(Per : HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE N.V. ANJARIA) What constitutes a 'mandate' for the purpose of provisions of the Gujarat Provision for Disqualification of Members of Local Authorities for Defection Act 1986, ('the Act', for the sake of brevity), and what is the scope of working of Rule 10 of Gujarat Provisions for Disqualification of Members of Local Authorities for Defection Rules, 1987, ('the Rules', for short), are the twin questions coming up for consideration in these two cognate Letters Patent Appeals, which are being decided by this common judgment as the facts involved are similar and the issues identical.
1.1 Letters Patent Appeal No.811 of 2011 arises from the judgment and order dated 22.04.2011 in Special Civil Application No.4188 of 2011; while Letters Patent Appeal No.812 of 2011 is from the judgment and order of even date in Special Civil Application No.4234 of 2011 of learned Single Judge. In the original writ petitions, the challenge was directed against the orders dated 24.03.2011 passed by the Designated Authority disqualifying the petitioners, who were the elected members of Zalod Taluka Panchayat and Fatepura Taluka Panchayat of Dahod District respectively, under Section 3(1)(b) read with Section 6 of the Act. In both the petitions learned single judge set aside the orders of the designated authority and consequentially the disqualification of the petitioners stood annulled.
2. The profile of relevant facts involved in the first petition being Special Civil Application No.4186 of 2001 relatable to Letters Patent Appeal No.811 of 2011, adopted for elaborate discussion in the present judgment was that the petitioners were the elected members of Zalod Taluka Panchayat. The body of Panchayat had total strength of 35 members, out of which 22 members were elected on the symbol of political party called the Bhartiya Janta Party, whereas 12 members were elected from the Indian National Congress on its symbol, and one was an independent member.
2.1 It was the case of the petitioners that it was resolved in the meeting dated 29.10.2010 of Zalod Taluka Sankalan Samiti to elect petitioner No.2 Rameshbhai Bachubhai Damor as the President of the Panchayat and to make him the candidate for that post. The State Level President of the Bhartiya Janta Party in his letter dated 07.11.2010 authorized the District President to issue mandate to vote in favour of the candidates selected by the party. In that letter, one Bhaveshbhai Babubhai Katara was named as party candidate for the post of President, whereas petitioner No.2 Rameshbhai Bachubhai Damor was mentioned as candidate for Vice President's post. It was the further case that the petitioners visited Dahod District Party Office on 08.11.2010 to have instructions about the party mandate but no information was supplied to them. The District President had issued a letter dated 09.11.2010 to one Rameshbhai Hathila for service of party mandate to elect the members of the party but it was never served on the members.
2.2 In the meeting held on 09.11.2010 to elect the President and the Vice President, petitioner No.2 Rameshbhai Bachubhai Damor got elected as President by securing 26 votes and the appellant-original respondent Nos.3 in the petition, Bhaveshkumar B. Katara could muster eight votes as evidently the petitioners did not vote for Bhaveshbhai Katara. Said Bhaveshkumar Katara filed appeal No.51 of 2010 before the Designated Authority seeking disqualification of the petitioners on the ground that they had defied the party mandate, and succeeded in getting the petitioners disqualified. In the writ petitions, the learned single judge concluded otherwise, holding that there was nothing on record to show that a mandate was served upon the petitioners or was read over at the time of meeting.
3. This Court heard learned senior counsel Mr. N. D. Nanavati with learned advocate Mr. M. A. Kharadi for appellant and Mr. B. M. Mangukia, learned advocate for respondent Nos. 2 to 14 appearing in Letters Patent Appeal No.812 of 2011; also heard learned senior counsel Mr.Persy Kavina with learned advocate Mr. Y. F. Mehta for the appellant and learned senior counsel Mr. B.B.Naik with learned advocate Mr. Dilip Rana for respondent Nos. 2 to 15 in Letters Patent Appeal No.811 of 2011. In both the appeals, on behalf of respondent No.1- designated authority, learned Additional Advocate General Tushar Mehta canvassed his own contentions at length.
3.1 Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants in both the appeals contended that every elected member of the party knew about the party mandate which was, according to them, issued, and some of them had even signed below that letter dated 7.11.2010 and hence the petitioners could not disclaim knowledge about the mandate. According to appellants, letter dated 07.11.2010 was a mandate. Despite that the petitioners had not discharged their burden under Rule 10 to obtain the mandate, they became liable to be disqualification under the Act . It was argued that the learned single judge having completely missed the effect of Rule 10 of the Rules, erred in law in setting aside the order of disqualification passed by the designated authority.
