1. Learned counsel for the applicant, learned counsel for opposite party no.2 as well as learned A.G.A. are present.
2. The present application under section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed for quashing the chargesheet dated 26.9.2017 in Case No. 998 of 2020, arising out of Case Crime No. 261 of 2017, under Sections 354, 452, 323, 504, 506 I.P.C. and Section 3(1)(r) (s) of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, Police Station- Tikait Nagar, District- Barabanki.
3. Learned counsel for the applicant has submitted that the applicant and opposite party no.2 are resident of same locality and they are known to each other. A minor dispute arose between the parties, resultantly the present F.I.R. has been lodged by opposite party no.2 against the applicant with false and exaggerated facts. The dispute was private in nature which has no grave social effect. Essential ingredients are not made out to constitute the offence.
4. It has again been submitted by learned counsel for the applicant that the dispute between the parties was basically civil in nature and during continuing of proceedings both the parties entered into compromise and settled their disputes amicably by the intervention of some respectable persons. Parties have annexed their compromise agreements. Next submission is that the offence mentioned in the F.I.R. have no grave social effect. The compromise agreement has been submitted as Annexure-4 with the petition. By the order of this Court dated 5.2.2021, compromise was sent to the Senior Registrar of this Court for verification. Now, the compromise has been verified in presence of the parties on 12.2.2021 before the Senior Registrar of this Court. If, the criminal proceedings in pursuance of the aforesaid FIR is continued, no fruitful purpose will be served. Hence, the chargesheet in question as well as the entire criminal proceedings in the aforesaid case which is subject matter of present application is liable to be quashed.
5. Learned counsel for the opposite party no. 2 has not opposed the prayer rather he submitted that the parties have settled their disputes amicably and at present no grievance is left in between the parties against each other. If, the prayer of the applicant is allowed then opposite party no.2 will not have any objection. Learned A.G.A. also did not opposed the prayer of counsel for the applicant.
6. Both the parties have arrived at a compromise. In such a matter, the Court has inherent jurisdiction to pass a suitable order as may be necessary to prevent the abuse of process of subordinate court and to secure the ends of justice.
7. The co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Dinesh Sharma and Ors.Vs. State of U.P and Ors. [2017(Suppl.)ADJ 613] has held in para 7 which reads as under:
"7. A perusal of the case law referred herein above makes it very clear that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has lent its judicial countenance to the exercise of inherent jurisdiction in such matters so that the abuse of the Court's process may be averted. Even in the cases which involved non compoundable offences their quashing has been approved by the Apex Court if the nature of the offence is such which does not have grave and wider social ramifications and where the dispute is more or less confined between the litigating parties. A criminal litigation emanating from matrimonial dispute has been found to be the proceedings of the same class where the inherent jurisdiction of this Court may be suitably exercised if the parties inter-se have mutually decided to bury the hatchet and settle the matter amicably in between them. There are many other litigations which may also fall in the same class even though they do not arise out of matrimonial disputes. Several disputes which are quintessentially of civil nature and other criminal litigations which do not have grave and deleterious social fall-outs may also be settled between the parties. In such matters also when parties approached the Court jointly with the prayer to put an end to the criminal litigations in which they had formerly locked their horns, or if the record or the mediation centre's report indicates a rapprochement in between the parties, the Court in the wider public interest may suitably exercise its power and terminate the pending proceedings. Such positive exercise of the inherent jurisdiction can also find its vindication in a more pragmatic reason. When the complainant of a case or the victim of the offence itself expresses its resolve not to give evidence against the accused in the back drop of the compromise between the parties inter-se or if the fact of inter-se compromise in between the parties is apparent on the face of record, and they are still called upon to depose in the Court, they in all probability, go back on their words and resile from their previous statements, the truthfulness of which is best known only to themselves. They are in such circumstances very likely to eat their words and perjure themselves. The solemn proceedings of the Court often get reduced to a sham exercise and farce in such circumstances. The proceedings can hardly be taken to their logical culmination and in such circumstances, the prospect of the conviction gets lost. In all probability, the trial becomes a futile exercise in vain and the precious time of Court is attended with nothing except a cruel wastage. Of course, there are crimes which are the offences against the State and the inter-se compromise between the litigants cannot be countenanced with and the Court despite the rapprochement arrived at in between the parties, would still not like to terminate the prosecution of the culprits. There are crimes of very grave nature entailing far reaching deleterious ramifications against the society. In those matters, the Courts do not encourage either mediation or a compromise through negotiation and even the Apex Court has carved out exceptions and did not approve the quashing of non-compoundable offences regardless of their gravity. The Courts have to be discreet and circumspect and must see whether the exercise of inherent jurisdiction is indeed serving the ends of justice or to the contrary defeating the same."
8. In present case, if despite compromise, parties of litigation be compelled to prosecute and to face the trial, no useful purpose will be served.
