JUDGMENT Shishir Kumar, J.
1. The present writ petition has been filed for quashing the judgment and order dated 15.9.2000 (Annexure-8 to the writ petition) passed by the District Judge, Gorakhpur, respondent No. 1 in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 19 of 2000, Akhilesh Pratap Singh v. Shiv Bachan Singh and Ors. Further issuing a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the judgment and decree dated 25.5.1995, passed by the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Gorakhpur in Original Suit No. 270 of 1984, Sri Ram Singh and Ors. v. Shiv Bachan Singh and Ors. (Annexure-3 to the writ petition).
2. The facts arising out of the present writ petition are that the respondent Nos. 9 and 10 along with the petitioners instituted a Suit No. 270 of 1984 in the Court of respondent No. 2 and against respondent Nos. 3 to 8 praying for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering in their possession over the land in dispute. Admittedly, on the date when the suit was filed, the petitioners were minors, therefore, they were represented by respondent No. 10 who was their mother and next friend. In the aforesaid suit, the petitioners were plaintiff Nos. 3 and 4 respectively while respondent Nos. 9 and 10 were plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 respectively. In the aforesaid suit, Sri Om Prakash Sinha and one Deo Prakash Rai, advocates were engaged as counsels for the plaintiffs by respondent No. 10 and as the petitioners were minor, as such, they could not and did not independently engage another advocate as their counsel. On 30.1.1985, the respondent No. 9 (plaintiff No. 1) filed an application (Paper No. 12-ka) stating that he has got no interest in the suit property and as such, he is not interested in pursuing the Original Suit No. 270 of 1984 and as such, has prayed for dismissal of the said suit against the defendants so far as respondent No. 9 was concerned. The aforesaid application was never disposed of by the Court. On 21.2.1995. the respondent No. 10 that is plaintiff No. 2 filed an application (Paper No. 84 A-2) stating that the petitioners with plaintiff Nos. 3 and 4 have become major and prayed that above fact may be recorded in the case. That on 10.3.1995, the trial court that is respondent No. 2 directed that an endorsement to that effect be made that the petitioner has become major. The order dated 10.3.1995 was passed by the trial court in the absence of the petitioners which is apparent from the order sheet of the suit. On 10.3.1995, itself paper No. 85 (Ka-2) alleged to be a compromise between all the parties to the suit (including the petitioners) and allegedly the signatures of all the parties including the petitioners were filed. The same was verified on the same date, i.e., 10.3.1995 and during verification of the compromise all parties to the suit except the petitioners were present and the petitioners have been shown to be represented by one Sri Hari Nandan Srivastava, advocate. The aforesaid fact is clear from the order sheet and the endorsement to that effect by the Civil Judge (Senior Division) has been made. A copy of the order sheet has been filed by the petitioners as Annexure-2 to the writ petition.
3. Petitioners further state that the petitioners were ignorant of any of the above proceedings going before the trial court and they have never entered in any compromise regarding the suit property. The signatures of the petitioners on the compromise are forged and the petitioners have never signed on paper No, 85 (Ka-2) and the petitioners have never engaged any advocate as their counsel in the Original Suit No. 270 of 1984. In fact as the petitioners having no knowledge regarding the pendency of the proceedings which was going on before the trial court. On 13.3.1995, the respondent No. 10 moved an application stating that the respondent Nos. 3 to 8 fraudulently obtained her thumb impression on certain papers and, as such, before passing any order she may be afforded an opportunity. The trial court fixed 25.3.1995. On 25.3.1995, the case was adjourned to 12.4.1995. 12.4.1995 was a public holiday, so it was adjourned to 15.4.1995 and on 15.4.1995, a date was fixed, i.e., 4.7.1995. Before 4.7.1995, the respondent Nos. 3 to 8 moved an application for an early date and the date was preponed to hearing on 4.5.1995 and on 4.5.1995, the date was fixed to 25.5.1995. The petitioners had no knowledge that any proceedings are pending as no notices were issued to the petitioners informing them about the said proceedings, therefore, the petitioners were not present. By order dated 25.5.1995, the respondents have disposed of the Original Suit No. 270 of 1984 in terms of compromise allegedly to be entered into by the parties to the suit. A copy of the same has been filed as Annexure-3 to the writ petition.
