(Per : Panchal, J.) By means of filing this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner has prayed to issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to quash and set aside order dated July 3, 2000 of Special Land Acquisition Officer and Deputy Collector,Narmadar Project Unit No.7, Bharuch, by which application dated June 1, 2000 submitted by the petitioner under section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is rejected as time barred.
2.The petitioner was owner of land bearing Block Nos. 444 and 468 situated at village Kashad, Taluka & District : Bharuch. The lands belonging to the petitioner and others were acquired for public purpose pursuant to publication of notification under section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ("the Act" for short) in the Official Gazette on April 29, 1985. After considering the objections which were filed by the land owners, declaration under section 6 of the Act was also made, which was published in the Official Gazette on September 9, 1985. The interested persons were thereafter served with notices and the Land Acquisition Officer by his award dated July 17, 1986 had offered compensation to the claimants at the rate of Rs. 150/per Are. Some of the land owners who were dissatisfied with the offer of compensation,had sought references and the Reference Court, Bharuch had enhanced compensation payable to the claimants in Land Acquisition Cases No.473/87 to 491/87 by judgment and award dated February 26, 1997. The petitioner has averred that he was not aware about the said judgment and award passed by the District Court, as the petitioner is residing at Bombay with his son, but in the month of February, 2000, he learnt that compensation payable to the claimants was enhanced by the Reference Court. According to the petitioner, the appeals which were filed by the State Government against common award dated February 26, 1997 rendered in Land Acquisition Cases No.473/87 to 491/87 were dismissed by the High Court by judgment dated April 18, 1998 and after getting certified copy of the same, the respondent had disbursed the amount of compensation to the claimants. What is stated by the petitioner in the petition is that the advocate of the petitioner applied for certified copy of the judgment and award of the reference court on April 5, 2000, which was delivered to the petitioner on April 18, 2000, after which the application under section 28-A of the Act was submitted before the respondent on June 2, 2000. However, the respondent has rejected the said application by an order dated July 3, 2000 as being time barred, which is produced at Annexure-A to the petition. The petitioner has claimed that period of limitation for filing an application under section 28-A of the Act would begin to start from the date of knowledge of the award and, therefore, the application submitted by the petitioner could not have been dismissed as time barred by the respondent. Under the circumstances, the petitioner has filed present petition and claimed relief to which reference is made earlier.
3.Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner. The submission that limitation of three months for filing application for redetermination of compensation under section 28-A of the Act begins to start from the date of knowledge of the award and, therefore, the impugned order should be set aside, has no substance. In TOTA RAM v. STATE OF U.P. & Ors. (1997)6 SCC 280,the Supreme Court has authoritatively pronounced that limitation of three months for filing application under section 28-A for redetermination of compensation begins to start from the date of the award of the Court and not from the date of knowledge of the award. The Supreme Court has further explained in the said decision that the word "Court" means Court of original jurisdiction to whom reference under section 18 would lie and what is excludible is time taken for obtaining certified copy of the award and decree of the reference court. Similar view is expressed by the Supreme Court in JOSE ANTONIO CRUZ DOS R. RODRIGUESE AND ANR. v. LAND ACQUISITION COLLECTOR AND ANR. (1996)6 SCC 746. In view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the above-referred to two decisions, we are of the opinion that no error was committed by the respondent in rejecting the application submitted by the petitioner under section 28-A of the Act as time barred. The petition, therefore, does not have any merit and cannot be entertained.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition fails and is summarily dismissed.
(J.M.Panchal,J.) ( M.C.Patel,J. ) (patel)