3.2 The thrust of the arguments of the appellants was thus that Rule 10 of the Rules cast a duty upon the members to ensure whether any mandate was issued by the political party to which they belong. It was their further duty to obtain such mandate, and that duty was in form of burden to be discharged in law. Rule 10 being statutory, it had to be complied with. Elaborate submissions were made by learned senior counsel on the scope and ambit of Rule 10 and the nature of burden imposed thereunder. It was contended that no particular form or format for mandate is provided under the statute or the Rules; and that it is also not the requirement anywhere in the provisions that it must be served on the members. It was seriously argued that, in the facts of the case, the party mandate was in existence, as the names of the candidates for the posts in the Panchayat were decided by the party leadership and communicated to the State Level President and a letter dated 07.11.2011 was sent.
3.3 Learned counsels for the appellants relied on following decisions in support of their propositions.
1. Order dated 10th May 2011 passed in Letters Patent Appeal No.506 of 2011 Shardaben Premjibhjai Makwana vs. Settlement Commissioner [2011-TLGJ-01288] Madhuben Bhikhabhai Rokad vs. State of Gujarat [2011 GLHEL-HC.224639] Raiyabhai M. Savalia vs. Settlement Commissioner [2011 GLHEL-HC 225045] Narendrabhai M. Nayak vs. Bhagyesh Jha [2011 (1) GLR 104] Lalsing G. Rathava vs. Competent Authority [2010 (1) GLH 401] Falguniben H. Mehta vs. State of Gujarat [2010 (1) GLR 81] Padhya Kaminiben vs. Manishkumar [2009 (3) 2737] Pravinji S. Thakore vs. State of Gujarat [ 2008 GLHEL- HC -220217 = 2008 (3) GCD 2010, 2008 JX (Guj.) 226] 3.4 On the effect of Rule 10, all the learned counsels relied on the observations made in paragraph 36 in Devabhai Parbatbhai Avadia vs. Competent Authority Appointed Under Anti-defection Act [ 2009 (0) GLHEL- HC 221825].
3.5 Learned senior counsel for the respondents on the other hand submitted that there was no mandate issued; it was neither known nor served on the petitioners. It was also submitted that before the competent authority also, the mandate was not available when the meeting was held to elect the officer bearers of the Panchayat. It was submitted that the contention of the appellant about letter dated 07.11.2010 being given to some of the members and they having acquired the knowledge by signing them, was not raised before the learned single judge, therefore, the same could not be permitted to be raised for the first time in the Letters Patent Appeal. The learned senior counsel submitted that in any view the petitioners being not aware of mandate having been issued if at all it was, no question arose for discharging the requirements of Rule 10 on their part.
3.6 Learned Additional Advocate General, Mr. Tushar Mehta, submitted on behalf of the designated authority that he was an independent government officer who conducted the proceedings of the meeting in accordance with rules wherein the President and Vice President of the Panchayat were elected. It was submitted that his duty in respect of verifying whether the mandate had been issued by the political party was under Rule 10, however, the same could not be treated to be of the level of the burden cast on the members of a Panchayat or municipality of ensuring that there was a mandate issued. He dwelt on the interpretation of Rule 10 canvassed on behalf of the appellants and contended that the order of the learned single judge was not well directed as it failed to take into account the effect of Rule 10 of the Rules. The learned Additional Advocate General emphasized in particular the observations in paragraph 37 of the decision in Devabhai Parbatbhai Avadia (supra) to buttress his submissions.
4. The compass of the controversy is really confined to the case of original petitioners that there was no mandate issued, received or known to them and countered by the other side-the appellants, that the party mandate existed and the onus to ensure and obtain it was on the petitioners in view of provisions of Rule 10 of the Rules.
4.1 Section 3(1) (b) of the Act reads as under:
"3.
Disqualification on ground of defection: (1) Subject to the provisions of sections 4 and 5, a councillor or a member belonging to any political party shall be disqualified for being a councillor or a member,-
(a) xxxxxx
(b) if he votes or abstains from voting in any meeting of a municipal corporation, panchayat or as the case may be, municipality contrary to any direction issued by the political party to which he belongs or by any person or authority authorized by it in this behalf without obtaining in either case the prior permission of such political party, person or authority and such voting or abstention has not been condoned by such political party, person or authority within fifteen days from the date of such voting or abstention."
