JUDGMENT Sabhajeet Yadav, J.
1. The petitioner has filed the above noted writ petition challenging the order dated 2.4.1993 passed by District Judge, Mainpuri, contained in Annexure 13 of the writ petition, whereby he has been dismissed from service on the basis of a disciplinary enquiry held against him.
2. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner was appointed as Stenographer in the Judgeship of District Mainpuri on 1.4.1982. His appointment was purely on temporary basis. In pursuance of his appointment he had joined his service on 5.4.1982. On 13.9.1982 one Sri Brahmanand lodged F.I.R. against petitioner under Sections 363, 366, 368 and 376 IPC. at police station Ailau, District Mainpuri with the allegations that the petitioner enticed and kidnapped his sister Km. Mandodari Devi from his residence in the night of 12/13.9.1982. The then District Judge, Mainpuri issued a show cause notice to the petitioner as to why his services be not terminated, which was served upon him on 24.9.1982, while he was in the police lock up. The then District Judge, Mainpuri after considering all the facts ceased his services with effect from 16.9.1982 vide order dated 30.9.1982. The petitioner made representation before this Court, which was treated as an appeal in administrative side. In the appeal this Court vide order dated 11.12.1991 held that the provisions of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India have not been followed and the then District Judge, Mainpuri was directed to frame chargesheet against the petitioner and thereafter hold an enquiry in the matter in accordance with law within three months. The order dated 11.12.1991 was not clear with regard to the reinstatement of petitioner, therefore, a reference was made by District Judge to this court whereupon the matter was clarified by this court vide order dated 20.5.1992 where by it was held that the petitioner would be deemed to have been reinstated in service and was to be relegated to his original position before passing of the order dated 30.9.1982. However it was left open to the District Judge to suspend the petitioner or not while serving the charge sheet upon him as directed by order dated 11.12.1991, in that event make the payment of the subsistence allowance as envisaged under F.R. 53 of U.P. Financial Hand Book. In respect of payment of salary during the period the petitioner was out of employment, the District Judge was directed to decide simultaneously along with decision in disciplinary inquiry according to F.R. 54 of U.P. Financial Hand Book Vol. 2 Part-2 to 4. The District Judge gave a charge sheet to the petitioner on 20.1.1992. The petitioner has submitted his reply to the charge sheet.
3. When the disciplinary inquiry was not completed within time allowed by this Court, the petitioner filed writ petition No. 27785 of 1992. While dismissing the aforesaid writ petition vide order dated 12.8.1992 this Court has directed to conclude the disciplinary inquiry within one month if not concluded earlier but the said inquiry was not concluded as directed by this Court, then the petitioner was advised to file contempt petition before this Court. Thereupon this Court had issued notice to Sri M.P. Singh the then District Judge on 16.11.1992 (contained in Annexure-7 of the writ petition), which had annoyed the District Judge and on account of said animosity and biased opinion against the petitioner, he had framed fresh charge sheet against the petitioner by including old and stale charges on 11.6.1992 (as contained in Annexure-8 of the writ petition). The petitioner was also placed under suspension on 2.6.1992. The petitioner had filed objection against framing of fresh charge sheet and protested against the same. Instead of deciding the aforesaid objection of the petitioner, the inquiry officer went on holding the inquiry without giving any opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. When the petitioner gave applications to cross-examine the witnesses, his applications were rejected. Thus a slip-shod ex-part inquiry was held against the petitioner and on 20.1.1993 a show cause notice was served upon him, along with which the finding of inquiry officer had also been supplied to the petitioner. The petitioner had filed two objections against the aforesaid show cause notice on 3.2.1993. In one objection he had levelled charges of bias against the inquiry officer and disciplinary authority/the then District Judge and in another objection he had assailed the findings of inquiry officer on various grounds mentioned in para 27 of the writ petition which were in brief that (i) No opportunity was given to the petitioner to cross examine the witnesses which were produced against him before the inquiry officer; (ii) the petitioner was not supplied the documents which were used by the inquiry officer in his findings; (iii) the petitioner was not given opportunity to adduce his defence evidence and (iv) the findings of inquiry officer was also based upon old and stale charges which were deemed to have been waived and never directed to be included by this Court.
4. It was further stated that although District Judge did not agree with the findings of the Enquiry Officer in respect of proof of the main charge of bigamy which was charge No. 3 in the charge sheet but the mandatory provisions of Rule 5(4) of the U.P. Subordinate Courts Staff (punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1976 was not complied with which provides that if the punishing authority did not agree witty the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer, then the grounds for dis-agreement is to be communicated to the Government servant charged. The District Judge found that the petitioner was guilty of all the three charges and in his order he did not allow the benefits of his past service and allowances for which he was entitled after reinstatement by the District Judge with effect from 10.9.1982 to 2.6.1992 on which dale the petitioner was reinstated in service but was suspended. It is stated that according to the order of the Hon'ble High Court the petitioner would be deemed to have been reinstated till he was suspended on 2.6.1992. At any rate without any controversy the petitioner was entitled to all the benefits of service and emoluments during the period 16.9.1982 to 2.6.1992 i.e. till the date of suspension and thereafter the petitioner was entitled for subsistence allowance till his services were terminated on 2.4.1993, but he was neither paid any past salary nor any subsistence allowance from 2.6.1992 to 2.8.1992. The petitioner has assailed the impugned order dated 2.4.1993 on various grounds, inter alia, that he was acquitted from all the charges levelled against him by the criminal court in Session Trial No. 35 of 1983. Copy of the judgment and order dated 18.5.1990 passed by the Sessions Judge, Mainpuri has already been placed on the record of the departmental proceedings.
5. A detailed counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents running in 36 paragraphs. In paragraph 4 of the counter affidavit it is stated that during a short span of five months service, the petitioner was posted as Stenographer with three Presiding Officers, namely, Sri R.L. Shankhwar, Sri M.P.S. Tejan and Sri Phool Singh. They have made reports against him to the District Judge regarding his misconduct, misbehavior, leakage of judgments and absence from duty without leave. These charges were found proved against him and they were sufficient to dismissal of the petitioner. In paragraph 8 of the counter affidavit it is stated that it is wrong to allege that the services of the petitioner were terminated with effect from 16.9.1982 without affording any opportunity to him. Contrary to it his services were not terminated, but he was ceased to work with effect from 16.9.1982 vide order dated 30.9.1982 passed by the then District Judge, Mainpuri. While passing the said order, a show cause notice was served upon the petitioner in reply to which he had admitted that he had contracted the marriage with Km. Mandodari Devi on 14.9.1982. It is also necessary to mention here that the order dated 30.9.82 was set aside by this Court. In paragraph 11 of the counter affidavit, it is stated that mere acquittal of the petitioner in criminal case in question was not sufficient for his reinstatement. In para 13 of the counter affidavit it has been specifically stated that it was no where mentioned in the order of the High Court dated 11.12.91 that apart from the charge of re-marriage in life time of his first wife, no other charge could be framed against the petitioner. A public servant is always answerable for his misconduct. In para 15 of the counter affidavit it is further stated that there is no restriction in the enquiry rules that during enquiry no charge could be amended. The petitioner remained present in the enquiry throughout either himself or through his representative. In para 17 of the counter affidavit it is stated that all the charges against the petitioner were framed in accordance with law, which were approved by the District Judge. The allegation to the effect that some charges were framed by the District Judge against the petitioner with the annoyance due to the contempt petition filed against the District Judge, is denied. Actually the charges were framed by the Enquiry Officer and not by the District Judge though the same were approved by the District Judge according to the legal procedure of disciplinary enquiry. In paras 18 and 20 of the counter affidavit it is further stated that there is no presumption of waiver of charge against the Govt. servant. No limitation has been prescribed for taking any action for misconduct of a public servant. A Govt. servant cannot be deemed to have been exonerated from the charge of misconduct on the ground of being stale and old. In para 21 of the counter affidavit it is stated that the petitioner was given due opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. He had also cross-examined some witnesses according to his need. The conduct of the petitioner never remained cooperating during the enquiry; on certain dates he did not appear before the Enquiry Officer and moved adjournment application through his counsel. Photocopy of the report of the proceedings has also been filed alongwith counter affidavit. In para 22 of the counter affidavit, it is further stated that the petitioner moved application for inspection of enquiry record and also applied for supply of certified copies of certain documents. He examined himself in defence on 22.12.1992. It is wrong to say that the enquiry was concluded exparte against him. The copies of the statements of witnesses and also of the petitioner as defence witness have been tiled as Annexure-CA-5 to the counter affidavit.
6. In para 24 of the counter affidavit it is stated that after dis-agreeing with the findings of the Enquiry Officer on the point of second marriage in the life time of first wife, the District Judge has complied with the provisions of Rule 5(4) of the U.P. Subordinate Courts Staff Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1976. He had also taken note of the Rule 29 of the U.P. Govt. Servant Conduct Rules, 1956 on the point of contracting another marriage without obtaining prior permission of the Government during lifetime of his first wife. The District Judge did not dis-agree with the findings of facts recorded by the Enquiry Officer on the point of another marriage, but the District Judge had taken a note of the admission of the petitioner regarding another marriage with Km. Mandodari in lifetime of first wife Smt. Urmila Devi. The petitioner had also instituted Suit No. 2 of 1983 Amar Singh v. Km. Mandodari Devi in the court of Civil Judge (Senior Division) Mainpuri for restitution of conjugal rights against Km. Mandodari Devi and her parents. In para 25 of the counter affidavit it has been stated that since the appeal of the petitioner was allowed on technical grounds without exonerating him of the charges levelled against him. Therefore, his case is not covered under Rule 54(2) of the Fundamental Rules. Thus he was not found entitled to get the salary and allowance for the period he was out of employment. The petitioner was deemed to have been suspended vide order dated 2.6.92 and he was allowed subsistence allowance, since he reported his presence on 3.8.92 in Copying Department and he has been paid the subsistence allowance since then. In para 26 of the counter affidavit it is further stated that the petitioner did not report about his presence on the place of attachment with effect from 16.9.91 to 2.6.1992, therefore, under Rule 53(2) of the Fundamental Rules he was not entitled for any subsistence allowance for the above period. The direction given by the High Court vide order dated 20.5.1992 was not quite clear, but the District Judge had acted according to the direction of the High Court. In para 27 of the counter affidavit it is further stated that by the order dated 11.12.91 passed by the High Court in departmental appeal of the petitioner, his case was remitted back for re-consideration as he was not exonerated from the charge of misconduct by this Court, therefore, by virtue of the aforesaid fundamental rules he was not entitled for such benefits as of right, as alleged by the petitioner in the para under reply. After due enquiry the services of the petitioner were dispensed with vide order dated 2.4.93. In paras 33 and 34 of the counter affidavit, it has been specifically stated that the subject matter of disciplinary enquiry was not same as in Session Trial No. 35 of 1983 State v. Amar Singh, therefore, his acquittal in the aforesaid trial will not entitle him for any service benefits. It is stated that the services of the petitioner were terminated for bigamy on his part and misconduct on the part of Govt. servant.
7. Since the counter and rejoinder affidavits have been exchanged between the parties and the case is ripe for final disposal, therefore, with the consent of the learned counsels for the parties this case has been heard to be decided finally.
8. I have heard Sri A.P. Tiwari, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Amit Asthalkar appearing on behalf of respondents and also perused the record.
9. The thrust of the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that whole inquiry held in disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner is vitiated under law on the ground that (i) the petitioner was not given opportunity to cross examine the witness produced during inquiry (ii) he was not supplied the copy of documents used and relied upon by the inquiry officer (iii) he was not given opportunity to adduce his own evidence and (iv) the charges in inquiry were old and stale which were deemed to have been waived and never directed to be included in the charge sheet by this Court inasmuch as on the ground of malafide and biased opinion of inquiry officer and disciplinary authority against the petitioner. At any eventuality once the disciplinary authority did not agree with the findings of the Enquiry Officer in respect of the proof of the charge of bigamy under Rule 5(4) of the U.P. Subordinate Courts Staff (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1976, he was required to communicate the brief grounds for his disagreement to the petitioner, but the District Judge without communicating his disagreement with the aforesaid findings of the Enquiry Officer on the charge of bigamy, which was the main charge in the disciplinary enquiry and without affording him any opportunity of hearing upon the dis-agreement has proceeded to hold that the aforesaid charge of bigamy has also been proved alongwith other two charges found proved against the petitioner. It is also submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that on account of the orders dated 11.12.91 and 20.5.92 passed by this Court in the departmental appeal the petitioner was deemed to have been reinstated in service with all consequential benefits, but no consequential benefits of service have been given to him inasmuch as the subsistence allowance during the period of suspension has also not been paid to him. In support of his submission the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has also relied upon several reported decisions. The same would be referred herein after at the relevant places. Contrary to it the learned counsel for the respondents has supported the action of respondents and the impugned order of dismissal passed by the District Judge, Mainpuri on the basis of material available on the record as well as the stand taken in the counter affidavit.
10. In order to deal with the aforesaid submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner, it is necessary to examine the relevant provisions of law inasmuch as the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer as well as the Disciplinary Authority. From the perusal of the findings of the Enquiry Officer, it is clear that before dealing with the charges framed in the chargesheet against the petitioner, in paragraph 10 of the enquiry report he has dealt with two preliminary objections raised by the petitioner. Paragraph 10 of the enquiry report is reproduced as under:-
"10. At the first, two preliminary objections of Sri Amar Singh should be dealt. Sri A mar Singh has taken a plea that after acquittal in S.T. No. 35 of 1983 Under Sections 363, 366, 368, 376 IPC vide judgment dated 18.5.90 no departmental proceedings can be drawn and in this connection he has filed a Photostat copy of a ruling of the Hon'ble Gujrat High Court in Thakur Chandra Singh Takhat Singh v. State of Gujrat and Anr., 1985(2) Service Law Reporter 566 and this Photostat copy of this ruling is paper No. 48/2-3. The court of Spl. Judge (Anti Dacoity) deciding the Sessions Trial Case No. 35 of 1983 had not any occasion to decide the questions of bigamy, indiscipline, misconduct etc. which are now in question of this inquiry. In that session Trial case Sri Amar Singh was acquitted on the finding that Km. Mandodari Devi was major and went with her own will with Sri Amur Singh accused and offences under Sections 363, 366, 368, 376 IPC. were not proved. The charges in the inquiry are quite different from the charges in the Session Trial Case. The Supreme Court in Nelson Motish v. Union of India, AIR 1992 Supreme Court page 1981 has laid down that nature and scope of criminal case are very different from those of a departmental disciplinary proceedings and an order of acquittal in the criminal case cannot conclude and bar the departmental proceedings. Therefore, the said plea of Sri Amar Singh delinquent employee is misconceived and not tenable.
Amar Singh delinquent employee has also taken a plea that the earlier charge sheet dated 20.1.1992 paper No. 8 could not have been cancelled and a fresh charge sheet dated 11.6.1992 paper No. 26 could not have been framed. This plea is also totally baseless and misconceived and not tenable because the punishing authority District Judge has inherent jurisdiction to amend, cancel and reframe the charge sheet.
More over it may be mentioned that after framing of the amended charge sheet dated 11.6.1992 Sri Amar Singh filed a writ petition before Hon'ble High Court which was dismissed vide judgment dated 12.8.1992, paper No. 45 and the Hon'ble High Court directed by judgment dated 12.8.1992 to conclude the inquiry within one month from the date of receipt of the order. Therefore, it shall be presumed that Hon'ble High Court considered the fresh charge sheet dated 11.6.1992 as correct and legal action of the Punishing Authority. Therefore, the said legal objections of Sri Amar Singh delinquent employee relating to competency of departmental inquiry are negatived and rejected."