9. On the point another Bench of this Court had occasioned to discuss the power of the Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in the case of Nazmul Hasan and Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors. [2018 (7) ADJ 245] in which it has held in paras 15 and 16 which read as under:
"15. Considering the compromise arrived at between the parties on 7.5.2018, as extracted above in paragraph 5 and the categorical stand of the opposite party No. 3 before this Court, we are of the considered opinion that no useful purpose would be served in continuation of criminal proceedings in pursuance of the impugned First Information Report lodged by opposite party No.3. Accordingly, it would be appropriate, in the facts and circumstances of the case, to quash the impugned First Information Report as continuation of the proceedings of the First Information Report would be a futile exercise.
16. We, therefore, allow the writ petition and quash the proceedings of the First Information Report dated 14.9.2017, vide Case Crime No. 0404 of 2017, under Sections 498-A, 323, 377, 506 of Indian Penal Code and Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 at Police Station Saadatganj, District Lucknow, lodged by Smt. Anjum Rizvi-the opposite party No. 3."
10. In the case of Jitendra Raghuvanshi and Ors. Vs. Babita Raghuvanshi and Ors. [2013 (4) ADJ 40] in which the Apex Court considering the previous judgments of the Supreme Court has held that the criminal proceedings can be quashed by this court under its inherent power on the basis of mutual settlement. The relevant paras of the case are reproduced as under:
"11. The inherent powers of the High Court Under Section 482 of the Code are wide and unfettered. In B.S. Joshi (supra), this Court has upheld the powers of the High Court Under Section 482 to quash criminal proceedings where dispute is of a private nature and a compromise is entered into between the parties who are willing to settle their differences amicably. We are satisfied that the said decision is directly applicable to the case on hand and the High Court ought to have quashed the criminal proceedings by accepting the settlement arrived at."
11. The Apex Court in the case of Shiji @ Pappu and Ors. Vs. Radhika and another [2011 CJ (SC) 239] has scrutinized the legal position in case of compromise in criminal cases in which the dispute was civil in nature and continuation of proceeding will be sheer abuse of process of law and in this context the technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way of quashing criminal proceeding. Although the power should be used by the court sparingly. It has been held by Apex Court by referring the previous judgments that:
"11. That brings to the decision of this Court in Madan Mohan Abbot' case (supra) whereby the High Court had declined the prayer for quashing of the prosecution for offences punishable under Sections 379, 406, 409, 418, 506/34 IPC despite a compromise entered into between the complainant and the accused. The High Court had taken the view that since the offence punishable under Section 406 was not compoundable the settlement between the parties could not be recognized nor the pending proceedings quashed. This Court summed up the approach to be adopted in such cases in the following words:
"6. We need to emphasise that it is perhaps advisable that in disputes wherethe question involved is of a purely personal nature, the court should ordinarily accept the terms of the compromise even in criminal proceedings as keeping the matter alive with no possibility of a result in favour of the prosecution is a luxury which the courts, grossly overburdened as they are,cannot afford and that the time so saved can be utilized in deciding more effective and meaningful litigation. This is a common sense approach to the matter based on ground of realities and bereft of the technicalities of the law.
7. We see from the impugned order that the learned Judge has confused compounding of an offence with the quashing of proceedings. The outer limit of Rs 250 which has led to the dismissal of the application is an irrelevant factor in the later case. We, accordingly, allow the appeal and in the peculiar facts of the case direct that FIR No. 155 dated 17-11-2001 PS Kotwali,Amritsar and all proceedings connected therewith shall be deemed to be quashed."
12. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Nikhil Merchant v. CBIMANU/SC/7957/2008 : 2008 (9) SCC 677 where relying upon the decision in B.S. Joshi (supra), this Court took note of the settlement arrived at between the parties and quashed the criminal proceedings for offences punishable under Sections 420,467, 468 and 471 read with Section 120B of IPC and held that since the criminal proceedings had the overtone of a civil dispute which had been amicably settled between the parties it was a fit case where technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way of quashing of the criminal proceedings since the continuance of the same after the compromise arrived at between the parties would be a futile exercise. We may also at this stage refer to the decision of this Court in Manoj Sharma v.State and Ors. MANU/SC/8122/2008 : (2008) 16 SCC 1. This Court observed:
"8. In our view, the High Court's refusal to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the criminal proceedings cannot be supported. The first formation report, which had been lodged by the complainant indicates a dispute between the complainant and the accused which is of a private nature. It is no doubt true that the first information report was the basis of the investigation by the police authorities, but the dispute between the parties remained one of a personal nature. Once the complainant decided not to pursue the matter further, the High Court could have taken a more pragmatic view of the matter.
9. As we have indicated herein before, the exercise of power under Section482 Code of Criminal Procedure of Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary to be exercised in the facts of each case. In the facts of this case we are of the view that continuing with the criminal proceedings would be an exercise in futility."