4.2 Rule 10 was inserted in the Rules under Gujarat Provisions for Disqualification of Members of Local Authorities for Defection (Amendment) Rules, 2007 with effect from 13.02.2007 and it reads as under:
"10.
A Councillor of Municipal Corporation or the Municipality or a member of the Panchayat who is elected on the symbole of political party shall while attending any meeting of Municipal Corporation or the Municipality or a Panchayat ensure whether any mandate is issued by such political party and if any mandate is issued by such political party, he shall obtain such mandate from such political party, or by any person or authority by it. The Chair-person of any meeting of Municipal Corporation or the Municipality or a Panchayat shall verify that such a mandate has been issued by the political party, and circulated to the conuncillor of Municipal Corporation or the Member of Municipality or a member of the Panchayat."
4.3 While the provisions of the Act and the Rules are considered by this Court in several decisions, in the context of the facts of the present case, it would be necessary to re-examine the scope of Section 3(1)(b) of the Act and Rule 10 of the Rules in particular, and the scheme emerging therefrom.
4.4 Section 3 of the Act provides for disqualification of the Councilor or a member elected to the Municipality or the Panchayat in two eventualities. Sub-clause (a) provides that when he has voluntarily given up the membership of political party, he shall be disqualified. Under Sub-clause (b), which is relevant in the present case, the Councilor or a member who votes or abstains from voting in any meeting contrary to any direction issued by the political party to which he belongs, shall be disqualified.
The political party may, however, condone such voting or abstination within the stipulated time as provided, in which event the disqualification will not stand.
4.5 Rule 10 of the Rules enjoins the Councilor or a member concerned, while attending any meeting of Municipal Corporation or Municipality or a Panchayat as the case may be, to ensure whether any mandate is issued by the political party. A further duty is imposed that if mandate is issued, he shall have to 'obtain' such mandate from the political party or the authorized person or the authority authorized by it. In its second limb, the Rule requires the Chairperson of the meeting to 'verify' that the mandate has been issued by the political party, and it is 'circulated' to the councilor or a member. For the purpose of disqualification on the ground of defiance of the mandate, Section 3(1)(b) and Rule 10 inform each other and interactively operate together.
4.6 Adopted verbatim from paragraph 2(i)(b) of the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution, Section 2(i)(b) is pari materia and proposes to achieve the same object of removing the evil of unethical defections in the grass-root level local self-government bodies of Municipalities and Panchayats. Such defections are perceived as contagious disease destabilizing and paralyzing the institutions of democratic governance. The object of introducing the law on disqualification is highlighted in Kihota Hollohon v. Zachilhu [AIR 1993 SC 412].
4.7 The basic condition for invoking and applying Section 3(1)(b) is that there has to be a direction from the political party. As rule 10 would also be attracted while deciding whether disqualification is incurred by a member, the bare minimum requirement is that the member has knowledge of such direction, termed as mandate, having been issued.
4.8 For canvassing on behalf of appellants that original petitioners had knowledge of the mandate or in the facts of the case the knowledge was attributable to them, reliance was placed on the observations of Division Bench of this Court in Shardaben Premjibhai Makwana vs. Settlement Commissioner and Director of Land Records [2011 (3) GCD 1950] "Therefore, what is required to be proved by the aggrieved party is that such member had a knowledge of the direction/whip/mandate and that still he has voted and/or abstained from voting contrary to such a direction/whip/mandate. Therefore, what is required is the knowledge of the concerned member with respect to whip/mandate issued by the political party to which he belongs or by any person or authority authorized by it in that behalf. The moment it is proved that prior to the meeting it was brought to the notice of the concerned member and/or it was within knowledge of the concerned member with respect to the whip/mandate issued by the political party to which he belongs or by any person or authority authorized by it and thereafter he has acted contrary to such a whip/mandate, in that case he incurs disqualification under Section 3(1)(b) of the Act, 1986."