11. From the perusal of the aforesaid findings of the Enquiry Officer it is clear that so far as with regard to the cancellation of the earlier charge sheet dated 20.1.1992 and framing of a fresh charge sheet dated 11.6.1992 are concerned, the findings of the Enquiry Officer was fully justified for the simple reason that the petitioner had already filed writ petition against the enquiry proceedings and the charge sheet dated 11.6.1992. While dismissing the writ petition, this Court had directed vide judgment and order dated 12.8.1992 to conclude the enquiry; within one month from the date of receipt of the order. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be permitted to raise any further question with regard to the illegality of framing the charge sheet dated 11.6.1992. Similarly with regard to the plea of acquittal of the petitioner in criminal case under Sections 363, 366, 368 and 376 IPC, the Enquiry Officer had also suitably dealt with and had recorded categorical findings to the effect that the said acquittal does not debar the respondents to hold departmental inquiry in given facts and circumstances of the case while taking a note of the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in Nelson Motis v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1992 SC 1981.
12. At this juncture it is necessary to point out that in a case of Kailash Chandra II v. State of U.P. and Ors., Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 9165 of 2000 decided on 4.3.2005 reported in 2005 All. L.J. 1343 I have dealt with the issue in question at length. After analysing several decisions rendered by Apex Court and other High Courts and this Court in case of State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. v. S. Sree Rama Rao AIR 1963 SC 1723, Sri R.R. Kapur v. Union of India and Anr. AIR 1964 SC 787, State of Orissa v. Sailabehari Chatterji AIR 1963 Orissa 73, S. Krishnamurthy v. Chief Engineer, Southern Railway P. T. Madras and Anr. AIR 1967 Madras 315, K. Rangaranjan v. The State of Madras 1968 Lab.I.C. 63, Khushi Ram v. Union of India 1974 Lab I.C. 553, Doraikannu v. The General Manager, Parrys Confectionary Ltd. Nellikuppam and Anr. 1977 Lab. I.C. 1471, Corporation of the City of Nagpur Civil Lines Nagpur and Anr. v. Ramchandra G. Modak and Ors. AIR 1984 SC 626, P.N. Tripathi v. Central Bank of India and Ors. 1985 Lab I.C. 991, Jayaram Panda v. D.V. Raiyani and Ors. AIR 1989 Orissa 109 (Full Bench), Nelson Motish v. Union of India AIR 1992 SC 1981, Krishnakant Raghunath Bibhavnekar v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. AIR 1997 SC 1434 and Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. and Anr., AIR 1999 SC 1416) in para 26 of the decision I have deduced some propositions as under:
"26. On a conspectus of the whole issue, the conclusions, which are deducible from the provisions of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India and the relevant service rule and various decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court, other High Courts and this Court are as under:-
(i) Rule to prove the offence in criminal trial beyond reasonable doubt is not applicable in proving misconduct in disciplinary proceedings, as the strict rule of evidence is also not applicable in disciplinary proceedings under domestic inquiry. It is also well known that the domestic tribunal is not bound by several rules that are binding on appreciation of evidence by a criminal Court As for instance, a criminal Court would not accept the evidence of an accomplice, unless corroborated in material particulars, while the departmental inquiry may base its finding on the uncorroborated testimony of the accomplice.
(ii) Finding of Court in a criminal trial against a public servant could not always be regarded as binding in domestic inquiry against that public servant in proving misconduct against him. It is quite possible that the evidence on which criminal court has proceeded may not be the same as the material before the departmental tribunal and it is possible that while the case in the criminal court may fail for want of evidence there may be sufficient evidence forthcoming in the departmental proceeding. The proceeding in the criminal court may also fail for want of sanction or other technical ground while no such infirmity may vitiate the departmental proceeding.
(iii) The nature and scope of a criminal trial are very different from those of departmental and disciplinary proceedings. The standard of proof in both the proceedings are also different altogether.
(iv) The nature and purposes of both the proceedings are also different altogether. The order of acquittal recorded in criminal proceedings bars a second prosecution on the same facts in view of principles laid down in Cr.P.C. and Article 20(2) of Constitution of India. The decision to hold a departmental inquiry Government servant, which is required in the interest of the public administration, is entirely a different proceeding.
(v) The object of holding a departmental inquiry is entirely a different i.e. whether the delinquent is guilty of any misconduct or delinquency and the mere fact that the inquiry officer may reach a conclusion different from that recorded by the criminal court does not abridge his right There is no constitutional, statutory or legal bar on the basis of which it can be held that a departmental inquiry is bad in view of the order of acquittal recorded by a criminal court.
(vi) The dominant purpose of a criminal proceeding is to achieve the protection of public while that in the disciplinary proceeding is purity and efficiency of public service, therefore the field of operation of the two proceedings are quite different and independent.
(vii) If the trial of criminal charge results in conviction, the disciplinary authorities are bound to follow and accept it and take appropriate action against such Government servant as envisaged under proviso (II)(a) of Article 311(2) of the Constitution and the relevant service rules, without holding full fledged inquiry against such Government servant and in such situation full fledged inquiry is not necessary, but in a case of acquittal the disciplinary proceeding may follow where the acquittal is other than clean and honourable acquittal on merit wherein the court dealing ;with criminal case has completely exonerated the accused by recording positive finding that he did not commit the alleged offence and the prosecution case found totally false and completely thrown out against him.
(viii) If the conduct alleged is the foundation for prosecution though it may end in acquittal on appreciation or lack of sufficient evidence or on account of benefit of doubt or on any other technical ground like lack of sanction for prosecution, the authority may take appropriate action after holding disciplinary inquiry in respect of misconduct against the delinquent employee."
13. Thus from the aforesaid legal position it is well settled that mere acquittal does not conclude the departmental inquiry even if grounded on the same fact unless it is a clean and honourable acquittal based on merits wherein prosecution case is found totally false and thrown out by the criminal court on positive findings to that effect, the acquittal based on appreciation of evidence, lack of sufficient evidence, benefit of doubt or on other technical grounds like lack of sanction for prosecution or discharge of delinquent employee to be reinstated in service merely on account of his such acquittal in criminal case.
14. Now testing the facts of the case on touch-stone of the aforesaid proposition it is dear from the judgment and order of trial court dated 18.5.1990 passed in Session Trial No. 35/1983 it seems that the prosecution story has not been thrown out by the court conducting the trial in its entirety as found false by the court rather the accused has been acquitted on the ground of lack of sufficient evidence and on account of fact that Km. Mandodari Devi was major and joined the company of accused Amar Singh delinquent employee at her own accord without any positive evidence and proof of enticement made by him in this regard, therefore, it was found that the charges levelled against the petitioner under Section 363, 366 I.P.C. was not established. With regard to the illicit sexual inter-course with Km. Mandodari Devi by the petitioner during the period w.e.f. 13.9.82 to 24.9.82 in which they were admittedly living together only this much has been observed that there is no proof of resistance in sexual inter-course on the part of prosecutrix i.e. Km. Mandodari Devi. Therefore, the charges of rape under Section 376 I.P.C. was also found not proved against the petitioner without examining the aforesaid charge at several angles of descriptions given under Section 375 I.P.C., therefore, the aforesaid acquittal cannot be said to be clean and honourable acquittal of petitioner on merits wherein prosecution case was found totally false and thrown out in its entirety holding that the accused was falsely implicated in crime in question rather it was based on appreciation of evidence of record and found short of proof warranting the conviction of the petitioner in aforesaid offences. It might also be based on lack of sufficient evidence to establish the prosecution case beyond doubt but the same was not sufficient to conclude the disciplinary inquiry held against the petitioner in absence of such finding in criminal trial.
15. In a similar case of unproved bigamy in a criminal trial under Section 494 I.P.C. the Hon'ble Apex Court in a case of State of Karnataka and Anr. v. Venkataramanappa reported in J.T. 1996 (9) 734 has held that the prosecution evidence in criminal complaint may have fallen short of those standards but that does not mean that the State was debarred in any way from invoking the Rule of Karnataka Civil Service Rules, which forbids a Government servant to marry a second time without permission of the Government because for the purpose of Rule 28, such strict standards of proof as would warrant a conviction for bigamy under Section 494 I.P.C. may not be necessary and directed the departmental inquiry to be completed.
16. At this juncture it is necessary to point out that in a traditional society like ours the offences like under Section 363, 366, 368, 376 I.P.C. being crime of such nature which are also stigmatic and impair the social reputation of family of prosecutrix and victim badly, therefore, on this count also Ft has been seen at several occasions that people wants to bury the issue as far as possible and as early as possible without prolonging it and without hotly contesting the matter. Thus prosecution case in such cases occasionally fails for shortage of standard of proof and variety of such other reasons. In view of these facts and circumstances of the case also, 1 have no hesitation to hold that the aforesaid acquittal of petitioner could not legitimately conclude the departmental inquiry, which was held against him. Besides this as held by inquiry officer the charges in departmental inquiry were not same as in criminal trial. The disciplinary authority had also agreed with the aforesaid findings. Therefore, I could not find any error in it.
17. In so far as with regard to the question of opportunity of cross-examination of witnesses, adducing of defence evidence and furnishing of documents are concerned, it is necessary to point out that in paragraph 8 of the enquiry report the Enquiry Officer has recorded findings of fact that from the side of department six departmental witnesses were examined, the delinquent employee was afforded several opportunities to cross-examine the witnesses, but he either became absent or sought adjournments almost on the each and every dates when the witnesses attended the enquiry. The petitioner has cross-examined only one witness, namely Brahmanand son of Jamuna Sahai and did not cross-examine any other departmental witnesses. Although he was also permitted to engage counsel at his request and he had engaged Sri Atma Ram Saxena Advocate as his counsel but the petitioner and his counsel always tried to delay and avoid the enquiry in spite of several orders from this Court for expeditious disposal of the enquiry. Lastly, all the documents were furnished to him on 4.1.1993, though most of them were already in his possession, as they were related to his own cases. He did not lead any evidence in his defence despite adequate opportunity was afforded to him but he did not avail the same. For ready reference paragraph 8 of the enquiry report submitted by the Enquiry Officer is reproduced as under:-
"8. From the side of the department six departmental witnesses, namely, Sri Avinash Chandra Mishra-Ex-Second Clerk in Mainpuri Judgeship- witness No. 1, Sri Brahmanand son of Sri Jamuna Sahai witness No. 2, Sri Chandrahas Singh Ex-Sadar Munsarim- witness No. 3, Sri Ram Chandra, Senior Assistant District Election office, Mainpuri- witness No. 4, Sri Brahmanand son of Sri Mangali Prasad witness No. 5 and Sri Avinash Chandra Pandey-Ex-Senior Administrative Officer in Mainpuri Judgeship- witness No. 6 have been examined. The delinquent employee was afforded several opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, but he either became absent or sought adjournment almost on each and every date when the witnesses attended the inquiry and harassed the witnesses who had again and again to attend the inquiry and were returned. The delinquent employee has only cross-examined the witness No. 2 Sri Brahmanand son of Sri Jamuna Sahai and has not cross-examined any other departmental witness. He was also permitted to engage the counsel at his request and he engaged Sri Atma Ram Saxena Advocate. The delinquent employee and his counsel always tried to delay and avoid the inquiry in spite of several orders of the Hon'ble High Court for expeditious disposal of this inquiry Lastly copies of all documents etc. were furnished to him by 4.1.1993, though most of them were already in his possession as they related to his own judicial cases and witnesses were again summoned for cross-examination on 5.1.1993, but cross-examination was done only with one witness Sri Brahmanand son of Sri Jamuna Sahai and no cross-examination was done with other witnesses and therefore inquiry proceeded exparte. Sri Amar Singh delinquent employee has not led any evidence in his defence. Thus in spite of being afforded adequate and reasonable opportunity of hearing, he has not availed the opportunities."
18. In paragraph 9 of the enquiry report categorical finding has been recorded that the petitioner procured false and collusive medical certificate paper No. 101/2 from the Senior Medical Superintendent, District Hospital, Mainpuri for the period w.e.f. 7.12.1992 to 21.12.1992. Dr. S.P. Kureel, Homeopathic Doctor in the District Hospital, Mainpuri had submitted report paper No. 106/2 that Amar Singh was suffering from fever on 7.12.1992, but the application dated 7.12.1992 papers No. 92/1 and 93/3 and registered envelope paper No. 93/2 show that Amar Singh was never ill on 7.12.1992 as no ground of illness was mentioned in that applications, but it was stated that the petitioner has no hope of justice and wants to get assistance from the Hon'ble High Court. Therefore, these papers show that Amar Singh was quite hale and hearty on 7.12.1992 and 8.12.1992 and was not ill. The Enquiry Officer had further recorded finding that when the petitioner appeared before him on 15.12.1992, he was quite hale and hearty, but avoided to participate in the enquiry, these facts show that the medical certificate for the period w.e.f. 7.12.1992 to 21.12.1992 was procured by the petitioner in collusion with the doctor to justify his absence in enquiry. For ready reference paragraph 9 of the enquiry report is reproduced as under:-
"9. Rule 55(1) of Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules 1930 as applicable in U.P. lays down that (he delinquent employee shall be entitled to cross-examination the witnesses, to give evidence in person, to have such witnesses called as he may wish, provided that the Enquiry Officer may for sufficient reasons refuse to call a witness. Sub-rule (4) of the said Rule 55 provides that this rule shall not apply where the person concerned has absconded or where it is for other reasons impracticable to communicate with him. Similar are the provisions of Rule 5, U.P. Subordinate Court Staff (Punishment & Appeal) Rules, 1976, As already stated inspite of several opportunities Sri Amar Singh delinquent employee unjustifiably became absent on several dates in this inquiry and he unjustifiably avoided to cross-examine the witnesses and has led no evidence in defence inspite of reasonable opportunity being given to him. These facts are apparent from detailed orders passed in the order sheet. A mention may be made that he procured a false and collusive medical certificate paper No. 101/2 from the Senior Medical Superintendent, District Hospital, Mainpuri for the period from 7.12.92 to 21.12.92. Dr. S.P. Kureel, Homeopathic Doctor in the District Hospital, Mainpuri submitted a report paper No. 106/2 that he found Sri Amar Singh suffering from fever on 7.12.92, but applications dated 7.12.92 papers No. 93/1 and 93/3 and registered envelope 93/2 show that Sri Amar Singh was never ill on 7.12.92, as no ground of illness was mentioned in these applications, but it was stated that he had no hope of justice and wants to set assistance of the Hon'ble High Court and the inquiry be staved and Photostat copy of this application was also dispatched by Sri Amar Singh by registered post on 8.12.92 which are papers No. 93/2 and 93/3. Therefore, these papers show that Sri Amar Singh was quite hale and hearty on 7. 12.92 and 8.12.92 and was not ill. He also appeared before me in this inquiry on 15.12.92 and was quite hale and hearty, but avoided to participate in the inquiry. These facts show that the said certificate for leave from 7.12.92 to 21.12.92 was procured by Sri Amar Singh in collusion with the doctor to justify his absence from this inquiry and to avoid and delay the inquiry. As already mentioned on 5.1.93 witnesses were again summoned, but baseless applications were moved on behalf of Sri Amar Singh and cross-examination was not done with all the witnesses and therefore, opportunity of cross-examination had to be closed and inquiry had to be ordered to proceed exparte. As already stated the Hon'ble High Court had directed to conclude the inquiry within three months vide order dated 11.12.91 and thereafter vide order dated 20.5.92 the Hon'ble High Court again directed to conclude the inquiry within one month and by the third order dated 12.8.92 the Hon'ble High Court further directed to conclude the inquiry within one month, but due to dilatory tactics adopted by Sri Amar Singh could not he concluded in lime. Therefore, now this report is being submitted."
