Ajai Kumar Srivastava vs Dy. General Manager Varanasi & ...

Heard Sri S. K. Mishra and Sri Utpal Chaterji, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri S. K. Kakkar, Advocate, assisted by Sri Sumit Kakkar, learned counsel for the respondent.

This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner praying for quashing of the Appellate Order dated 15.11.1999 passed by Deputy General Manager (Appellate Authority), State Bank of India, Zonal Office, Varanasi and the termination order dated 24.07.1999 passed by Assistant General Manager , (Disciplinary Authority), Region IV, State Bank of India, Zonal Office, Varanasi.

The petitioner's case is that while discharging duties of cashier / clerk in Mumfordganj Branch, Allahabad in year 1994 he was on Medical leave on 16.02.1994 and then from 25.03.1994 to 04.04.1994. He was suspended from service by order dated 14.08.1995 on the allegation of misappropriation of funds and a charge-sheet dated 11.04.1996 was served on him detailing seven charges of misappropriation of funds of the Bank. Petitioner submitted his reply to the said charge-sheet denying the charges. He represented before the Disciplinary Authority on 28.07.1997 stating that charges leveled against him in the charge-sheet are vague and no material in their support has been supplied to him. The Enquiry Officer appointed by the Disciplinary Authority proceeded with the enquiry illegally and against the procedure mentioned in Desai Award and Shashtri Award and therefore, the petitioner objected to the same by his representation dated 10.11.1998 and 15.12.1998. However, Enquiry Officer submitted his report dated 22.05.1999 in which it has been stated that the charge no.1 against petitioner has not been proved, while charge nos.2 to 7 have been proved against him.

Written brief was submitted by Presenting Officer of the Bank before the Enquiry Officer but no such brief was submitted by the petitioner since he had already filed the representation dated 15.12.1998 objecting to the enquiry proceedings and no orders were passed thereon and the second show cause notice dated 29.06.1999 / notice of proposed punishment was issued to the petitioner by the Disciplinary Authority to show cause why his services may not be terminated and the petitioner replied to the same on 15.07.1999. Disciplinary Authority vide order dated 24.07.1999 dismissed the petitioner from service and his salary and allowances were fortified, except the subsistence allowance already paid to him. Against the punishment order dated 24.07.1999 petitioner preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority, which was dismissed by the order dated 15.11.1999 and the punishment order dated 24.7.1999 passed by the Disciplinary authority was confirmed.

In support of the same allegations, as leveled against the petitioner in the charge-sheet dated 11.04.1996, disciplinary proceedings were also initiated against 10 other employees of the Bank but only the petitioner was punished. Regarding the same allegations as in the charge-sheet issued to the petitioner, the Central Bureau of Investigation (C.B.I) in investigating the allegations but no charge-sheet has been submitted against the petitioner and therefore, the Disciplinary Authority ought to have stayed disciplinary proceedings till conclusion of the investigation by the C.B.I. The enquiry conducted by the Enquiry Officer is absolutely illegal and vitiated since he himself cross-examined the petitioner, instead of Presenting Officer cross-examining him and acted as Presenting Officer. The petitioner did not filed written brief and taking his representation dated 10.11.1998 to be his written brief, enquiry was concluded but no finding has been recorded by the Enquiry Officer regarding his defence, that on the dates when the disputed transactions took place, he was on leave and therefore, he could not be said to be involved in the transactions. If the Disciplinary Authority disagreed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer in respect of charge no.1, he was required to issue notice or give opportunity of hearing to the petitioner before recording his findings to the contrary and has not recorded reasons for arriving at a different finding from that of the Enquiry Officer.

The Enquiry Officer never asked the petitioner whether he wants to be represented by a defence representative of his choice, nor he was given the copies of day to day enquiry proceedings, nor he directed the Presenting Officer to furnish the copies of the documents to the petitioner which were relied upon by him, despite repeated requests by the petitioner, nor he had directed the Presenting Officer to produce the relevant witnesses before him. The recital in the show cause notice dated 29.06.1999 that the documents produced on behalf of the Bank have been supplied to the petitioner is incorrect. By his letter dated 15.12.1998 the petitioner prayed before the Disciplinary Authority to provide him list of defence documents and the name of the witness whom he wanted to examine in his defence to prove himself not guilty. No action was taken on his representation. Two employees, namely, Sri Manoj Kumar Tandon and Sri Pramod Kumar Jauhari, were reinstated in service out of 11 employees reinstated without any enquiry, although 11 employees were charge-sheeted for similar charges. Sri Ashutosh Bajpai was promoted to Middle Management Grade though he was found guilty of giving wrong certificate of balancing of ledgers and passing reversing vouchers in the all the Savings Accounts. The Disciplinary Authority did not consider that the petitioner's fault of overdrawing the account was treated as clean over draft and he was persuaded to make a lump sum deposit of rupees four lakhs on the promise of punishment of minor misconduct short of dismissal from service. No financial loss has been caused to the bank nor the petitioner has misappropriated the funds of the Bank. The allegation against him only amounts to irregularities and do not constitute misconduct. The impugned orders are absolutely illegal and hence this writ petition has been filed.

The respondents have filed their counter affidavit stating that there were seven grave charges leveled against the petitioner. The first charge was with regard to an amount of Rs.1,09,600/- pertaining to Savings Bank Account of Sri I.S. Verma was credited to Current Account No. P 51 of the petitioner without consent of the account holder.

The second charge was that the petitioner on 25.03.1994 conspired with other members of the Branch and de-fraud the bank and accordingly, a false debit was raised in the branch clearing general account through Schedule-IV for Rs.4,87,300/- and this amount was posted in Savings Bank Account No. 7547 of Sri K. C. Miglani and subsequently withdrawn in instalments on 25th March, 1994 and 4th April, 1994 and an amount of Rs.89,150/- and Rs.10,000/- was misappropriated by the petitioner by crediting the same to his Current Account No. P 51 on the aforesaid two dates.

The third charge was that he raised fake debit of Rs 5 lakhs in the branch Savings Bank Account and out of the above amount, an amount of Rs. 2 lakh was once again misappropriated by him by means of crediting the same in his current Account No. P 51.

The fourth charge was that a fake debit was raised on 30. 12.1994 of Rs.5.30 and out of the said amount Rs. 2.50 lakhs and Rs.25,000/- were misappropriated by the petitioner by transferring the amount to his Current Account No. P 51 and Saving Bank Account No.11068, in favour of Smt. Rashmi Srivastava, his wife.

The fifth charge against him was that he raised fake debit of Rs.2.30 lakhs in Savings Bank Account No.11068 of Smt. Rashmi Srivastava, his wife, wherein no credit balance was available. The same was credited to his Current Account No. P 51 with intention of defrauding the Bank.

Sixth charge was that on 31.05.1995 and 20.10.1993 he raised false debit of Rs.3.60 lakhs in the Saving Bank Account No.11068 of Smt. Rashmi Srivastava wherein there was no credit balance and got Rs. 3 lakhs credited to his Current Account No. P 51 and last charge was that on 20.10.1993 the petitioner borrowed Rs.35,000/- from account of Sri K. C. Miglani S.B. Account No.7547 without seeking any permission or consent from the Bank.

During the enquiry the petitioner was found involved in various fraud of raising fake entries in the books of account and misappropriating money for personal gains in conspiracy with other members of the bank. He utilised the proceeds of fraudulent credits for reducing his over drawings in his Current Account, which was much beyond his sanctioned limit. Along with the petitioner many other employees of the Bank were involved in such transaction from the year 1992 to 1995 and this was detected in July, 1995, during inspection and audit of the Branch. Thereafter 11 clerks and Branch Manager of the said branch was suspended in 1995 and four officers including Branch Manager were found actively involved in the fraudulent transactions or negligent in performing their duties. After departmental enquiries, penalties were duly imposed on the charged clerks and officers in proportion to their involvement in the fraudulent activities and the case was registered with Central Bureau of Investigation, Lucknow. Charge-sheet has been submitted against three officers and five clerks, including the petitioner. Four clerks including the petitioner have been dismissed.

During the course of inquiry the petitioner neither produced any document nor produced any witness in his defence. The Enquiry Officer by his letter dated 03.11.1997 called the petitioner to appear before him on 20th November, 1997 and state whether he needs defence representative for his defence but the petitioner never made any such demand, while other charged employees opted for defence representatives, the enquiry was conducted in very fair and proper manner after affording him full opportunity of hearing for defending his case. His representations are matters of record and may be verified from the record. The presenting officer submitted his brief on 21.08.1998 before the Enquiry Officer but the petitioner did not submitted written brief despite repeated reminders. When no written brief was submitted by him, the enquiry report was submitted. The stand of the petitioner was that the other employees charge-sheeted with him were let off. Vide Annexure C.A.1 Bank has brought on record the details of punishment awarded to other employees. The charge-sheet filed against the petitioner by the C.B.I has also been brought on record. The question of medical leave of the petitioner has been considered by the Enquiry Officer on internal page 10 of the report. It is false to allege that he has not considered the request of the petitioner for supply of documents, which were given to the petitioner and the minutes of enquiry proceedings bearing signature of the petitioner acknowledging receipt of the documents has been filed as Annexure No.C A 3 to the counter affidavit. It has been further denied that the charges against the petitioner were vague. Sri Manoj Tandon was exonerated of the charges, after enquiry and Sri Pramod Jauhari was given warning as one single fake entry was made in his current account for a sum of Rs.6000/-. Sri Ashutosh Bajpai was promoted before issuance of charge-sheet but departmental enquiry is pending against him. The Bank has suffered loss of almost Rs.22 lakhs and more and a Civil Suit for recovery of Rs.6 lakhs has also been filed against the petitioner. The petitioner being a member of Award Staff, his service conditions are governed by Shashtri and Desai Award and he has alternative remedy of approaching the Industrial Tribunal. The writ petition filed by him deserves to be dismissed.

Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the second show cause notice dated 29.06.1999 / tentative order of punishment issued to the petitioner enclosing therewith the findings of the Enquiry Officer was absolutely illegal since the Disciplinary Authority had made his mind to dismiss the petitioner from service without even hearing him, therefore, the tentative order of punishment was passed in violation of principles of natural justice. He has relied upon para 26 to 31 of the judgment in the case of Himachal State Electricity Board Limited Vs. Mahesh Daliya, (2017) 1 SCC 768, which is as under :

26. Present is not a case of not serving the inquiry report before awarding the punishment rather the complaint has been made that before sending the inquiry report to the delinquent officer, Disciplinary Authority has already made up its mind to accept the findings of the inquiry report and decided to award punishment of dismissal. Both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench on the aforesaid premise came to the conclusion that principle of natural justice have been violated by the Disciplinary Authority. The Division Bench itself was conscious of the issue, as to whether, inquiry is to be quashed from the stage where the Inquiry Officer\Disciplinary Authority has committed fault i.e. from the stage of Rule 15 of the CCS (CCA) Rules as non-supply of the report. Following observations have been made in the impugned judgment by Division Bench in para 21:

"21. Having said so, the core question is - whether the inquiry is to be quashed from the stage where the Inquiry Officer/Disciplinary Authority has committed fault, i.e. from the stage of Rule 15 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, i.e. non-supply of inquiry report, findings and other material relied upon by the Inquiry Officer/Disciplinary Authority to the writ writ petitioner- respondent herein to explain the circumstances, which were made basis for making foundation of inquiry report or is it a case for closure of the inquiry in view of the fact that there is not even a single iota of evidence, prima facie, not to speak of proving by preponderance of probabilities, that the writ petitioner has absented himself willfully and he has disobeyed the directions?"

27. The above observation clearly indicates that Division Bench was well aware that fault has occurred on the stage of Rule 15 of the CCS (CCA) Rules. The Division Bench had also relied on the judgment of this Court in KRUSHNAKANT B. PARMAR Versus UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER (2012) 3 SCC 178 where this Court had laid down that absence from duty without any application on prior permission may amount to unauthorised absence but it does not always mean willful. Learned counsel for the appellant, as noted above, has confined his submission on the proof of the second part of the charge and he has not invited us to enter into the issue as to whether absence of the writ petitioner was willful or not.

28. As noted above, the Division Bench, having posed the question, as to whether, inquiry is to be quashed from the stage whether the Disciplinary Authority committed fault i.e. from the Rule 15, has not further dwelt upon the question nor has given any reason as to why the opportunity for holding the inquiry from the stage fault was found be not given.

29. On the scope of judicial review, the Division Bench itself has referred to judgment of this Court reported in M.V. BIJLANI VERSUS UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS (2006) 5 SCC 88. This Court, noticing the scope of judicial review in context of disciplinary proceeding made following observations in para 25:

"It is true that the jurisdiction of the court in judicial review is limited. Disciplinary proceedings, however, being quasi-criminal in nature, there should be some evidence to prove the charge. Although the charges in a departmental proceeding are not required to be proved like a criminal trial i.e. beyond all reasonable doubt, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the enquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial function, who upon analysing the documents must arrive at a conclusion that there had been a preponderance of probability to prove the charges on the basis of materials on record. While doing so, he cannot take into consideration any irrelevant fact. He cannot refuse to consider the relevant facts. He cannot shift the burden of proof. He cannot reject the relevant testimony of the witnesses only on the basis of surmises and conjectures. He cannot enquire into the allegations with which the delinquent officer had not been charged with."

30. The three Judge Bench of this Court in B.C. CHATURVEDI VERSUS UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS 1995 (6) SCC 749 had noticed the scope of judicial review with regard to disciplinary proceeding. Following observations have been made in paras 12 and 13:

"12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to re-appreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case." "13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to re- appreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India V. H.C. Goel this Court held at p. 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could issued."

31. Both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench have heavily relied on the fact that before forwarding the copy of the report by letter dated 02.04.2008 the Disciplinary Authority-cum-Whole Time Members have already formed an opinion on 25.02.2008 to punish the writ petitioner with major penalty which is a clear violation of principle of natural justice. We are of the view that before making opinion with regard to punishment which is to be imposed on a delinquent, the delinquent has to be given an opportunity to submit the representation/reply on the inquiry report which finds a charge proved against the delinquent. The opinion formed by the Disciplinary Authority-cum-Whole Time Members on 25.02.2008 was formed without there being benefit of comments of the writ petitioner on the inquiry report. The writ petitioner in his representation to the inquiry report is entitled to point out any defect in the procedure, a defect of substantial nature in appreciation of evidence, any misleading of evidence both oral or documentary. In his representation any inputs and explanation given by the delinquent are also entitled to be considered by the Disciplinary Authority before it embarks with further proceedings as per statutory rules. We are, thus, of the view that there was violation of principle of natural justice at the level of Disciplinary Authority when opinion was formed to punish the writ petitioner with dismissal without forwarding the inquiry report to the delinquent and before obtaining his comments on the inquiry report. We are, thus, of the view that the order of the High Court setting aside the punishment order as well as the Appellate order has to be maintained.

The second argument of the learned Senior counsel for the petitioner is that since the Enquiry Officer did not find the charge no.1 proved against the petitioner, he should have issued notice to the petitioner before recording a contrary finding. His argument is that the petitioner was required to be heard before the finding of the Enquiry Officer was reversed by the Disciplinary Authority. In support of his argument he has relied upon para 7 to 9 of the judgment in the case of Punjab National Bank Vs. Kunj Bihari Mishra reported in Laws SC 1998-8-15 and which are as under :

In Ram Kishan's case (supra) disciplinary proceedings on two charges were initiated against Ram Kishan. The inquiry officer in his report found the first charge not proved and the second charge was partly proved. The disciplinary authority disagreed with the conclusion reached by the inquiry officer and a show cause was issued as to why both the charges should not be taken to have been proved. While dealing with the contention that the disciplinary authority had not given any reason in the show cause to disagree with the conclusions reached by the inquiry officer an that, therefore, the findings based on that show cause notice was bad in law, a Two-Judge Bench at page 161 observed as follows:

" ... The purpose of the show-cause notice, in case of disagreement with the findings of the inquiry officer, is to enable the delinquent to show that the disciplinary authority is persuaded not to disagree with the conclusions reached by the inquiry officer for the reasons given in the inquiry report of he may offer additional reasons in support of the findings by the inquiry officer. In that situation, unless the disciplinary authority gives specific reasons in the show cause on the basis of which the findings of the inquiry officer in that behalf is based, it would be difficult for the delinquent to satisfactorily give reasons to persuade the disciplinary authority to agree with the conclusions reached by the inquiry officer. In the absence of any ground or reason in the show-cause notice it amount to an empty formality which would cause grave prejudice to the delinquent officer and would result in injustice to him. The mere fact that in the final order some reasons have been given to disagree with the conclusions reached by the disciplinary authority cannot cure the defect."

At this stage it will be appropriate to refer to the case of State of Assam and Anr. Vs. Bimal Kumar Pandit ([1964] 2 SCR 1] decided by a Constitution Bench of this Court. A question arose regarding the contents of the second show cause notice when the Government accepts, rejects or partly accepts or partly rejects the findings of the Enquiry Officer. Even though that case relates to Article 311(2) before its deletion by the 42nd Amendment, the principle laid down therein, at page 10 of the report, when read alone with the decision of this Court in Karunakar's case will clearly apply here. The Court observed at Page 10 as follows:-

"We ought, however, to add that if the dismissing authority differs from the findings recorded in the enquiry report, it is necessary that its provisional conclusions in that behalf should be specified in the second notice. It may be that the report makes findings in favour of the delinquent officer, but the dismissing authority disagrees with the said findings and proceeds to issue the notice under Article 311(2). In such a case, it would obviously be necessary that the dismissing authority should expressly state that it differs from the findings recorded in the enquiry report and then indicate the nature of the action proposed to be taken against the delinquent officer. Without such an express statement in the notice, it would be impossible to issue the notice at all. There may also be cases in which the enquiry report may make findings in favour of the delinquent officer on some issues and against him on some other issues. That is precisely what has happened in the present case. If the dismissing authority accepts all the said findings in their entirety, it is another matter: but if the dismissing authority accepts the findings recorded against the delinquent officer and differs from some or all of those recorded in his favour and proceeds to specify the nature of the action proposed to be taken on it own conclusions, it would be necessary that the said conclusions should be briefly indicated in the notice. In this category of case, the action proposed to be taken could be based not only on the findings recorded against the delinquent officer in the enquiry report, but also on the view of the dismissing authority that the other charges not held proved by the enquiring officer, are according to the dismissing authority, proved. In order to give the delinquent officer a reasonable opportunity to show cause under Article 311(2), it is essential that the conclusions provisionally reached by the dismissing authority must, in such cases, be specified in the notice. But whether the dismissing authority purports to proceed to issue the notice against the delinquent officer after accepting the enquiry report in its entirety, it cannot be said that it is essential that the dismissing authority must say that it has so accepted the report. As we have already indicated, it is desirable that even in such cases a statement to that effect should be made. But we do not think that the words used inArticle 311(2) justify the view that the failure to make such a statement amounts to contravention of Article 311(2). In dealing with this point, we must bear in mind the fact that a copy of the enquiry report had been enclosed with the notice, and so, reading the notice in common sense manner, the respondent could not have found any difficulty in realising that the action proposed to be taken against him proceeded on the basis that the appellants had accepted the conclusions of the enquiring officer in the entirety."

