The petitioner is a registered dealer under the Kerala Value Added Tax Act, 2003 (hereinafter referred to as (“the KVAT Act”) and CST Act, engaged in the manufacture and trade of plywood, flush door, block board etc. A consignment of plywood was despatched by the petitioner to a consignee and, while the vehicle that was transporting the said consignment was en route to the consignee, it was detained by the first respondent who issued a notice under Section 47 (2) of the KVAT Act. It is the case of the petitioner that, although he produced all the required documents before the first respondent, the second respondent, thereafter issued a notice under Sec. 49 of the KVAT Act proposing a confiscation of the vehicle that was used to transport the consignment of plywood. It is the case of the petitioner that when, despite submitting a detailed reply to the notice received by him from the 2nd respondent, the 2nd respondent was not inclined to release the vehicle or the goods, the petitioner approached this Court through Writ Petition 25627/2010 and by Ext.P11 judgment this Court disposed the said Writ Petition directing the 2nd respondent to consider the documents produced by the petitioner in support of his case and pass orders thereon. It is pointed out that the 2nd respondent thereafter passed orders detaining the vehicle and directed the payment of redemption fee and detention amount for the release of the vehicle and the goods. Although the petitioner has complied with the orders passed by the 2nd respondent, the Writ Petition is filed challenging the provisions of Section 49 of the KVAT Act, 2003 as unconstitutional, being beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature and ultra vires Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner also contends that the provisions are violative of Article 301 of the Constitution of India, to the extent it restricts the free movement of goods in the course of trade and commerce.
2. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents wherein the circumstances leading to the detention of the vehicle and the goods has been narrated. As regards the challenge to the validity of the legislation, it is the contention of the State that the impugned provision is one that is intended to check evasion of tax in respect of notified commodities and, in that respect, it is one that would be incidental or ancillary to the power of the State Legislature to enact a law for the levy of tax on sale or purchase of goods. It is also pointed out that Ext. P13 order is appealable under the terms of the Act and, in so far as the petitioner has not availed the alternate remedy under the statute, the Writ Petition is to be dismissed on that ground.
3. I have heard Sri.Abraham, the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as learned Government Pleader Smt.Lilly for the respondent. In as much as there is a challenge in the Writ Petition against the Constitutional validity of the provisions of Sec. 49 of the KVAT Act, I also considered it appropriate to appoint Advocate Sri. Harishankar Menon as Amicus Curiae to assist this Court in the matter.
4. On a consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case as also the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, as also by the Amicus Curiae appointed by this Court, I find that the challenge, against the provisions of Section 49 of the KVAT Act, is essentially that they are beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature, in that the power of the State Legislature does not extend to making a provision for confiscation of vehicles, in a legislation that is intended to to provide for a levy of tax on the sale or purchase of goods. Before examining the contentions of the petitioner in that regard, it would be apposite to refer to the provisions of Section 49 of the KVAT Act which reads as under :-
“49. Confiscation by Authorised officers in certain cases :- (1) Any officer, not below the rank of a Commercial Tax Officer shall have the power to intercept and search the vehicle or vessel or any conveyance transporting notified goods at any place within the State for the purpose of enabling such officer to verify whether any notified goods are being smuggled into or out of the State.
(2) If on verification such officer has reason to suspect that the notified goods are being smuggled into or out of the State, he may, without any unreasonable delay, produce the goods and the vehicle before such officer authorised by the Government, by notification in the Gazette, not below the rank of an Assistant Commissioner.
(3) Where the authorised officer is satisfied that the driver or other person in charge of the vehicle or vessel or other conveyance is smuggling notified goods, the officer shall have the power to seize and detain the goods along with the vehicle or vessel;
Provided that before taking action to seize and detain the goods and the vehicle or vessel under this section, the officer shall give the person in charge of the goods and the owner, if ascertainable, and to the owner of the vehicle or the person in charge of the vehicle a notice in writing informing him the reason for the seizure and detention of the goods and vehicle or vessel and an opportunity of being heard:
Provided further than the authorised officer may release the goods and the vehicle or vessel seized and detained if the owner or the person in charge of the notified goods or the owner or person in charge of the vehicle or vessel files an option to pay in lieu of seizure and detention, a [redemption fee] equal to thrice the amount of tax due at the rate applicable to the goods liable to seizure and detention and twice the tax due or an amount of Rs. 50,000 whichever is higher for the release of the vehicle or vessel in lieu of detention.