19. I have gone through the aforesaid findings of the Enquiry Officer, I could not find any illegality in the procedure followed in the disciplinary enquiry. The Enquiry Officer had recorded justified reasons for proceeding with the enquiry without causing any further delay in permitting the petitioner to cross-examine the witnesses, as according to the Enquiry Officer as and when the witnesses were summoned, the petitioner had avoided to appear before the Enquiry Officer by one pretext or the other. Besides this in para 22 of the counter affidavit a categorical statement of tact has been made to the effect that the petitioner had examined himself in defence on 22.12.1.992 before inquiry officer. He had cross-examined only one departmental witness according to his need and did not choose to cross-examine all other departmental witnesses whereas they were summoned again and again and lastly summoned again on 5.1.2003. The statement of petitioner made during inquiry is on record as Annexure-C.A.-5 of the counter affidavit. Thus it appears that as held by inquiry officer that the petitioner was trying to delay the proceedings by adopting dilatory tactics on one hand and on other hand tried to create grounds to challenge the proceedings at higher forum. In view of the aforesaid findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer and categorical statement of facts made in the counter affidavit, it cannot be said at all that the enquiry was concluded without affording adequate opportunity to the petitioner to cross-examine the witnesses and to adduce his own defence evidence during enquiry and he was not furnished the copy of documents relied upon by inquiry officer in the findings recorded by him. The decisions relied upon by the petitioner in this connection rendered in case of Mr. M.G. Jayaram Naidu v. University of Mysore and Ors., reported in 1974 All India Services Law Journal 699, Subhash Chandra Sharma v. Managing Director, U.P. Co-op. Spg. Mills Federation Ltd., Kanpur and Anr., reported in 1999(41 A.W.C. 3227, Gurucharan Singh v. National Thermal Power Corporation Ltd. and Ors., reported in 2004(2) A.W.C. 1365 and P.N. Srivastava v. State of U.P. and Ors., reported in 1999(1) E.S.C. 719 (All.) are distinguishable on the facts and can be of no assistance to the case of the petitioner in given facts and circumstances of the case discussed herein before.
20. The next submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that out of three charges framed against the petitioner in the chargesheet dated 11.6.1992, the Enquiry Officer has found proved only two charges against him. The third charge with regard to performance of second marriage by the petitioner with Km. Mandodari Devi during the life time of his first wedded wife Smt. Urmila Devi without obtaining prior permission of the Government and thereby breach of Rule 29 of the U.P. Government Servant Conduct Rules, 1956 on account of bigamous marriage prohibited for the Government servant under the above Rules was found not proved against the petitioner by the inquiry officer. The Disciplinary Authority had disagreed with the aforesaid findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer with regard to performance of second marriage by the petitioner. Thus in view of the proviso of Rule 3(4) of the U.P. Subordinate Court Staff (Punishment & Appeal) Rules, 1976, if the Punishing Authority was dis-agreed with any part or whole part of the enquiry report, the points of his dis-agreement were required to be communicated to the petitioner, but the disciplinary Authority did not communicate the same, as such the disciplinary proceedings in respect of charge No. 3 and the findings of the Disciplinary Authority on the aforesaid charge are vitiated under the law. In support of his submission learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decision rendered in Jagdish Prasad Yadav v. State of U.P. and Ors., reported in (2002) 1 UPLBEC 596.
21. To deal with the submission of learned counsel for petitioner and to find out complete answer to the questions involved there under and aforesaid case law cited by the learned counsel of the petitioner it is necessary to examine the relevant findings of inquiry officer and disciplinary authority and relevant service rule and other laws having material bearing with the issue. First of all it is necessary to reproduce paragraph 6 of the enquiry report, wherein the charges framed in the chargesheet dated 11.6.1992 have been incorporated in verbatim as under-
"6. Therefore vide charge sheet dated 11.6.92 paper No. 26 following charges have been framed against Sri Amar Singh Steno delinquent employee:-
Charges Firstly, that while you temporarily working as Stenographer in the court of Munsif, Mainpuri in this Judgeship during the month of September 1982 you indulged yourself in enticing a girl, named Km. Mandodari, from the rightful guardianship of her parent from village Ratanpur Bara, police station Ailau, District Mainpuri in the intervening night of 12/13.9.1992 and retaining her in your illegal custody till 18.9.1992 and developed illegitimate sexual relations with her, an act which was unbecoming of a Government servant and thereby you committed breach of Rule 3 of the Government Servant Conduct Rules.
Secondly, that you while working as Stenographer in this Judgeship during the aforesaid period remained absent and reports about your unsatisfactory work and conduct were made by your Presiding Officer involving even leakage of judgments and your indisciplined behaviour and thereby you committed gross misconduct.
Thirdly, that you while working as Stenographer remained absent from the office and on 18.9.92 at Meerut performed a second marriage with one Mandodari, daughter of Jamuna Sahai, resident of village Ratanpur Bara, police station Ailau, District Mainpuri, when you had already first wedded living wife, viz. Smt. Urmila Devi resident of village Kharpari, police station Kotwali, Mainpuri without obtaining permission of the Government/governor envisaged by the rules and thereby committed an offence by breach of Rule 29 of the U.P. Government Servant Conduct Rules, 1956 and also committed bigamous marriage prohibited for the Government servant under the above rules, which amounted to gross misconduct."
22. From the perusal of the enquiry report it appears that in paragraphs 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16 of the enquiry report the Enquiry Officer had dealt with charge No. 1, levelled against the petitioner and in paragraph 17 of the enquiry report he had concluded his findings on charge No. 1 and found proved against the petitioner. For ready reference paragraph 17 of the enquiry report is reproduced as under:-
"17. Thus from the aforesaid discussion and statement of witness No. 2 Sri Brahmanand son of Sri Jamuna Sahai, it is clear that Sri Amar Singh delinquent employee enticed away Km. Mandodari Devi from her parental house in the intervening night of 12/13.9.1982 and retained her in his illegal custody till 24.9.1982 and developed illegitimate sexual relations with her and kept Km. Mandodari Devi with him against the wishes of her father, mother and brothers. Hence, charge No. 1 is proved against Sri Amar Singh delinquent employee."
23. It appears that in para-18 of the inquiry report the Enquiry Officer while dealing with charge No. 3 had recorded the findings to the effect that in view of my conclusion upon charge No. 1 and in view of the judgment dated 30.11.1983 passed in Original Suit No. 494 of 1982 Amar Singh v. Km. Mandodari Devi, there has been no legal marriage between Amar Singh and Km. Mandodari Devi, therefore, prima facie this third charge had not been established. At this juncture it is necessary to point out that in para 13, 14, 15 and 16 of the report inquiry officer had discussed several documents and in para 15 recorded the finding to the effect that since in Original Suit No. 494 of 1982 Amar Singh v. Km. Mandodari Devi instituted by the petitioner seeking relief of permanent injunction for restraining Km. Mandodari Devi and her parents for arranging her marriage with any other person, IV Additional District Judge, Mainpuri vide judgment and order dated 30.11.1983 had held that there has been no legal marriage between Amar Singh and Km Mandodari Devi, therefore, in para 18 of the inquiry report he had held that prima facie charge No. 3 is not established. For ready reference paragraph 18 of the enquiry report is reproduced as under:-
"18. Charge No. 3:- This charge is that being already married with Smt. Urmila Devi, Sri Amar Singh delinquent employee performed second marriage with Km. Mandodari Devi. In view of my conclusion upon charge No. 1 and, specially in view of the judgment dated 30.11.1983 paper No. 125 Passed in Original Suit No. 494 of 1982 Amar Singh v. Smt. Mandodari Devi, there has been no legal marriage between Amar Singh and Mandodari Devi. Therefore, prima facie this third charge is not established. "
24. Thereafter, in paragraphs 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25 of the enquiry report, the Enquiry Officer had proceeded to deal with charge No. 3 in detail at length and discussed various papers and the evidence and in paragraph 25 of the enquiry report he had held that it is proved that Smt. Urmila Devi daughter of Mangali Prasad was married with Amar Singh son of Ram Bharosey resident of village Ratanpur Bora, delinquent employee and was not married with another Amar Singh son of Rati Ram, resident of village Rautamai, Thesil Chhibramau, District Farrukhabad and there has been no legal marriage of Amar Singh with Km. Mandodari Devi. Had there been any legal marriage of Amar Singh with Km. Mandodari Devi, then only this charge of bigamy would have been regarded as proved. Charge no 3 of bigamy is not established. For ready reference paragraphs 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25 of the enquiry report are reproduced as under:-
"19. However, here it may be mentioned that the delinquent employee Sri Amar Singh has taken the case that he was never married with Smt. Urmila Devi. This case of Sri Amar Singh does not appear to he correct and true. Witness No. 5 Sri Brahmanand son of Sri Mangali Prasad is the step brother of Smt. Urmila and from his statement it is clear that her step sister Smt. Urmila Devi was married to Sri Amar Singh delinquent employee, witness No. 2 Sri Brahmanand son of Jamuna Sahai lives in the house adjacent to the house of Sri Amar Singh delinquent employee in village Ratanpur Bara. He has stated that he has seen Sri Amar Singh delinquent employee and Smt. Urmila Devi living together as husband and wife. There is no reason that step brother witness No. 5 will falsely depose and falsely make an unknown person his brother-in-law. A person will never create such type of false relationship. Voter list paper No. 68 of the year 1983 also shows that Smt. Urmila Devi is the wife of Sri Amar Singh son of Ram Bharosey. All these evidence proves that Sri Amar Singh was married with Smt. Urmila Devi.
20. Here it may be mentioned that there was one letter of Smt. Urmila Devi of the year 1982 in which she mentioned herself as wife of Sri Amar Singh delinquent employee and requested the District Judge, Mainpuri to take action against Sri Amar Singh delinquent employee and this paper was in the earlier inquiry file and when earlier inquiry file was received in this judges hip from the Hon'ble High Court after disposal of the representation/appeal of Sri Amar Singh that paper was missing. It was paper No. 26 in the earlier inquiry file. One more paper No. 45 in the earlier inquiry file was missing which was report of the office. Two letters dated 21.12.91 paper No. 6 and dated 25.5.92 paper No. 20 were sent by the District Judge, Mainpuri to the Hon'ble High Court regarding the said two missing papers and Hon'ble High Court vide letter dated 25.6.92 paper No. 32 informed that no paper was detained there. Therefore the aforesaid two papers have been missed. This fact is also clear from the statement of the departmental witness No. 6 Sri Awdhesh Chandra Pandey, Ex. Senior Administrative Officer, in Mainpuri Judges his who had checked the earlier inquiry file in its receipt from the Hon'ble High Court and had noted the said papers missing.
21. There is one subsequent letter dated 4.6.92 of Smt. Urmila Devi paper No. 25 which was received by post wherein she mentioned herself as wife of Sri Amar Singh delinquent employee. Another inland letter dated 30.6.92 paper No. 34 is also on record which appears to be sent by Smt. Urmila Devi, wherein it is stated that two persons got her signatures upon some papers by fraud and used those papers in relation to some case illegally. Smt. Urmila Devi has now died and therefore, she was not available for examination in this inquiry. Sri Amar Singh delinquent employee has also filed an affidavit dated 27.7.90 alleged to be written by Smt. Urmila Devi which is paper No. 12/72 wherein she has stated that she was married with another Amar Singh son of Ratiram r/o village Rautamai, Tehsil Chhihramau, District Farrukhabad. It appears that this affidavit paper No. 12/72 and inland letter dated 30.6.92 paper No. 30 are manipulated and are forged papers and these papers appear to have been manipulated by Sri Amar Singh delinquent employee and are against the statement of witness No. 5 Sri Brahmanand s/o Sri Mangali Prasad who is step brother of Smt. Urmila Devi. The aforesaid affidavit and inland letter have no value for want of examination of Smt. Urmila Devi in this inquiry. Sri Amar Singh has filed forged papers which fact is clear from the following facts :-
22. Sri Amar Singh delinquent employee has filed a certified true copy of the voter list of the year 1983, which is paper No. 12/61 -69 wherein at page No. 9 at serial No. 317 Rakesh Singh son of Rambabu is mentioned as a voter and has also filed a Photostat copy of the printed voter list paper No. 12/76-79 and in this Photostat copy of the voter list at serial No. 317 Rakesh Singh s/o Ram Babu is mentioned as voter, whereas the District Election Officer has furnished certified true copy of the voter list paper No. 68, wherein at serial No. 317 Smt. Urmila Devi w/o Amar Singh who is son of Ram Bharosey is mentioned in the voter list. Seeing the contradictions in the copies of the voter list. Sri Ram Chandra. Senior Assistant. District Election Office. Mainpuri witness No. 4 was examined. He has stated that the certified true copy paper No. 68 is the correct copy of the voter list. As regards certified copy No. 12/61/69 filed by Sri Amar Singh, this witness has stated that in this certified copy of paper (having pages 9 and 10 on front and reverse side) has been changed by the person who has filed it and correct page has been removed and instead a forged page has been inserted and this witness Sri Ram Chandra stated that the said paper No. 12/65 hearing pages 9 and 10 of this certified copy was not prepared by- him and does not bear his initials and this is forged. In this paper the name of Rakesh Singh s/o Ram Babu at serial No. 317 has been wrongly got typed instead of real voter Smt. Urmila Devi w/o Amar Singh. Similarly, in relation to printed voter list paper No. 12/76/79 he has stated that in this printed voter list page No. 4 at the hack of paper No. 12/77 has been forged by getting printed separately in some private printing press and getting Photostat copy by posing it and printing of this page No. 4 is different from printing of other pages. This Photostat copy does not bear initials or signatures of any Election Officer but is attested by Veterinary Medical Officer, Kundraki, District Muradabad. Therefore, from the statement of Sri Ram Chandra witness No. 5, Senior Assistant District Election Officer, Mainpuri, it is clear that Sri Amar Singh delinquent employee has prepared and filed forged copies of voter list from which he cannot take any advantage. Sri Amar Singh has not filed the original of Photostat copy of voter list No. 12/76-79.
23. Sri Amar Singh delinquent employee has also taken the case that Smt. Urmila Devi was married with another Amar Singh s/o Ratiram r/o village Rautamai, Tehsil Chhibramau, District Farrukhabad and in this connection he has filed certificate of Gram Pradhan of village Kharpari, District Mainpuri paper No. 12/70, certificate of Gram Pradhan of village Rautamai. Tehsil Chhibramau. District Farrukhabad paper No. 12/71, certificate of Gram Pradhan of Ratanpur Bora. District Mainpuri paper No. 12/92, affidavit of Smt. Urmila Devi paper No. 12/72, copy of Pariwar Register paper No. 12/74, electoral roll of village Rautamai paper No. 12/75, but all these papers appear to be manipulated and got up and cannot be relied upon unless and until original documents are summoned and concerned officials are examined because it is proved that Sri Amar Singh is preparing forged papers and has filed two forged voter lists as discussed above. Besides, it may he mentioned that the aforesaid papers filed by Sri Amar Singh delinquent employee cannot also be relied upon in the face of statement of Sri Brahmanand s/o Sri Mangali Prasad witness No. 5 who is step brother of Smt. Urmila Devi and has stated that Smt. Urmila Devi was married with the delinquent employee.
24. When Sri Amar Singh delinquent employee surrendered in court on 24.9.82 in relation to criminal case under Sections 363, 366, 376 I.P.C. Km. Mandodari Devi had submitted an affidavit dated 24.9.82 paper No. 26/17. A copy whereof has also been filed by Sri Amar Singh which is paper No. 12/80 and in this affidavit Km. Mandodari Devi stated that there has been court marriage between Amar Singh and Mandodari Devi, hut this affidavit has no value because alleged marriage before the marriage Officer, Meerut was not legal as already discussed. Besides, by mere saying by any person that he is married with any person can not confer the status of being legally married if there has been no legal marriage. Mandodari Devi did not state before the Hon'ble High Court in Habeas Corpus writ petition that she was married with Sri Amar Singh.
25. Sri Amar Singh has led no evidence to controvert the statement of witness No. 2 Sri Brahmanand s/o Jamuna Sahai, witness No. 4 Sri Ram Chandra, Senior Assistant, District Election Office, Mainpuri and witness No. 5 Sri Brahmanand s/o Sri Mangali Prasad which should he relied upon. In view of the aforesaid discussions, it is proved that Smt. Urmila Devi daughter of Sri Mangali Prasad was married to Sri Amar Singh s/0 Ram Bharosey r/o Ratanpur Bora, the delinquent employee and was not married with another Amar Singh s/o Ratiram r/o Rautamai, Tehsil Chhibramau, District Farrukhabad and there has been no marriage of Sri Amar Singh with Mandodari Devi. Had there been any legal marriage of Sri Amar Singh with Mandodari Devi, then only this charge of bigamy would have been regarded as proved. Charge No. 3 of bigamy is not established."