In Karunakar's case (supra) the question arose whether after the 42nd amendment of the Constitution, when the inquiry officer was other than a disciplinary authority, was the delinquent employee entitled to a copy of the inquiry report of the inquiry officer before the disciplinary authority takes decision on the question of guilt of the delinquent. It was sought to be contended in that case that as the right to show cause against penalty proposed to be levied had been taken away by the 42nd amendment, therefore, there was no necessity to give to the delinquent a copy of the inquiry report before the disciplinary authority took the final decision as to whether to impose a penalty or not. Explaining the effect of 42nd amendment the Constitution Bench at page 755 observed that "All that has happened after the Forty-second Amendment of the Constitution is to advance the point of time at which the representation of the employee against the enquiry officer's report would be considered. Now, the disciplinary authority has to consider the representation of the employee against the report before it arrives at its conclusion with regard to his guilt or innocence of the charges." The Court explained that the disciplinary proceedings break into two stages. The first stage ends when the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions on the basis of the evidence, inquiry officer's report and the delinquent employee's reply to it. the second stage begins when the disciplinary authority decides to impose penalty on the basis of its conclusions. It is the second right which was taken away by the 42nd Amendment but the right of the charged officer to receive the report of the inquiry officer was an essential part of the first stage itself. This was expressed by the Court in the following words:

" The reason why the right to receive the report of the enquiry officer is considered an essential part of the reasonable opportunity at the first stage and also a principle of natural justice is that the findings recorded by the enquiry officer form an important material before the disciplinary authority which along with the evidence is taken into consideration by it to come to its conclusions. It is difficult to say in advance, to what extent the said findings including the punishment, if any, recommended in the report would influence the disciplinary authority while drawing its conclusions. the findings further might have been recorded without considering the relevant evidence on record, or by misconstruing it or unsupported by it. If such a finding is to be one of the documents to be considered by the disciplinary authority, the principles of natural justice require that the employee should have a fair opportunity to meet, explain and controvert it before he is condemned. It is negation of the tenants of justice and a denial of fair opportunity to the employee to consider the findings recorded by a third party like the enquiry officer without giving the employee an opportunity to reply to it. Although it is true that the disciplinary authority is supposed to arrive at its own findings on the basis of the evidence recorded in the inquiry, it is also equally true that the disciplinary authority takes into consideration the findings on the basis of the evidence recorded in the inquiry, it is also equally true that the disciplinary authority takes into consideration the findings recorded by the enquiry officer do constitute an important material before the disciplinary authority which is likely to influence its conclusions. If the enquiry officer were only to record the evidence and forward the same to the disciplinary authority, that would not constitute an additional material before the disciplinary authority of which the delinquent 4 employee has no knowledge. However, when the enquiry officer goes further and records his findings, as stated above, which may or may not be based on the evidence on record or are contrary to the same or in ignorance of it, such findings are an additional material unknown to the employee but are taken into consideration by the disciplinary authority while arriving on its conclusions. Both the dictates of the reasonable opportunity as well as the principles of natural justice, therefore, require that before the disciplinary authority comes to its own conclusions, the delinquent employee should have an opportunity to reply to the enquiry officer's findings. the disciplinary authority is then required to consider the evidence, the report of the enquiry officer and the representation of the employee against it."

These observations are clearly in tune with the observations in Bimal Kumar Pandit's case (supra) quoted earlier and would be applicable at the first stage itself. the aforesaid passages clearly bring out the necessity of the authority which is to finally record an adverse finding to give a hearing to the delinquent officer. If the inquiry officer had given an adverse finding, as per Karunakar's case (supra) the first stage required an opportunity to be given to the employee to represent to the disciplinary authority, even when an earlier opportunity had been granted to them by the inquiry officer. It will not stand to reason that when the finding in favour of the delinquent officers is proposed to be over-turned by the disciplinary authority then no opportunity should be granted. The first stage of the inquiry is not completed till the disciplinary authority has recorded its findings. The principles of natural justice would demand that the authority which proposes to decide against the delinquent officer must give him a hearing. When the inquiring officer holds the charges to be proved then that report has to be given to the delinquent officer who can make a representation before the disciplinary authority takes further action which may be prejudicial to the delinquent officer. When, like in the present case, the inquiry report is in favour of the delinquent officer but the disciplinary authority proposes to differ with such conclusions then that authority which is deciding against the delinquent officer must give him an opportunity of being heard for otherwise he would be condemned unheard. In departmental proceedings what is of ultimate importance is the findings of the disciplinary authority.

Under Regulation - 6 the inquiry proceedings can be conducted either by an inquiry officer or by the disciplinary authority itself. When the inquiry is conducted by the inquiry officer his report is not final or conclusive and the disciplinary proceedings do not stand concluded. The disciplinary proceedings stand concluded with decision of the disciplinary authority. It is the disciplinary authority which can impose the penalty and not the inquiry officer. Where the disciplinary authority itself holds an inquiry an opportunity of hearing has to be granted by him. When the disciplinary authority differs with the view of the inquiry officer and proposes to come to a different conclusion, there is no reason as to why an opportunity of hearing should not be granted. It will be most unfair and iniquitous that where the charged officers succeed before the inquiry officer they are deprived of representing to the disciplinary authority before that authority differs with the inquiry officer's report and, while recording of guilt, imposes punishment on the officer. In our opinion, in any such situation the charged officer must have an opportunity to represent before the Disciplinary Authority before final findings on the charges are recorded and punishment imposed. This is required to be done as a part of the first stage of inquiry as explained in Karunakar's case(supra).

The result of the aforesaid discussion would be that the principles of natural justice have to be read into Regulation 7(2). As a result thereof whenever the disciplinary authority disagrees with the inquiry authority on any article of charge then before it records its own findings on such charge, it must record its tentative reasons for such disagreement and give to the delinquent officer an opportunity to represent before it records its findings. The report of the inquiry officer containing its findings will have to be conveyed and the delinquent officer will have an opportunity to persuade the disciplinary authority to accept the favorable conclusion of the inquiry officer. The principles of natural justice, as we have already observed, require the authority, which has to take a final decision and can impose a penalty, to give an opportunity to the officer charged of misconduct to file a representation before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges framed against the officer.

Further reliance has been placed on para 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the judgement in case of State of India Vs. K. P. Narayana Kutti reported in Laws SC-2003-1-102.

This appeal is directed against the order dated 11th March, 1999 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court affirming the order passed by the learned Single Judge. The respondent herein was working as a Manager, Grade-I in the appellant Bank. On the allegations of certain misconduct and irregularities, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him by the appellants. Several charges were framed against him. The Enquiry Officer, after conducting enquiry, submitted a report holding that some of the charges were proved, some of the charges were partly proved and some of the charges were not proved. The disciplinary authority, while accepting the finding of the Enquiry Officer to the extent that some charges were proved and some of the charges were not proved, however, did not agree with the report of the Enquiry officer as regards the finding that the charges were partly proved. The disciplinary authority held that those were fully proved. In that view, on consideration of the material, the disciplinary authority recommended for dismissal of the respondent from service. Accepting the said recommendation, the competent authority passed an order of dismissal from service. The respondent unsuccessfully appealed against the order of dismissal to the authorities. Thereafter, he filed a writ petition before the High Court challenging the order of dismissal from service. The learned single Judge of the High Court, after hearing learned counsel for the parties, allowed the writ petition accepting the contention that no opportunity was given to the respondent by the disciplinary authority in regard to the charges with which the findings of the Enquiry officer were not agreed to by the disciplinary authority in the light of the judgment of this Court in the case of Punjab National Bank and Ors v. Kunj Behari Misra, [1998] 7 SCC 84. The appellants took the matter in appeal before the Division Bench of the same High Court. The Division Bench of the High Court did not find any good or valid reason to differ from the conclusion arrived at by the learned single Judge and dismissed the appeal following the judgment of the Punjab National Bank aforesaid. Hence this appeal.

2. Mr. R. Sundaravaradan, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants strongly contended that providing further opportunity to the respondent by the disciplinary authority, even if it were to disagree with 'the findings of the Enquiry Officer, was not necessary in terms of the regulations governing service conditions of the respondent; not providing an opportunity by the disciplinary authority did not prejudice the case of the respondent in any way. As such the high Court was not justified in setting aside the order of dismissal, particularly, when the respondent had the opportunity before the Enquiry Officer to put forth his case. He also made efforts to distinguish with the case of Punjab National Bank (supra) stating that providing an opportunity would not apply to cases prior to the case of Union of India and Ors. v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, [1991] 1 SCC 588. He added that this Court in Punjab National Bank case did not deal with the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant-Bank in this regard. He relied on the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in State of Orissa v. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra, [1963] Supp. 1 SCR 648.

