This petition, which purports to be in public interest, is by two petitioners. The first petitioner is a serving officer in the Indian Police Service and has stated that he has worked in the State Intelligence Organization. The second petitioner, who is the spouse of the first petitioner, has stated that she is a social activist. The reliefs which the petitioners seek are as follows:
"a. to kindly issue a writ of mandamus to the two respondents to stop the misuse of the Intelligence organizations - the Intelligence Bureau under the Government of India and the Intelligence Department/Intelligence Headquarters under the UP Government for any kind of political information and political intelligence, along with election related intelligence gather, as explained in the writ petition and/or otherwise, that is associated merely to political activities of various political organizations and does not have anything to do with law and order, public order, national security etc. which would warrant collection, analysis and dissemination of such information.
b. to kindly issue a writ of mandamus to the two respondents to frame modalities, methodologies and means so as to ensure the directions issued by this Hon'ble Court in prayer (a)..."
2. The affidavit in support of the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution has been deposed to by the second petitioner on behalf of the first petitioner as well, and it has been stated that the contents of various paragraphs in the petition are true to her personal knowledge. The first petitioner has argued the petition in person.
3. At the hearing of the petition, a preliminary objection has been raised to the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that the petitioners are meddlesome interlopers who have a track record of filing successive petitions purportedly in public interest. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Union of India has placed on record information which he has downloaded from the official website of the High Court at the Lucknow Bench which indicates that in 2010 the second petitioner had filed seven petitions; in 2011 ten petitions or, as the case may be, proceedings, and in 2012 twenty seven proceedings. In 2013, as many as 65 proceedings either by way of writ petitions, contempt petitions or revisions have been filed. A compilation has been placed on record containing diverse orders passed by this Court.
4. Essentially, the basis of the writ petition, as indicated in the reliefs which are sought, is that the Union of India and the State Government must stop, what is described as a misuse of intelligence organizations "for any kind of political information and political intelligence along with election related intelligence" because that is associated merely with political activities of various political organizations which does not, according to the petitioners, have anything to do with law and order, public order and national security.
5. We are of the view that entertaining a broad and generalized grievance of this nature would clearly lie outside the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Public interest litigation involves a relaxation of the conventional standards of locus standi which are prescribed by the Court and which are that only a party which has a direct and substantive interest in the outcome of the proceedings should be allowed to present a grievance. Public interest litigation emerged as a vital instrument of promoting access to justice since in a country, such as ours, with a widespread prevalence of poverty, people are ignorant of their rights as a result of social disability and illiteracy among other reasons. Though their fundamental rights are violated they are, for reasons of social disability, unable to move the Court. The relaxation of rules of standing was intended to enure to the benefit of those who are unable to approach the Court for seeking wide-ranging remedies particularly for the protection of their social and economic rights. Victims of injustice often do not have the resources or ability to seek access to justice. While rules of locus standi have been relaxed for entertaining public interest petitions to achieve that object, petitions in public interest cannot result in a deviation from the basic parameters underlying the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. One of the fundamental principles which governs judicial review is the separation of powers by which the power of legislation, administration and judicial review are vested in three separate wings of the State, namely, the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. The action of the legislature can be challenged when legislation is sought to be impugned on the ground that it violates constitutional prohibitions. Similarly, judicial review of administrative action extends to scrutinise whether administrative decisions violate fundamental rights or whether they are contrary to governing legislation whether of Parliament or a State legislature, or of subordinate legislation. As public interest litigation has expanded both in its reach and frequency, a large number of petitions are brought to Court, those which have been filed by the two petitioners being an illustration on point. It is necessary for the Court to continuously bear in mind the necessity to preserve the balance of constitutional powers which the constitution has carefully crafted.
6. What the petitioners seek is a direction by this Court to stop the utilization of intelligence organizations, in the present case, the Intelligence Bureau of the Union Government and the State Intelligence Department for gathering any kind of political information and political intelligence. We are of the firm view that such broad and general reliefs cannot be entertained by the Court, particularly in a petition which is filed in public interest.