4. On 28.5.1995, when the petitioners came to know regarding the order dated 25.5.1995 filed an application under Section 151, C.P.C. stating therein that the order dated 25.5.1995 has been passed fraudulently and has been obtained by the respondents and petitioners have never engaged any advocate as their counsel in the case nor had they signed any compromise and as such has requested to recall the order dated 25.5.1995. An application to that effect which was numbered as Paper No. 4C is annexed as Annexure-4 to the writ petition. The trial court by order dated 19.12.1998 has recalled the judgment and decree dated 25.5.1995 and restored the case to its original number. A copy of the same has been filed as Annexure-5 to the writ petition. From the perusal of the order dated 19.12.1998, it clearly goes to show that the trial court has taken into consideration the two main relevant facts that though the application which was filed for compromise signatures of the petitioners are there but during verification of the compromise which was done on the same day, i.e., on 10.3.1995, the petitioners were not present. The order sheet dated 10.3.1995 does not contain the signatures of the petitioners. The paper No. 85Ka-2 has also been singed by the respondent No. 9 though he had already filed a paper No. 12 (Ka) praying that his suit against the defendants may be dismissed.
5. Aggrieved by the order dated 19.12.1998, the respondent Nos. 3 to 8 filed a Civil Revision No. 41 of 1999, which was allowed by the IIIrd Additional District Judge, Gorakhpur, vide its judgment and order dated 25.9.1999. A copy of the same has been filed as Annexure-6 to the writ petition. From the perusal of the judgment passed by the appellate court shows that the revision instituted by the respondents was allowed by quashing the order dated 19.12.1998 only on the ground that against the judgment and decree dated 25.5.1995 an application under Section 151, C.P.C. was not maintainable and proper course for the petitioners was to file an appeal under Order XLIII, C.P.C. In view of the aforesaid judgment, the petitioners instituted a miscellaneous appeal under Order XLIII, which was registered and numbered as Miscellaneous Appeal No. 19 of 2000. The respondents vide its order dated 15.9.2000 dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioners. A copy of the same has been filed as Annexure-8 to the writ petition. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the petitioners have filed the present writ petition.
6. The writ petition was entertained and respondents were granted time to file counter-affidavit and it was also directed to maintain the status quo.
7. It has been contended on behalf of the petitioners that the finding rerecorded by the court below that as the Paper No. 84-Ka contained the signatures of the petitioners is contrary to the record and without any evidence. The judgment and order passed on 15.9.2000 is liable to be vitiated due to non-consideration of the relevant factors as the court below has failed to take into consideration the fact that admittedly, the petitioners were major on the date when the order on the compromise application was passed. Therefore, the mother of the petitioners cannot make an application for compromise by his own signature. Admittedly, an application on 21.2.1995 was filed intimating the Court that the petitioners have become major and this fact has been recorded by the trial court, as such, the order dated 25.5.1995, should not have been passed as the Court was aware that the petitioners have become major and as they have not put an appearance and signature has not been verified, therefore, no order of compromise should have been passed. The judgment dated 15.9.2000 is vitiated only on the ground in so far as it based on the facts that the respondent No. 10 has given her statement on oath establishing the compromise. It was obligatory on the part of the court below to have verified the signatures of the petitioners or the petitioners should have been called in Court for the purposes of verification of their signatures or correctness of the compromise deed. The judgment and order dated 25.5.1995 is liable to be vitiated only on the ground that the provisions of Order XXXII, Rule 12, C.P.C. has not been followed. As the judgment and decree dated 25.5.1995 has been passed without affording an opportunity to the petitioners and the same has been obtained by the respondent Nos. 3 to 8 by playing fraud upon the Court, as such, the petitioners submit that the order passed by the court below is liable to be set aside.
8. The further submission has been made on behalf of the petitioners are that on an application made by the petitioners under Section 151, the trial court has come to the conclusion that It will be in the interest of justice to recall its order and to verify the fact regarding the alleged signatures on the compromise and also to the effect that whether the petitioners have engaged another counsel or not. The trial court taking into consideration has come to the conclusion that the application filed on behalf of the petitioners under Section 151 was maintainable, as such, the revisional court ought to have not interfered only on the technical ground that the petitioners should have filed an appeal before the appellate court under Order XLIII, C.P.C.
