Court No. - 78
Case :- CRIMINAL MISC. BAIL APPLICATION No. - 35480 of 2019 Applicant :- Anuj Opposite Party :- State Of U.P. Counsel for Applicant :- Arvind Kumar Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A.
Hon'ble Siddharth,J.
Counter affidavit filed by learned AGA is taken on record.
Heard learned counsel for the applicant and learned A.G.A. for the State.
Submission is that the applicant was not named in the first information report. His name has surfaced in the statement of the co-accused, Priti. The applicant is in jail since 25.04.2019.
The Constitution Bench of Apex Court in Hari Charan Kurmi and Jogia Hajam Vs. State of Bihar, 1964 SCR (6) 623, has observed:
"As we have already indicated, this question has been considered on several occasions by judicial decisions and it has been consistently held that a confession cannot be treated as evidence which is substantive evidence against a co-accused person. In dealing with a criminal case where the prosecution relies upon the confession of one accused person against another accused person, [1911] I.L.R. 38 CAl. 559 at 588 [1931] I.L.R. 54 Mad. 75 at 77.
(1964) 6 SCR 623 at 631-633 the proper approach to adopt is to consider the other evidence against such an accused person, and if the said evidence appears to be satisfactory and the court is inclined to hold that the said evidence may sustain the charge framed against the said accused person, the court turns to the confession with a view to assure itself that the conclusion which it is inclined to draw from the other evidence is right. As was observed by Sir Lawrence Jenkins in Emperor v. Lalit Mohan Chuckerburty a confession can only be used to "lend assurance to other evidence against a co-accused". In re Periyaswami Moopan Reilly. J., observed that the provision of Section 30 goes not further than this: "where there is evidence against the co-accused sufficient, if believed, to support his conviction, then the kind of confession described in Section 30 may be thrown into the scale as an additional reason for believing that evidence". In Bhuboni Sahu v. King the Privy Council has expressed the same view. Sir John Beaumont who spoke for the Board, observed that "a confession of a co-accused is obviously evidence of a very weak type. It does not indeed come within the definition of "evidence" contained in Section 3 of the Evidence Act. It is not required to be given on oath, nor in the presence of the accused, and it cannot be tested by cross- examination. It is a much weaker type of evidence than the evidence of an approver, which is not subject to any of those infirmities. Section 30, however, provides that the court may take the confession into consideration and thereby, no doubt, makes it evidence on which the court may act; but the section does not say that the confession is to amount to proof. Clearly there must be other evidence. The confession is only one element in the consideration of all the facts proved the case; it can be put into the scale and weighed with the other evidence". It would be noticed that as a result of the provisions contained in Section 30, the confession has no doubt to be regarded as amounting to evidence in a general way, because whatever is considered by the court is evidence; circumstances which are considered by the court as well as probabilities do amount to evidence in that generic sense. Thus, though confession may be regarded as evidence in that generic sense because of the provisions of Section 30, the fact remains that it is not evidence as defined by Section 3 of the Act. The result, therefore, is that in dealing with a case against an accused person, the court cannot start with the confession of a co-accused person; it must begin with other evidence adduced by the prosecution and after it has formed its opinion with regard to the quality and effect of the said evidence, then it is permissible to turn to the confession in order to receive assurance to the conclusion of guilt which the judicial mind is about to reach on the said other evidence. That, briefly stated, is the effect of the provisions contained in Section 30. The same view has been expressed by this Court in Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh where the decision of the Privy Council in Bhuboni Sahu case has been cited with approval."
Hence at this stage of consideration of bail application of the co-accused, no credence can be given to the confessional statement of another co-accused.
On the other hand learned AGA has opposed the prayer for bail.
Keeping in view the nature of the offence, evidence on record regarding complicity of the accused, submissions of the learned counsel for the parties noted herein above, larger mandate of the Article 21 of the Constitution of India and the dictum of Apex Court in the case of Dataram Singh Vs. State of U.P. and another reported in (2018)3 SCC 22 and without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case, the Court is of the view that the applicant has made out a case for bail. The bail application is allowed.
Let the applicant, Anuj, involved in Case Crime No.290 of 2019, under Sections 307/34 IPC, Police Station Baraut, District- Baghpat be released on bail on his furnishing a personal bond and two sureties each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the court concerned subject to following conditions. Further, before issuing the release order, the sureties be verified.
1. The applicant will not tamper with the evidence during the trial.
2. The applicant will not pressurize/ intimidate the prosecution witness.
3. The applicant will appear before the trial court on the date fixed, unless personal presence is exempted.
4. The applicant shall not commit an offence similar to the offence of which they are accused, or suspected of the commission of which they are suspected.
5. The applicant shall not directly or indirectly make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade them from disclosing such facts to the Court or to any police officer or tamper with the evidence.
In case of breach of any of the above conditions, the complainant is free to move an application for cancellation of bail before this court.
Order Date :- 30.9.2019 SS