13. It is manifest that simply because an offence is not compoundable under Section 320 IPC is by itself no reason for the High Court to refuse exercise of its power under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure. That power can in our opinion be exercised in cases where there is no chance of recording a conviction against the accused and the entire exercise of a trial is destined to be an exercise in futility. There is a subtle distinction between compounding of offences by the parties before the trial Court in appeal on one hand and the exercise of power by the High Court to quash the prosecution under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure. on the other. While a Court trying an accused or hearing an appeal against conviction, may not be competent to permit compounding of an offence based on a settlement arrived at between the parties in cases where the offences are not compoundable under Section 320, the High Court may quash the prosecution even in cases where the offences with which the accused stand charged are non-compoundable. The inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure. are not for that purpose controlled by Section 320 Code of Criminal Procedure. Having said so, we must hasten to add that the plenitude of the power under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure. by itself, makes it obligatory for the High Court to exercise the same with utmost care and caution. The width and the nature of the power itself demands that its exercise is sparing and only in cases where the High Court is, for reasons to be recorded, of the clear view that continuance of the prosecution would be nothing but an abuse of the process of law. It is neither necessary nor proper for us to enumerate the situations in which the exercise of power under Section 482 may be justified. All that we need to say is that the exercise of power must be for securing the ends of justice and only in cases where refusal to exercise that power may result in the abuse Not the process of law. The High court may be justified in declining interference if it is called upon to appreciate evidence for it cannot assume the role of an appellate court while dealing with a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Subject to the above, the High Court will have to consider the facts and circumstances of each case to determine whether it is a fit case in which the inherent powers may be invoked."
12. In the case of Jayrajsinh Digvijaysinh Rana Vs. State of Gujarat and another [2012 CJ (SC) 896] in which the Apex Court has held in para 9 that if the cases are non compoundable under Section 320 Cr.P.C. even then the such a criminal matter can be quashed on the basis of mutual compromise where the chance of conviction is bleak. The relevant para 9 of the case is reproduced as under:
"9. On going through the factual details, earlier decision, various offences Under Section 320 of the Code and invocation of Section 482 of the Code, we fully concur with the said conclusion. In the case on hand, irrespective of the earlier dispute between Respondent No. 2-the complainant and the Appellant being Accused No. 3 as well as Accused Nos. 1 and 2 subsequently and after getting all the materials,relevant details etc., the present Appellant (Accused No. 3) sworn an affidavit with bona fide intention securing the right, title and interest in favour of Respondent No. 2herein-the Complainant. In such bona fide circumstances, the power Under Section 482 may be exercised. Further, in view of the settlement arrived at between Respondent No. 2-the complainant and the Appellant (Accused No. 3), there is no chance of recording a conviction insofar as the present Appellant is concerned and the entire exercise of trial is destined to be an exercise in futility. Inasmuch as the matter has not reached the stage of trial, we are of the view that the High Court, by exercising the inherent power Under Section 482 of the Code even in offences which are not compoundable Under Section 320, may quash the prosecution. However, as observed in Shiji (supra), the power Under Section 482 has to be exercised sparingly and only in cases where the High Court is, for reasons to be recorded, of the clear view that continuance of the prosecution would be nothing but an abuse of the process of law. In other words, the exercise of power must be for securing the ends of justice and only in cases where refusal to exercise that power may result in the abuse of the process of law."
13. In the case of Nikhil Merchant Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation [2008 CJ (SC) 1114] the Apex Court has discussed the scope of compromise where the disputes are private in nature and quashed the criminal proceedings on the basis of mutual compromise. The relevant paras of the case are reproduced as under:
"30. In the instant case, the disputes between the Company and the Bank have been set at rest on the basis of the compromise arrived at by them where under the dues of the Bank have been cleared and the Bank does not appear to have any further claim against the Company. What, however, remains is the fact that certain documents were alleged to have been created by the appellant herein in order to avail of credit facilities beyond the limit to which the Company was entitled. The dispute involved herein has overtones of a civil dispute with certain criminal facets. The question which is required to be answered in this case is whether the power which independently lies with this Court to quash the criminal proceedings pursuant to the compromise arrived at, should at all be exercised?
31. On an overall view of the facts as indicated here in above and keeping in mind the decision of this Court in B.S. Joshi's case (supra) and the compromise arrived at between the Company and the Bank as also Clause 11 of the consent terms filed in the suit filed by the Bank, we are satisfied that this is a fit case where technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way in the quashing of the criminal proceedings, since, in our view, the continuance of the same after the compromise arrived at between the parties would be a futile exercise."
14. In view of above, considering the submission of both the parties and judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court as well as of this Court, in the opinion of the Court, the High Court has ample power under its inherent jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceedings in which the parties have settled their disputes which are of civil in nature and have no any grave impact on the society. The time of courts is very precious which should not be wasted in any futile proceedings where the chance of conviction is bleak.
15. Accordingly, the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is allowed. The chargesheet dated 26.9.2017 in Case No. 998 of 2020, arising out of Case Crime No. 261 of 2017, under Sections 354, 452, 323, 504, 506 I.P.C. and Section 3(1)(r) (s) of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, Police Station- Tikait Nagar, District- Barabanki, pending in the court of Special Judge (SC/ST) Act, Barabanki is quashed.
Order Date :- 23.2.2021 Vikas/-