Provided further that if the owner of the vehicle produces the documents specified in sub-section (3) of section 46 and the owner of the goods proves the bonafides of the transport of goods within seven days of the seizure and detention the officer shall release the goods and the vehicle.
[(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions, if the owner or person in charge of the notified goods or the owner or person in charge of the vehicle fails to prove the genuineness of the transport of the notified goods or to remit the redemption fee as specified in second proviso to sub- section (3), within thirty days from the seizure and detention of goods and the authorised officer has reason to believe that the owner or the person in charge of the vehicle or the driver has transported the notified goods to evade payment of tax with the knowledge or connivance of the owner of the goods, the officer may confiscate the vehicle or vessel along with the goods:
Provided that the authorised officer shall serve notice to the owner of the vehicle or the person in charge of the vehicle or the owner of the notified goods, if ascertainable, intimating the person for the confiscation of the vehicle or vessel affording him and an opportunity of being heard. The officer shall also afford an opportunity to any such persons to pay a penalty equal to thrice the amount of tax attempted to be evaded in lieu of confiscation of the notified goods and an amount equal to thrice the amount of such tax or rupees one lakh whichever is higher in lieu of confiscation of the vehicle or vessel.
(5) No order confiscating any vehicle or vessel shall be made under sub section (4), if the owner or the person in charge of the vehicle or vessel proves to the satisfaction of the authorised officer that it was used for carrying the notified goods without the knowledge or connivance of the owner himself, his agent, if any, or the person in charge of such vehicle or vessel and that each of them has taken all reasonable and necessary precautions against such use.] Provided that the authorised officer shall serve notice to the owner of the vehicle or the person in charge of the vehicle or the owner of the notified goods, if ascertainable, intimating the reason for the confiscation of the vehicle or vessel and an opportunity of being heard. The officer shall also afford an opportunity to pay a penalty equal to thrice the amount of tax attempted to be evaded by the owner of the goods and rupees one lakh by the owner or person in charge of the vehicle or vessel in lieu of confiscation of vehicle, if the owner of the notified goods is not ascertainable or not willing to remit the penalty specified, the owner of the vehicle or the person in charge of the vehicle or vessel shall pay three times of the tax sought to be evaded and an amount of rupees one lakh in lieu of confiscation of the goods and vehicle.
(6) Any person aggrieved by an order under sub- section (5) may, within thirty days from the date of communication to him of such order, file an application for revision in such manner and in such form as may be prescribed and accompanied by a fee of rupees five hundred before the Deputy Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner may pass such orders thereon as he thinks fit;
Provided that the Deputy Commissioner may admit an application for revision preferred after the expiry of the said period if he is satisfied that the applicant had sufficient cause for not filing the revision petition within the said period.
7) Any person aggrieved by an order under sub- section (6) may, within thirty days from the date of communication to him of such order, file a revision in such manner and in such form as may be prescribed and accompanied by a fee of rupees five hundred before the Commissioner and the decision of the commissioner shall be final;
Provided that the Commissioner may admit an application for revision filed after the expiry of the said period, if it is satisfied that the applicant had sufficient cause for not filing the application within the said period.
8) Where an order of confiscation under this section has become final in respect of any goods/vessel such goods vehicle or vessels as the case may be shall vest in the Government free from all encumbrances.
(8A) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the goods so confiscated under this section can be disposed of by public auction or by public sale, if the Commissioner feels that compelling circumstances exist to do so] (9) The award of confiscation under this section shall not prevent the infliction of any punishment to which the person affected thereby is liable under the Act.”