Per contra, Mr. L. Nageswara Rao, learned senior counsel representing the respondent made submissions supporting and justifying the impugned order. He said that the Constitution Bench decision in the case of Bidyabhushan Mohapatra, above mentioned, is distinguishable; that was a case where this Court set aside the impugned order passed by the High Court in regard to the penalty imposed even on the proved charges. In the present case it is clear from the order of the learned single Judge as well as that of the Division Bench of the High Court that the High Court did not go into the merits of other contentions or the factual aspects. The parties also focused their arguments as to whether an opportunity was to be provided by the disciplinary authority in case the disciplinary authority disagreed with certain findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer. Applying the principle as stated in Punjab National Bank case (supra), as already indicated above, the High Court felt that providing an opportunity by the disciplinary authority was necessary. As is evident from the order of the learned single Judge, which was affirmed by the Division Bench, that the order of dismissal was set aside, however, liberty is given to the appellants to proceed in accordance with law, after giving opportunity to the respondent.

When asked, learned senior counsel for the appellants submitted that Regulation 7(2) of the Punjab National Bank Officer Employee' (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1977 referred to in the Punjab National Bank case is para-materia to the Rule 50(3)(ii) of State Bank of India (Supervising Staff) Service Rules governing the facts of the present case with which we are concerned. The contentions advanced by the learned senior counsel for the appellant before us are almost similar to the contentions advanced in the case of Punjab National Bank aforementioned. In the case of Punjab National Bank also similar contentions wore urged that the Punjab National Bank officer Employees' (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1977 did not require that an opportunity of being heard be given to the delinquent officers when the disciplinary authority disagreed with the finding of the enquiring authority; once the enquiring authority had given hearing to them and if the decision was before Ramzan Khan's case, the disciplinary authority was not required to give the copy of the enquiry report to the delinquent officer. In that view, it was not necessary to give a hearing to the case where disciplinary authority differs from the enquiry report. A Bench of learned three Judges in the said case has specifically noticed in paragraph II as to the controversy that was required to be resolved in that case. The controversy in that case also related to the case where the disciplinary authority disagreed with the findings of the enquiring authority and Regulation 7(2) does not expressly state that when the disciplinary authority disagrees with the finding of the enquiring authority an opportunity is to be given. After referring to various decisions including the decisions relied on behalf of the Bank, this Court has clearly held that where the disciplinary authority disagrees with the report of the enquiring authority in regard to certain charges, providing of an opportunity is necessary to satisfy the principle of natural justice. Paragraph 19 of the said judgment reads thus:

"The result of the aforesaid discussion would be that the principles of natural justice have to be read into Regulation 7(2). As a result thereof, whenever the disciplinary authority disagrees with the enquiry authority on any article of charge, then before it records its own findings on such charge, it must record its tentative reasons for such disagreement and give to the delinquent officer an opportunity to represent before it records its findings. The report of the enquiry officer containing its findings will have to be conveyed and the delinquent officer will have an opportunity to persuade the disciplinary authority to accept the favourable conclusion of the enquiry officer. The principle of natural justice, as we have already observed, require the authority which has to take a final decision and can impose a penalty, to give an opportunity to the officer charged of misconduct to file a representation before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges framed against the officer."

3. In paragraph 20 thereof, this Court agreeing with the case of Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. L.K. Ratna, [1986] 4 SCC 537 and Ram Kishan v. Union of India, [1995] 6 SCC 157, specifically stated that the view taken in State Bank of India v. S.S. Koshal, [1994] Supp. 2 SCC 468 and State of Rajasthan v. M.C. Saxena, [1998] 3 SCC 385, did not lay down the correct law. In our view, the controversy that is to be resolved in the present case arose for consideration in the said Punjab National Bank case directly. The said judgement in all force applies to the facts of the present case. The distinction sought to be made on behalf of the appellants taking support from the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in Mohapatra 's case (supra) does not help them for two reasons: firstly, that was not a case where the controversy that has arisen in this case dealing with specific regulation was directly dealt with. As already stated above, in the case of Punjab National Bank a three Judge Bench of this Court has directly considered the effect of said Regulation, particularly and directly in regard to providing of an opportunity to be read into the Regulation. Secondly, on the facts of the case before the Constitution Bench, this Court found that the direction given by the High Court to reconsider as to the punishment imposed in that case was not correct. The argument that in the case arising prior to Ramzan Khan's case not giving an opportunity by the disciplinary authority, would not vitiate the order of dismissal, also does not support the case of the appellants in the light of the fact that in the case of Punjab National Bank also the proceedings related to the period prior to Ramzan Khan case.

It was also contended on behalf of the appellants that the High Court committed an error in setting aside the order of dismissal when it was not shown that any prejudice was caused to the respondent by not giving an opportunity to him by the disciplinary authority. In this regard the learned counsel cited a decision of this Court in Union Bank of India v. Vishwa Mohan, [1998] 4 SCC 310. As already noticed above, before the High Court both the parties concentrated only on one point, namely, the effect of not providing an opportunity by the disciplinary authority when the disciplinary authority disagreed with some findings of the enquiry officer. It was also not shown by the appellants before the High Court that no prejudice was caused to the respondent in the absence of providing any opportunity by the disciplinary authority. The aforementioned case of Vishwa Mohan is of no help to the appellants. The learned counsel invited our attention to para 9 of the said judgment. As is evident from the said paragraph this Court having regard to the facts of that case, taking note of the various acts of serious misconduct, found that no prejudice was caused to the delinquent officer. In para 19 of the judgment in Punjab National Bank case, extracted above, when it in clearly stated that the principles of natural justice have to be read into Regulation 7(2) (Rule 50(3)(ii) of State Bank of India (Supervising Staff) Service Rules, is identical in terms applicable to the present case) and the delinquent officer will have to be given an opportunity to persuade the disciplinary authority to accept the favourable conclusion of the Enquiry Officer, we find it difficult to accept the contention advanced on behalf of the appellants that unless it is shown that some prejudice was caused to the respondent, the order of dismissal could not be set aside by the High Court.

Therefore, we are in respectful agreement with the decision of this Court in Punjab National Bank's case, being directly on the point. Moreover, in this case the High Court has given liberty to the appellants to proceed the case in accordance with law. Under these circumstances and in view of liberty given, as stated above, we do not find any good reason to upset the impugned order. Consequently, the same is affirmed and the appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.

Sri S. K. Kakkar, learned counsel for the respondent-bank has argued that if the Disciplinary Authority on receiving the report of the Enquiry Officer does not agrees to his findings, he has to record his reasons for disagreement and then to record his own findings, if the evidence available on record is sufficient or else he may remit the case to the Enquiry Officer for further enquiry. In support of his contention he has relied upon the case of Bank of India Vs. Degala Suryanarayana reported in Laws(SC) 1999-7-90 and has relied upon paragraphs 10 and 11 of the judgment quoted here in below :

The law is well settled. The Disciplinary Authority on receiving the report of the Enquiry Officer may or may not agree with the findings recorded by the latter. In case of disagreement, the Disciplinary Authority has to record the reasons for disagreement and then to record his own findings if the evidence available on record be sufficient for such exercise or else to remit the case to the Enquiry Officer for further enquiry and report.

Strict rules of evidence are not applicable to departmental enquiry proceedings. The only requirement of law is that the allegation against the delinquent officer must be established by such evidence acting upon which a reasonable person acting reasonably and with objectivity may arrive at a finding upholding the gravamen of the charge against the delinquent officer. Mere conjecture or surmises cannot sustain the finding of guilt even in departmental enquiry proceedings. The Court exercising the jurisdiction of judicial review would not interfere with the findings of fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry proceedings excepting in a case of malafides or perversity i.e., where there is no evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and with objectivity could have arrived at that findings. The Court cannot embark upon reappreciating the evidence or weighing the same like an appellate authority. So long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to be sustained, in Union of India v. H.C. Gael, [1964] 4 SCR 718 the Constitution Bench has held :-

"the High Court can and must enquire whether there is any evidence at all in support of the impugned conclusion. In other words, if the whole of the evidence led in the enquiry is accepted as true, does the conclusion follow that the charge in question is proved against the respondent? This approach will avoid weighing the evidence. It will take the evidence as it stands and only examine whether on that evidence legally the impugned conclusion follows or not."

He has further relied upon the judgement in the case of State Bank of India and others Vs. Ramesh Dinkar Punde, reported in 2006 All. CJ 2291 wherein it has been stated that the Principles of Evidence Act have no application to the domestic enquiry.

He has further argued that in Banking business absolute devotion, diligence integrity, honesty is required on the part of every employee and an employee who failed to confer these standard is not fit to be retained in service of the bank. He has relied upon para 12 of the judgment in the case Union Bank of India Vs. Vishwa Mohan reported in (1998) 4SCC 310, which is as under :-

. 12. After hearing the rival contentions, we are of the firm view that all the four charge sheets which were inquired into relate to serious misconduct. The respondent was unable to demonstrate before us how prejudice was caused to him due to non supply of the Inquiry Authority's report/findings in the present case. It needs to be emphasised that in the banking business absolute devotion, diligence, integrity and honesty needs to be preserved by every bank employee and in particular the bank officer. If this is not observed, the confidence of the public/depositors would be impaired. It is for this reason, we are of the opinion that the High Court had committed an error while setting aside the order of dismissal of the respondent on the ground of prejudice on account of non furnishing of the inquiry report/findings to him.