25. With regard to charge No. 2 the Enquiry Officer has recorded his findings in paragraphs 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 and concluded in paragraph 32 of the enquiry report, whereby he had held that charge No. 2 has been established against the petitioner. For ready reference paragraphs 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 and 32 of the findings of the Enquiry Officer are reproduced as under:-
Charge No. 2:- The record of earlier inquiry file shows that Sri Amar Singh was posted at the time of his appointment in the court of Sri R.L. Shankhawaar, the then Judicial Magistrate( Economic Offences), Mainpuri. Sri R.L. Shankhwar, Judicial Magistrate was not satisfied with the work and conduct of Sri Amar Singh and he submitted a report dated 22.6.82 against Sri Amar Singh to the District Judge, Mainpuri which is paper No. 8 in the earlier enquiry file over which the then District Judge, Mainpuri called for his explanation and asked him to show cause why he be not ceased for the neglect of duty vide order dated 23.6.1982. In this report Sri R.L. Shankhwar, Judicial Magistrate had mentioned that the judgment in criminal case No. 965 of 1981 State v. Ram Deen under Section 379 I.P.C. read with Section 39 Electricity Act was to be delivered on 21.6.82 and the judgment was dictated to Sri Amar Singh on the same day i.e. 21. 6.1982, but the accused became absent and the judgment could not be delivered and 22.6.82 was to be fixed for judgment and on this day as well the accused became absent. In these circumstances, the learned Judicial Magistrate suspected that Sri Amar Singh had leaked the judgment and on being enquired Sri Amar Singh Steno impertinently behaved with Sri R.L. Shankhwar, Judicial Magistrate. Sri Amar Singh steno submitted his explanation to the District Judge, Mainpuri which is paper No. 9 in the earlier inquiry filed and he refuted the allegations made by Sri R.L. Shankhwar, Judicial Magistrate. The learned District Judge, Mainpuri passed the following order upon the explanation of Sri Amar Singh:-
"Seen, he should not have behaved with the Presiding Officer bluntly and impertinently. He is severely warned for it. His work is also reported to he unsatisfactory and he should improve otherwise he would be ceased. "
27. Sri Amar Singh remained posted with Sri R.L. Shankhwar, Judicial Magistrate till 1.8.82 and from 2.8.82 he was posted in the court of Sri M.P.S. Tejan, II Addl. Munsif Magistrate, Mainpuri and Sri M.P.S. Tejan, II Addl. Munsif Magistrate, Mainpuri also found the work and conduct of Sri Amar Singh unsatisfactory and he served a notice upon Sri Amar Singh vide order dated 20.8.82 calling upon his explanation and this is paper No. 10 in the earlier inquiry file. In his order calling upon explanation from Sri Amar Singh, Sri M.P.S. Tejan, II Addl. Munsif Magistrate, Mainpuri mentioned that Sri Amar Singh Steno did not regularly attend his office at residence for taking dictation in the morning hours. Every Judicial Officer has to do judicial work of judgment writing etc. at his residence. Sri Amar Singh did not submit any explanation to Sri M.P.S. Tejan, II Addl. Munsif Magistrate, Mainpuri in compliance of order dated 20.8.82. Therefore, Sri M.P.S. Tejan, II Addl. Munsif Magistrate, Mainpuri was compelled to submit a report, dated 21.8.82 to the District Judge, Mainpuri, which is paper No. II and 12 in the earlier inquiry file. Upon this report the then District Judge, Mainpuri called for explanation of Sri Amar Singh Steno and Sri Amar Singh Steno submitted his explanation dated 24.8.82 to the District Judge, which is papers No. 13 and 14 in the earlier inquiry file. In his explanation Sri Amar Singh Steno admitted that he did not attend the residence of the Presiding Officer on one day. The District Judge ordered for his transfer to any other court. Thereafter from 28.8.82 Amar Singh Steno was posted in the court of Sri Phool Singh, Munsif Mainpuri and the then Munsif Mainpuri also found his work and conduct unsatisfactory. Sri Amar Singh Steno remained absent from 13.9.82 to 15.9.82 without prior leave. The then learned Munsif Mainpuri was also compelled to submit a report to the District Judge, Mainpuri on 16.9.82, which is paper No. 19 in the earlier inquiry file. It may be mentioned that in the night of 12/13.9.82 Sri Amar Singh had enticed away Km. Mandodari Devi and carried her to Meerut and Criminal Case was lodged against him and he surrendered before the court of Magistrate on 24.9.82 and thereafter vide order dated 30.9.82 the then District Judge had ceased his services with effect from 16.9.82.
28. Though the said Officers have not been examined, but their reports should be given due weight and it shall he presume that they submitted correct reports and unauthorized absence of Sri Amar Singh delinquent employee since 13.9.82 is an admitted facts. There can be no reasons for dissatisfaction of all the Officers with the work and conduct of Sri Amar Singh except on the ground that really his work and conduct was unsatisfactory and reports were correctly made against him.
29. The aforesaid reports and orders of the District Judge, Mainpuri are proved by Sri Avinash Chandra Mishra Ex. Second Clerk witness No. 1 and further by Sri Chandra has Singh. Ex. Sadar Munsarim- witness No. 3. Cross- examination was done with Sri Chandrahas Singh on 5.12.92, but on 5.12.92 statement was not recorded on oath and it was felt that his statement should be recorded on oath and therefore his statement on oath was again recorded on 10.12.92 and Sri Amar Singh avoided cross-examination with this witness. Therefore from the said paper it is proved that Sri Amar Singh remained absent without prior leave and there was suspicion on him to leake judgment and he was found impertinent and his work and conduct was not found satisfactory by all the officers with whom he remained posted during his small period of service from 5.4.82 till 16.9.82.
30. In this connection it may be mentioned that the conduct of Sri Amar Singh has been very much impertinent and indisciplined during this inquiry as well which is clear from the following facts. A marginal note in the order sheet dated 2.6.92 shows that Sri Amar Singh refused to receive the copy of suspension order after perusing it. After re-framing of charge sheet on 11.6.92 Sri Amar Singh delinquent employee was ordered to appear on 25.6.92 to receive the amended charge sheet and to submit reply by 2.7.92, but he absented and therefore copy of amended charge sheet had to he sent through registered post which he also avoided. After several dates on 1.8.92 the District Judge. Mainpuri who himself was conducting inquiry at that time, tendered a copy of the amended charge sheet to Sri Amar Singh, who was present, but Sri Amar Singh refused to receive the amended charge sheet and stated that he shall receive the amended charge sheet on 3.8.92. On 3.8.92 Sri Amar Singh delinquent employee refused to sign the order sheet. He levelled false and baseless allegations with impunity against all the Enquiry Officers as is clear from his various applications papers No. 15. 58. 73. 75. 80. 93. 101. III. 113 and 119.
31. It may again be mentioned here that vide order dated 21.12.91 (upon paper No. 4) the District Judge appointed IInd Additional District Judge, Mainpuri as Enquiry Officer. At that time Sri S.K. Gautam was the IInd Addl. District Judge. For reasons best known to the delinquent employee he did not want inquiry in the hands of Sri S.K. Gautam and got the Enquiry Officer changed by making an oral prayer to the District Judge, and therefore, the District Judge, Mainpuri changed the Enquiry Officer vide order dated 3.1.92 (this order is upon paper No. 3/1). Sri Dhani Ram, 1st Addl. District Judge was appointed Enquiry Officer. In his application dated 12.3.92 paper No. 15 Sri Amar Singh delinquent employee made false allegations against Sri Dhani Ram, 1st Addl. District Judge, Enquiry Officer and the District Judge passed an order dated 13.3.92 paper No. 17 upon his application. After transfer of Sri Dhani Ram, 1st Addl. District Judge from Mainpuri in June, 1992 the District Judge himself began to conduct the inquiry and Sri Amar Singh delinquent employee made false allegations against the District Judge as well and did not desire inquiry even in the hands of the District Judge as is clear from his several applications dated 28.10.92 and 1.12.92 which are papers No. 58 & 73. When Sri Amar Singh delinquent employee began to make false allegations against the District Judge, the District Judge thought it fit to appoint any other officer to conduct the inquiry further and therefore the District Judge, Mainpuri vide order dated 1.12.92 appointed Sri S.K. Gautam, IInd Addl. District Judge, Mainpuri to conduct the inquiry. Then Sri Amar Singh delinquent employee moved further application dated 2.12.92 paper No. 75 that he did not want inquiry in the hands of Sri S.K. Gautam. Addl. District Judge. Therefore, the District Judge, Mainpuri again changed the Enquiry Officer and appointed me to complete the inquiry vide order dated 2.12.92 and Sri Amar Singh delinquent employee has not even spared me and has levelled false and baseless allegations against me in several applications namely, papers No. 80, 93, 101, 111, 113 & 119. It appears that the sole aim of Sri Amar Singh delinquent employee has been to avoid and delay the inquiry and he never wanted speedy disposal of this inquiry and had no respect for the several orders of the Hon'ble High Court regarding expeditious disposal of this inquiry. From the language used in the aforesaid several applications and application dated 13.1.92 paper No. 7/1 and application dated 13.1.94 paper No. 26/10-11, it also appears that he is very much impertinent in use of words in his applications and the language used by him in his said several applications is very much impertinent, discourteous and goes to show his utter indiscipline.
32. He has also procured a false and collusive medical, certificate paper No. 101/2 from the District Hospital, Mainpuri. Therefore, Sri Amar Singh Steno has been grossly impertinent, indisiplined and committed mis-conduct involving even leak of Judgment and became unauthorisedly absent from his duties on several occasions in morning hours at the residence of his Presiding Officers and also become unauthorisedly absent from 13.9.82 without prior leave. He has also forged and filed forged copies of electoral roll. Therefore, charge No. 2 is also established against him as already discussed. "
26. In view of the aforesaid findings the Enquiry Officer had proposed punishment of dismissal in paragraph 33 of the enquiry report, which is reproduced as under-
"33. In view of my conclusions upon the aforesaid charges, the conduct of Sri Amar Singh Steno delinquent employee in keeping Km. Mandodari Devi from 13.9.82 till 24.9.82 against wishes of her parents and brother is highly improper and unbecoming of being a public servant. His conduct in taking away Km. Mandodari Devi to Meerut is also highly improper. The facts of Ram Gopal Chaturvedi v. State of Madhya Pradesh, A.I.R. 1971 Supreme Court page 158 (Para 8) show that a Civil Judge was dismissed from services on similar facts. He is most impertinent and indiscplined and committed misconduct and even forged papers. Therefore, he is not fit to remain in service. In my opinion, he should be dismissed from service with disqualification for Government service in future. Therefore, I proposed that Sri Amar Singh delinquent employee should be dismissed from service with disqualification for Government service in future. "
27. Now it is also necessary to examine the findings of the Disciplinary Authority/Punishing Authority/District Judge, Mainpuri on the aforesaid charges of misconduct levelled against the petitioner. With regard to first and second charges and the quantum of punishment proposed by the Enquiry Officer, the Disciplinary Authority had agreed with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer. In so far as the findings with regard to the third charge in connection of breach of Rule 29 of the U. P. Government Servant Conduct Rules, 1956 is concerned i.e. the charge pertaining to the contract bigamous marriage prohibited for the Government servant without first obtaining permission from the Government, the Disciplinary Authority did not agree with the inference or conclusion drawn by the Enquiry Officer on the basis of materials available on record. For ready reference the findings recorded by the Disciplinary Authority in this regard is reproduced as under:-
"In regard to first charge regarding committing breach of Rule 3 of the U.P. Government Servant Conduct Rules the Enquiry Officer held that Sri Amar Singh did not legally marry Km. Mandodari Devi. He fraudulently procured marriage certificate issued by the Marriage Officer, Meerut. Sri Amar Singh was acquitted of the charges Under Sections 363/366/376 IPC. in S.T. No. 35 of 1983 on 18.5.90 on the ground that Km. Mandodari Devi was above eighteen years of age and there was no definite evidence of enticement and she went on her own accord with Sri Amar Singh and that there was no proof of resistence by the girl for sexual intercourse.
It is admitted to Sri Amar Singh that he and Km. Mandodari Devi contracted marriage at Meerut before Marriage Officer. He filed habeas corpus petition No. 12404 of 82 at Allahabad which is paper No. 26/28 where Km. Mandodari Devi was summoned and she stated that she was not in illegal custody of her father. On her statement the petition filed by Sri Amar Singh was dismissed. Sri Amar Singh again filed petition No. 2 of 83 for restitution of conjugal rights which was decreed exparte by IV Addl. District Judge. Mainpuri on 30.11.83 paper No. 26/27. This exparte judgment was set aside on 17.7.84 and is still pending in the court of 1st Addl. District Judge. Mainpuri. Again Sri Amar Singh filed O.S. No. 494 of 82 for restraining her and her father from re-marrying Mandodari Devi with some other person. The suit was contested and it was dismissed on merits on 30.11.83 (Paper No. 125/1-3) with the observation that judge was no legal marriage between Sri A mar Singh and Mandodari Devi. The marriage certificate filed by Sri Amar Singh paper No. 12/35 is no certificate in the eye of law for non compliance of Sections 5 and 6 of Special Marriage Act.
I agree with the finding of the learned Enquiry Officer that Km. Mandodari was in his illegal custody from 13.9.92 till 24.9.92 and his behaviour and conduct is unbecoming of a Government servant.
As regards the charge that while working as Stenographer he remained absent from office and performed second marriage with Km. Mandodari while he was already married with Smt. Urmila Devi, the delinquent employee produced copy of voter list which according to the Enquiry Officer is a forged one. The Enquiry Officer has rightly held that his marriage with Smt. Urmila Devi is proved from the evidence on the record and during subsistence of first married wife, according to his own allegation, he contracted second marriage with Km. Mandodari Devi under Special Marriage Act at Meerut. Learned Enquiry Officer held that there was no legal marriage between Sri Amar Singh and Km. Mandodari Devi. The charge of bigamy is not proved against the delinquent employee. Therefore, the delinquent employee has not committed breach of Rule 29 of U. P. Government Servant Conduct Rules, 1956. I disagree with the finding of the learned Enquiry Officer. Rule 29 is reproduced below:-
"No Government servant who has a wife living shall contract another marriage without first obtaining the permission of the Government.... "
The word 'marriage' does not connote valid marriages but it also includes invalid and void marriage. Therefore, about the said charge of contracting another marriage without prior permission of the Government, he thus committed breach of Rule 29 of the Government Servant Conduct Rules.
As regards the second charge, reports regarding unsatisfactory work and indiscplined behaviour is prayed from the evidence on the record. I agree with the finding of the learned Enquiry Officer."
28. From the perusal of the findings of the Disciplinary Authority, it is dear that he had agreed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer, wherein he has held that petitioner has already married with Smt. Urmila Devi. The Disciplinary Authority had further recorded finding that during life time of first married wife or subsistence of his first marriage according to his own allegations and documents placed before the Enquiry Officer, the petitioner had married with Km. Mandodari Devi under Special Marriage Act at Meerut. Since the Enquiry Officer had held that in view of decision of IV Addl. D.J. dated 30.11.83 in O.S. No. 494 of 1982 there was no legal marriage between the petitioner and Km. Mandodari Devi, therefore, the charge of bigamy was not proved against the delinquent employee. Thus with regard to the conclusion and inference drawn by inquiry officer on the basis of material available on record in respect of standard of proof of charge of bigamy and consequent breach of Rule 29 of the Government Servant Conduct Rules, it appears that there is difference of opinion between inquiry officer and disciplinary authority. Therefore, in order to arrive at a correct conclusion, it is essential to examine which of the two views is correct in a given facts and circumstances of the case. In order to find out complete and correct answer to this question it is necessary to examine relevant statutory provisions of law having material bearing on the issue. In this connection it would be useful and appropriate to examine relevant statutory provisions applicable to the employee inasmuch as relevant provisions of Hindu Marriage Act 1955 and Special Marriage Act and provisions of Section 494 I.P.C. For ready reference the provisions of Rule 29 of the Uttar Pradesh Government Servant Conduct Rules, 1956 is reproduced again as under:-
"29. Bigamous marriage -(1) No Government servant who has a wife living shall contract another marriage without first obtaining the permission of the Government notwithstanding that such subsequent marriage is permissible under the personal law for the lime being applicable to him.