It will be seen on a perusal of the provisions of the Section that it essentially provides for penal action in respect of notified goods, which are sought to be transported without valid documents that are prescribed under Section 46 of the KVAT Act and would thereby, attract the definition of “Smuggling” as defined in Section 2(xlvi) which reads as under:
“Smuggling” means transportation of notified goods exceeding such value as may be prescribed, into or out of the State, without the documents prescribed by sub-section (3) of section 46 or under cover of a document which is bogus or forged or where the consignor or consignee, as the case may be in the State, as shown in the document accompanying the goods, is non-existent or bogus;”
5. The provision makes it clear that the apprehending of the vehicle, and the detention thereof along with the goods, can only be at the instance of an officer not below the rank of the Commercial Tax Officer. There are sufficient safeguards in the provision to ensure that only such notified goods, and the vehicles that are intimately connected with the transportation of the said goods, as would offend the provisions of Section 46 of the Act, are subjected to the rigour of Section 49. The challenge against the validity of the section, however, is primarily based on the earlier decision of this Court in Syed Sirajudeen v. Intelligence Officer - (2003) 129 STC 151, where this Court, considering a similar challenge against the provisions of Section 30 C of the KGST Act, struck down the provisions of the said Section on finding that the provisions, which enabled the authorities to confiscate the vehicles that were involved in smuggling of goods, did not actually define the word “smuggling”. In that context, it was held that the provisions of the Act governing confiscation, of vehicles and goods involved in smuggling, were vague and, therefore, were unconstitutional to that extent. The Division Bench of this Court followed the judgment in Checkpost Officer v. K.P. Abdulla - (1971) 27 STC 1, where the Supreme Court had held that the power to confiscate goods was not ancillary or incidental to the power to levy tax and hence, the provision that authorised the confiscation and detention of goods could not be legally sustained as part of a legislation that was enacted to levy tax on the sale or purchase of goods. It must, at once, be noticed that the said decision of the Supreme court was dealing with a legislation where, the power to detain and confiscate goods was available in respect of any goods that were seen transported across the check post, irrespective of whether the said transportation was in connection with a transaction of sale or not. It was in that context that the Supreme Court held the provision as arbitrary and unreasonable, in that it enabled the authorities under the legislation concerned to detain and confiscate any goods irrespective of whether they were covered by a transaction of sale or purchase. The said decision of the Supreme Court has been distinguished in a line of decisions that followed. It may be useful to refer to a few of them for the purposes of deciding the instant case. In Tripura Goods Transport Association v. Commissioner of Taxes - (1999) 112 STC 609 the Supreme Court, while dealing with a challenge to the validity of various Sections under the Tripura Sales Tax Act, 1976, which cast an obligation on transporters and carriers to get themselves registered, maintain accounts of goods transport and to furnish declaration forms relating to consignments, repelled a contention that the power to confiscate goods and vehicles was not incidental to the power to levy a tax on sale or purchase of goods. At paragraph 12 of the said decision it is observed as follows:-
“12. It is now necessary to scrutinise the impugned provisions to see what are the obligations cast on the transporters, what is the purpose of such obligation, is it in any way taxing such transporters or impeding the transport business to make it beyond the legislative competence and ultra vires article 301 of the Constitution of India ? Whenever any goods is sold or purchased inside or outside the State, the incidence of tax and the quantum of tax has to be ascertained under the provisions of the relevant taxing statute. For this, it is necessary to fix a dealer, the taxable goods, place of sale or purchase of such goods and the quantum of tax. If a dealer in taxable goods transaction of sale or purchase escapes attention of the taxing authority, tax on such goods escapes with resultant loss to the State revenue. To overreach this possible escape a mechanism is invariably brought in a statute to seal such loopholes of escape, of course casting obligations on some to perform certain acts to reach this objective. Thus, maintaining accounts of goods transported into or outside Tripura in the prescribed manner and to furnish in the prescribed manner such information as the Commissioner requires including filling of form XXIV is only for the said objective to be achieved with the help and aid of such transporter or carrier, etc, Such obligation is cast only for identifying the consignor or consignee to fix liability on them in correlation with the goods carried by such transporter further requiring the disclosure of such goods with its quantity, value, weight, to help the taxing authority to assess such goods on such escaping dealer. This helps the taxing authorities in collecting taxes, imposing penalties including punishing one for the offences committed. If such an obligation is not cast on such transporters then any dealer under a false name, can despatch his taxable goods to another person through a transporter escaping his sales tax liability on such goods. It cannot be denied that some such dealers and transporters do indulge in such illegal practices. This fact is brought in through the counter-affidavit filed by the respondents-State that some such consignments are booked with consignee as self, without disclosing the name, registration number and address of the consignee in the appropriate column of form XXIV. Incorrect, incomplete declaration in such forms, if not made punishable, would defeat the very purpose of enacting these provisions and would help such clandestine dealers to escape the liability of tax. So each of these provisions are brought in to help the authorities to check the evasion of tax.
