ORDER Poonam Srivastava, J.
1. Heard Sri Shashi Nandan, Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Santosh Kumar Srivastava, Advocate and Sri. R.C. Shukla, Advocate, appearing for he defendant/respondent.
2. This is a revision under Section 25 Provincial Small Causes Court Act challenging the judgment and decree dated 16.12.2002 passed by the Additional District Judge, court No. 10, Gorakhpur in S.C.C. Suit No. 12 of 2001, Achintya Kumar Lahiri v. Life Insurance Corporation of India.
3. The plaintiff/revisionist instituted a suit for decree of ejectment from the disputed accommodation, which consists of first floor of the building along with garage within the compound. The rate of rent as claimed by the plaintiff is Rs. 2500/- per month. A registered notice was served on 14.2.2001 to the respondent/tenant for arrears of rent from September 1996 up to January 2001 to the tune of Rs. 1,32,500/-(Rupees one lakh thirty two thousand five hundred). The notice was sent to the Divisional Manager Life Insurance Corporation of India, Divisional Office, Prabha Complex, Baxipur, Gorakhpur. The tenant sent a reply on 5.3.2001 stating therein that the rent has been deposited in the court of Civil Judge (junior Division) Gorakhpur w.e.f. September 1996 and, therefore, it is contended that no rent was due whatsoever. A copy of the notice has been annexed as annexure No. 2 and its reply as annexure No. 3 to the affidavit filed in support of the stay application. Subsequent thereto another notice was given on 25.7.2001 by the plaintiff determining the tenancy and to vacate the premises within a period of thirty days. It is asserted on the basis of an inquiry made from the post office by the plaintiff that the said notice was delivered to the defendant/ respondent on 26.7.2001. A copy of the inquiry report has been annexed as annexure No. 5 to the affidavit filed in support of the stay application. Since vacant possession was not handed over, the suit was instituted. Copy of the plaint has been annexed as annexure No. 1 and the written statement has been annexed as annexure No. 1 and the written statement has been annexed as annexure No. 6 to the affidavit filed in support of the stay application, No. 6 to the affidavit filed in support of the stay application. The suit was dismissed on the ground that the notice terminating the tenancy was illegal as it was sent to the Divisional Office and not to the Head Office of Life Insurance Corporation, which is situated at Mumbai. Objection raised was that the Life Insurance Corporation is a Central Government Undertaking and, therefore, tenancy could be terminated only by giving a notice to the Director or Chairman through its Secretary of the registered office situated at Mumbai and therefore the suit is barred under Order 29 Rule 2 C.P.C. It is also contended on behalf of the respondent that the determination of the tenancy by the landlord is illegal as another suit was instituted on a previous occasion vide suit no, 18 of 1991, which was dismissed. A revision filed against the said judgment was dismissed. A revision filed against the said judgment was dismissed. Thereafter, a review was also dismissed. It is further contended that another suit was instituted by Smt. Jaishree Lahiri in the year 1986 for getting the accommodation vacated. The accommodation in question is Divisional Office and the accommodation is also used by the Officers of Life Insurance Corporation, who come from out side.As many as six issues were framed by the Judge Small Causes Court, issue No. 1 was whether the plaintiff has determined the tenancy of the defendant/respondent? Issue No. 2 was whether the suit is barred under Order 29 Rule 2 C.P.C.? Issue No. 3 was in respect of validity of the notice dated 25.7.2001, The court below decided issue Nos. I and 3 simultaneously against the plaintiff and in favour of the tenant. While coming to this conclusion that the notice was illegal, the court below placed reliance on provision of Section 3(2) of the Act, it is provided that the Corporation shall be body corporate having perpetual succession and common seal with power, subject to the provision of the Act to acquire hold and dispose of the property and may by its name sue and be sued. Section 4 of the Act provides constitution of the Corporation. On this basis, the court dismissed the suit for the reason that the defendant was not Chairman but was Life Insurance Corporation, Divisional Office through its Senior Divisional Manager. The court below dismissed the suit on the basis of provision of Order 29 Rule 1 C.P.C. as well. No finding was recorded regarding arrears of rent and payment of damages. Argument advanced by Sri Shashi Nandan, Senior Advocate appearing for the revisionist is in three folds. First submission is that admittedly Divisional Office of Life Insurance Corporation was tenant and this averment was made in paragraph Nos. 2 and 3 of the plaint, which stands admitted in the written statement. Thus, notice under Section 106 Transfer of Property Act is to be given to the tenant determining the tenancy. The tenant/respondent has admitted in paragraph No. 5 of the written statement that the Divisional Office has received notice determining the tenancy, it sufficiently fulfills requirement of law and the court below illegally held the notice to be invalid. It is further contended that provision of Order 29 Rules 2 and 3 C.P.C. do not come in way and it could not be said that the suit is barred under the said provision. Learned Counsel for the revisionist has placed provision of Order XXIX Rules 2 and 3 C.P.C., which are quoted below:
2. Service on corporation. Subject to any statutory provision regulating service of process, where the suit is against a corporation, the summons may be served-
(a) on the secretary, or on any director, or other principal officer of the corporation, or
(b) by leaving it or sending it by post addressed to the corporation at the registered office, or if there is no registered office, or if there is no registered office then at the place where the corporation carries on business.
State Amendment- [Uttar Pradesh]- In its application to the State of Uttar Pradesh, in Order XXIX, Rule 2, insert the following, after Clause (a):
(aa) on its corporation pleader in the district where the Court issuing summons is located, if one has been appointed and the appointment has been notified to the District Judge under Rule 10 of Order XXVII, or. "-U.P. Act (57 of 1976) (1-1-1977)
3. Power to require personal attendance of officer of corporation.- The court may, at any stage of the suit, require the personal appearance of the secretary or of any director, or other principal officer of the corporation who may be able to answer material questions relating to the suit.
4. In view of the aforesaid provision, it is emphatically argued that it speaks only about the registered Office and not Head Office. The court below was liable to examine whether the Divisional Office will" be a registered Office or not and also that the said Rule speaks regarding service of notice and not maintainability of the suit. Issue No. 2 was regarding maintainability of the suit, which has wrongly been decided by the court below. Reliance has been placed on a number of decisions, India General S.N. & Ry Company and Anr. v. Lal Mohan Saha and Ors. A.I.R 1916 Calcutta page 818, Jute & Gunny Brokers Ltd. and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. . The Apex Court ruled that the service of requisition order on the mill through Managing Agent is good service within the meaning of Order 29 Rule 2 C.P.C. The Managing Agent of Corporation is an Officer as defined in Section 2(11) of Companies Act 1913 and considering the nature of his duty, he would be Principal Officer of the Corporation as contemplated by Order 2 Rule 2 C.P.C. In the context, the Apex Court has held inn paragraph No. 11, which is quoted below:
In the matter of service, we are concerned with Clause (a) of Order XXIX, Rule 2, which provides that summons may be served on the secretary, or on any director or other principal officer of the corporation: and what we have to see is whether service on the managing agents was service on "other principle officer" of the corporation. Section 2 (11) of the Indian (Companies Act, No. VII of 1913, which was in force at the relevant time, defines an "officer" to include any director, managing agent, manager or secretary. So a managing agent of a corporation is an officer of the corporation. The question then is whether he is a principal officer, and the answer to our mind is obvious, considering the nature of the duties of a managing agent of a corporation. It is not seriously disputed either that if a managing agent is an officer of the corporation he would, considering the nature of his duties, be a principal officer. What is, however, contended is that the definition of an officer given In the Companies Act is an artificial definition and is only for the purposes of the Companies Act and not for the Code of Civil Procedure. The appeal court did not accept this contention and was of the opinion that the definition of an officer given in the Companies Act can also be utilized for the purpose of the Code of Civil Procedure and we think that that view is correct. Therefore, when the service in this case was effected on the managing agents of the mills it was effected on one of the principal officers of the mills it was effected on one of the principal officers of the corporation and would be a good service under Order XXIX. Rule 2. But it is contended that the intention behind Order XXIX, Rule 2, is that the service must be on a human being and that Order XXIX, Rule 2 does not contemplate service on one corporation for the purpose of securing service on another corporation. In this connection reliance is placed on Rules 1 and 3 of Order XXIX where it is urged that the same words occur and it is clear that these rules contemplate that the other principal officer mentioned therein must be a human being.