(2) No female Government servant shall marry any person who has a wife living without first obtaining the permission of the Government. "
29. Although the heading of rule is much significant and throws sufficient light to convey correct meaning of the expression 'marriage' used in the rule but a bare reading of the aforesaid provisions also make it dear that a Government servant, who has a wife living, is prohibited to contract another marriage without first obtaining the permission of the Government. The contract of another marriage is prohibited to such Government servant, for whom the contract of second marriage would be lawful and permissible under Personal Law applicable to him. Thus it is clear that contract of another marriage for the purposes of the aforesaid rule in absence of any prior permission of the Government by the Government servant, while his first wife is living would be a breach or infraction of the aforesaid rules and accordingly would be treated to be gross misconduct on the part of the Government servant. The aforesaid rule is based on sound public policy for simple reason that every Government servant irrespective of caste, creed or sect, race or religion, usage and customs prevailing in his religion, sect or community is required to observe minimum code of conduct so as ensure uniformity and purity in public life. That is why rule, envisaged that unless prior permission is obtained from the Government such subsequent another marriage during the lifetime of his first wife would be contrary to and in violation of rules even if contract of such subsequent second marriage is permissible under personal law applicable to such Government servant. Thus it leaves no room for doubt that since expression "marriage" used in rule is without any adjective of valid or invalid or void hence should not be given restrictive meaning rather, it should be given such meaning which would include invalid or void marriage also.
30. Under Section 11 of Hindu Marriage Act 1955 and Section 24 of the Special Marriage Act 1954 a bigamous marriage is "void" marriage. Under Section 5(1) of Hindu Marriage Act, bigamy includes both polygamy and polyandry. Polygamy permits a male to have more than one wife simultaneously. Polyandry permits to a female to have more than one husband simultaneously. Similar provisions have also been made in Section 4(a) of the Special Marriage Act in this regard. A void marriage is no marriage in the eye of law. It is marriage which does not exists from its beginning. It is called a marriage because two persons have undergone to ceremonies of marriage since it is a void marriage, therefore, no legal consequence and mutual rights and obligations flows from such marriage. It does not confer legal marital status to either party of the marriage and legitimacy to the children born there from. It is also punishable under Section 17 of Hindu Marriage Act and Section 44 of the Special Marriage Act and Section 494 and 495 I.P.C. Thus from the aforesaid provisions of law it is clear that a bigamous marriage is virtually a void marriage because of the reason that it is solemnized while either party of the marriage has a spouse living at the time of such second marriage.
31. Apart from the provisions of Hindu Marriage Act and Special Marriage Act, Section 494 I.P.C. also describes such marriage as void and punishable under the code. The provisions of Section 494 I.P.C. reads as under:
"494. Marrying again during life-time of husband of wife.- Whoever, having a husband or wife living marries in any case in which such marriage is void by reason of its taking place during the life of such husband or wife, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine."
Exception.- This section does not extend to any person who marriage with such husband or wife has been declared void by a Court of competent jurisdiction, nor to any person who contracts a marriage during the life of a former husband or wife, if such husband or wife, at the time of the subsequent marriage, shall have been continually absent from such person for the space of seven years, and shall not have been heard of by such person as being alive within that time provided the person contracting such subsequent marriage shall, before such marriage takes place, inform the person with whom such marriage is contracted of the real state of facts so far us the same are within his or her knowledge. "
32. From the perusal of aforesaid section and exception appended thereto it is clear that unless the second or subsequent marriage falls within the category of exception of the aforesaid section any such subsequent marriage during the life time of husband or wife would be void by reason of its taking place during the life time of such husband or wife to become punishable under the provisions of Code. Thus bigamous marriage is virtually a void marriage under law and take place during the life of first husband or wife. Thus from a close scrutiny and analyses of the various provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, Special Marriage Act and purpose and object and scheme underlying thereunder and aforesaid provision of Indian Penal Code it is clear for the purposes of rights and obligation as marital status to the parties of Marriage, law of succession and inheritance inasmuch as matrimonial disputes, the solemnization of marriage in accordance of the provisions of law is essential. Necessary formalities of ceremony of solemnization of marriage and strict proof thereof is essential. Similarly solemnization of bigamous marriage is also essential in accordance of the provisions of law and strict proof thereof is necessary for the purposes of aforesaid Acts and provisions of Section 494 of I.P.C. otherwise it would not be a second marriage or a bigamous marriage in the eye of law.
33. The aforesaid discussion leads towards an another question required to be answered by this Court, as to whether for the purposes of Rule 29 of the aforesaid rule the second/another marriage during the life time of first wife is required to be contracted strictly in accordance of the provisions of law or any short thereof and its strict proof is essential or not? In my considered view, to insist upon that the bigamous marriage should be strictly in accordance of law and strict proof thereof essential it would defeat and frustrate the very purpose and object of the rule itself. The provisions of the rule would not be practicable to be pressed into service and virtually the rule would be rendered redundant/inefficacious and unworkable for the simple reason that in domestic inquiry, disciplinary authority is not expected to go into intricacies of such legal niceties as expected from regular competent civil. Matrimonial and Criminal Courts. It is also because of the reason that the purpose and object of domestic inquiry is altogether different and distinct from other civil or criminal proceedings. The nature, scope and standard of proof are also different in such proceedings as held in preceding part of the judgment. Therefore, the disciplinary proceeding being quasi-judicial administrative proceeding cannot be equated with the civil or criminal proceedings before regular court. Accordingly the administrative authorities are not required to go into such deep and detail scrutiny into the matter in domestic inquiry. They are required to make limited inquiry of misconduct under the relevant service rule for their administrative purposes. In such limited domestic/disciplinary inquiry, they are expected to collect materials and evidence not strictly in accordance of rule of evidence as held earlier and that Strict Standard of proof is not required in domestic inquiry, it is also not reasonably practicable for them to follow such standard for variety of limitations and handicaps. If on the basis of such available material a reasonable conclusion can be drawn, it is op< for them to arrive at such conclusion.
34. At this juncture it would be useful to refer a decision of Humble Apex Court rendered in State of Karnataka and another V.T. Venkataramanappa JT 1996 (SC 734 : 1996 (6) SCC 455) where the charge of bigamy against delinquent Government employee for the purpose of misconduct under relevant service rule w under consideration. The respondent, a police constable was prosecuted at the instant of his wife for having contracted second marriage. He was discharged for want evidence. A departmental inquiry was instituted against him for having contract second marriage, for which he was suspended. He approached the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal against the order of suspension and for stopping of the inquiry against him on the ground that a criminal court had discharged him of the offence bigamy. Tribunal accepted the stand of the respondent, quashed the department proceedings and lifted the suspension. On appeal filed by the State Their Lordship Humble Supreme Court has held as under :- "There is a string of judgments of this Court hereunder strict proof of solemnization of the second marriage, with due observance of rituals and ceremonies, has been insisted upon. The prosecution evidence in the criminal complaint may have fallen short of those standards hut that does not mean that the State was in any way debarred from invoking Rule 28 of the Karnataka Civil Service Rules, which forbids a government servant to marry a second time without the permission of the Government. But, here the respondent being a Hindu, could never have been granted permission by the Government to marry a second time because of his personal law forbidding such marriage. It was thus beyond the ken of the Tribunal to have scuttled the departmental proceedings against the respondent on the footing that such question of bigamy should normally not be taken up for decision in departmental enquiries, as the decisions of competent courts tending to be decisions in ram would stand at the highest pedestal. There was a clear fallacy in such view because for purposes of Rules 28, such strict standards, as would warrant a conviction for bigamy under Section 494 I PC, may not, to begin with, be necessary."
35. Thus from the aforesaid discussions, I am of considered opinion that the inquiry officer tell into error while holding that the marriage between the Amar Singh and Km. Mandodari Devi was not legal marriage for the reasons that in injunction suit No. 494/1982 Amar Singh v. Mandodari Devi restraining her and her parents for arranging her marriage with other person while dismissing the civil suit vide judgment and order dated 30.11.83, IV Addl. District Judge held that there was no legal marriage between Amar Singh and Km. Mandodari Devi and second marriage was solemnized in another district i.e. Meerut, in violation of Section 5 and 6 of Special Marriage Act inasmuch as Marriage Certificate was obtained by playing fraud in collusion of Marriage Officer, Meerut. In my opinion for the strict proof of second marriage as bigamous marriage and strict adherence of the provisions of Special Marriage Act as was required in suit for injunction for restraining the Mandodari Devi and her parents for arranging her marriage with other person was not required for purpose of Rule 29 of the aforesaid rule for holding him guilty of misconduct for violation of Rule 29 of the aforesaid Rule. The aforesaid finding could be justify in conferring marital status to the parties of marriage and for matrimonial relations and other obligations arise out of such marriage. The aforesaid suit of the petitioner was dismissed rightly or wrongly it does not much matters for disciplinary inquiry. It could have been dismissed for other reasons also that since his second marriage being bigamous and void, therefore, it was not legal marriage with Mandodari Devi so as to restrain her and her parents from arranging her marriage with another person.
36. It is not in dispute that Km. Mandodari Devi herself has submitted an affidavit on 24.9.1982 paper No. 26/17 when the petitioner was in police lockup. A copy of which has also been filed by Sri Amar Singh which is paper No. 12/80 wherein Km. Mandodari Devi has stated that there has been court marriage between her and Amar Singh. Besides this, other papers through out submitted by Amar Singh delinquent employee to the effect that he has married with Km. Mandodari Devi and clearly admitted the factum of marriage with Km. Mandodari Devi, which is second marriage during the life time of Smt. Urmila Devi as found proved by the inquiry officer also shows that he has contracted second marriage during the life time of his first married wife Smt. Urmila Devi. Therefore for the purpose of Rule 29 of the aforesaid rules the strict proof of second marriage strictly in accordance of Special Marriage Act during the lifetime of first wife was not required and could not be insisted upon by the inquiry officer. Thus in my considered opinion the view taken by inquiry officer in this regard is wholly erroneous and misconceived. Contrary to it the view taken by disciplinary authority was justified in given facts and circumstances of the case.
37. Now an another question arises for consideration as to whether the aforesaid findings of the Disciplinary Authority on charge No. 3 are vitiated for non-compliance of the proviso to Rule 5(4) of the Uttar Pradesh Subordinate Courts Staff (Punishment and Appeals) Rules, 1976 or not? In order to find out suitable answer of this question it, is necessary to have a glance over the provisions of Clause (4) of Rule 5 of the Uttar Pradesh Subordinate Courts Staff (Punishment and Appeals) Rules, 1976, which is reproduced as under-
"5(4) After the inquiry against a Government servant has been completed and after the punishing authority has arrived at provisional conclusions in regard to the penalty to be imposed, the Government servant charged shall if the penalty proposed is dismissal, removal or reduction in rank, be supplied with a copy of the report of the enquiry officer prepared under Sub-rule (1) together with the recommendation if any, in regard to punishment, made by the officer conducting the inquiry and be given a notice stating the penalty proposed to be imposed on him and calling upon him to submit a particular date which affords him reasonable time, such representation as he may be to make on the proposed penalty, provided that such representation shall he based on the evidence adduced during the inquiry.
Provided that, if for sufficient reasons, the punishing authority disagrees with any part or whole of the report of the enquiring officer above mentioned; the point or points of such disagreement together with a brief statement in the grounds there of shall also he communicated to the Government servant charged. "
38. From the perusal of the aforesaid proviso of the rule, it is dear that the aforesaid proviso embodied a facet of the principles of natural justice, which might have many facets whether the non-compliance of any facet of the principles of natural justice vitiates or fatal to the disciplinary proceedings is a question to be considered in the light of facts and situation of the case as to whether any prejudice has been caused to the petitioner on account of such non-compliance of the aforesaid facet of the principles of natural justice or rules? In order to appreciate the issue in better manner it would be appropriate to refer some decisions of Hon'ble Apex Court wherein Hon'ble Apex Court has enunciated sufficient law from time to time on similar issue.
39. In Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and Ors. v. B. Karunakar and Ors. reported in 1993(4) SCC 727 : AIR 1994 SC page 1074 Hon'ble Apex Court at page 1092-93 of the report has held as under :-
"Hence, in all cases where the Inquiry Officer's report is not furnished to the delinquent employee in the disciplinary proceedings, the courts and Tribunals should cause the copy of the report to he furnished to the aggrieved employee if he has not already secured it before coming to the Court Tribunal and give the employee an opportunity to show how his or her case was prejudiced because of the non-supply of the report. If after hearing (he parties, the Court /Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the non-supply of the report would have made no difference to the ultimate findings and (he punishment given, the Court/Tribunal should not interfere with the order of punishment. The Court/Tribunal should not mechanically set aside the order of punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished as is regrettably being done at present. The courts should avoid resorting to short-cuts. Since it is the Courts/Tribunals, which will apply their judicial mind to the question and give their reasons for setting aside or not setting aside the order of punishment( and not any internal appellate or provisional authority), there would be neither a breach of the principles of natural justice nor a denial of the reasonable opportunity. It is only if the Courts/Tribunals find that the furnishing of the report would have made a difference to the result in the case that it should set aside the order of punishment. Where after following the above procedure, the Courts/Tribunals set aside the order of punishment, the proper relief that should be granted is to direct reinstatement of the employee with liberty to the authority/management to proceed with the inquiry by placing the employee under suspension and continuing the inquiry from the stage of furnishing him with the report. The question whether the employee would be entitled to the back wages and other benefits from the date of his dismissal to the date of his reinstatement if ultimately ordered should invariably be left to be decided by the authority concerned according to law after the culmination of the proceedings and depending on the final outcome. If the employee succeeds in the fresh enquiry and is directed to be reinstated, the authority should be at liberty to decide according to law how it will treat the period from the date of dismissal till the reinstatement and to what benefits, if any and the extent of the benefits, he will be entitled. The reinstatement made as a result of the setting aside of the inquiry for failure to furnish the report should be treated as a reinstatement for the purpose of holding the fresh inquiry from the stage of furnishing the report and no more, where such fresh inquiry is held that will also he the correct position in law."
40. In case of M.C. Mehta v. Union of India and Ors., reported in AIR 1999 Supreme Court 2583 in para 21 of the decision of Hon'ble Apex Court has taken note of earlier decision rendered in S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, reported in(1980) 4 SCC 379 : AIR 1981 SC 136 and in paragraph 22 of the decision it is held that if on the admitted or indisputable factual position, only one conclusion is possible and permissible, the Court need not issue a writ merely because there is violation of principles of natural justice. For ready reference paragraphs 21 and 22 of the aforesaid decision are reproduced as under:-
"21. It is true that in Ridge v. Balwin, 1964 AC 40, it has been held that breach of principles of natural justice is in itself sufficient to grant relief and that no further de facto prejudice need be shown. It is also true that the said principles have been followed by this Court in several cases but we might point out that this Court has not laid down any absolute rule. This is clear from the judgment of Chinnappa Reddy, J. in S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan (1980)4 SCC 379 : AIR 1981 SC 136. After stating (P.395) (of SCC) ; (at P. 147 of AIR) that principles of natural justice know of no exclusionary rule dependent on whether it would have made any difference if natural justice had been observed and that non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to a man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary.