6. It will be apparent from a perusal of the above findings of the Supreme Court that the Court also dealt with the contention that the provisions of the Act were ultra vires Article 301 of the Constitution of India and held it to be not so. In State of Rajasthan v. D.P. Metals - (2001) 124 STC 611, which was another case relating to the imposition of penalty on transporters of goods and persons in-charge of the goods, in paragraph 29 of the judgment, it was observed as follows:-
“29. It is thus settled law that provisions to check evasion of tax are within the legislative competence of the States under entry 54 of List II. This being so, provisions to make the imposition of tax efficacious or to prevent evasion of tax are within the legislative competence. Unlike the dalals and forwarding agents, as in Sant Lal's case (1993) 91 STC 321 (SC); (1993) 4 SCC 380 the persons referred to in section 78 (2) are persons concerned with the movement of goods which are sold or are likely to be sold. With there being no valid challenge to section 78(2) a provisions contained in sub-section 5 of section 78 which provides for levy of penalty in case of non-compliance of section 78 (2) can only be regarded as consequential and valid. If there was legislative competence to enact section 78 (2) then the same power contained in entry 54 of List II could enable the State Legislature to provide for consequence of non-compliance by incorporating sub-section (5) therein. Section 78 (5) and Section 78(8) are part of an integral scheme and deal with two separate classes of people referred to in section 78 (2).”
Thereafter, in CTO v. Swastik Roadways - (2004) 135 STC 1, the Supreme Court while considering the validity of the provisions under the Madhya Pradesh Commercial Tax Act which prescribed the maintenance of records by, and penalty on, clearing and forwarding agents consequent to a failure to furnish information on transactions of dealers, found as follows in paragraph 11:
“11. We do not find any merit in the arguments advanced on behalf of the respondents. The power to levy a tax includes all incidental powers to prevent the evasion of such tax. The powers such as the power to seize and confiscate goods in the event of evasion of tax and the power to levy penalty are meant to check tax evasion and are intended to operate as a deterrent against tax evaders and are therefore ancillary or incidental to the power to levy tax on the sale of goods and thus fall within the ambit and scope of entry 54 of List II to the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India. This position in law is not disputed by the respondents. What is disputed is that when tax is sought to be recovered from the clearing and forwarding agents in the form of penalty under section 57 (2), the same falls outside the ancillary or incidental powers of the State Legislature under entry 54 of List II as the levy under the Act is on sale and purchase of goods and as there is no nexus between such sale or purchase of goods and the clearing and forwarding agents, sections 57 and 58 and especially the penalty provisions fall outside such ancillary powers. As stated above, the said Act provides not only for levy of tax on sale and purchase of goods but also provides for computation of tax, incidence of tax, recovery of tax, assessment and reassessment. The impugned provision of section 57(1) and section 58(1) operate in aid of sections 27, 28 and 29 of the Act. To illustrate, the sale price is net of cost of freight or installation. The dealer in his return is entitled to show such expense as deduction. The Commissioner is entitled to verify the claim for deduction. If the assessing authority has reason to believe in the course of assessment under section 27 or reassessment under section 28 that deduction claimed is excessive, it can call for information from the clearing and forwarding agent. He can reopen the assessment in cases where fraud is detected in the matter of deduction on account of excessive claims of deduction being allowed and on that basis the assessing authority is empowered to levy penalty on the dealer. Such particulars will be called for if the dealer-assessee has transported the goods through the clearing and forwarding agent. Where false claims for deduction are made on taxable goods dispatched to other places by way of sale without accounting for the same, it results in tax evasion. To check such evasions, sections 57 and 58 are enacted. The information sought under section 57 (1) and the maintenance of register under section 58 will therefore help the revenue to identify the nature of the transaction to verify the claims of the dealer and to trace the taxable transactions so that a person or a transaction liable to sales tax under the State Act does not escape payment of such tax. When the Commissioner acts under section 57 (1) he acts in cases where he detects such evasions. This is clear from provisions of sections 57 (1) and 58 (1). under various sections of the Act, tax-evaders are sought to be penalised and by contravening the provisions of sections 57 and 58 the clearing and forwarding agent also becomes liable as he facilitates such tax evasion. In the circumstances, the High Court erred in holding that there was no proximate connection between the clearing and forwarding agents and the tax evasion”.