Further reliance has been placed on Mayank Agarwal Vs. Bareilly Chetriya Gramin Bank and others reported in 2013 (1) U.P. L.B.E.C 33 wherein it has been held that the requirement of proof beyond doubt is not required in disciplinary proceedings rather preponderance of probabilities is the criteria and has placed reliance upon paragraphs 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 to 27 of the judgment quoted herein above :

20. It is well settled that so far as the departmental inquiry and action of competent authorities in dismissing the service of incumbent is concerned the scope of judicial review is confined to the decision making process. Scope of judicial review can not be extended to the examination of correctness or reasonableness of a decision as a matter of fact.

21. Where the inquiry is conducted on the charges against the public servant, the court is to examine and determine ;

(I) Whether the inquiry was held by the competent authority;

(ii) Whether rules of natural justice are complied with;

(iii) Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence and authority has power and jurisdiction to reach finding of fact or conclusion;

22. The technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the court. The doctrine of "proof beyond doubt" has no application. Preponderance of probabilities and some material on record are necessary to arrive on the conclusion whether or not the delinquent has committed misconduct.Per Lalit Popli Vs. Canara Bank and others, reported in 2003 (3) SCC, 583.

23. In fact the petitioner is trying to assail the correctness of findings of disciplinary authorities as if before an appellant forum. The issue was considered by the Apex court in 1992 Supp. (2) SCC 312, H.B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority, Karnal and others Vs. M/s Gopi Nath & sons and others. Relevant paragraph 8 is as under:

"8...... Judicial review, it is trite, is not directed against the decision but is confined to the decision making process. Judicial review cannot extended to the examination of the correctness or reasonableness of a decision as a matter of fact. The purpose of judicial review is to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the authority after according fair treatment reaches, on a matter which it is authorised by law to decide, a conclusion which is corect in the eyes of the Court. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. It will be erroneous to think that the Court sits in judgement not only on the correctness of the decision making process but also on the correctness of the decision itself."

24. In 1995 (6) SCC 749 , B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India, the Apex court reiterated the same. The relevant paragraphs 12 and 13 are as under:

"12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to re-appreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case."

" 13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented. The appellate authority has co-extensive power to re-appreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel [(1964) 4 SCR 781], this Court held at page728 that if the conclusion,upon consideration of the evidence, reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued."

25. In recent decisions the apex court has reiterated the scope of judicial review in dealing with departmental inquiries in 2009 (8) SCC 310 State of U.P. and another Vs. Man Mohan Nath Sinha and another. It has been held that it is not open to the High Court to reappreciate and reappraise the evidence led before inquiry officer and examine the finding recorded by the inquiry officer as a court of appeal and reach its own conclusion by restoring the petition and sending the matter back to the High Court, it was observed that High Court fell into grave error in scanning evidence as if it was a court of appeal.

26. In the said matter, the High Court while examining impugned order formulated the question for consideration as to whether in view of the evidence on record the charge levelled against the delinquent stood proved and further proceeded to appreciate the evidence and set aside the order of dismissal. Relevant paragraphs 13, 14 and 15 are as under:

"13. The aforesaid decisions were noticed by a Constitution Bench of this court in State of Madars V. G. Sundaram, and it has been held that it is not open to the High Court to reappreciate the evidence before the Tribunal and record the conclusion that the evidence does not establish charges against the delinquent. In the words of the Constitution Bench:(AIR p. 1105, paras 9-10) "9. It is, therefore, clear that the High Court was not competent to consider the question whether the evidence before the Tribunal and the Government was insufficient or unreliable to establish the charge against respondent. It could have considered only the fact whether there was any evidence at all which, if believed by the Tribunal, would establish the charge against the respondent. Adequacy of that evidence to sustain the charge is not a quest before the High Court when exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. This view was reiterated in Union of India V. H.C. Goel.

10. It is, therefore, clear that the High Court was in error in re-appreciating the evidence before the Tribunal and recording the conclusion that evidence did not establish the charges against the respondent."

"14. The scope of judicial review in dealing with departmental enquiries came up for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh And Ors. vs. Chitra Ventaka Rao and this Court held:

"21. .........The High Court is not a court of appeal under Article 226 over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. The Court is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Second, where there is some evidence which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion. The departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there is some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 .

x x x

23. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction. The Court exercises it not as an appellate court. The findings of fact reached by an inferior court or tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence are not reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by a tribunal, a writ can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Again if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. A finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal is insufficient or inadequate to sustain a finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal. See Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishna, AIR 1964 SC 477.

24. The High Court in the present case assessed the entire evidence and came to its own conclusion. The High Court was not justified to do so. Apart from the aspect that the High Court does not correct a finding of fact on the ground that the evidence is not sufficient or adequate, the evidence in the present case which was considered by the Tribunal cannot be scanned by the High Court to justify the conclusion that there is no evidence which would justify the finding of the Tribunal that the respondent did not make the journey. The Tribunal gave reasons for its conclusions. It is not possible for the High Court to say that no reasonable person could have arrived at these conclusions. The High Court reviewed the evidence, reassessed the evidence and then rejected the evidence as no evidence. That is precisely what the High Court in exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari should not do."

"15. The legal position is well settled that the power of judicial review is not directed against the decision but is confined to the decision-making process. The court does not sit in judgement on merits of the decision................."

27. In another decision in 2010(11) SCC 233 General Manager (p) Punjab & Sindh Bank and others Vs. Daya Singh.Relevant paragraphs 24 and 25 are as under:

"24. Absence of reasons in a disciplinary order would amount to denial of natural justice to the charge- sheeted employee. But the present case was certainly not one of that category. Once the charges were found to have been established, the High Court had no reason to interfere in the decision. Even though there was sufficient documentary evidence on record, the High Court has chosen to hold that the findings of the Inquiry Officer were perverse. A perverse finding is one which is based on no evidence or one that no reasonable person would arrive at. This has been held by this Court long back in Triveni Rubber & Plastics vs. CCE AIR 1994 SC 1341. Unless it is found that some relevant evidence has not been considered or that certain inadmissible material has been taken into consideration the finding cannot be said to be perverse. The legal position in this behalf has been recently reiterated in Arulvelu and Another vs. State Represented by the Public Prosecutor and Another (2009) 10 SCC 206. The decision of the High Court cannot therefore be sustained. "

"25 As held in T.N. C.S. Corporation Ltd. vs. K. Meerabai (2006) 2 SCC 255 the scope of judicial review for the High Court in departmental disciplinary matter is limited. The observation of this Court in Bank of India v. Degala Suryanayana are quite instructive: SCC pp.768-69, para 11) "11.Strict rules of evidence are not applicable to departmental enquiry proceedings. The only requirement of law is that the allegation against the delinquent officer must be established by such evidence acting upon which a reasonable person acting reasonably and with objectivity may arrive at a finding upholding the gravamen of the charge against the delinquent officer. Mere conjecture or surmises cannot sustain the finding of guilt even in departmental enquiry proceedings. The court exercising the jurisdiction of judicial review would not interfere with the findings of fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry proceedings excepting in a case of mala fides or perversity i.e where there is no evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and with objectivity could have arrived at that finding. The court cannot embark upon reappreciating the evidence or weighing the same like an appellate authority. So long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to be sustained. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel the Constitution Bench has held: (AIR p.. 370,para 23) "23.......... the High Court can and must enquire whether there is any evidence at all in support of the impugned conclusion. In other words, if the whole of the evidence led in the enquiry is accepted as true, does the conclusion follow that the charge in question is proved against the respondent? This approach will avoid weighing the evidence. It will take the evidence as it stands and only examine whether on that evidence legally the impugned conclusion follows or not."

Regarding the allegation of the petitioner that he was not provided with defence representative, learned counsel for the respondents has argued that he was repeatedly directed to nominate his defence representative but the petitioner neither submitted any written statement nor intimated his representative and therefore the Bank cannot be faulted on this account. He has referred to para 17 of the judgement in the case State Bank of India Vs. N. K. pandey reported in (2013) 1 UPLBEC 305.

17. We may in the light of the above-mentioned statutory provisions examine the correctness of the order passed by the High Court. The charged officer, admittedly, did not choose to nominate his defence representative in spite of several opportunities given by the Inquiring Authority nor had he submitted any written statement to the Inquiring Authority. Time was given upto 14.01.1998 to do so but he had not availed of that opportunity. Neither the charged officer nor any defence representative appeared before the Inquiring Authority. The arguments that were raised before the High court of non-compliance of the procedure, could have been raised by the charged officer before the Inquiring Authority, but the same was not done and he had not co-operated with the inquiry proceedings. In the said circumstances, the Inquiring Authority was entitled to hold the enquiry ex parte as provided under Rule 68(2)(xix).

Finally reliance has been placed upon the judgment in the case of Chairman, Disciplinary Authority, Rani Lakshmi Bai Kshetriya Gramin Bank vs. Jagdish Sharan Varshney and others reported in 2009(4) SCC 240, wherein it has been held that the Appellate Authority is required to give reasons for affirming the order of the lower authority though briefly, he has referred to para 5 and 6 thereof, which are as follows :-

5. In our opinion, an order of affirmation need not contain as elaborate reasons as an order of reversal, but that does not mean that the order of affirmation need not contain any reasons whatsoever. In fact, the said decision in Prabhu Dayal Grover's case(supra) has itself stated that the appellate order should disclose application of mind. Whether there was an application of mind or not can only be disclosed by some reasons, at least in brief, mentioned in the order of the appellate authority. Hence, we cannot accept the proposition that an order of affirmation need not contain any reasons at all. That order must contain some reasons, at least in brief, so that one can know whether the appellate authority has applied its mind while affirming the order of the disciplinary authority.