7. The Election Commission of India is vested with the power of superintendence, direction and control over the electoral process by Article 324 of the Constitution. The conduct of free and fair elections forms the basis and foundation of our democracy. Any disruption of the stability of the electoral process is a matter which threatens the existence of the nation as a free political entity. To postulate that intelligence agencies should be excluded or prohibited from gathering any kind of information pertaining to the conduct of elections would be of serious prejudice to the stability of the electoral process. As a matter of first principle, we are of the view that the broad and general proposition which has been made by the petitioners cannot be subscribed to.
8. The petitioners have relied upon several reports including those of the L.P. Singh Committee and of the Girish Chandra Saxena Committee on the basis of which they urge that intelligence agencies have been misused at various points in time for political surveillance and for election related information gathering for extraneous purposes. The petitioners also rely upon academic expositions on the subject. The issues which have been raised by the petitioners - important as they are - are not capable of being determined and supervised through judicially manageable standards. For the Court to issue any direction in a matter of this kind, it would be necessary to define expressions such as 'political information gathering' and 'political intelligence'. The Court would necessarily have to define the boundaries between intelligence gathering in regard to the electoral process which has a bearing on law and order, public order and national security and what kind of intelligence gathering would lie outside. The dangers of the judicial process being involved in answering generalized grievances is that bereft of a specific context of a particular case, the Court is called upon to formulate absolute and even abstract norms. Issues which appear clear at the core become controversial on the margins. It is the exposition of principles on the margins of discourse that poses the challenge for judicial review. At the core, we do not live in a totalitarian State and it is an anathema to suppress political dissent. But, the sanctity of the electoral process may be undermined by those who disregard democratic processes as an instrument of change in a political system founded on dialogue, freedom and tolerance. The dividing line between the two cannot be laid down in the abstract without the judge hearing the facts of a particular case or grievance. These are matters which the Constitution has - in the first instance - left to the political arm of the government which is accountable to Parliament. The sanctity and credibility of the judicial process lies in determining those cases where the Court can apply conventional standards of judicial review and those cases which are best left to the wisdom of the branches of the State which are accountable to the electoral process, and to the elected legislatures which are entrusted with the duty to oversee and monitor. The Court will step in where there is a constitutional or statutory violation.
9. If a grievance is brought to Court in respect of a specific complaint, such as unlawful phone tapping or unlawful surveillance, the Court can enquire whether a fundamental right has been violated. It would be possible for the Court to enquire into the veracity of the grievance and deal with the individual grievance raised before the Court. But it cannot be said that a generalized grievance of this nature which is brought before the Court in a public interest petition can be entertained. Abstract doctrinal formulations, divorced from a particular context, are best avoided, absent a specific case of violation.
10. In the view which we have taken, it is not necessary for the Court to deal with the objection which has been raised on behalf of the respondents regarding the bona fides of the petitioners. We quite see that the mere fact that petitioners have presented several writ petitions on issues of public interest before a court is not suggestive of a lack of bona fides. To hold otherwise would seriously erode the importance of social activism. Social activists, indeed, have to be active. The shoulders of the Court as an institution of governance under the rule of law are broad enough to deal with an occasional excess. It is equally necessary that persons who come before the Court with grievances of this nature should have due regard to the fact that the time of the Court is precious and it must be allocated to those important matters particularly pertaining to the violation of human rights which cry for judicial intervention. Otherwise public interest litigation will reach such a proportion that the Court will not be able to deal with ordinary civil and criminal cases which crowd its docket. This is, indeed, one of the dilemmas which confronts a contemporary judge.
11. We clarify that we are not dismissing the writ petition on the ground of a lack of a bona fides on the part of the petitioners. We have considered the prayers in the petition. Having considered them, we do not find any reason to interfere.
12. The petition is, accordingly, dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
Order Date :- 21.2.2014 AHA (Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, C.J.) (Dr. D.K. Arora, J.)