On the same lines as the above decisions was the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in A.B.C (India) Ltd. v. State of Assam - (2005) 142 STC 88, which also dealt with the validity of a provision under the Assam General Sales Tax Act, which required transporters and carriers to maintain accounts and furnish information. The Court made the following observations with regard to the nature of the relationship of a transporter, to the transaction of sale or purchase of goods:-
“22. In our view, the transporters are not strangers to the sale or purchase of goods; to the contrary are parts and parcels and are directly involved in storing the goods purchased or sold by, and in many cases such, transactions are fictitiously carried on in false name and address besides false classifications vis-a- vis transportation of such goods in and outside the State making themselves party to the episode of such fictitious transactions for the sole purpose of evasion of tax by the dealers purchasing and selling such goods”.
7. It will be clear from a perusal of the aforementioned judgments that the provisions of Section 49 of the KVAT Act, which are essentially for the purposes of ensuring that there is no activity of smuggling, and thereby an attempted evasion of tax that is due under the KVAT Act, in respect of notified goods, is in the nature of a machinery provision under a legislation that is intended to levy a tax on the sale or purchase of goods. The said provision is intended to ensure that the charge is effective and that no amount, that is due under the Act, escapes an assessment to tax under the Act. Being in the nature of a machinery provision that is intended to further the objects of main enactment, the provision itself has to be seen as one that is incidental or ancillary to the power of the State Legislature to enact a legislation for levy of tax on sale or purchase of goods. The challenge against the validity of the said provision on this ground must necessarily fail.
8. There is yet another aspect of the matter that requires to be considered. The challenge in the instant case is against the provisions in a taxing statute. While it is trite that the provisions of a statute will not be struck down as unconstitutional unless that is the only option available, when it comes to an examination of the constitutional validity of a taxing statute, the State Legislature is given a wider latitude and the Courts will be more circumspect while dealing with a challenge against the validity of a taxing statute. The special considerations that come into play while dealing with taxing statutes, or economic legislation, has been re-iterated in a number of decisions of the Supreme Court. In R.K. Garg v. Union of India and Others – (1981) 4 SCC 675, in the context of a challenge against the Special Bearer Bonds (Immunities and Exemptions) Act, 1981 and while repelling the said challenge, it was stated as follows:
“8. Another rule of equal importance is that laws relating to economic activities should be viewed with greater latitude than laws touching civil rights such as freedom of speech, religion etc. It has been said by no less a person than Homes, J. that the legislature should be allowed some play in the joints, because it has to deal with complex problems which do not admit of solution through any doctrinaire or strait-jacket formula and this is particularly true in case of legislation dealing with economic matters, where, having regard to the nature of the problems required to be dealt with, greater play in the joints has to be allowed to the legislature. The court should feel more inclined to give judicial deference to legislative judgment in the field of economic regulation than in other areas where fundamental human rights are involved. Nowhere has this admonition been more felicitously expressed than in Morey v. Doud where Frankfurier, J. said in his inimitable style:
In the utilities, tax and economic regulation cases, there are good reasons for judicial self-restraint if not judicial deference to legislative judgment. The legislature after all has the affirmative responsibility. The courts have only the power to destroy, not to reconstruct. When these are added to the complexity of economic regulation, the uncertainty, the liability to error, the bewildering conflict of the experts, and the number of times the Judges have been overruled by events – self-limitation can be seen to be the path to judicial wisdom and institutional prestige and stability.
