(Per : HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE AKIL KURESHI)
1. This contempt petition has been filed by the petitioners of Special Civil Application No.1030 of 2010. The proceedings have chequered history.
2. The facts may be noted in brief.
2.1. All the applicants are petitioners of Special Civil Application No.1030 of 2010, in which they have challenged their termination by the State Transport (Employees) Co-operative Bank Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as 'the Bank') dated 3.2.2010.
2.2. In Special Civil Application No.1030 of 2010, learned Single Judge passed an interim order on 10.2.2010. Learned Judge giving brief reasons, while admitting the petition, granted mandatory interim relief to the petitioners, in following terms:
"5. Accordingly, PETITION IS ADMITTED and, by way of interim relief, respondent No.2 bank is directed not to operate or execute the orders terminating service of the petitioners and, even if they are relieved by now, reinstate them in their original post, on the same terms and conditions on which they were serving before 03.02.2010, till and subject to further orders of this court. It would, however, be open for the respondent bank to initiate necessary legal procedure for termination of service of any of the petitioners in accordance with law. RULE returnable on 09.03.2010. Notice of Rule is waived by learned A.G.P. for respondent No.1 and notice of Rule may be served upon respondent No.2 by way of direct service as learned counsel Mr.Pandya has expressed his inability to waive service of Rule."
2.3. Subsequent to such directions, all the applicants came to be reinstated in service by the Bank on or around 16.2.2010. However, the Bank once again terminated the services of all the applicants by issuing orders dated 10.1.2011. Orders itself give brief background to the litigations pending before the High Court. It also referred to the communication of the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, requiring the Bank to terminate the services of the applicants. The order also recorded that since the appointment of the applicants was illegal, their services are being terminated by the present order. Each employee was offered various amounts towards gratuity, retrenchment compensation, notice pay and other service dues of the concerned employee. For example, in case of one Smt. Hema R. Thakker, Clerk, the Bank tendered an amount of Rs.8,75,316/-, for which, a cheque No.115075 was issued.
2.4. Such termination orders came to be challenged by the applicants by filing a fresh petition, being Special Civil Application No.586 of 2011. In such petition, they also prayed for interim relief. Learned Single Judge of this Court passed an order on 14.7.2011 and admitted the petition. However, no interim relief was granted. Learned Judge, however, provided that, "3. Learned advocate Mr. Raval submitted that order which has been passed by this Court on 10/2/2010 in SCA no.1030/2010 is violated by respondent nos. 3 to 5. If that be so, it is open for the petitioners to file appropriate proceeding in accordance with law."
At that stage, the applicants have approached this Court with the present contempt petition, contending that the respondents have committed breach of the interim relief granted by this Court on 10.2.2010. The applicants have made two fold grievance. The grievance against the officers of the Bank is that despite mandatory interim direction of this Court in order dated 10.2.2010, their services came to be terminated once again after brief spell of reinstatement. This action, the applicants contend, is opposed to the directions issued by learned Single Judge.
3. With respect to the Registrar, Co-operative, the stand of the applicants is that despite clear directions of this Court in judgment in the case of Parmar Dipubhai B and Ors. Vs. Registrar of Co-operative Societies and Ors. reported in 2006 (2) GLH 659, the Registrar interfered with the question of disengagement of the employees of the Bank. Such action is also, therefore, in clear disregard of the judgment rendered by this Court.
4. On the other hand, the stand of the Bank and its officer is that learned Single Judge in the interim order dated 10.2.2010 did not prevent the Bank from taking fresh steps for terminating the service of the applicants. In fact, such liberty was preserved when the Court observed that, "it would, however, be open for the respondent bank to initiate necessary legal procedure for termination of service of any of the petitioners in accordance with law".
5. Further stand of the Bank is that the appointment of the applicants was illegal at the very outset. In any case, due to reduction in work, services of these applicants are not required. The Bank has agreed before this Court that in any case, there is any need to take work from the contractual appointees, the applicants would be given first preference.
6. Stand of the Registrar is that no contempt is committed. The Bank had itself passed a resolution to terminate the service of the applicants. In any case, the Registrar was acting under the order passed by this Court in Public Interest Litigations, being Special Civil Application No. 1469 of 2000 and other connected petitions, decided on 15.7.2009.
