JUDGMENT Umeshwar Pandey, J.
1. Heard Sri Prashant Kumar Singh, learned Amicus Curiae appearing for the accused-appellant and the learned A.G.A.
2. This jail appeal arises out of the judgment and order dated 30th August, 2001 passed by the Addl. Sessions Judge (Court No. 4), Allahabad.
3. The appellant was charged for the offence punishable under Section 307 read with Section 34 I.P.C, on the allegations that on 17.10.1994 the police had received information from certain informer (Mukhbir) that two persons were sitting in suspicious state at the railway crossing near Peeer Baba Temple. On this information the police party, headed by the complainant Umesh Chandra Pandey, proceeded for the spot. The police informer was also accompanying them. On their arrival near the aforesaid temple, the informer (Mukhbir) indicated the police party towards the two miscreants, who on getting the clue of the arrival of police became alert.
4. After finding themselves surrounded by the police, they took out their country-made pistols. The police party warned them and asked them to stand up, but the miscreants started firing and running towards the railway crossing. While running also the accused persons fired at the police party, but no one was injured. The police apprehended them at the railway line and on enquiry they disclosed their names as Abdul Husain @ Soni (the appellant) and the second one identified himself as Gulshan. They were taken in custody and on search illicit arms and ammunitions were found from their possession. They were brought to the police station and on the basis of the recovery memo F.I.R. was lodged. After completion of the investigation charge-sheet was submitted in the case, whereupon the accused were committed to the court of Sessions for trial for the offence punishable under Section 307/34 I.P.C.
5. The appellant-accused Abdul Husain @ Soni was charged for the offence punishable under Section 307/34 I.P.C. along with other accused and they pleaded not guilty to the charge and claimed to be tried. Later on the appellant Abdul Husain @ Soni moved an application before the trial Judge on 20.7.2001 stating that he was pleading guilty to the charged offence and he may be pardoned. On the basis of this plea of being guilty taken by the appellant in his aforesaid application before the trial court, the Addl. Sessions Judge recorded his statement on 30.8.2001. The English rendering of the same is as below:
"Stated on oath that on 17.10.99 at about 18.50 hours at A.D.C. Railway Crossing in the circle of Police Station Kydganj, I, with intention to cause murder, fired from my pistol, but it did not hit anyone. I may be punished suitably."
6. On the aforesaid plea of the accused the trial Judge held that the offence punishable under Section 307 read with Section 34 I.P.C. was fully established and he accordingly convicted him for the offence and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a term of seven years and also to pay a fine of Rs, 10,000/-. The accused Abdul Husain @ Soni thereafter preferred this appeal from jail which has been heard at length and the record of the trial court has also been perused.
7. This conviction is based purely on the plea of the accused admitting himself as guilty of the charged offence. No other material available on the record has been proved nor taken into consideration by the trial Judge for recording his conviction, The learned Amicus Curiae appearing in this case has very precisely submitted that in such cases where the accused pleaded guilty upon which his conviction has been recorded the court has to be very circumspect while passing the conviction order and awarding the sentence. The court has to be satisfied that the admission of the guilt made by the accused in his statement given before it is voluntary, unqualified, unambiguous and untainted. It is further to be found out if the statement so given for pleading the guilt of the offence covers all the ingredients, which are required to be proved by the prosecution. In case the ingredients are not complete, the court ought not to record conviction of the accused, rather it should direct recording of the evidence of the prosecution in the case and to proceed with the normal course of trial. The learned Amicus Curiae has further submitted that in the present case while giving statement of pleading to the guilt the accused appellant has not disclosed as to who was his target and whom he intended to murder. This ambiguity appearing in the statement being so obvious the court below should not have treated it as a complete statement of plea of guilt for recording conviction for the offence under Section 307/34 I.P.C. The murder is to be intended in a case for attempt to murder. If the intension of commission of murder is not demonstrated, the offence under Section 307 I.P.C. would not be made out. In the aforesaid context the learned Amicus Curiae has cited the case law of State of Maharashtra through C.B.I. v. Sukadev Singh @ Sukha and Anr., reported in JT 1992 (4) SC 73 and Smt. Legeshri v. The State, AIR 1955 NUC (Allahabad) 2749 (Vol. 42). He has also cited an American case Robert J. Henderson v. Timothy G. Morgan, 1977 Cr. L.J. 738 : (1977-49 L. Ed. 2d 108).