6. The view we are taking was also taken by this Court in Divisional Forest Officer vs. Madhusudan Rao, JT 2008 (2) SC 253 (vide para 19), and in Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. vs. Union of India, AIR 1966 SC 671, siemens Engineering & Manufacturing Co. Ltd. vs. Union of India, AIR 1976 SC 1785 (vide para 6), etc After hearing the Counsels for the parties, it is to be kept in mind that the petitioner is an award staff of Nationalized Bank and the disciplinary proceedings against him, is covered by Ist Bipartite Settlement of 1966. The relevant Clauses of the aforesaid settlement are is as follows:-

19.11 When it is decided to take any disciplinary action against an employee such decision shall be communicated to him within three days thereof.

19.12. The procedure in such cases shall be as follows :--

(a) An employee against whom disciplinary action is proposed or likely to be taken shall be given a charge sheet clearly setting forth the circumstances appearing against him and a date shall be fixed for enquiry, sufficient time being given to him to enable him to prepare and give his explanation so also to produce any evidence that he may wish to tender in his defence. He shall be permitted to appear before the Officer conducting the enquiry, to cross-examine any witness on whose evidence the charge rests and to examine witness and produce other evidence in his defence. He shall also be permitted to be defended--

(i) (x) by a representative of a registered trade union of bank employees of which he is a member on the date first notified for the commencement of the enquiry.

(y) where the employee is not a member of any trade union of bank employees on the aforesaid date, by a representative of a registered trade union of employees of the bank in which he is employed:

OR

(ii) at the request of the said union by a representative of the state federation or all India Organisation to which such union is affiliated;

OR

(iii) with the Bank's permission, by a lawyer.

He shall also be given a hearing as regards the nature of the proposed punishment in case any charge is established against him.

(b) Pending such inquiry he may be suspended, but if on the conclusion of the enquiry it is decided to take no action against him he shall be deemed to have been on duty and shall be entitled to the full wages and allowances and to all other privileges for the period of suspension; and if some punishment other than dismissal is inflicted the whole or a part of the period of suspension, may, at the discretion of the management, be treated as on duty with the right to a corresponding portion of the wages, allowance, etc.

(c) In awarding punishment by way of disciplinary action the authority concerned shall take into account the gravity of the misconduct, the previous record, if any, of the employee and any other aggravating or extenuating circumstances, that may exist. Where sufficiently extenuating circumstances exist the misconduct may be condoned and in case such misconduct is of the "gross" type he may be merely discharged, with or without notice or on payment of a month's pay and allowances, in lieu of notice. Such discharge may also be given where the evidence is found to be insufficient to sustain the charge and where the bank does not, for some reason or other, think it expedient to retain the employee in question any longer in service. Discharge in such cases shall not be deemed to amount to disciplinary action.

(d) If the representative defending the employee is an employee of the same bank at an outstation branch within the same State, he shall be relieved on special leave (on full pay and allowances) to represent the employee and be paid one return fare. The class of fare to which he will be entitled would be the same as while travelling on duty. In case of any adjournment at the instance of the bank, he may be asked to resume duty and if so, will be paid fare for the consequential journey. He shall also be paid 50% of the halting allowance for 69 70 the period he stays at the place of the enquiry defending the employee as also for the days of the journeys which are undertaken at the bank's cost

(e) enquiry need not be held if--

(i) the misconduct is such that even if proved the bank does not intend to award the punishment of discharge or dismissal; and

(ii) the bank has issued a show cause notice to the employee advising him of the misconduct and the punishment for which he may be liable for such misconduct; and

(iii) the employee makes a voluntary admission of his guilt in his reply to the aforesaid show cause notice. However, if the employee concerned requests a hearing regarding the nature of punishment, such a hearing shall be given, 19.13. Where the provisions of this Chapter conflict with the procedures or rules in force in any bank regarding disciplinary action, they shall prevail over the latter. There may, in such procedures or rules, exist certain provisions outside the scope of the provisions contained in this Chapter enabling the bank to dismiss, warn, censure, fine an employee or have his increment stopped or have an adverse remark entered against him. In all such cases also the provisions set out in Clauses 19.10 and 19.11 above shall apply.

19.14 The Chief Executive Officer or the principal officer in India, of a bank, or an alternate officer at the Head Office or principal office appointed by him for the purpose, shall decide which officer (s) shall be empowered to hold enquiry and take disciplinary action in the case of each office or establishment. He shall also decide which officer or a body higher in status than the Officer authorised to take disciplinary action shall be empowered to deal with and dispose of any appeals against orders passed in disciplinary matters.

A perusal of Clause 19.12 (a) of the aforesaid settlement shows that the disciplinary authority is required to give notice to the delinquent employee regarding the proposed punishment and accordingly the notice of proposed punishment dated 29.06.1999 was issued to the petitioner. The reliance of the Counsel for the petitioner on the Apex Court Judgment in the case of Himachal Pradesh Electricity Board Limited Vs. Mahesh Dahiya (Supra), is not well founded since the provisions of Rule-15 of Central Civil Services ( Classification Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965 are as follows,

15. ACTION ON INQUIRY REPORT:

(1) The disciplinary authority, if it is not itself the inquiring authority may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, remit the case to the inquiring authority for further inquiry and report and the inquiring authority shall thereupon proceed to hold the further inquiry according to the provisions of Rule 14, as far as may be.

(2) The disciplinary authority shall forward or cause to be forwarded a copy of the report of the inquiry, if any, held by the disciplinary authority or where the disciplinary authority is not the inquiring authority, a copy of the report of the inquiring authority together with its own tentative reasons for disagreement, if any, with the findings of inquiring authority on any article of charge to the Government servant who shall be required to submit, if he so desires, his written representation or submission to the disciplinary authority within fifteen days, irrespective of whether the report is favourable or not to the Government servant.

*[(3) (a) In every case where it is necessary to consult the Commission, the Disciplinary Authority shall forward or cause to be forwarded to the Commission for its advice:

(i) a copy of the report of the Inquiring Authority together with its own tentative reasons for disagreement, if any, with the findings of Inquiring Authority on any article of charge; and

(ii) comments of Disciplinary Authority on the representation of the Government servant on the Inquiry report and disagreement note, if any and all the case records of the inquiry proceedings.

(b) The Disciplinary Authority shall forward or cause to be forwarded a copy of the advice of the Commission received under clause (a) to the Government servant, who shall be required to submit, if he so desires, his written representation or submission to the Disciplinary Authority within fifteen days, on the advice of the Commission.

(4) The Disciplinary Authority shall consider the representation under sub-rule (2) and/or clause (b) of sub-rule (3), if any, submitted by the Government servant and record its findings before proceeding further in the matter as specified in sub-rules (5) and (6).

(5) If the Disciplinary Authority having regard to its findings on all or any of the articles of charge is of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in clauses (i) to (iv) of rule 11 should be imposed on the Government servant, it shall, notwithstanding anything contained in rule 16, make an order imposing such penalty.

(6) If the Disciplinary Authority having regard to its findings on all or any of the articles of charge and on the basis of the evidence adduced during the inquiry is of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in clauses (v) to (ix) of rule 11 should be imposed on the Government servant, it shall make an order imposing such penalty and it shall not be necessary to give the Government servant any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed to be imposed.] *[Substituted vide the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) (Second Amendment) Rules, 2014 - Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions (Department of Personnel and Training) Notification dated the 31st October, 2014 issued from 11012/8/2011-Estt.(A)] A perusal of the aforesaid Rule shows that there is no provision therein like Clause 19.12 (a) of the Ist Bipartite Settlement of 1966. Rather Rule 15(6) provides that no such notice is to be given to the delinquent employee to show cause against proposed punishment. Clause- 19.12(a) of the Settlement clearly provides that in the Second Show Cause Notice/ Notice of Proposed Punishment, the tentative punishment shall be proposed and thereafter the delinquent employee would be required to reply the same. In the case of Union of India, Appellant Vs. H.C. Goel, Respondent, AIR 1964 SC 364, the Apex Court considered the situation where the report of Enquiry Officer was partly in favour of the delinquent employee and partly against him and held that the provisional punishment should be indicated in the second show cause notice and reasons were given in paragraph no.11 as follows:-

"11. ...........If the report makes findings in favour of the public servant, and the Government agrees with the said findings, nothing more remains to be done, and the public servant who may have been suspended is entitled to reinstatement and consequential reliefs. If the report makes findings in favour of the public servant and the Government disagree with the said findings and holds that the charges framed against the public servant are prima facie proved, the Government should decide provisionally what punishment should be imposed on the public servant and proceed to issue a second notice against him in that behalf. If the enquiry officer makes findings, some of which are in favour of the public servant and some against him, the Government is entitled to consider the whole matter and if it holds that some or all the charges framed against the public servant are, in its opinion, prima facie established against him, then also the Government has to decide provisionally what punishment should be imposed on the public servant and give him notice accordingly. If would thus be seen that the object of the second notice is to enable the public servant to satisfy the Government on both the counts, one that he is innocent of the charges framed against him and the other that even if the charges are held proved against him, the punishment proposed to be inflicted upon him is unduly severe."

Therefore, the first argument of the petitioner can not be accepted to be correct for the reasons stated above and is hereby rejected.