4.9 There cannot be any dispute to the proposition that the knowledge of mandate by a member is essential. However, the decision in Shardaben (supra) and the observations made therein are of no help to the appellants in view of issue in focus. In Shardaben (supra), the Court was convinced from the record that the mandate was served upon the respective appellants of that case and they had knowledge about the same before the election took place.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant may be right in their submissions that Section 3(1)(b) of the Act does not provide as to how and in what manner direction / mandate is required to be issued and, therefore, it cannot be insisted upon that the mandate has to be in a particular form. Even as it is the position, it cannot be gainsaid from a bare reading of Section 3(1)(b) and Rule 10 that the 'direction' issued by the political party has a definite connotation in the context of working and object of the law. The legislature is not expected to incorporate in the statute, such direction in its exact format so as to become a 'mandate'. In what form and format and in what expression and content, a political party should issue its mandate has to be appreciated and culled out from the provisions and phraseology of the law, its object and purpose, the conditions in which the provisions operate and keeping in view the functional requirements of the provisions both in law and in practice. A definite concept of what a 'mandate' ought to be in law does emanate from the provisions.
5.1 Section 3(1)(b) of the Act contemplates a 'direction', which is a 'direction issued'. It is observed in Kanhiya Lal Omar vs. R. K. Trivedi and others [AIR 1996 111], a 'direction' means 'an order' issued to a particular individual or a precept which many have to follow. A direction may be a specific or general order.
5.2 In Devabhai Parbatbhai Avadia (supra), the Court explained the import of word 'direction' as under:
"
In Section 3(1)(b) of the Act the word that is used is 'direction'. Similarly in Rule 3(6) of the Rules again the word 'direction' is used. However, when one goes to subsequently added Rule 10 of the Rules the word 'mandate' is used. The meaning of the term 'mandate' when used as noun means authoritative command or instruction. In thesaurus the word 'mandate' when used as a noun has been defined to mean a document giving an official instruction or command. A plain dictionary meaning of the term 'direction' means an order or instruction, the act or process of directing, supervision. Hence though the parties as well as the designated authority have loosely used the term whip it is not necessary to consider the meaning of the said term. Suffice it to state that when provisions of the Act and Rule 10 of the Rules are read together the meaning that is conveyed is issuance of direction/ command by the political party to its members to act in a particular manner or to desis (sic.) from acting in a particular manner.
5.3 A plain reading of Rule 10 makes it clear that a member is required inter alia to 'obtain' the mandate. In the second part of the Rule the Chairperson of the meeting has to 'verify' such mandate 'issued' by the political party and that it is 'circulated' to the councilors or members. In order to 'obtain' and 'verify' mandate which is to be 'circulated', what is minimal is that mandate has to be clear and definite.
5.4 In Kihota Hollohon (supra), it was contended before the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court that the expression 'any direction' occurring in para 2 (1) (b) was required to be construed in a limited manner. The Supreme Court accepted the contention and held that those words required to be construed harmoniously with other provisions and appropriately confined to the objects and the purposes of the 10th Schedule and those objects and purposes define and limit the contours of its meaning. It was held that assignment of a limited meaning was for the purpose of harmonious and contextual construction. The Court did not find justification to give the words the wider meaning. The Constitution Bench then held that the direction or whip resulting into disqualification has to be clearly worded.
"Keeping in view the consequences of the disqualification i.e., termination of the membership of a House; it would be appropriate that the direction or whip which results in such disqualification under Paragraph 2(1)(b) is so worded as to clearly indicate that voting or abstaining from voting contrary to the said direction would result in incurring the disqualification under Paragraph 2(1)(b) of the Tenth Schedule so that the member concerned has fore-knowledge of the consequences flowing from his conduct in voting or abstaining from voting contrary to such a direction."
5.5 The need to construe a mandate strictly, considering the consequences that ensue for flouting, finds supports from observations of the Supreme Court in Sadashiv H. Patil vs. Vithal D. Teke [(2000) 8 SCC 82].
" A finding as to disqualification under the Act has the effect of unseating a person from an elected office held by him pursuant to his victory at the polls in accordance with the democratic procedure of constituting a local authority. The consequences befall not only him as an individual but also the constituency represented by him which would cease to be represented on account of his having been disqualified. Looking at the penal consequences flowing from an elected councilor being subjected to disqualification and its repercussion on the functioning of the local body as also the city or township governed by the local body the provisions have to be construed strictly. A rigorous compliance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules must be shown to have taken place while dealing with a reference under Section 7 of the Act."