9. The further submission of the petitioners is that admittedly, the objection was invited and the respondents have been afforded an opportunity and after perusal of the record, the trial court has recorded a finding that on the vakalatnama, the signatures of the petitioners have been made and if on the compromise applications there are signatures of the petitioners why the compromise has been verified by the advocate and the petitioners were not present in court though the compromise application was filed on the same day. The trial court after going into all the facts and records was pleased to hold that it clearly appears that there was no verification of the signature of the petitioners and under what circumstances the advocate concerned has verified the compromise. This clearly creates a doubt in the mind of the Court, therefore, the Court has recalled its order dated 25.5.1995 and has directed that the suit will be decided on merits. The revisional court on a revision filed by the respondents has set aside the order without verifying this fact that what were the circumstances that when the compromise was signed by the petitioners on the same day. Under what circumstances the same has been verified by the alleged advocate. It has further been submitted that as the revisional court has held that the application under Section 151, C.P.C. was not maintainable and the appeal under Order XLIII, Rules 1 and 2, C.P.C. was maintainable. The order passed by the trial court setting aside the compromise decree was set aside only on the ground that the petitioners would have filed an appeal under Order XLIII of C.P.C. In such a situation, the petitioners submit that they have filed an appeal and the appellate court without considering all these aspects of the matter was pleased to dismiss the appeal vide Its order dated 15.9.2000. No finding to this effect has been recorded by the court below that once an application has been filed informing the Court that the petitioners have become major, how an application on behalf of the mother of the petitioners are maintainable for the purposes of compromise. The trial court has recorded a finding of fact that it clearly creates a doubt in the mind of the Court that as the application signed on behalf of the parties have been filed on the same date but under what circumstances the advocate concerned alleged to have appeared on behalf of the petitioners have verified the compromise and sign of the petitioners. It clearly cerates a doubt in the mind of the Court that there is something fishy in the matter as such, on an application filed by the petitioners the compromise decree was set aside.
10. The power under Section 151, C.P.C. is an inherent, power and in the interest of justice if the Court comes to the conclusion that a party has suffered a loss and has been denied justice, it is always open to the Court to interfere on an application filed by a person under Section 151, C.P.C.
11. On the other hand the counsel for the respondents has submitted that the application filed by the petitioners itself was not maintainable and the petitioners were having a remedy provided under the statute, therefore, the application under Section 151, C.P.C. was not maintainable. The order passed on an application filed on behalf of the petitioners under Section 151, C.P.C. now cannot be taken into consideration as the revisional court by its order dated 25.9.1999 has already set aside the order dated 19.12.1998 and the miscellaneous appeal filed by the petitioners has already been dismissed vide its order dated 15th September, 2000, therefore, the order passed on an application filed on behalf of the petitioners under Section 151, C.P.C. cannot be read into and cannot be taken into consideration for the purposes of the decision of the present case. Further it has been submitted on behalf of the contesting respondents that as the application was filed by the petitioners and was signed by both the petitioners as well as the respondent Nos. 9 and 10 and contesting defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 3 (respondent Nos. 3, 4 and 5) in the writ petition. As such, subsequently after the order passed on the basis of the compromise application the petitioners cannot say that they have not signed on the comprise and has not authorized any advocate to appear on their behalf. It has further been submitted that a finding to this effect has also been recorded that the petitioners Nos. 1 and 2 and respondents Nos. 9 and 10 were represented in the suit by Sri Hari Nandan Srivastava, advocate, who duly filed his vakalatnama, was Paper No. 83 (Ga) and the same was on record. It is also absolutely incorrect to say that the petitioners were not conscious of the proceedings of the suit. They themselves have moved an application dated 21.2.1995 under their signatures with a request to inform the Court that they have become major. The petitioners' were present in Court on 10.3.1995 when the application 84 (Ka-2) was filed and allowed. The petitioners duly signed the compromise and they were identified by their counsel Sri Hari Nandan Srivastava, advocate. It is also incorrect to say that the petitioners have never signed on the compromise and their signatures were forged. The revision filed by the respondents has rightly been allowed by the revisional court on 25.9.1999 as no leave has been granted by the revisional court while passing the order dated 25.9.1999, as such, appeal preferred by the petitioners were barred by limitation and was not maintainable, as such, the same has rightly been dismissed by the appellate court on 15.9.2000. There was full compliance of Order XXXII, Rule 2 of Civil Procedure Code and no fraud was committed upon the Court.