"As we said earlier, where on the admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion is possible and under the law only one penalty is permissible the Court may not issue its writ to compel the observance of natural justice, not because it is not necessary to observe natural Justice but because Courts do not issue futile writs. "
22. It is, therefore, clear that if on the admitted or indisputable factual position, only one conclusion is possible and permissible, the Court need not issue a writ merely because there is violation of principles of natural justice. "
41. In Canara Bank and Ors. v. Shri Debasis Das and Ors., reported in JT 2003(3) SC 183 in paragraph 12 of the decision the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that where grant of opportunity in terms of principles of natural justice do not improve the situation, "useless formality theory" can be pressed into service. For ready reference the observation made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in paragraph 12 of the decision is reproduced as under:-
"12. Residual and crucial question that remains to be adjudicated is whether principles of natural justice, have been violated : and if so, what extent any prejudice has been caused. It may be noted at this juncture that in some cases it has been observed that where grant of opportunity in terms of principles of natural justice do not improve the situation, "useless formality theory" can be pressed into service. "
42. Similar view has also been taken by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Canara Bank v. V.K. Awasthy, reported in JT 2005(4) SC 40. For ready reference the observations made in paragraph 18 of the judgment are reproduced as under:-
"18. As was observed by this Court we need not to go into 'useless formality theory' in detail; in view of the fact that no prejudice has been shown. As is rightly pointed out by learned counsel for the appellant unless failure of justice is occasioned or that it would not be in public interest to do so in particular case, this Court may refuse to grant relief to the concerned employee (see Gadde Venkateswara Rao v. Govt. of A. P. and Ors.). It is to be noted that legal formulations cannot be divorced from the fact situation of the case. Personal hearing was granted by the Appellate Authority, though not statutorily prescribed. In a given case post-divisional hearing can obliterate the procedural deficiency of a pre-decisional hearing."
43. In this connection it is necessary to mention here that from the pleadings in the writ petition there is nothing to indicate that on account of non-compliance of the aforesaid proviso of Rule embodying the principles of natural justice any material prejudice has been caused to the petitioner as the petitioner cannot dispute the fact that he had contracted his second marriage with Km. Mandodari Devi, while his first wife Smt. Urmila Devi was living without any prior permission of the Government. It was throughout his case in the disciplinary proceedings that he had married with Km. Mandodari Devi. It would not be out of place to mention that for that purpose he had placed the marriage certificate issued by the Marriage Officer, Meerut under Special Marriage Act. He had filed the Habeas Corpus petition before this Court claiming that Km. Mandodari Devi had been married with him, but her parents have illegally detained her. The aforesaid Habeas Corpus petition was dismissed. He filed a suit for restitution of conjugal rights claiming that the Km. Mandodari Devi is his wedded wife. Besides this, he has also filed a suit for permanent injunction restraining Km. Mandodari Devi and her parents to organise her marriage with any other person. Although his aforesaid suit has also been dismissed but in all the proceedings the petitioner's own case is that he had married with Km. Mandodari Devi and she had also admitted at one point of time by filing an affidavit on 24.9.82 stating therein that she had married with the petitioner in court under Special Marriage Act. A copy of the aforesaid affidavit has been filed by the petitioner as paper No. 26/17 and 12/80 as held in para 24 of the inquiry report, therefore, he cannot be permitted to escape and resile back from his own admission in respect of the contract of second marriage with Km. Mandodari Devi. His earlier marriage with Smt. Urmila Devi has been found proved by the Enquiry Officer and aforesaid findings of the Enquiry Officer had also been confirmed by the Disciplinary Authority and this Court also cannot take different view on the aforesaid findings of facts unless it is shown that the aforesaid findings are without evidence or wholly perverse. And I am of the opinion that the aforesaid findings of inquiry officer are based on some relevant materials referred and discussed in detail as shown herein before. The materials accepted by the inquiry officer as well as Disciplinary Authority reasonably supports the conclusion drawn by them. Therefore, aforesaid findings of fact can neither be said to be perverse nor without evidence.
44. Thus on the basis of admitted and indisputable facts the legal inference, which could be drawn, is that while subsistence of his first marriage with Smt. Urmila Devi, during her life time the petitioner had contracted his second marriage with Km. Mandodari Devi which is bigamous marriage without prior permission of the Government, as such he had committed breach of Rule 29 of the U.P. Government Servant Conduct Rules, 1956 referred earlier, which is a gross misconduct on his part. The aforesaid conduct is unbecoming of a public servant. Therefore in view of the aforesaid discussions, it is clear that on account of non-communication of dis-agreement by the Disciplinary Authority with the findings of the Enquiry Officer in connection of charge No. 3 to the petitioner there is nothing to indicate that the petitioner has been prejudiced in any manner in the disciplinary inquiry held against him.
45. At this juncture it is necessary to point out that learned counsel for petitioner could not demonstrate that in case, petitioner would have been communicated the aforesaid grounds of disagreement of Disciplinary Authority in respect of Charge No. 3, the petitioner would have improved the situation. Thus the said non-compliance of the aforesaid rule cannot be said to be fatal to the inquiry proceeding held against the petitioner. Thus in my considered view mere non-communication of grounds of disagreement by the Disciplinary Authority in connection of the findings and inference of the Enquiry Officer in respect of the charge No. 3 to the petitioner does not vitiate the findings of disciplinary authority on both the counts viz (i) in view of admitted or indisputable factual position only one conclusion is possible and permissible and the grant of opportunity in the terms of the aforesaid rule do not improve the situation, therefore, useless formality theory can be pressed into service and this Court need not to issue a futile writ for compliance of the aforesaid rules not because that compliance of rules is not necessary but because of the reason that in given facts and circumstances of the case court need not to issue futile writ. (ii) It is also because of another reason too particularly when the Enquiry Officer had already proposed the punishment of dismissal only on remaining two charges according to him proved against the petitioner and the Disciplinary Authority has concurred with the quantum of punishment proposed by the Enquiry Officer. Therefore, on this count also it could not be said that in absence of proof of charge No. 3 levelled against the petitioner, the quantum of punishment would have been otherwise or lesser than awarded by the disciplinary authority. Contrary, submissions made by learned counsel of petitioner in this regard is without substance and not tenable at all. Accordingly the same is liable to be rejected. The decision of this Court rendered in Jagdish Prasad Yadav (supra) relied upon by learned counsel of petitioner is distinguishable on facts can be of no assistance to the case of petitioner.
46. Now next question arises for consideration as to whether disciplinary inquiry culminated in impugned action held against the petitioner is vitiated on account of malafide and any biased opinion of inquiry officer and disciplinary authority against the petitioner? To find out appropriate answer to this question it is necessary to examine the available material on record to find out actual state of affairs prevailing at relevant point of time. From the perusal of pleadings of the petitioner contained in para 18, 19 and 20 of the writ petition it appears that he has stated that when the inquiry was not completed within time the petitioner approached this Court by filing writ petition. There upon on 12.8.1992 a direction was given to the District Judge to complete the inquiry within a month, yet the inquiry was not completed as directed by this Court. The petitioner was advised to file contempt petition before this Court upon which on 16.11.1992 notice was issued to Sri M.P. Singh, the then District Judge, Mainpuri. On account of aforesaid contempt notice and order made by this Court on 20.5.1992 the District Judge was annoyed and after going through the reply given by the petitioner to the charge sheet he felt that in fact the charge of bigamy could not be proved against the petitioner. He then without any sanction of law and in order to wreak vengeance framed a fresh charge sheet against the petitioner wherein those charges which had become stale by passage of time in regard to which no charge could have been framed as adequate punishment had already been given to the petitioner by the District Judge after inquiry. Except to the aforesaid allegations, no other allegation Has been levelled in the body of the petition. However in ground nos. 10, 11 and 12 only it has been mentioned that the District Judge was annoyed on account of contempt petition filed by the petitioner and accordingly he was prejudiced and predetermined to punish the petitioner before actual conclusion of the inquiry.
47. At this juncture it is necessary to point out that in order to allege malafide it was necessary for the petitioner to implead the District Judge by name as necessary party in the writ petition but the petitioner did not implead the District Judge by name as necessary party in the writ petition, therefore, the allegation against the said District Judge is legally not tenable as held by Hon'ble Apex Court in I.K. Mishra v. Union of India and Ors. (1997) 6 SCC 228 (para 8). Besides this the aforesaid statement of fact is also incorrect for simple reason that the amended charge sheet was framed on 11m June 1992 as contained in Annexure-8 of the writ petition and petitioner was ordered to appear on 25th June 1992 to receive the amended charge sheet and to submit reply by 2nd July, 1992 but he absented, therefore, the copy of amended charge sheet was sent through registered post which he has also avoided to receive and after several dates on 1.8.1992 the District Judge, Mainpuri who himself was conducting the inquiry at that time tendered a copy of amended charge sheet to the petitioner but he refused to receive the same and stated that he will receive the amended charge sheet on 3rd August 1992 and on 3rd August 1992 also he refused to sign the order sheet and levelled false and baseless allegation with impunity against all inquiry officers as is clear from various applications, paper Nos. 15, 58, 73, 75, 80, 93, 101, 111, 113 and 119 (as contained in para 30 of the inquiry report), therefore, it is, incorrect to say that the amended charge sheet was issued against the petitioner due to annoyance and any animosity against him on account of order of this Court dated 12.8.92 and contempt notice dated 16.11.92 as the notice has been issued against the District Judge in the contempt petition on 16.11.1992 (Sixteenth November, 1992) and the amended charge sheet was issued much earlier on 11th June 1992. Therefore, it cannot be said at all that on account of filing of contempt petition the earlier charge sheet framed against the petitioner was amended by the then District Judge. Mainpuri on account of annoyance, animosity and any prejudice against the petitioner and action was taken by pre-disposed and pre-determined mind against him.
48. Contrary to it from the available material on record as held by inquiry officer in para 30, 31 and 33 of the inquiry report it appears that the petitioner was very much impertinent and indisciplined during the course of inquiry. A reference of para 30, 31 and 33 of the inquiry report has already been given by reproducing the same herein before in the earlier part of this judgment hence need not to be reproduced again. From the perusal of aforesaid inquiry report it is clear that the petitioner has made several attempt to change the inquiry officer from time to time and also succeeded in getting them changed at some occasion. While doing so it appears that he has tried to delay and avoid the inquiry and was trying to create evidence to challenge the same at appropriate or higher forum after conclusion of inquiry if the result of inquiry would go against him. In para 31 of the inquiry report the inquiry officer has pointed out that after changes of several inquiry officer at behest of the petitioner in June 1992 the then District Judge himself begun to conduct inquiry but the petitioner made false allegation against the District Judge as well and did not desire inquiry even in the hands of District Judge as is clear from several applications dated 28.10.1992, 1.12.1992 which are paper nos. 58 and 73. These facts further demonstrate that the aforesaid applications for changing of "inquiry officer were made by the petitioner with a view that in case the inquiry may be conducted by District Judge of another district he would be able to challenge the same in this court in judicial side, if any adverse order would be passed against him by the District Judge of another district, as the District Judge of another District would have no jurisdiction to hold the inquiry of class 111 employee of ministerial establishment of another district. Even this Court could not confer the jurisdiction upon District Judge of another district for holding any disciplinary inquiry against the petitioner under the relevant services rule namely The Sub-ordinate Civil Court Ministerial Establishment Rules, 1947 and the Uttar Pradesh Sub-ordinate Courts Staff Punishment and Appeal Rules, 1976 applicable to the petitioner wherein the concerned District Judge of the concern district is appointing and punishing authority of Class III employees of Ministerial Establishment of Sub-ordinate Court of said district. It is well settled as held by Hon'ble Apex Court in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak and Anr. AIR 1988 SC 1531 that Supreme Court by its directions could nut confer jurisdiction on the High Court to try any case when it did not possess such jurisdiction under the scheme of the Act. Applying the same principle it can be held that similarly High Court cannot confer jurisdiction or power upon the District Judge of another district to hold an inquiry against the ministerial establishment of another district who did not possess such jurisdiction under the scheme of aforesaid statutes/rules.
49. At this juncture it is also necessary to point out that although from the records of the domestic inquiry held against the petitioner there is nothing to indicate that the then District Judge, Mainpuri, disciplinary and punishing authority of the petitioner was any way prejudiced and biased against the petitioner but at the same time it is to be noticed that a personal bias is one of three major limbs of the bias namely pecuniary bias, personal bias and official bias. For appreciating the case of personal bias or bias to the subject matter the test is whether there was real likelihood of a bias even though such a bias has not in fad taken place as held by Hon'ble Apex Court in Rattan Lal Sharma v. Managing Committee. Dr. Hari Ram (Co-education) Higher Secondary School and Ors. AIR 1993 SC 2155. In para 11 of the decision Hon'ble Apex Court held as under:
"11. ... For appreciating a case of personal bias or bias to the subject matter the test is whether there was a real likelihood of a bias even though such bias has not in fact taken place. De Smith in his Judicial Review of Administrative Action, (1980) at page 262 has observed that a real likelihood of bias means at least substantial possibility of bias. In R.V. Sunder land Justices. (1901) 2 KB 357 (373) it has been held that the Court will have to judge the-matter as a reasonable man would judge of any matter in the conduct of his own business. In R. V. Sussex Justices, (1924) I KB 256 (259 it has been indicated that answer to the question whether there was a real likelihood of bias depends not upon what actually was done but upon what might appear to be done. In Halsbury Laws of England. (4th Edn.) Vol. 2, para 551, it has been indicated that the test of bias is whether a reasonable intelligent man, fully apprised of all the circumstances, would feel a serious apprehension of bias. The same principle has also been accepted by this Court in Manak Lal v. Dr. Prem Chand, 1957 SCR 575 (AIR 1957 SC 425). This Court has laid down that the test is not whether in fact, a bias has affected the judgment, the test always is and must be whether a litigant could reasonably apprehend that a bias attributable to a member of the Tribunal might have operated against him in the final decision of the Tribunal. It is in this sense that it is often said that justice must not only he done but must-also appear to he done."
50. Now testing the facts of the instant case on the touchstone of law laid Down by Apex Court in Rattan Lai Sharma's case (supra), it is clear that facts of the instant case are quite distinguishable from the aforesaid case. In that case a member of departmental inquiry committee had deposed as witness against delinquent employee. But instant case, the petitioner could have hardly made out any case of such a nature either against inquiry officer or against disciplinary authority. The judgment cited by learned counsel for the petitioner rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in Kumaun Mandal Vikas Ltd. v. Girja Shanker Pant and Ors. reported in 2001 SCC(Labour & Service) 189 is distinguishable on the facts of the case and should be understood in the context of which Their Lordship of Supreme Court has rendered the aforesaid decision. Besides this I have gone through the aforesaid decision of Hon'ble Apex Court. I have also given anxious consideration on law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court and testing the facts of the case on the law enunciated by Hon'ble Apex Court, 1 am of considered view that the aforesaid decision hardly lends any support to the case of the petitioner. From a close scrutiny of the record also it is clear that neither the inquiry officer nor disciplinary authority /punishment authority, District Judge, Mainpuri can be held to have any pre-conceived opinion or pre-disposition or pre-determination to hold inquiry against the petitioner in a particular manner or they were in any manner pre-disposed or suffering from prejudice or have biased opinion against the petitioner and acted accordingly. Thus the submission of learned counsel of the petitioner in this regard is wholly misconceived, misplaced and not tenable at all, accordingly deserves to be rejected.
51. Besides this the doctrine of bias cannot be invoked against the necessity as no other person than the District Judge of concerned district was empowered under the aforesaid statutory rule to take disciplinary action against the petitioner as appointing/punishing authority, therefore, the doctrine pf bias cannot be invoked in cases of necessity rather it has to give way to the doctrine of necessity. In this connection it would be useful to make reference of few observations of professor H.W.R. Wade, made in Part 14 of Administrative Law Fifth Edition at page 426 and 427 of the Book as under:
"Indivisible authorities : cases of necessity In all the cases so far mentioned the disqualified adjudicator could be dispensed with or replaced by someone to whom the objection did not apply. But there are many cases where no substitution is possible, since no one else is empowered to act. Natural justice then has to give way to necessity, for otherwise there is no means of deciding and the machinery of justice or administration will break down.