7. On the basis of the above factual position, learned counsel for the applicants vehemently contended that the respondents have committed contempt of orders passed by this Court. He submitted that learned Single Judge in the interim order did not permit the Bank authorities to terminate the service of any of the applicants. Learned Judge only permitted the Bank to initiate proceedings for doing so.
8. Learned counsel further submitted that the Bank had acted under coercion of the Registrar, who had issued series of directions and notices to the Bank authorities. This action of the Bank, according to the counsel, was opposed to the ratio laid down in the case of Parmar Dipubhai (supra). He relied on the decision of this Court in the case of (The) State of Gujarat Vs. The Secretary, Labour, Social Welfare & Tribal Development Dept., Sachivalaya, Gandhinagar and Another reported in 1982 GLH 55, to contend that to disregard a binding decision by an authority would also amount to contempt.
9. On the other hand, learned counsel Shri Dave for the Bank officials contended that in terms of the interim order passed by this Court after reinstating the applicants in service, they were terminated by offering all service benefits, including benefits flowing from Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act.
10. Learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr. Rahul Dave defended the Government officials contending that the Bank itself having passed resolution to terminate service of the applicants, no contempt can be stated to have been committed by the Registrar.
11. Having thus perused the record and having heard the learned counsel for the parties, it emerges that the writ petition challenging the initial order of termination, being Special Civil Application No.1030 of 2010, is pending before this Court. Subsequent writ petition challenging later termination orders being Special Civil Application No.586 of 2011 is also pending. In the later petition, fresh orders of termination issued by the Bank are challenged. We therefore, do not propose to make any comment on the legality of the orders of termination.
12. In the interim order dated 10.2.2010, learned Single Judge directed the Bank to reinstate the applicants in service. However, while doing so, learned Judge left it open to the Bank to initiate necessary legal procedure for termination of the service of the applicants in accordance with law. Under this liberty, the Bank passed fresh orders of termination. Their stand is that the procedure as required under the law has already been followed. It is not in dispute that while carrying out such termination, the Bank tendered service benefits as also other payments to each employee. Whether such procedure is one which would satisfy the requirement of law or not, is a separate and independent question and we are sure, would be examined by the learned Single Judge in the writ petition filed by the applicants challenging their subsequent termination. However, when such highly disputed factual as well as legal questions arise, we would not be justified in holding that the Bank officials acted in violation of or opposed to any of the directions, orders or writs issued by this Court.
13. Coming to the conduct of the Registrar, three factors need to be taken into account. Firstly, the decision of learned Single Judge in the case of Parmar Dipubhai (supra) lays down certain ratio with respect to the power of the Registrar to interfere with the engagement of the staff of the Co-operative Societies. It is true that this decision has not been stayed by the higher Court.
13.1. Second factor to be borne in mind is that the Bank had also passed an independent resolution, deciding to terminate the service of the concerned employees. The stand of the Bank before us is that in any case, quite apart from the question of initial illegality in the appointment of the employees, presently, the Bank is overstaffed and the services of these employees are no longer required. It is further stated that no persons, junior to the applicants, have been retained in service. We are of-course not going into the validity of such a statement.
13.2. Third factor is that Public Interest Litigation was brought before this Court, complaining about the continued engagement of illegally appointed staff in Co-operative Banks, particularly the opponent Bank, and in which certain observations were made by this Court.
14. Viewed in the background of these three independent factors, we are not inclined to take any steps against the Registrar for his alleged action. In the Public Interest Litigation, Division Bench in its order dated 15.7.2009, only left it open for the authority to act in accordance with law, especially and strictly under the provisions of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act. This would also mean that the authority had to take into account the law as settled by this Court in various decisions. If by virtue of the decision in the case of Parmar Dipubhai (supra), it was not open for the Registrar to enforce termination of the services of the societies, the Registrar zealously pursuing the Bank authorities to take certain action, may not be entirely warranted. However, the same cannot be seen as a conscious or deliberate disregard or disobedience of an order of the Court, particularly when the Bank itself has taken a stand that resolution was passed to terminate the services of the applicants on twin grounds of appointment being illegal at the outset and that such services would not be required due to reduction in work. We would not like to take any serious view of the matter in facts of this case.
15. With the above observations, the contempt petition is disposed of. We make it clear that nothing stated in the order would prejudice either side in the pending proceedings before the learned Single Judge. Notice is discharged.
(AKIL KURESHI, J.) (C.L.
SONI, J.) omkar Top