8. In the present case the trial court with the above referred statement of the accused has though recorded conviction of the appellant, but it appears that it has not observed the due care which ought to be taken by the court while recording a confessional statement. If the accused intends to advance a plea of the guilt to the charged offence, the court is required to take certain precautions before it records the conviction in that case. It has to find out that such admission in clear, unequivocal and unambiguous. Besides, the court must also find out that the statement so given by the accused for pleading himself as guilty is sufficient to cover all the ingredients of the offence. Only upon such unqualified and unconditional statement, the court has to record the conviction and not otherwise. In the aforesaid case of Sukhdev Singh (supra) the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the court has to find out if the plea of such admissions of guilt actually tantamount to an admission of all the facts constituting the offence. The observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court are, "It is, therefore, essential that before accepting and acting on the plea the Judge must feel satisfied that the accused admits facts or ingredients constituting the offence. The plea of the accused must, therefore, be dear, unambiguous and unqualified and the Court must be satisfied that he has understood the nature of the allegations made against him and admits them. The Court must act with caution and circumspection before accepting and acting on the plea of guilt. Once these requirements are satisfied the law permits the Judge trying the case to record a conviction based on the plea of guilt."
9. In the light of the aforesaid observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court if the plea of the accused taken in the statement given before the trial court is tested it becomes obvious that the aforementioned statement of the applicant does not contain the fact as to who was intended by him as his target of murder. The statement of the accused recorded on 30.8.2001 is only to the effect that he fired with an intention to kill which did not hit anybody. It is quite clear that the accused has not disclosed his target whom he intended to shoot and kill. Section 300 of the I.P.C. gives the definition of murder and for convenience it may be reproduced as below:
"300. Murder.- Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or-
2ndly. - If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or-
3rdly. - If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or-
4thty. - If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid."
10. There are four conditions, either of which if admitted or demonstrated on record makes the act of the accused covered within the definition of murder. In the present case the appellant was charged for the attempt of murder. If his act so alleged is not such whereby either of the aforesaid conditions of the murder is covered, it will not amount to an offence of attempt to murder. For committing the offence of attempt to murder the offender has to either cause the injury with intention to cause death or he knows that by the act so done he is likely to cause death of the person targeted or the act done with intention to cause bodily injury to any person intended to be inflicted is sufficient in ordinary course to cause death or he knows that the act is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probabilities, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death and he commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such bodily injury to such individual or group of individuals. The appellant accused if has stated that he fired with an intention to commit murder, such statement does not admit to the fact that any particular person, individual or group of persons was there whom he intended to murder. A statement given by the accused that he fired in air towards the sky with an intention to commit murder, will not amount to commission of an offence of attempt to murder. The words and the sense which appear from the statement of accused given before the court by way of pleading guilt of the charged offence have to be weighed very meticulously and precisely by the courts before the conviction is recorded against him. In this case as has been submitted by the learned Amicus Curiae, the statement of admission of guilt given before the court does not disclose the. ingredients of the offence and as such the court should not have recorded his conviction. I find sufficient force in such arguments of the learned Amicus Curiae. The accused has not disclosed the person whom he intended to kill and thus, to commit his murder. This statement of the appellant should not have been treated as sufficient by the trial court to record his conviction under the aforesaid offence punishable under Section 307/34 I.P.C.
11. Besides the aforesaid lacuna appearing in the case I further find that these 4-5 lines statement of the accused has been recorded quite cursorily by the trial court. Upon the basis of this statement only the court had awarded punishment after holding him guilty, of rigorous imprisonment of long seven years. This demonstrates to the fact that the court below has taken the whole matter with extreme callousness and no serious thought has been given for recording the conviction of appellant. The court in such cases is duty bound to observe all precautions for the purposes to ascertain that the statement about the admission of guilt given by the accused is wholly voluntary and untainted. In order to test that such statement of admission of guilt is without any pressure etc. the court has to put collateral questions to such accused and find out that such admission of guilt is an intelligent admission. The court has to caution the accused also that the statement of admission of guilt so given by him would render and make him liable for commission of the offence which might result into award of severe punishment against him by the court. If these tests have not been observed by the court, the statement so recorded, cannot be treated as voluntary and intelligent admission of guilt. Such circumspection and caution has to be necessarily observed by the court before accepting and acting up-on the plea of guilt. The observance of these essential formalities for assessing that the plea of guilt given is wholly voluntary and with full intelligence at the command of the accused, if has not been done by the court, such plea of guilt recorded cannot be treated as sufficient for recording conviction of the accused. In the present case the learned trial Judge has failed to observe all these formalities and in a slip-shod manner has accepted the laconic statement of the accused recorded as admission of the guilt, upon which he has based the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence. In these circumstances, the judgment under challenge in the present appeal cannot sustain in the eye of law and has to be set aside.
12. In result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and order dated 30,8,2001 is set aside.
13. The case is sent back to the trial court for being taken up for trial and to proceed in accordance with law. It shall, however, be open to the trial court not to reject any fresh plea of guilt by way of admission of the offence if given by the accused-appellant, but it shall observe all these formalities before recording the admission of guilt of the accused and before accepting it for recording conviction against him,
14. Office is directed to send back the record atonce to the trial court where the case shall proceed in accordance with law.