6. Therefore, though the term 'mandate' is not defined anywhere in the Act or the Rules, from the import of the provisions as discussed above, it is trite to hold that a direction under Section 3(1)(b) has to be clear and categorical as well as one containing a command issued to a circle of persons, being the councilors or the members. The mandate is an instruction to a member participating in the meeting to vote or not to vote in favour of a particular resolution. Therefore, it has to be couched in a language so as to become a direction and command. Mere contemplation or decision about mandate by the political party is not enough. The direction or mandate has to be issued, and must be issued specifically to those elected members, to whom it is intended to apply. It may be a common communication though ideal is to issue a mandate individually. The mandate is also called a 'whip'. A 'whip' is one which is felt by one to whom it touches.
6.1 An amorphous instruction or intra-party communication or correspondence referring to some decision of the political party or its office bearers regarding selection of the names of the candidates and for voting in their favour cannot be construed in law as a mandate. The command must have been to vote or abstain from voting at a particular meeting. Then only it can be characterized as a mandate as contemplated under the provisions of the Act and the Rules. It is only when the mandate is specific and specifically addressed in connection with particular meeting, that a councilor or a member can obtain knowledge of the mandate. On the basis of a vague, uncertain or misdirected direction, no knowledge could be obtained by the members concerned.
6.2 A clear mandate only would enable the councilor or a member to discharge his or her burden under Rule 10. Only with reference to such a mandate, he or she can be subjected to burden of obtaining it. The Chairperson would be enabled to verify that mandate was issued only if mandate is in proper form and issued.
6.3 In order that a member could discharge the burden cast under Rule 10, it is a prerequisite and condition precedent that there is a definite direction/mandate issued by the political party addressing instructions to vote in a particular way. If the fact of proper and legal mandate having been issued is established, then only the duty cast under Rule 10 on the councilor or a member can arise. It is after initial burden to prove that the mandate in proper form was issued is discharged by the person who raises the plea for disqualification, that Rule 10 comes into play.
7. Weighing by the above stated standards, it is not possible to hold that letter dated 07.11.2010 (at page-50) can be termed as a mandate. It was only a letter issued by the State President of the political party concerned authorizing the District President to issue mandate to all elected members of the Taluka panchayat to vote in favour of the persons chosen by the party to be the candidates for the posts in the Taluka Panchayat. It did not contain a command issued to the members and addressed to such members instructing them to vote in a particular way. Neither it was itself a mandate, nor a mandate pursuant thereto was issued. The communication dated 11.10.2010 calling upon Rameshbhai Hathila to show cause as to why the mandate was not served upon the petitioners and the members of the Taluka Panchayat belonging to the Bhartiya Janta Party, his explanation dated 13.11.2010 to the said show cause notice and giving his own justification as to why the mandate was not served, showed that the so called mandate had not reached the petitioners and other members. Hence the petitioners could not have been presumed to be in knowledge thereof actually or notionally. Therefore, learned single judge was eminently justified in recording the finding in his judgment that there was nothing on record to show that mandate/whip was given to the Presiding Officer at the time of election and there was nothing on record to show that mandate/whip was issued by the party or was read over at the time of election.
7.1 In view of above discussion, the contention of the appellant that the petitioners had knowledge about the mandate cannot survive. It was contended that some of the members who were served with the letter dated 07.11.2010 had put their signatures also. However, knowledge of a mandate could not be attributed to the petitioners as there was no valid mandate in the eye of law.
7.2 A member can be said to have been posted with the knowledge of the mandate only if the mandate is duly worded in form of a command or a direction. The proper issuance of mandate in its proper form is also expected so that a member knows about it before the meeting, and while attending the meeting he can ensure whether a mandate is issued and obtain the same as required under Rule 10 of the Rules, if not served on him. While the service of mandate is not provided for in the statute or the Rules, its issuance with clarity and in a language which commands the member is sine qua non.
7.3 It would be now apposite to refer to and quote paragraphs 36 and 37 in Devabhai Parbatbhai Avadia (supra) extensively relied on for the purpose of interpreting Rule 10 of the Rules and to assail the impugned judgment, as a suffix to and in the context of what is discussed and held above, "36.