The second argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner is that before disagreeing with the findings of the enquiry officer regarding Charge No.1, petitioner was required to be issued notice. The learned Counsel for the respondent-Bank has argued that in the present case, the disciplinary authority considered the material on record of the enquiry proceedings and then recorded his reasons for disagreement to the findings regarding Charge No.1 recorded by the enquiry officer, holding the same as not proved against the petitioner. His reliance on the cases of the Bank of India Vs. Degal Surayanarayana (supra), appears to be correct. Further the second show cause notice/ notice of proposed punishment was issued to the petitioner by the disciplinary authority on 29.06.1999 and the petitioner submitted his detailed reply to the same by his reply dated 15.07.1999, which has been annexed as Annexure No.10 to the writ petition. A perusal of the reply of the petitioner shows that he has made detailed objections regarding not only the acceptance of the Charge No.1 as correct by the disciplinary authority but has also filed his detailed objections to the findings regarding the other charges. He has also pointed out the other defects in the enquiry in detail. The reply runs into 20 paragraphs. A perusal of the punishment order shows that it has only considered, (1), that there is no procedure of seeking prior comments of the delinquent employee before passing the tentative order of punishment on the basis of the findings of the enquiry officer, (2), the documents sought by the petitioner were given to him during the course of enquiry, (3), the petitioner never produced any witness/ evidence in support of his defence and has finally concluded that he has seen all the relevant documents and does not finds any grounds for re-opening the enquiry. The proposed punishment is commensurate to the charges leveled and proved against him and has affirmed the punishment.

The punishment order, though of affirmation of the enquiry report of the enquiry officer, requires application of mind to the objections raised by the delinquent employee to the findings of the enquiry officer by the disciplinary authority. When the part of the charges are held not proved against the delinquent employee by the Enquiry Officer, but the disciplinary authority does not accepts the findings of the Enquiry Officer on such charges as correct and invites objection after reversing the finding, he is required to record reasons, after considering the reply of the delinquent employee, as to why he is accepting the charges as proved, which were not found to be proved by the Inquiry Officer.

In the present case the charge no.1 against the petitioner, that an amount of Rs.1,09,600/- pertaining to the Savings Bank Account of Sri I.S. Verma was credited to the Current Account No. P-51 of the petitioner without consent of the Account Holder was not found proved by the Enquiry Officer. In his reply dated 15.07.1999, the petitioner submitted his reply against the acceptance of the charge no.1 as provided by the disciplinary authority in his reply as follows:

"That against charge no.1, you and the Enquiry Officer have failed to observe as to who debited the account of Mr. I.S. Verma and who passed the voucher of debit and different credit vouchers of the account of Mr. I.S. Verma and whether the person passing such vouchers acted bonafidely, who were the persons who checked the respective day book and respective ledgers and authenticated the balances of the respective accounts and whether those persons were accountable answerable for acting against the laid down norms of the Bank and who for was responsible for the same. This was most important as the function of the Enquiry Officer is to find out the facts, under current account Rules no passing powers of a single pie vested with the clerical staff, it is not clear from the charge no. (i) as to exactly what nature of irregularity/ offence, I committed and what actually the charge means, what instructions of the Bank I violated."

Perusal of entire punishment order dated 27.07.1999 passed by the disciplinary authority shows that objection of the petitioner to the acceptance of the charge no.1 as proved, has not been considered in the entire punishment order. The Apex Court in the case of S.N. Mukherjee Vs. Union of India, (1990) 4 SCC 594, has held that the reasons are required to be given by the quasi- judicial authority, while passing the order. The observations of the Apex Court are as follows:-

22. The question as to whether an administrative authority should record the reasons for its decision has come up for consideration before this Court in a number of cases.

23. In Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shyam Sundar Jhunjhunwala [1962] 2 SCR 339, a Constitution Bench of this Court. while dealing with an order passed by the Central Government in exercise of its appellate powers under Section 111(3) of the Companies Act, 1956 in the matter of refusal by a company to register the transfer of shares, has held that there was no proper trial of the appeals before the Central Government since no reasons had been given in support of the order passed by the Deputy Secretary who heard the appeals. In that case it has been observed:

"If the Central Government acts as a tribunal exercising judicial powers and the exercise of that power is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution we fail to see how the power of this Court can be effectively exercised if reasons are not given by the Central Government in support of its order." (P. 357)

24. In Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. V. Union of India [1966] 1 S.C.R. 466 the order passed by the Central Government dismissing the revision petition under Rule 55 of the Mineral Concession Roles, 1960, was challenged before this Court on the ground that it did not contain reasons. Bachawat, J., speaking for himself and Mudholkar, J., rejected this contention on the view that the reason for rejecting the revision application appeared on the face of the order because the Central Government had agreed with the reasons given by the State Government in its order. The learned Judges did not agree with the submission that omission to give reasons for the decision is of itself a sufficient ground for quashing it and held that for the purpose of an appeal under Article 136 orders of courts and tribunals stand on the same footing. The learned Judges pointed out that an order of court dismissing a revision application often gives no reasons but this is not a sufficient ground for quashing it and likewise an order of an administrative tribunal rejecting a revision application cannot be pronounced to be in-valid on the sole ground that it does not give reasons for the rejection. The decision in Hari Nagar Sugar Mills case (supra) was distinguished on the ground that in that case the Central Government had reversed the decision appealed against without giving any reasons and the record did not disclose any apparent ground for the reversal. According to the learned Judges there is a vital difference between an order of reversal and an order of affirmance. Subba Rao, J., as he then was, did to concur with this view and found that the order of the Central Government was vitiated as it did not disclose any reasons for rejecting the revision application. The learned Judge has observed:

"In the context of a welfare State, administrative tribunals have come to stay. Indeed, they are the necessary concomitants of a Welfare State. But arbitrariness in their functioning destroys the concept of a welfare State itself. Self-discipline and supervision exclude or at any rate minimize arbitrariness. The least a tribunal can do is to disclose its mind. The compulsion of disclosure guarantees consideration. The condition to give reasons introduces clarity and excludes or at any rate minimizes arbitrariness; it gives satisfaction to the party against whom the order is made; and it also enables an appellate or supervisory court to keep the tribunals within bounds, A reasoned order is a desirable condition of judicial disposal." (P. 472).

"If tribunals can make orders without giving reasons, the said power in the hands of unscrupulous or dishonest officer may turn out to be a potent weapon for abuse of power. But, if reasons for an order are given, it will be an effective restraint on such abuse, as the order, if its discloses extraneous or irrelevant considerations, will be subject to judicial scrutiny and correction. A speaking order will at its best be a reasonable and at its worst be at least a plausible one. The public should not be deprived of this only safeguard." (P. 472).

"There is an essential distinction between a court and an administrative tribunal. A Judge is trained to look at things objectively, uninfluenced by considerations of policy or expediency; but an executive officer generally looks at things from the standpoint of policy and expediency. The habit of mind of an executive officer so formed cannot be expected to change from function to function or from act to act. So it is essential that some restrictions shall be imposed on tribunals in the matter of passing orders affecting the rights of parties; and the least they should do is to give reasons for their orders. Even in the case of appellate courts invariably reasons are given, except when they dismiss an appeal or revision in limine and that is because the appellate or revisional court agrees with the reasoned judgment of the subordinate court or there are no legally permissible grounds to interfere with it. But the same reasoning cannot apply to an appellate tribunal, for as often as not the order of the first tribunal is laconic and does not give any reasons." (P. 472-73).

25. With reference to an order of affirmance the learned Judge observed that where the original tribunal gives reasons, the appellate tribunal may dismiss the appeal or the revision, as the case may be, agreeing with those reasons and that what is essential is that reasons shall be given by an appellate or revisional tribunal expressly or by reference to those given by the original tribunal.

26. This matter was considered by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Bhagat Raja case (supra) where also the order under challenge had been passed by the Central Government in exercise of its revisional powers under Section 30 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development Act, 1957 read with rules 54 and 55 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960. Dealing with the question as to whether it was incumbent on the Central Government to give any reasons for its decision on review this Court has observed:

"The decisions of tribunals in India are subject to the supervisory powers of the High Courts under Art. 227 of the Constitution and of appellate powers of this Court under Art. 136. It goes without saying that both the High Court and this Court are placed under a great disadvantage if no reasons are given and the revision is dismissed curtly by the use of the single word "rejected, or "dismissed". In such a case, this Court can probably only exercise its appellate jurisdiction satisfactorily by examining the entire records of the case and after giving a hearing come to its conclusion on the merits of the appeal. This will certainly be a very unsatisfactory method of dealing with the appeal." (P. 309).

27. This Court has referred to the decision in Madhya pradesh Industries case (supra) and the observations of Subba Rao, J., referred to above, in that decision have been quoted with approval. After taking note of the observations of Bachawat, J., in that case, the learned Judges have held: "After all a tribunal which exercises judicial or quasi-judicial powers can certainly indicate its mind as to why it acts in a particular way and when important rights of par- ties of far-reaching consequences to them are adjudicated upon in a summary fashion, without giving a personal hearing when proposals and counter proposals are made and examined, the least that can be expected is that the tribunals shall tell the party why the decision is going against him in all cases where the law gives a further right of appeal." (P.315).

28. Reference has already been made to Som Datt Datta's case (supra) wherein a Constitution Bench of this Court has held that the confirming authority, while confirming the findings and sentence of a Court-Martial, and the Central Government, while dealing with an appeal under Section 165 of the Act, are not required to record the reasons for their decision and it has been observed that apart from any requirement imposed by the statute or statutory rule either expressly or by necessary implication, it could not be said that there is any general principle or any rule of natural justice that a statutory tribunal should always and in every case give reasons in support of its decision. In that case the Court was primarily concerned with the interpretation of the provisions of Act and the Army Rules, 1954. There is no reference to the earlier decisions in Harinagar Sugar Mills case (supra) and Bhagat Raja case (supra) wherein the duty to record reasons was imposed in view of the appellate jurisdiction of this Court and the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 136 and 227 of the Constitution of India respectively.