The court must always remember that “legislation is directed to practical problems, that the economic mechanism is highly sensitive and complex, that many problems are singular and contingent, that laws are not abstract propositions and do not relate to abstract units and are not to be measured by abstract symmetry”; “that exact wisdom and nice adaption of remedy are not always possible” and that “judgment is largely a prophecy based on meager and uninterpreted experience”. Every legislation particularly in economic matters is essentially empiric and it is based on experimentation or what one may call trial and error method and therefore it cannot provide for all possible situations or anticipate all possible abuses. There may be crudities and inequities in complicated experimental economic legislation but on that account alone it cannot be struck down as invalid. The courts cannot, as pointed out by the United States of Supreme Court in Secretary of Agriculture v. Central Reig Refining Company, be converted into tribunals for relief from such crudities and inequities. There may even be possibilities of abuse, but that too cannot of itself be a ground for invalidating the legislation, because it is not possible for any legislature to anticipate as if by some divine prescience, distortions and abuses of its legislation which may be made by those subject to its provisions and to provide against such distortions and abuses. Indeed, howsoever great may be the care bestowed on its framing, it is difficult to conceive of a legislation which is not capable of being abused by perverted human ingenuity. The Court must therefore adjudge the constitutionality of such legislation by the generality of its provisions and not by its crudities or inequities or by the possibilities of abuse of any of its provisions. If any crudities, inequities or possibilities of abuse come to light, the legislature can always step in and enact suitable amendatory legislation. That is the essence of pragmatic approach which must guide and inspire the legislature in dealing with complex economic issues.
The said observations have been quoted with approval in later cases which also indicate that the approach of the Court, while examining a challenge to the constitutionality of an enactment, is to start with a presumption of constitutionality. Thereafter, the Court should try to sustain its validity to the extent possible and it should strike down the enactment only when it is not possible to sustain it. The Court should not approach the enactment with a view to pick holes or to search for defect of drafting, much less, in exactitude of language employed. It is necessary that any defects in drafting should be ironed out as part of the attempt to sustain the validity or the constitutionality of the enactment. The said principles emanate from a recognition of the fact that, an Act made by a legislature represents the will of the people and, therefore, cannot be lightly interfered with. In the context of a taxing statute, the following observation in Government of Andhra Pradesh v. P. Lakshmi Devi – (2008) 4 SCC 720, is also significant.
“73. All decisions in the economic and social spheres are essentially adhoc and experimental. Since economic matters are extremely complicated, this inevitably entails special treatment for special situations. The State must, therefore be left with wide latitude in devising ways and means of fiscal or regulatory measures, and the court should not, unless compelled by the statute or by the Constitution, encroach into this field, or invalidate such law”.
9. Applying the aforesaid tests laid down by the various decisions of the Supreme Court, it is clear that in the instant case, the provisions of Section 49 of the KVAT Act, cannot be struck down as unreasonable, arbitrary or violative of Article 301 of the Constitution of India. The provision provides ample safeguards for ensuring compliance with the rules of natural justice and also ensures that the person proceeded against is given ample opportunity to show cause against the proposed detention and subsequent confiscation. The defects that had been pointed out in the erstwhile provisions of Section 30 C of the KGST Act were removed by the Legislature while enacting the new provision under Sec. 49 of the KVAT Act. The prescription with regard to the value of the goods, for the purposes of attracting the definition of smuggling, has also been provided under Rule 66 of the KVAT Rules. In that view of the matter, when the scheme envisaged in Sec. 49 of the KVAT Act is considered in its entirety , it cannot be said that it falls foul of the Constitutional provisions for holding it to be invalid and unconstitutional. The challenge against the constitutional validity of the said provision, therefore, fails and is repelled.
10. It is pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner that, against Ext. P13 order, he has not availed of the statutory remedy under the Act as he had chosen to challenge the validity of the provision before this Court through the present proceedings. In view of the fact that the challenge against the validity of Sec. 49 of the KVAT Act has been repelled through this judgment, I deem it appropriate to afford the petitioner an opportunity of challenging Ext. P13 order before the appellate authority under the KVAT Act. Hence, if the petitioner prefers an appeal against Ext. P13 order within a period of three weeks from today, the same shall be considered by the appellate authority on merits and appropriate orders shall be passed thereon. Save for the said direction, the Writ Petition fails and is accordingly dismissed.
11. Before concluding, I must also place on record the appreciation of this Court for the valuable assistance rendered by the amicus curiae Sri. Harisankar V. Menon, whose erudition and industry were on magnificent display during the course of his submissions before this Court. His inputs were of great assistance to the court while rendering the judgment in this case.
Sd/- A.K.JAYASANKARAN NAMBIAR JUDGE
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