This point made an appearance in Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal, already recounted. Before the appeal could proceed from the Vice- Chancellor to the House of Lords, the Lord Chancellor had to sign an order for enrolment. But it was held that his shareholding in the company, which disqualified him from, hearing the appeal, did not affect the enrolment, since o one but he had power to effect it. 'For this is a case of necessity, and where that occurs the objection of interest cannot prevail.' Reference was made to a year book case of 1430 where an action was brought against all the judges of the Court of Common Pleas in a matter which lay only in that, court. Comparable situations have occurred in modern cases. In one, a county court registrar was sued unsuccessfully in his own court, and had to tax costs in his own favour. In another, the government of Saskatchewan called upon the court to determine whether the salaries of judges were liable to income tax: and the Privy Council confirmed that the court was right to decide it, as a matter of necessity.
In administrative cases the same exigency may easily arise. Where statute empowers a particular minister or official to act, he will usually be the one and only person who can do so. There is then no way of escaping the responsibility even if he is personally interested. Transfer of responsibility is, indeed, a recognized type of ultra vires. In one case it was unsuccessfully argued that the only minister competent to confirm a compulsory purchase order for land for an airport had disqualified himself by showing bias and that the local authority could only apply for a local Act of Parliament. The court will naturally not allow statutory machinery to be frustrated in this way. For similar reasons a governor of a colony may validly assent to an Act of indemnity for his own actions, since otherwise the Act could not be passed at all. It is generally supposed, likewise, that a minister must act as best he can even in a case where he, for instance, himself owns property which will be benefited if he approves a development plan. Such cases of private and personal interest are conspicuous by their absence in the law reports. But there have been cases involving public funds. The Local Government Superannuation Act 1937 gave employees of local authorities statutory rights to pensions under certain conditions, but provided that any question concerning these rights should be decided first by the local authority, and then in case of dispute by the minister, whose decision on-questions of fact was to be final. The Court of Appeal held that there was no escape from these clear provisions."
52. At this juncture, I would like to refer few decisions of Hon'ble Apex Court where the doctrine of necessity was considered by Hon'ble Apex Court as exception to the rule against the doctrine of bias. In Election Commission of India and Anr. v. Dr. Subramaniam Swamy and Anr. reported in (1996) 4 SCC 104 in para 16 and 17 of the decision the Hon'ble Apex Court has dealt with the doctrine of necessity in detail as under:
"16. We must have a clear conception of the doctrine. It is well settled that the law permits certain things to be done as a matter of necessity which it would otherwise not countenance on the touchstone of judicial propriety. Stated differently, the doctrine of necessity makes it imperative for the authority to decide and considerations of judicial propriety must yield. It is often invoked in cases of bias where there is no other authority or Judge to decide the issue. If the doctrine of necessity is not allowed full play in certain unavoidable situations, it would impede the course of justice itself and the defaulting party would benefit therefrom. Take the case of a certain taxing statute which taxes certain perquisites allowed to Judges. If the validity of such a provision is challenged who but the members of the judiciary must decide it. If all the Judges are disqualified, on the plea that striking down of such a legislation would benefit them a stalemate situation may develop' In such cases the doctrine of necessity comes into play. If the choice is between allowing a biased person to act or to stifle the action altogether, the choice must fall in favour of the dormer as it is the only way to promote decision-making. In the present case also if the two Election Commissioners are able to reach a unanimous decision, there is no need for the Chief Election Commissioner to participate, if not the doctrine of necessity may have to he invoked. "
"17. We think that is the only alternative in such a situation. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the proper course to follow is that the Chief Election Commissioner should call a meeting of the Election Commission to adjudicate on the issue of disqualification of Ms. J. Jayalalitha on the grounds alleged by Dr. Swamy. After calling the meeting he should act as the Chairman but then he may refuse himself by announcing that he would not participate in the formation of opinion. If the two Election Commissioners reach a unanimous opinion, the Chief Election Commissioner will have the opinion communicated to the Governor. If the two Election Commissioners do not reach a unanimous decision in the matter of expressing their opinion on the issue referred to the Election Commission, it would be necessary for the Chief Election Commissioner to express his opinion on the doctrine of necessity. We think that in the special circumstances of this case this course of action would be the most appropriate one to follow because if the two Election Commissioners do not agree, we have no doubt that the doctrine of necessity would compel the Chief Election Commissioner to express his views so that the majority opinion could he communicated to the Governor to enable him to take a decision in accordance therewith as required by Article 192(1) of the Constitution."
53. In case of Badrinath v. Government of Tamil Nadu and Ors. J.T. 2000 (Suppl. 1) SC 346 in para 83, 84 and 85 of the decision Hon'ble Apex Court has held that unless there is a statute or statutory rule compelling the person to take a decision and there is no legally permissible alternative to substitute the adjudicator by another adjudicator the doctrine of necessity can not be pressed into service. For ready reference para 83, 84 and 85 of the decision is reproduced as under :
"83. It may be noticed that where a statute or a statutory rule constitutes a designated authority to take administrative or quasi-judicial decisions and where the person concerned is disqualified to take a decision on the principle of likelihood of bias, then the law (in certain circumstances explained below) makes an exception in the situation and the said person is entitled to take a decision notwithstanding his disqualification for otherwise no decision can be taken by anybody on the issue and public interest will suffer. But the position in the present case is that there is no statute or statutory rule compelling the Chief Secretary to be a member of the Screening Committee. If the Committee is constituted under an administrative order and a member is disqualified in a given situation vis-a-vis a particular candidate whose promotion is in question, there can be no difficulty in his 'reclusions' himself and requesting another senior officer to be substituted in his place in the Committee. Alternatively, when there dire three members in the Committee, the disqualified member could leave it to the other two - to take a decision. In case, however, they differ, then the authority, which constituted the Committee, could be requested to nominate a third member. These principles are well settled and we shall refer to them. "
"84 This Court had occasion to deal with identical situations and these rulings go against the respondents. In J. Mohapatra' and Co. and Anr. v. State of Orissa and Anr., {1984 (4) SCC 103}, the official members as well as non-official members of a Committee were, having regard to their interest, disqualified for being on the Committee. It was argued that the Government having appointed the Committee by resolution, the doctrine of necessity applied. The said contention was rejected. It was held that it was not difficult for those disqualified members to be substituted by other members. This Court held:
"It is true, the members of this Sub-Committee were appointed by a Government Resolution and some of them were appointed by virtue of the official position they were holding, such as, the Secretary, Education Department of Government of Orissa, and the Director, Higher Education etc. There was, however, nothing to prevent those whose books were submitted for selection from pointing out this fact to the State Government so that it could amend its Resolution by appointing a substitute or substitutes, as the case may be. There was equally nothing to prevent such non-official author-members from resigning from the Committee on the ground of their interest in the matter. "
"85. Again, in Institute of Chartered Accountants v. L.K. Ratna {JT 1986 SC 671 : 1986 (4) SCC 537} this Court held that in the absence of statutory compulsion, the principle of 'necessity' does not apply. This Court observed that:
"In the Regulations there was nothing to suggest that decision could not be taken by the other members of the Disciplinary Committee who were not disqualified."
54. Again in case of Amar Nath Chowdhury v. Braithwaite & Co. Ltd. and Ors. AIR 2002 SC 678 in para 6 and 8 of the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court the doctrine of necessity has been dealt with. For ready reference para 6 and 8 of the decision is reproduced as under:
"6. One of the principles of natural justice is that no person shall be a judge in his own cause or the adjudicating authority must be impartial and must act without any kind of bias. The said rule against bias has its origin from the maxim known as 'Debet Esse Judex in Propria Causa', which is based on the principle that justice not only be done but should manifestly be seen to be done. This could be possible only when a Judge or an adjudicating authority decides the matter impartially and without carrying any kind of bias. Bias may be of different kind and form. It may be pecuniary, personal or there may be bias as to the subject matter etc. In the present case, we are not concerned with any of the aforesaid form of bias. What we are concerned with in the present case is whether' an authority can sit in appeal against its own order passed in the capacity of Disciplinary Authority. In Financial Commissioner (Taxation), Punjab and Ors. v. Harbhajan Singh, (1996)9 SCC 281, it was held that the Settlement Officer has no jurisdiction to sit over the order passed by him as an Appellate Authority. In the present case, the subject-matter of appeal before the Board was whether the order of removal passed by the Disciplinary Authority was in conformity with law. It is not disputed that Shri S. Krishnaswami, the then Chairman-cum-Managing Director of the Company acted as a Disciplinary Authority as well as an Appellate Authority when he presided over and participated in the deliberations of the meeting of the Board while deciding the appeal of the appellant. Such a dual function is not permissible on account of established rule against bias. In a situation where such a dual junction is discharged by one and the same authority, unless permitted by an act of legislation or statutory provision, the same would be contrary to rule against bias. Where an authority earlier had taken a decision, he is disqualified to sit in appeal against his own decision, as he already prejudged the matter otherwise such an appeal would be termed an appeal from Caesar to Caesar and filing of an appeal would be an exercise in futility. In that view of the matter, in the present case, fair play demanded that Shri Krishnaswami, the then Chairman-cum-Managing Director of the Company ought not to have participated in the deliberations of the meeting of the Board when the Board heard and decided the appeal of the appellant. "
"8. In view of the aforesaid definition of the expression 'Board', the Board could have constituted a Committee of the Board/Management or any officers of the Company by excluding Chairman-cum-Managing Director of the Company and delegated any of Us power, including the appellate power, to the such a committee to eliminate any allegation of bias against such an appellate authority. It is, therefore, not correct to contend that rule against bias is not available in the present case in view of the 'doctrine of necessity'. We are, therefore, of the view that reliance of the doctrine of necessity in the present case is totally misplaced. "
55. Thus in view of the aforesaid settled legal position now coming to the facts and circumstances of the case that there can be no dispute that the petitioner was Stenographer in the Ministerial Establishment of district judgeship Mainpuri. Under Rule 9, 10, 11 and 15 of the Subordinate Civil Courts Ministerial Establishment Rules 1947. District Judge of the concerned District alone was appointing authority of the petitioner and under Rule 4 of the U.P. Subordinate Courts Staff (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1976 he alone was punishing and disciplinary authority of the petitioner -under the aforesaid statutory rule. Under the aforesaid rule concern District Judge could not be substituted by any Addl. District Judge of the same district, nor he could transfer his duties and jurisdiction under the aforesaid statutory rule upon any other Addl. District Judge. Indeed such transfer or abdication of his aforesaid duties and powers upon other person would be ultra vires, nor disciplinary Inquiry of the petitioner could be transferred to any other district judge of another district, who had no such power under statutory rule to hold inquiry against the petitioner as in view of decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in A.R. Autulay v. R.S. Nayak and Anr. AIR 1988 SC 1531, no such power could be conferred upon an authority even by High Court or Supreme Court, if the authority has no such power under statute as it would also be legislation by the court, which power, court does not have. Therefore, it was statutory compulsion to the concern district judge of district Mainpuri to hold disciplinary inquiry against the petitioner to take appropriate action against him under the aforesaid statutory rule. In such a situation doctrine of necessity can be pressed into service against the doctrine of bias as exception to aforesaid doctrine to run the administration and to save the action of authority otherwise there would be impossible to take disciplinary action against the petitioner and administrate machinery would be broken-down.
56. At this juncture I would like to make reference of certain other decisions of Hon'ble Apex Court wherein scope of judicial review in the matter pertaining the disciplinary inquiry inasmuch as quantum of punishment in such disciplinary proceedings have been dealt with in detail. In case of Union of India v. Parma Nanda AIR 1989 S.C. 1185, while taking note of earlier decisions in para 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26 and 27 Hon'ble Apex Court has laid down the law in this regard. For ready reference para 20, 21, 23, 24, 25 and 27 is reproduced as under:
"20. In State of Orissa v. Bidyabhushan, 1963 Supple (1) SCR 648 : AIR 1963 SC 779) the enquiry was conducted against the petitioner on several charges and eventually he was dismissed from service. The Orissa High Court found that the findings on two of the charges were had being in violation of the principles of natural justice. The findings on the remaining charges were, however, found to be justified. The High Court remitted the matter to the Government for fresh consideration for awarding a proper punishment. The High Court observed (AIR 1960 Orissa 68 at P. 73):
"That the findings in respect of charges I (a) and l(e) should be set aside as being opposed to the rules of natural justice, but the findings in respect of charges l(c) arid l(d) and charge 2 need not be disturbed. It will be then left to Government to decide whether, on the basis of these charges, the punishment of dismissal should be maintained or else whether a lesser punishment would suffice,"
"21. The Supreme Court reversed this order on the ground that if the dismissal could be supported on any finding as to substantial misdemeanour for which the punishment could lawfully be imposed, it was not for the Court to consider whether that ground alone would have weighed with the authority dismissing the public servant. "
"23. This proposition in Dhirajlal's case (AIR 1955 SC 271) was explained and the statement of law in Bidyabhushan's case (AIR 1963 SC 779) was affirmed in State of Maharashtra v. B.K. Takkamore, (1967) 2 SCR 583 : AIR 1967 SC 1353. It was a case of supersession of the Corporation. The show cause notice issued to the corporation mentioned two grounds for supersession. One of the grounds was held to by irrelevant. This Court, however, upheld the order of supersession stating that the order cannot be set aside for reason that one of the grounds is found to be non-existent or irrelevant if another ground by itself was serious enough, to supersede the Corporation, Bachawat, J. said (at p.594) (of SCR) :(at p. 1359 of AIR):
"The principle underlying these decisions appears to be this. An administrative or quasi judicial order based on several grounds, all taken together, cannot be sustained if it be found that some of the grounds are nonexistent or irrelevant, and there is nothing to show that the authority would have passed the order on the basis of the other relevant and existing grounds. On the other hand, an order based on several grounds some of which are found to be non-existent or irrelevant can be sustained if the court is satisfied that the authority would have passed the order on the basis of the other relevant and existing grounds, and the exclusion of the irrelevant or non-existent grounds could not have affected the ultimate opinion or decision."
"24. This principle again receives support from the decision of in Zora Singh v. J.M. Tandon, AIR 1971 SC 1537. There the Chief Settlement Commissioner cancelled the allotment of land made to a person but the High Court allowed the writ petition quashing the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner and directing him to proceed to decide the case on merits. The Commissioner re-heard the entire case as directed by the Court but came to the same conclusion as before and reaffirmed his earlier decision canceling the allotment. The person unsuccessfully moved the High Court with a writ petition challenging the order of the Commissioner and finally appealed to the Supreme Court. In dismissing that appeal, Shalat, J., made inter alia, the following observations (at p. 1540):
"The High Court was right in holding that even if there were amongst the reasons given by the Commissioner, some which were extraneous, if the rest were relevant and could be considered-sufficient, the Commissioner's conclusions would not be vitiated. The principle that if some of the reasons relied on by a Tribunal for its conclusion turn out to be extraneous or otherwise unsustainable, its decision would be vitiated, applies to cases in which the conclusion is arrived at not on assessment of objective satisfaction. The reason is that whereas in cases where the decision is based on subjective satisfaction if some of the reasons turn out to he irrelevant or invalid, it would be impossible for a superior court to find out which of the reasons, relevant or irrelevant, valid or invalid, had brought about such satisfaction. But in a case where the conclusion is based on objective facts and evidence, such a difficulty would not arise. If it is found that there was legal evidence, before the Tribunal, even if some of it was irrelevant, a superior court would not interfere if the finding can he sustained on the rest of the evidence. The reason is that in a writ petition for certiorari the superior court does not sit in appeal, but exercises only supervisory Jurisdiction, and therefore, does not enter into the question of sufficiency of evidence. There was, in our view, legal evidence before the Commissioner upon which he was entitled to rest his finding that the copies relied on by, the appellant were not genuine. "
"25. The view taken in Bidyabhushan case (AIR 1963 SC 779) has been repeatedly affirmed and reiterated in Railway Board v. Niranjan Singh, (1969) 3 SCR 548 at p. 552 : (AIR 1969 SC 966 at pp. 968-69). P.P. Gupta case, AIR 1970 SC 679 2 SCR 218 : 1972 Lab IC 627). Any doubts as to the incapacity of the Court to review the merits of the penalty must vanish when we read the remarks of Mathew, J., in Sardar Bahadur's case (at p. 225) (of SCR): (at pp. 630-31 of Lab IC):
"A disciplinary proceeding is not a criminal trial. The standard of proof required is that of preponderance of probability and not proof beyond reasonable doubt. If the inference that Nand Kumar was a person likely to have official dealings, with the respondent was one which reasonable person would draw from the proved facts of the case, the High Court cannot sit as a court of appeal over a decision based on it. Where there are some relevant materials which the authority has accepted and which materials may reasonably support the conclusion that the officer is guilty, it is not the function of the High Court exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 to review the materials and to arrive at an independent finding on the materials. If the enquiry has been properly held the question of adequacy or reliability of the evidence cannot be canvassed before the High Court."