12. In such a situation, the respondents submit that as the petitioners have not approached this Court with clean hands, therefore, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. It has further been submitted that from the perusal of the order sheet it is also clear that the Court has recorded a finding to this effect that the petitioners have signed the compromise and the advocate who was appearing on their behalf has verified the compromise and in such a situation, the order dated 25.5.1995 has been passed. There is no illegality in the order and the writ petition is liable to be dismissed.
13. I have heard learned Counsel for the petitioners and counsel for the respondents and have perused the record.
14. From the perusal of the record, it clearly appears that admittedly, when the suit was filed the petitioners were minor. Subsequently, the petitioners moved an application on 21.2.1995, informing the Court that they have become major, therefore, an application for compromise should have been filed by the petitioners. Any application filed by mother on behalf of the petitioners was not maintainable after 21.2.1995. When the petitioners came to know regarding the compromise decree, they immediately moved an application under Section 151, C.P.C. for setting aside the said order on the ground that they have never entered into compromise and has not authorized any counsel to act on their behalf. The trial court has recorded a finding that from the perusal of the original file it appears that in the application there was a signature of the petitioners but as on the same day the compromise was verified and as the same has been verified by the advocate and it has not been verified by the petitioners, as such, it creates doubt if on the compromise application dated 10.3.1995 when there were signatures of the petitioners, under what circumstances the same has been verified by the advocate. The trial court has also recorded a finding while considering the application under Section 151, C.P.C. that no reasons to this effect has been recorded that why the petitioners have not verified the compromise. The amendment application which was accepted there is only signature and thumb impression of the plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 only. There is no signature of the petitioners on the said application. A finding to this effect has also been recorded that after the application filed by the petitioners, intimating the Court that they have become major no new vakalatnama was filed before above. It is not clear that after becoming major, the petitioners have engaged one Hari Nandan Srivastava, advocate as their counsel. The trial court after recording the aforesaid findings has set aside the compromise decree dated 25.5.1995. As regards the contention raised by the respondents that the application under Section 151 was not maintainable and the petitioners should have filed an appeal under Order XLIII of the Civil Procedure Code. It is also clear from the record that the appeal was filed but the appeal was dismissed by order dated 15th September, 2000 but the appellate court has not recorded a finding to this effect that under what circumstances, when the application for compromise was filed on the same day and it bears signatures of the petitioners how the petitioners have not verified the compromise and same has been verified by the alleged advocate. It is also not in dispute that the petitioners after becoming major, an information was given to the Court that no application on behalf of the mother of the petitioners was maintainable unless it is verified that it has been signed by petitioners. From the perusal of the order sheet it is also clear that when the compromise application was filed on 10.3.1995, immediately after three days, an application was filed by the mother of the petitioners Smt. Chandrawati that she has not signed on the compromise application and on 25.5.1995 when the compromise decree was passed, the mother of the petitioners has given a statement that under misconception, she had filed an objection against the compromise application. This clearly creates a doubt in the mind of the Court while considering the application under Section 151 filed on behalf of the petitioners. From the perusal of the order sheet from 10.3.1995 to the date of compromise decree, i.e., 25.5.1995, clearly goes to show that strict Judge, Gorakhpur 12006 (2) on 25.5.1995, the Court has not recorded in the order sheet regarding presence of the petitioners in Court. The orders from 10.3.1995 till the date of compromise decree dated 25.5.1995 is being reproduced below:
10-3-95 okn is'k gqvk mHk; i{k gkftj gS 84d 2 Lohdkj fd;k tkrk gS la'kks/ku 2 fnu esa fd;k tk;s A 10-3-95 i=koyh is'k gqbZ] i{kdkjksa dh vksj ls Jh eqdqUn yky xqIr ,dokssdsV ,oa Jh gfjuUnu JhokLro ,MoksdsV mifLFkfr gq, rFkk lqygukek ds lacaa/k esa i{kdkjksa dh f'kuk[r fd;k lqygukek U;k;ky; ds le{k i{kdkjksa dh milfLFkfr esa rlnhd fd;k x;k A okLrs vkns'k 13-3-95 dks is'k gks A gLrk{kj vLi"V flfoy tt 13-3-95 vf/koDrkx.k dk;Z ls fojr gSa lqygukek 85d 2 ds fo:) vkifÙk Jherh pUnzkorh oxSjg us izLrqr fd;k ftlds lkFk layXu odkyrukek esa vkseizdk'k flUgk ,MoksdsV o nso izdk'k jk; ,MoksdsV o jktdqekj xqIrk ,MoksdsV ds uke vafdr gSa A ijUrq odkyrukek ij fdlh vf/koDrk dk gLrk{kj ugha gS A izkfFkZuh dk dFku gS fd lqygukek 85 d 2 mldh tkudkjh vkSj jtkeUnh ls rlnhd ugha gqvk gS A pwafd Jherh pUnzkorh nsoh ds ikzFkZuk i= ij fdlh vf/koDrk ds gLrk{kj ugha gS A vr% mldh vkifÙk dks xzká djus ds fy, mldh fu'kkuh vaxwBk dk f'kuk[r fdlh vf/koDrk }kjk gksuk vko';d gS A blfy, Jherh pUnzkorh dks funsZ'k fn;k tkrk gS fd og vius fu'kkuh vaxwBk dh f'kUkk[r fdlh vf/koDrk ls djkos rHkh mldh vkifÙk iks"k.kh; gksxh A ckngw Jherh pUnzkorh nsoh us U;k;ky; dks crk;k fd lc vf/koDrk U;k; dk;Z ls fojDr gSa blfy, blds gLrk{kj dks f'kUkk[r djus ds fy, dksbZ rS;kj ugha gS vr% okLrs vkifÙk fuLrkj.k fnukad 25-3-95 is'k gks mDr frfFk rd Jherh pUnzkorh nsoh dks funsZ'k fn;k tkrk gS fd og vius fu'kkuh vaxwBk dh f'kuk[r fdlh vf/koDrk ls djkosa A gLrk{kj vLi"V flfoy tt 25-3-95 okn is'k gqvk i{kdkj gkftj vk;s A vkifÙk e; 'kiFk i= vksñ ihñ us nkf[ky fd;k okLrs fuLrkj.k fnukad 12-4-95 dks is'k gks A 15-4-95 fnukad 11 rFkk 14-4-95 vodk'k Fkk vkt is'k gqvk i{kdkj mifLFkr gSa vkns'k okLrs fuLrkj.k fnukad 4-7-95 dks is'k gks A ckngw 12x izkFkZuk i= }kjk izfroknh okLrs utnhd dh frfFk fu;r djus gsrq fn;k x;k vkifÙk ugha gS A vkns'k&&4-5-95 dks is'k gks lwpuk nh tk; A 4-5-95 okn is'k gqvk A izfroknh gkftj e; vf/koDrk vk;s oknh ds vf/koDrk gkftj ugha vk;s mudks lwfpr fd;k tk; okLrs fuLrkj.k fnukad 25-9-95 dks is'k gS lwpuk nh tk; A 25-5-95 uke xokg&&pUnzkorh nsoh iRuh Jh dSyk'k flag mez 45 o"kZ xzke doygh] rglhy ukSruoka] ftyk egjktxat A 'kiFk c;ku fd;k fd eSaus rFkk esjs yM+ds vf[kys'k izrki flag vfHkeU;q izrki flag rFkk esjs HkkbZ Jh jke flag us Jh f'kocpu flag] jke flag] v'kksd dqekj flag ls eqdnek le>k cq>k dj lqyg dj fy;k Fkk vkSj lqygukek cuok dj lqudj le> cq> dj U;k;ky; ds le> vius vf/koDrk Jh gfjuUnu JhokLro ds lkFk vkdj vnkyr ds le{k rlnhd fd;k Fkk A ;g lqygukek lgh gS vkSj dqN yksxksa ds cgdkos esa vkdj ,d nj[kkLr o ,d c;ku gQdks dkxt uañ&87x] 88x ns fn;k Fkk tks xyr gS vkSj [kkfjt gksxk A lqygukek lgh gS A fu'kkuh ;g c;ku esjs cksyus ij is'kdkj }kjk lqudj rlnhd vaxqBk fy[kk x;k fd;k pUnzkorh nsoh 25-5-95 25-5-95 25-5-95 i=koyh is'k gqbZ A mHk; i{k gkftj gSa izfrokfnuh uañ&2 Jherh pUnzkorh nsoh dk c;ku fy[kk x;k ftlls mlus ;g Lohdkj fd;k gS fd mlus LosPNk ls lqygukek fd;k gS fnukad 13-3-95 dks lqygukek 85d 2 ds fo:) Jherh pUnzkorh nsoh izfrokfnuh uañ&2 us vkifÙk 87x is'k fd;k mlh ds fuLrkj.k gsrq vkt ;g rkjh[k fu;r gS A izfrokfnuh uañ&2 pUnzkorh nsoh us lqygukek dh ckr Lohdkj dj fy;k gS vkSj Lo;a U;k;ky; esa mifLFkr gksdj c;ku fn;k gS rFkk vkifÙk in cy ugha fn;k gS blfy, vkifÙk fujLr fd;k tkrk gS vkSj lqygukek Lohdkj fd;k tkrk gS okn lqygukek 85d&2 ds vk/kkj ij mHk; i{kksa ds chp fuf.kZr fd;k tkrk gS A lqygukek 85d&2 fMØh dk va'k gksxk A
15. It is not in dispute now that writ Jurisdiction is a discretionary jurisdiction. It is not issued merely because if it is lawful to do so. Once a factual stand is taken, it cannot be changed on any legal proposition whatsoever nor it is permissible for the Court to examine the correctness of findings of fact unless it is found to be perverse being based on no evidence or contrary to evidence, as the writ court exercises its supervisory jurisdiction and not of appellate forum. The purpose of writ court is not only to protect a person from being subjected for violation of law but also to advance justice and not to thwart it. The Constitution does not place any fetter on the power of the extraordinary jurisdiction but leaves it to the discretion of the Court. However, being the power of discretionary, the Court has to balance competing interest, keeping in mind that the Interest of justice and the public interest can coalesce in certain circumstances.
