JUDGMENT D.P. Singh, J.
1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. The petitioner Bank challenges order dated May 1, 1985 and February 18, 1986 passed by the Industrial Tribunal in a reference arising out of termination of respondent No. 2 workman, which reference is still pending before the Tribunal to be answered.
2. Brief facts for the decision of this petition are that the respondent workman while working as a clerk in the petitioner bank was suspended vide order dated August 30, 1971 when a fraud was detected and first information reports were lodged. As it is in such cases the criminal (sic) investigation came to naught. Without any success, the respondent-workman challenged his suspension in a suit. A departmental enquiry was set in motion and a charge-sheet dated December 3, 1974 was served upon him. The charges related to specific cases of forgery in the ledger account of one individual who interestingly made payment through cheques in favour of a firm in the name of the wife of the workman himself. In the departmental enquiry the workman admitted his guilt, as aforesaid, in helping the party. After he had admitted his wrong doings, the enquiry was closed and he was dismissed from service. The workman took the matter to a departmental appeal which was also rejected. This gave rise to an Adjudication Case No. 83 of 1978. The Tribunal vide its order dated May 1, 1985 held that the acceptance of negligence by the workman did not automatically mean that he had accepted his guilt, held that the enquiry was not fair and thus gave an opportunity to the petitioner bank to lead evidence to prove the charge. The respondent workman filed a review application dated June 21, 1985 on the ground that since the bank did not ask for leading evidence, the Court could not grant them such liberty. Further prayer was made that he ought to be paid the wages during the pendency of the reference before the Tribunal. The Tribunal vide the second impugned order dated February 18, 1986 after directing the petitioner bank to keep on making payments to the workman as if no order of termination was in existence, upheld its earlier order so far as the permission to the petitioner for leading of evidence was concerned. It also fixed a date for leading of evidence by the parties. In reaching a decision with regard to payment of emoluments to the workman, the Tribunal had taken resort to certain bipartite settlements where a workman was entitled for payment, in case of a criminal case not being found to be true.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that criminal trial and a departmental enquiry are totally different. He has further submitted that the management was within right to pass an order of termination and till it is set aside the Tribunal did not have the jurisdiction to grant wages as it would otherwise mean that the Tribunal has prejudged the issue.
4. To appreciate the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner, it would be necessary to note the terms of reference:
"Whether the action of the Management of Allahabad Bank in dismissing Sri Jagat Narain Kapoor, clerk, Ahmedabad Branch of the Bank in Lucknow w.e.f. December 17, 1976 is legal and justified? If not, to what relief is the workman entitled?"
5. It cannot be disputed that an establishment has the power to pass an order of discharge without seeking any approval or permission of the Labour Court or Tribunal. The order of discharge operates from the day it is made and until it is set aside or held to be invalid, the same has to be taken as validly made. The Tribunal has proceeded as if the management had to take approval or permission of the Tribunal as prescribed in the case of protected workman or in cases covered by Section 33(2)(b). The Tribunal was not in any way entitled to dwell upon the conditions with respect to suspension or payment of wages before dealing with the legality of discharge. It has only come to the conclusion that the departmental enquiry was not fair and proper on the ground that the management had acted upon the so called admission of the negligence by the workman which it (sic) had thought did not amount to admission of guilt. The Tribunal does have powers to make interim order, but such an order which has been passed amounts to finally deciding the dispute itself even though the legality of the order is yet to be tested. A perusal of the enquiry report and the order passed by the Tribunal dated May 1, 1985 shows that the order itself is not free from doubt but this Court at this stage would not enter into that controversy. On behalf of the workman it had been contended that the Tribunal under Section 11-A of the Act had the jurisdiction to pass the impugned order. This argument cannot I be accepted. Section 11-A was introduced in the statute book basically to empower the Tribunal or the Labour Court to interfere in the quantum of punishment, but, in my view, under the garb of exercising power under Section 11-A, the Tribunal did not have the jurisdiction to pass such an order which amounts to suspension of the discharge order itself without in fact giving such an opportunity to the management. It cannot be disputed that in the event the discharge is upheld by the Tribunal, the order would operate from the date it was actually made. A perusal of the charge-sheet shows that the charges against the workman were of a serious nature involving falsification of the ledger, where the workman himself had admitted atleast that it was his negligence in helping the customer at the cost of the bank, that too helping a customer who makes payment through cheques to a firm owned by the wife of the workman. In my view, the order of the Tribunal granting payment of wages etc. to the workman was unwarranted on the facts of this case, and that too on a review petition. In my view, the entire approach of the Tribunal was unwarranted.
6. In view of the discussions hereinabove, this writ petition succeeds and is allowed and the impugned order dated February 18, 1986 is hereby quashed. No order as to cost.