29. In Travancore Rayon Ltd. V. Union of India [1970] 3 SCR 4(1) this Court has observed:

"The Court insists upon disclosure of reasons in support of the order on two grounds; one, that the party aggrieved in a proceedings before the High Court or this Court has the opportunity to demonstrate that the reasons which persuaded the authority to reject his case were erroneous; the other, that the obligation to record reasons operates as a deter- rent against possible arbitrary action by the executive authority invested with the judicial power."

30. In Mahabir Prasad Santosh Kumar v. State of U.P reported in (1969) 3 SCC 868, the District Magistrate had cancelled the licence granted under the' U.P Sugar Dealers' Licensing Order, 1962 without giving any reason and the State Government had dismissed the appeal against the said order of the District Magistrate without recording the reasons. This Court has held:

"The practice of the executive authority dismissing statutory appeal against orders which prima facie seriously preju- dice the rights of the aggrieved party without giving reasons is a negation of the rule of law."

"Recording of reasons in support of a decision on a disputed claim by a quasi-judicial authority ensures that the decision is reached according to law and is not the result of caprice, whim or fancy or reached on grounds of policy or expediency. A party to the dispute is ordinarily entitled to know the grounds on which the authority has rejected his claim. If the order is subject to appeal, the necessity to record reasons is greater, for without recorded reasons the appellate authority has no material on which it may determine whether the facts were properly ascertained, the relevant law was correctly applied and the decision was just."

31. In Woolcombers of India Ltd. case (supra) this Court was dealing with an award of an Industrial Tribunal. It was found that the award stated only the conclusions and it did not give the supporting reasons. This Court has observed:

"The giving of reasons in support of their conclusions by judicial and quasi-judicial authorities when exercising initial jurisdiction is essential for various reasons. First, it is calculated to prevent unconscious unfairness or arbitrariness in reaching the conclusions. The very search for reasons will put the authority on the alert and minimise the chances of unconscious infiltration of personal bias or unfairness in the conclusion. The authority will adduce reasons which will be regarded as fair and legitimate by a reasonable man and will discard irrelevant or extraneous considerations. Second, it is a well-known principle that justice should not only be done but should also appear to be done. Unreasoned conclusions may be just but they may not appear to be just to those who read them. Reasoned conclusions, on the other hand, will have also the appearance of justice. Third, it should be remembered that an appeal generally lies from the decision of judicial and quasi- judicial authorities to this Court by special leave granted under Article 136. A judgment which does not disclose the reasons, will be of little assistance to the Court."

32. In Siemens Engineering & Manufacturing Co. of India Limited case (supra) this Court was dealing with an appeal against the order of the Central Government on a revision application under the Sea Customs Act, 1878. This Court has laid down:

"It is now settled law that where an authority makes an order in exercise of a quasi-judicial function it must record its reasons in support of the order it makes. Every quasijudicial order must be supported by reasons." (P 495) "If courts of law are to be replaced by administrative authorities and tribunals, as indeed, in some kinds of cases, with the proliferation of Administrative Law they may have to be so replaced, it is essential that administrative authorities and tribunals should accord fair and proper hearing to the persons sought to be affected by their orders and give sufficiently clear and explicit reasons in support of the orders made by them. Then along administrative authorities and tribunals, exercising quasi-judicial function will be able to justify their existence and carry credibility with the people by inspiring confidence in the adjudicatory process. The rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order is, like the principle of audi alteram partera, a basic principle of natural justice which must inform every quasi-judicial process and this rule must be observed in its proper spirit and mere pretence of compliance with it would not satisfy the requirement of law."

33. Tarachand Khatri v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi & Others, [1977] 2 SCR 198 was a case where an inquiry was conducted into charges of misconduct and the disciplinary authority, agreeing with the findings of the Inquiry Officer, had imposed the penalty of dismissal. The said order of dismissal was challenged on the ground that the disciplinary authority had not given its reasons for passing the order. The said contention was negatived by this Court and distinction was drawn between an order of affirmance and an order of reversal. It was observed:

" ..... while it may be necessary for a disciplinary or administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions to state the reasons in support of its order if it differs from the conclusions arrived at and the recommendations made by the Inquiry Officer in view of the scheme of a particular enactment or the rules made thereunder, it would be laying down the proposition too broadly to say that even an ordi- nary concurrence must be supported by reasons."

34. In Raipur Development Authority and Others v. Chokhamal Contractors and Others, [1989] 2 S.C.C. 721 a Constitution Bench of this Court was considering the question whether it is obligatory for an arbitrator under the Arbitration Act, 1940 to give reasons for the award. It was argued that the requirement of giving reasons for the decision is a part of the rules of natural justice which are also applicable to the award of an arbitrator and reliance was placed on the decisions in Bhagat Raja case (Supra) and Siemens Engineering Co. case (Supra). The said contention was rejected by this Court. After referring to the decisions in Bhagat Raja case (Supra); Som Datt Datta case (Supra) and Siemens Engineering Co. case (Supra) this Court has observed:

"It is no doubt true that in the decisions pertaining to Administrative Law, this court in some cases has observed that the giving of reasons in an administrative decision is a rule of natural justice by an extension of the prevailing rules. It would be in the interest of the world of commerce that the said rule is confined to the area of Administrative Law ..... But at the same time it has to be borne in mind that what applies generally to settlement of disputes by authorities governed by public law need not be extended to all cases arising under private law such as those arising under the law of arbitration which is intended for settlement of private disputes."

35. The decisions of this Court referred to above indicate that with regard to the requirement to record reasons the approach of this Court is more in line with that of the American Courts. An important consideration which has weighed with the Court for holding that an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions must record the reasons for its decision, is that such a decision is subject to the appellate jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution as well as the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution and that the reasons, if recorded, would enable this Court or the High Courts to effectively exercise the appellate or supervisory power. But this is not the sole consideration. The other considerations which have also weighed with the Court in taking this view are that the requirement of recording reasons would (i) guarantee consideration by the authority; (ii) introduce clarity in the decisions; and (iii) minimise chances of arbitrariness in decision making. In this regard a distinction has been drawn between ordinary Courts of law and tribunals and authorities exercising judicial functions on the ground that a Judge is trained to look at things objectively uninfluenced by considerations of policy or expediency whereas an executive officer generally looks at things from the standpoint of policy and expediency.

36. Reasons, when recorded by an administrative authority in an order passed by it while exercising quasi-judicial functions, would no doubt facilitate the exercise of its jurisdiction by the appellate or supervisory authority. But the other considerations, referred to above, which have also weighed with this Court in holding that an administrative authority must record reasons for its decision, are of no less significance. These considerations show that the re- cording of reasons by an administrative authority serves a salutary purpose, namely, it excludes chances of arbitrariness and ensures a degree of fairness in the process of decision-making. The said purpose would apply equally to all decisions and its application cannot be confined to decisions which are subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. In our opinion, therefore, the requirement that reasons be recorded should govern the decisions of an administrative authority exercising quasijudicial functions irrespective of the fact whether the decision is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. It may, however, be added that it is not required that the reasons should be as elaborate as in the decision of a Court of law. The extent and nature of the reasons would depend on particular facts and circumstances. What is necessary is that the reasons are clear and explicit so as to indicate that the authority has given due consideration to the points in controversy. The need for recording of reasons is greater in a case where the order is passed at the original stage. The appellate or revisional authority, if it affirms such an order, need not give separate reasons if the appellate or revisional authority agrees with the reasons contained in the order under challenge.

After considering the above dictum of the Apex Court, it is clear that the disciplinary authority was required to consider the objection of the petitioner regarding the charge no.1, which was not found proved against him by the enquiry officer but found to be proved by the disciplinary authority. He was also required to record his consideration and finding regarding the objection of the petitioner to the decision making process of the Enquiry Officer and also to the other charges which were found to be proved by the Enquiry Officer and affirmed by the disciplinary authority, while proposing punishment of dismissal from service to the petitioner.

The punishment order therefore can not be upheld by this Court and is hereby quashed. The appellate order also can not be upheld since it has affirmed the illegal punishment order of the disciplinary authority without application of mind to the basic flaw of lack of reason therein and it is also hereby quashed. The petitioner shall be reinstated in service on the post, he was working, within a period of 6 weeks from the date of presentation of the certified copy of this order before the authority concerned. He is held entitled to benefits of continuity of service, 1/3rd of his arrears of salary and other service benefits from the date of passing of suspension order dated 14.08.1995 to the date of actual reinstatement in service. Any amount paid towards suspension allowance shall be deducted. It is open for the respondents to proceed with the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner from the stage it has been found vitiated by this Court, i.e., from the stage of consideration of the objection dated 15.07.1999 of the petitioner to the second show cause notice/ notice of provisional punishment dated 26.09.1999 issued by the disciplinary authority, as per paragraph no. 32 of the Judgment in the case of Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board Limited Vs. Mahesh Dahiya (supra). The Disciplinary Authority shall pass a reasoned and speaking order regarding the entire objections raised by the petitioner in his reply dated 15.07.1999.

The writ petition is partly allowed. No order as to costs.

Order Date :-24.04.2018 SS