The learned Judge also said (at p. 227) (of SCR) : (at p. 631 of Lab IC):
"Now it is settled by the decision of this Court in State of Orissa v. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra (AIR 1963 SC 779) that if the order of a punishing authority can be supported on any finding as to substantial misdemeanour for which the punishment can be imposed, it is not for the Court to consider whether the charge proved alone would have weighed with the authority in imposing the punishment. The Court is not concerned to decide whether the punishment imposed provided it is justified by the rules, is appropriate having regard to the misdemeanour established."
"27. We must unequivocally state that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to interfere with the disciplinary matters or punishment cannot be equated with an appellate jurisdiction. The Tribunal cannot interfere with the findings of the Inquiry Officer or competent authority where they are not arbitrary or utterly perverse. It is appropriate to remember that the power to impose penalty on a delinquent officer is conferred on the competent authority either by an Act of legislature or rules made under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. If there has been an enquiry consistent with the rules and in accordance with principles of natural justice what punishment would meet the ends of justice is a matter exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority. If the penalty can lawfully be imposed and is imposed on the proved misconduct, the Tribunal has no power to substitute its own discretion for that of the authority. The adequacy of penalty unless it is mala fide is certainly not a matter for the Tribunal to concern with. The Tribunal also cannot interfere with the penalty if the conclusion of the Inquiry Officer or the competent authority is based on evidence even if some of it is found to be irrelevant or extraneous to the matter." "
57. In case of Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra, JT 1999 (1) SC 61, Hon'ble Apex Court has again reiterated the scope of judicial review in respect of disciplinary inquiry in detail after having noticed the earlier decisions and the recent decisions rendered by the Apex Court. In this connection para 19, 21 and 22 of the aforesaid decision is reproduced as under:
"19. It is useful to note the following observations of this Court in Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur, (1972) 4 SCC 618:
"Where there are some relevant materials which the authority has accepted and which materials may reasonably support the conclusion that the officer is guilty, it is not the function of the High Court exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 to review the materials and to arrive at an independent finding on the materials. If the enquiry has been properly held the question of adequacy or reliability of the evidence cannot be canvassed before the High Court. "
"21. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749, this Court opined:
"The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate them evidence or the nature of punishment. In a Disciplinary Enquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot he permitted to he canvassed before the Court/Tribunal."
Further it was held:
"A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation. It may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof. "
"22. Again in Government of Tamil Nadu and Anr. v. A. Rajapandian. 1995 (1) SCC 216, this Court opined:
"It has been authoritatively settled by string of authorities of this Court that the Administrative Tribunal cannot sit as a court of appeal over a decision based on the findings of the inquiring authority in disciplinary proceedings. Where there is some relevant material which the disciplinary authority has accepted and which material reasonably supports the conclusion reached by the disciplinary authority, it is not the function of the Administrative Tribunal to review the same and reach different finding than that of the disciplinary authority. The Administrative Tribunal, in this case, has found no fault with the proceedings held by the inquiring authority. It has quashed the dismissal order by re-appreciating the evidence and reaching a finding different than that of the inquiring authority."
58. Thus is view of the aforesaid discussion, 1 am of considered opinion that all the three charges levelled against the petitioner have been found proved against him and I have no hesitation to hold that findings of Disciplinary authority holding the petitioner guilty of the aforesaid charges can neither be said to be without evidence nor perverse rather it is based on relevant material on record and cannot be found faulty on any score. The quantum of punishment imposed against the petitioner is also justified in given facts and circumstances of the case. The petitioner has been found guilty of committing gross misconduct unbecoming to a Government servant, lie is not fit person to be retained in service of ministerial establishment of sub-ordinate judiciary and in other services of the government on the similar or other posts as held by him. In my considered opinion any one of the charge out of three charges proved against the petitioner was sufficient to warrant his dismissal in given facts and circumstances of the case. Having regard to the nature of duties discharged by the petitioner the second charge which was in respect of indiscipline, impertinent behavior with the officers with whom the petitioner was attached to work as Stenographer, his habit of absence from duty without leave and the leakage of judgment on his part while working as Stenographer is most serious charge of gross misconduct which alone is sufficient to warrant and justify his dismissal horn service as Stenographer, therefore, his dismissal from the service was only way to ensure purity, cleanness and discipline in the administration and public life.
Besides the aforesaid misconduct proved against the petitioner, he was found very much impertinent and indisciplined during whole inquiry proceeding and making false allegations with impunity against several inquiry officers and disciplinary authority by the petitioner as held by inquiry officer in para 30, 31 and 33 of the inquiry report was also not befitting to the post. Thus the impugned action taken against the petitioner is fully justified in given facts and circumstances of the case.
59. Now next question with regard to the payment of salary from the date of termination of petitioner with effect from 16.9.82 till the date of suspension on 2.6.92 and thereafter payment of subsistence allowance till the dale of his dismissal on 2.4.1993 is concerned, it is to be point out that the Enquiry Officer while considering Fundamental Rule 54 contained in Vol. II part II to IV of U.P. Financial Hand Book has held that the petitioner was not entitled for payment of any back wages during the aforesaid period. On 2.6.92 he was placed under suspension and reported his duty in the police cell of copying department of the judgeship on 3.8.1992 since then he was paid his subsistence allowances. Thus the petitioner was not entitled for payment of the subsistence allowance for the period in which he did not report to his duty. The disciplinary authority has also agreed to the aforesaid findings of inquiry officer. For ready reference the provisions of Rule 54 of the Financial Hand Book and paragraphs 34, 35, 36 and 37 of the enquiry report are reproduced as under:-
"54. (1) When a Government Servant who has been dismissed, removed or compulsorily retired is reinstated as a result of appeal or review or would have been so reinstated hut for his retirement on superannuation while under suspension or not, the authority competent to order reinstatement shall consider and make specific order-
(a) regarding the pay and allowances to be paid to the Government servant for the period of his absence from duty including the period of suspension preceding his dismissal, removal, or compulsory retirement, as I hi case may be, and
(b) whether or not the said period shall be treated as a period spent on duly.
(2) Where the authority competent to order reinstatement is of opinion that the Government servant who had been dismissed, removed or compulsorily retired, has been fully exonerated the Government servant shall, subject to the provisions of Sub-rule (6), be paid the full pay allowance to which he would have been entitled, had he not been dismissed, removed or compulsorily retired or suspended prior to such dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement, as the case may be;
Provided that where such authority is of opinion that the termination of the proceedings instituted against the Government servant had been delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant, it may, after giving him an opportunity to make his representation within sixty days from the date on which the communication in this regard is served on him and after considering the representation, if any, submitted by him, direct, for reasons to be recorded in writing, that the Government servant shall, subject to the provisions of Sub-rule (7), be paid for the period of such delay, only such amount (not being the whole) of such pay and allowance as it may determine.
(3) In a case falling under Sub-rule (2) the period of absence from duty including the period of suspension preceding dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement, as the case may be, shall be treated as a period spent on duty for all purposes.
(4) In cases other than those covered by Sub-rule (2) including cases where the order of dismissal, removal of compulsory retirement from service is set aside by the appellate or reviewing authority solely on the ground of non- compliance with the requirements of Clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution and no further inquiry is proposed to he held, the Government servant shall subject to the provisions of Sub-rules (6) and (7), be paid such amount (not being the whole) of the pay and allowances to which he would have been entitled had he not been dismissed, removed or compulsorily retired or suspended prior to such dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement, as the case may be, as the competent authority may determine, after giving notice to the Government servant of the quantum proposed and after considering the representation, if any, submitted by him in that connection, within such period which is no case shall exceed sixty days, from the date on which the notice has been served as may be specified in the notice.
Provided that any payment under this sub-rule shall be restricted to a period of three years immediately preceding the date on which orders for reinstatement of such Government servants are passed by the appellate authority or reviewing authority, or immediately preceding the date of retirement on superannuation of such Government servant as the case may be.
(5) In a case falling under Sub-rule (4) the period of absence from duty including the period of suspension preceding his dismissal removal or compulsory retirement, as the case may be, shall he treated as a period spent on duty, unless the competent authority specifically directs that it shall be so treated for any specified purpose:
Provided that if the Government servant so desires such authority may direct that the period of absence from duty including the period of suspension preceding his dismissal, removal of compulsory retirement as the case may be, shall be converted into leave of any kind due and admissible to the Government servant. Note - The order of the competent authority under the preceding proviso shall be absolute and higher sanction shall be necessary for the grant of-,
(a) extraordinary leave in excess of three months in the case of temporary Government servant; and
(b) leave of any kind in excess of five years in the case of permanent Government servant.
(6) The payment of allowances under Sub-rule (2) of Sub-rule (4) shall be subject to all other conditions under which such allowances are admissible.
(7) The amount determined under the proviso to Sub-rule (2) or under Sub- rule (4) shall not be less than the subsistence allowance and other allowance admissible under rule 53.
(8) Any payment made under this rule to Government servant on his reinstatement shall be subject to adjustment of the amount, if any, earned by him through an employment during the period between the date his removal, dismissal or compulsory retirement, as the case may be, and the date of reinstatement. Where the emoluments admissible under this rule are equal to or less than the amounts earned during the employment elsewhere, nothing shall be paid to be Government servant.
Note- Where the Government servant does not report for duty within reasonable time after the issue of the orders of reinstatement after dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement, no pay and allowance will be paid to him for such period till he actually takes over charge. "
The findings of inquiry officer with regard to Entitlement to back salary:
34. The Hon'ble Appeal Judges vide order dated 20.5.1992 paper No. 23/2-3 directed to decide the question of admissibility of pay and allowances of back period simultaneously with this inquiry and it was directed that two matters viz. disciplinary proceedings as a consequence of remand/order and the payment of past salary should be decided together and the payment of past salary is to be decided with reference to Fundamental Rule 54 of the Financial Hand Book. Sri Amar Singh delinquent employee has moved an application dated 22.10.92 which are papers No. 50 and 51 in the record for the purpose that he has not been in any service or business from 16.9.82 till June 1992 when he again joined in Mainpuri Judgeship. According to F.R. 54(1) when a Government servant, who has been dismissed, removed or compulsorily retired, is reinstated as a result of appeal, the authority competent to order reinstatement shall consider and make specific order regarding the pay and allowances to be paid to the Government servant for the period of his absence from duty including the per Cod of suspension proceeding his dismissal or removal and Whether or not the said period shall be treated as a period spent on duty. Sub-rule (2) of the said F.R. provides that if the Government Servant has been fully exonerated, he shall be paid the full pay and allowances. Sri Amar Singh delinquent employee was not fully exonerated, but his appeal was allowed on technical ground of non-compliance of the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India and the Hon'ble High Court permitted the disciplinary proceedings to be taken in accordance with law. Therefore, his case is not covered under the said Sub-rule (2).
35. Sub-rule (3) of the F.R. provides that in a case falling under Sub-rule (2), the period of absence from duty shall he treated as a period spent on duty and as already discussed, the case of Sri Amar Singh is not covered by these Sub-rules (2) and (3).
36. According to Sub-rule (4) of the said F.R.54 in cases other than those covered by Sub-rule (2) where the order of dismissal or removal is set aside by the Appellate Authority solely on the ground of non-compliance with the requirement of Clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution and no further inquiry is proposed to be held, the Government servant shall subject to the provisions of Sub-rule (3) (6) and (7) be paid such amount ( not being the whole) of the pay and allowances to which he would have been entitled, had he not been dismissed or removed, as 36, the competent authority may determine. Proviso to the Sub-rule (4) provides that any payment under this Sub-rule (4) shall be restricted to a period of three years immediately preceding the date on which orders for reinstatement of such Government servant are passed by the Appellate Authority.
37. Sub-rule (5) provides that in case falling under Sub-rule (4), the period of absence from duty including the period of suspension shall net be treated as a period spent on duty, unless the competent authority specifically directs that it shall be so started. Therefore: the case of Sri A mar Singh delinquent employee is also not covered under Sub-rule (4) of the F.R.54 as further inquiry was proposed against him "
60. From the perusal of the aforesaid findings of inquiry officer as well as disciplinary authority it is clear that neither Sub-rule (2) of Rule 54 of fundamental rule referred above, which applies only in cases where the competent authority makes reinstatement by setting aside the order of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement on full exoneration of the charges levelled against delinquent employee nor Sub-rule (4) of the aforesaid Rules is applicable which provides that on setting aside the order of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement on account of non-compliance; of requirements of Clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution no further inquiry is proposed to be held, but in petitioner's case the order of his earlier termination was set aside on technical ground i.e. on account of non-compliance of provisions of Article 311(2) of Constitution of India without exonerating the petitioner from the charges levelled against him rather while setting aside the order of termination the disciplinary authority was directed to hold fresh inquiry in respect of charges leveled against the petitioner. It was also not a case of reinstatement on full exoneration of the charges without proposal of any further inquiry to be held against*the petitioner therefore, the petitioner was not entitled to get any benefit of past salary under the aforesaid rules. Accordingly the findings recorded by inquiry officer which was accepted by the disciplinary authority is fully justified in given facts and circumstances of the case and does not call for any interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
61. In this connection the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in Union of India v. Madhusudan Prasad, reported in 2004 Supreme Court Cases (L.& S.) 29, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has dealt with the provisions of Fundamental Rule 54 of the Financial Hand Book. In the aforesaid case the Appellate Authority directed the reinstatement of the respondent and held that he was not entitled to get back wages for the period he was out of service. But the respondent was removed from service without any enquiry and he was not even given a show cause notice prior to his dismissal from service. In the aforesaid case the employee was reinstated without any further direction to hold any fresh inquiry against him, his case was dearly covered by Fundamental Rule 54(4) whereas the case of petitioner is neither covered under Fundamental Rule 54(2) nor under Fundamental Rule 54(4) of the aforesaid rules. Thus the facts of instant case are distinguishable from the facts of the aforesaid case. Similarly the facts of the decisions rendered in W.B. Korreya v. The Deputy Managing Director (Tech.) Indian Airlines, Air Lines House, New Delhi and Ors., reported in 1980(2) SLR 466, Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam reported in 2004 Supreme Court Cases (L.& S.) 406. H.L. Mehra v. Union of India and Ors., reported in 1974 All India Services Law Journal 379. are also distinguishable from the facts of the instant case, as different statutory scheme were under consideration in the aforesaid cases and therefore, the same can be of no assistance to the case of the petitioner.
62. In view of the discussions made herein before, I am of considered opinion that in given facts and circumstances of the case the petitioner is not entitled for any relief claimed in the writ petition. The writ petition is bereft from merits. Thus the writ petition fails and is dismissed.
There shall be no order as to costs.