16. In A.M. Allison v. B.L. Sen , the Apex Court has held that writ court can refuse to exercise its Jurisdiction as writ proceedings cannot of course if it is satisfied that there has been no failure of justice. In case the authority/Court has done substantial Justice, the appellate court may not interfere. But if the order appears to be denying the substantial Justice, the writ court has full jurisdiction in case it comes to the conclusion that there is a failure of justice the writ court can interfere in its discretionary jurisdiction. If there is a denial of substantial Justice, on technical ground the writ court has always having a jurisdiction to interfere.
17. The same view has been reiterated in Mohammad Swalleh and Ors. v. IIIrd Additional District Judge, Meerut and Anr. , the Apex Court has held that "finality of order in judicial proceeding is one of the essential principles which the scheme of the administration of justice must strive for. It is true that there has been some technical breach because if the application was not maintainable before the trial court in the appeal or revision before the appellate court, the same could not be set aside. The High Court had come to the conclusion that order passed by the Prescribed Authority was invalid and improper. The High Court itself could have set it aside. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case Justice has been done though, as mentioned hereinbefore, technically the appellant had a point that the order of District Judge was illegal and improper."
18. In Sree Jain Swetambar Terapanthi Vid (S) v. Phundan Singh and Ors. , the Apex Court while considering the discretionary jurisdiction has observed that "From the above discussion, the principle that emerges is that where the High Court has granted some relief by way of social justice or on equitable grounds without violating the rights of other parties, though in law such relief was not permissible, the Supreme Court could not interfere in Its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 if the order under appeal advances the case of justice and if it is just an equitable so to do."
19. In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Anr. v. Mst. Katiji and Ors. , the Apex Court has held in para 4 of the said judgment which is being reproduced below:
4. When substantial Justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial Justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.
20. When substantial Justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial Justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to vested right in injustice being done because of non-deliberate delay. Therefore, the Court has to examine the case with this angle also bearing in mind that cause of substantial Justice cannot be defeated on mere technicalities.
21. In such a situation in the present case in my opinion, the order passed by the trial court recalling the order dated 25.5.1995 on the basis of finding recorded was an order of substantial Justice only for the purposes that the suit be decided after affording full opportunities to the parties. As there was a doubt in the mind of the Judge concerned regarding the validity of the compromise application and regarding the order dated 25.5.1995, which was based on the application for compromise.
22. In view of the aforesaid fact, the writ petition is allowed. The order dated 15.9.2000, passed in Misc. Appeal No. 19 of 2000 (Annexure-8 to the writ petition) and order dated 25.9.1999, passed in Revision No. 41 of 1999 are hereby set aside and the order dated 19.12.1998 (Annexure-5 to the writ petition) is restored and the trial court is directed to decide the Suit No. 270 of 1984 on merits after affording an opportunity to the parties. As the suit is of 1984, it will be in the interest of justice that the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Gorakhpur, decide the said suit expeditiously if possible, preferably within a period of six months from the date of production of the certified copy of this order.
There shall be no order as to costs.