunity to lead evidence to prove the charges. It was held that no duty was cast on the Tribunal suo moto to call upon employer to adduce evidence. The High Court granted such opportunity to the employer, but their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the High Court was not justified in granting such non-sought opportunity. That was a case about general principles of natural justice and would not be of much assistance to the petitioner.
7. Similarly, State of Kerala v. K.I.Shaduli Grocery (supra), was a case pertaining to the best judgment assessment under the Kerala Sales Tax Act & Rules, where principles of natural justice were discussed and it was held that the principles of natural justice were attracted where the Sales Tax Officer refused to summon the wholesale dealers for cross-examination. No doubt, in that case it was held that the principles of natural justice or the rule of audi alteram parterm, which requires that no man should be condemned unheared, were violated. In the instant case, the petitioner was not being denied opportunity of hearing, nor principles of natural justice were violated, rather the petitioner was directed to put only such questions to respondent No. 2 which are germane to the controversy under Section 6(f) of the Act.
8. There is another aspect of the matter. Whether the right of cross-examination in a particular way by putting a particular question to the witness in the witness box is an integral part of the principles of natural justice, I am of the considered opinion that whether the principles of natural justice has been observed in a particular case, must itself be judged in the light of the functions of the statutory body and also under the circumstances of the case with reference to the provisions of particular statute. In the instant case, it was a matter under Section 6(f) of the Act. But the question sought to be put in cross-examination did not pertain to the controversy which could have been agitated under Section 6(f).
9. In the State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad (1966) S.C.R. 401, it was urged that the opportunity of hearing includes right to cross-examination. But that argument was rejected by their Lordships of the Supreme Court by observing that right of cross-examination depends upon the circumstances of each case and on the terms of statute under which matter is to be enquired into. Relying upon Nagendra Nath Bose v Commissioner, Hill Division (1958) S.C.R. 1240, it was held that the question as to whether the right of cross-examination is available had to be decided in the light of the fact that it was dealing with a statute.
10. In Khem Chand v. Union of India and Ors. (1959-I-LLJ-167) it was held that the opportunity of hearing must be taken to be a reasonable one. It gives a chance to a party to cross-examine a witness called against him and to examine himself or any other witness in support of his case. But these observations were to be understood in the context of proceedings in which they were made and were not to be taken as laying down a general proposition that right of cross-examination is available as a part of natural justice in each and every proceedings. In that case the question that arose for consideration was whether a Government servant who was dismissed from service was given reasonable opportunity. The thing emphasised was on the right to cross-examine the witness who was examined by the opposite parties. But that does not mean a right to put irrelevant questions which were not germane to the controversy involved. I am, therefore, of the considered opinion that in the instant case it cannot be held that on behalf of the petitioner irrelevant questions which were not germane to the controversy under Section 6(f) of the Act could have been put to other side.
11. Applying posteriori and prior; reasonings, I am of the view that the impugned order does not suffer from any error, much less an error apparent on the face of record and the petitioner is not entitled to any relief prayed for.
12. In the result, the petition fails and the same is dismissed summarily. The interim stay dated 30th March, 1988 is vacated. It is directed that respondent No. 1 shall proceed to dispose of the matter as early as possible, positively by 30th September, 1989, and would permit the petitioner to put only such questions which were germane to the controversy under Section 6(f) of the Act, and not beyond that.