(Per : HONOURABLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE MR.BHASKAR BHATTACHARYA) These two appeals were heard analogously as those arise out of a common order dated April 23. 2010 passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Ahmedabad Bench 'A' in ITA No.774/Ahd/2003 and ITA No.775/Ahd/2003 by which the Tribunal allowed two separate applications for condonation of delay of 385 days in preferring the two appeals.
Being dissatisfied, the assessee has come up with these appeals.
After hearing Mr. Shah, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the assessee and Mr. Bhatt, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the Revenue and after going through the materials on record, we find that after passing of the order impugned before the Tribunal, the Revenue at first decided not to prefer any appeal but subsequently it changed its decision and decided to prefer appeals, and in that process, there was delay of 385 days.
The Tribunal below, after considering the explanation given by the Revenue in the application for condonation of delay was satisfied that there was a bonafide mistake on the part of the previous officer in deciding not to prefer any appeal and subsequent decision taken by the officer concerned cannot be said to be malafide and such mistake on the part of the officer concerned cannot be a ground for rejecting the applications for condonation of delay.
In the facts of the present cases, we are of the view that the Tribunal, on the basis of materials on record was quite justified in holding that these were fit cases where the delay should be condoned, and in the absence of any materials placed before us showing that such conclusion was based on overlooking of any material fact or law, we do not propose to interfere with the order passed by the Tribunal condoning delay in preferring the appeals.
It is now a well settled law that in the matter of discretion exercised by the Courts or Tribunals below, the appellate Courts generally would not interfere with the discretion merely on the ground that on the selfsame facts another view is possible. The present cases are not such where the view taken by the Tribunal can be said to be an absurd view or based on misconception of law relating to limitation. We, thus, find that no substantial question is involved in these appeals and therefore, the appeals deserve to be dismissed, and are dismissed accordingly. We, however, make it clear that any observation made by the Tribunal on the merits of the matter while condoning the delay should not be binding upon the Tribunal at the time of hearing of the appeals.
[BHASKAR BHATTACHARYA, ACTING C.J.] mathew [J.B.PARDIWALA. J.] Top