5. Similar view was affirmed in the case of Shalimar Rope Works Ltd. v. Ms Abdul Husain H.M. Hasan Bhai Bassiwala and Ors. . Orissa High Court has taken similar view in the case of Ms Oscar v. Barbil Municipality . Argument advanced on behalf of the revisionist has been strongly disputed by the counsel appearing for Life Insurance Corporation. Learned Counsel states that the defendant arrayed in the suit was Divisional Office Gorakhpur whereas the registered office is at Mumbai. In the circumstances, notice itself was invalid and the suit instituted on the basis of the notice could not proceed and has tried to support the judgment of the court below.
6. After hearing learned Counsel for the respective parties at length and on perusal of the judgment of the court below, it is evident that the word registered office has not been defined in Life Insurance Corporation Act 1956. Sub Clause (2) of Section 3 provides that the Corporation is a body corporate and has a right to hold and dispose of the property and may by its name sue and be sued. Perusal of these provisions makes it apparent that the suit could not be thrown out merely because it was sued through Divisional Manager of the Divisional Office. There is no complete embargo on the institution of such suit. The defendant has admitted that he is tenant of the building in question and also notice was duly served on him, therefore, it can not be said that the suit could not have been instituted in the manner, which was done since the Head Office of Mumbai was not arrayed as the defendant. Notice was served on the defendant/respondent, which was replied by the Divisional Manager (annexure No. 2). Therefore, I am in agreement with the argument advanced by the counsel for the revisionist. Order 29 Rules 2 and 3 C.P.C. is also not regarding maintainability of the suit on the contrary, it is in respect of service of summons or process in a pending suit. Rule 2 of Order 29 C.P.C. regulates service of process where a suit has already been instituted and it is not in respect of a notice determining tenancy under Section 106 Transfer of Property Act. The court below was completely misguided and erred in law while holding the notice invalid, for the reason that it was not served at Mumbai office. Admitted position is that the defendant/respondent was a tenant and paying rent from month to month and the tenancy was determined under Transfer of Property Act, therefore, finding to the contrary holding the notice invalid in view of Order 29 Rules 2 and 3 C.P.C. is altogether erroneous and illegal. There is yet another circumstance, which has to be taken in to consideration Since the defendant has filed written statement after receipt of the summon, the court was duty bound to decide the suit on merits. Annexure No. 2 to the stay application is the notice dated 14.2.2001 along with registered receipt and annexure No. 4 is the second notice dated 25.7.2001 where by the revisionist had determined the tenancy and was required handover vacant possession after expiry of thirty days from the date of service of notice. I have already held that service of notice was sufficient and, therefore, tenancy was validly terminated by means of a notice and findings to the contrary are set aside. The court below has failed to give any finding on the issue Nos. 4 and 5 for the reason that notice was held to be invalid and consequently the court declined to decide issue No. 6. Issue Nos. 1 and 2 are decided in favour of the plaintiff/revisionist. I hold that the notice given by the revisionist determining the tenancy is a valid notice and finding of Judge Small Causes Court is set at naught.
7. For the reasons discussed above, I allow this revision setting aside the impugned judgment and decree dated 16.12.2002 passed in S.C.C. Suit No. 12 of 2001 and remand the case to the Judge Small Causes Court to give its finding on issue Nos. 4, 5 and 6. The Judge Small Causes Court is directed to decide issue Nos. 4, 5 and 6 in accordance with law expeditiously, preferably, within a period of four months from the date a certified copy of this order is produced before him.
8. Cost on parties.