..... The first part of the Rules requires that the alleged defaulter shall ascertain as to whether any mandate has been issued by such political party, and if issued he shall obtain a copy thereof. To put it differently the onus which was uptill now incorrectly understood to be on the petitioner, and to a certain extent on the designated authority, is shifted on the alleged defaulter. The said burden is primary in nature and unless and until it is discharged a rebuttable presumption arises that such a political party has issued a mandate and the alleged defaulter has acted contrary to such a direction in light of the information available on record as furnished by the leader of the party in the local body.
37. The second part of the Rules cannot be pressed into service by an alleged defaulter to discharge the onus which is statutorily cast on the alleged defaulter by the first part of the said Rule. The second part merely requires the chairperson of the meeting to verify whether a mandate has been issued by a political party and circulated to its members by the political party. The said part of Rule 10 of the Rules does not cast any burden on the chairperson to circulate the mandate of a political party to the members of the political party after obtaining a copy of such mandate from the political party. In fact the second part of the Rule is only to ensure that the chairperson knows the correct position so that in a given case if a councilor/member makes a statement before the said authority that no such mandate has been issued the chairperson may make the position clear. A reading of the second part of the Rule cannot mean that the chairperson, who is not otherwise in any manner connected with any political party, is required to act for and on behalf of a particular political party, considering that in a local body there may be two or more political parties being represented by different groups of councilors/members. The chairperson cannot be asked to collect mandate from all political parties and have copies thereof distributed to the respective members of all such political parties."
8. As a logical sequel to the above discussion, it is pertinent to observe that it appears, on conjoint consideration of Section 3(1)(b) and Rule 10 in the Rules, that the legislature has intended the mandate to be in writing. The 'direction' 'issued' under Section 3(1)(b) of the Act; and the duty of a member 'to obtain', duty of the Chairperson 'to verify' and also that the mandate is 'circulated', collectively indicate that the mandate is supposed to be in printed form or in writing. Something which is in writing or in printed form can only be 'issued' or 'obtained' or 'verified' and "circulated". Anything in writing or in print brings clarity and precision needed. As the statute or the Rules do not expressly require the mandate to be in writing or in print, an oral mandate is not impermissible and will not cease to be a mandate for the purpose of this Act for the reason that it was not in writing. Nevertheless, it will be in the interest of the political party that the mandate is issued in writing.
9. Letters Patent Appeal No.812 of 2011 arising from the judgment of learned single judge in Special Civil Application No. 4234 of 2011 had similar facts. The original petitioners were elected members of Fatepura Taluka Panchayat, District-Dahod whose body consisted of 23 members out of which 14 were from the Bhartiya Janta Party, 8 were elected on the symbol of Indian National Congress and one member was independent. One Gayatriben Rameshbhai Katara was declared elected as President in the meeting held on 09.10.2011, though the mandate was in favour of another candidate as claimed and alleged by the appellant-original respondent. According to the case of the petitioners, no mandate was served on them and they could not get it despite inquiry. The appellant herein had contended that the mandate was issued as per letter dated 07.11.2010 (Page-40 onwards in the petition) by the State President. It was a communication from State Level President to District President mentioning the names of the candidates selected by the party and authorizing the District Level President to serve the mandate on all elected members of the Taluka Panchayat belonging to Bhartiya Janta Party. That letter dated 07.11.2010 was claimed to be the mandate and was similarly worded as communication of even date at page-50 in the other Special Civil Application No. 4188 of 2011. The minutes of the meeting wherein the election of the President and Vice President of the Panchayat took place, produced on record, mentioned inter alia that the competent authority was given a letter from the Bhartiya Janta Party containing party mandate. However, the same was returned on the ground that in the rules for election, there was no such provision. Accordingly, it could be easily inferred that in the meeting concerned also the mandate was not circulated or put to knowledge of the members. The case of the petitioners was that there was no mandate issued or communicated to them and that they had no knowledge of any mandate. Thus, the facts being similar to those in the Letters Patent Appeal No.811 of 2011, the above discussion, observations and the principles laid down hereinabove would also apply to the facts involved in the Letters Patent Appeal No.812 of 2011.
10. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned judgments and orders of learned single judge in both the petitions do not warrant interference. Both the Letters Patent Appeals, are, therefore, dismissed with no order as to costs. In view of dismissal of both the Letters Patent Appeals, Civil Application No. 5695 of 2011 and Civil Application No.5724 of 2011 do not survive, and accordingly they are disposed of.
[D.
H. WAGHELA, J.] [N.
V. ANJARIA, J.] Amit Top