JUDGMENT D.K. Seth, J.
1. In this writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the order of suspension dated 6.1.1992 which was held to be illegal by the Inspector, Arabic Madrasa, U. P. Allahabad in his order dated 31.3.1992. Therefore, in this writ petition the petitioner had prayed for revocation of the order of suspension in pursuance of the order dated 31.3.1992. Admittedly in the meantime, pursuant to the charge-sheet, which was mentioned in the order of suspension, an enquiry was held and the petitioner having been found guilty, his service was terminated by the Management by an order dated 1st November, 1992. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents, it has been alleged that in terms of Rule 34 of the U. P. Recognition of Non-Governmental Arabian and Persian School Rules, 1987, the proceedings of the enquiry have been forwarded to the Inspector and the Inspector has not given any suggestion as contemplated in Rule 34. Therefore, after the said order has been passed, the question of suspension becomes academic.
2. Mr. M.A. Qadeer, learned counsel for respondents contends that in 1995, the order dated 31.3.1992 has since been recalled. Mr. B.D. Mandhyan, learned counsel for the petitioner, on the other hand, contends that after the order of termination, the recalling of the order in 1995 is wholly immaterial and as such is nonest in the eye of law.
3. But the fact remains that the petitioner has not challenged the order of termination, though the said fact was disclosed in the counter-affidavit filed by respondents in 1995. At this stage, Mr. Mandhyan fairly submits that the entire question is dependent on the question of interpretation of Rule 34 of the said Rules. If the said Rule cannot be interpreted to mean that an order of termination or suspension requires approval of the Inspector, in that event, the order of suspension and the order of termination cannot be sustained. Mr. Qadeer contends that Rule 34 does not contemplate grant or refusal of approval either to the order of suspension or termination as such there is no further scope for decision in the writ petition which has become infructuous by reason of the termination of the petitioner's service which has not been challenged.
4. After having heard the learned counsel for the parties at length, it appears that unless if the order of termination is challenged, the question of suspension becomes academic. The effect of Rule 34 of the said Rules was interpreted in the case of Shamshad Ahmad v. Committee of Management, Madarsa Hanifia Ahle Sunnat Bahrul Uloom, Mau Nath Bhanjan, Mau and others. 1997 (3) ALR 578. In the said case, the Rule 34 which was interpreted to mean that it does not envisage any approval of the order of termination. For our present purpose. Rule 34 as translated by Mr. Qadeer as well as in the said decision in the case of Shamshad Ahmad (supra), may be quoted herein below:
"34. In case the Committee of Management decides to terminate the services of any teacher or employee. it will be necessary to take legal proceedings before termination/removal. Complete details of proceedings shall be forwarded to the Inspector. Arabic Madarsas. U. P., Allahabad. In case there is any irregularity in the proceedings, the Inspector shall have the power to make his suggestions to the Committee of Management."
5. A plain reading of the said rule itself shows that service of a teacher can be terminated by the Committee of Management after taking appropriate legal proceedings. The only obligation of the Committee of Management is to forward the complete details of the proceedings to the Inspector, Arabic Madarsa. U. P. Allahabad. The scope and extent of power conferred on the Inspector has been specified in the said rule within the limits that in case there is any irregularity in the proceedings. in that event, the Inspector may make his suggestion to the Committee of Management. The expression 'suggestion' cannot be substituted for 'approval'. The suggestion is with regard to the irregularity and the suggestion is to the Committee of Management. The "suggestion to the Committee of Management" cannot be construed to mean "approval" or its "disapproval". The said provision does not contain anything to show that the Inspector has any other power other than making his suggestion provided there is an irregularity. Beyond this, the Inspector has no other power-either to reverse the decision of the Committee of Management or to affirm the decision of the management. The power can be exercised only when there is an irregularity.
6. In the present case, it has not been alleged that the Inspector has found any irregularity by sending his suggestion. On the other hand, in the counter-affidavit, as contended by Mr. Qadeer, it has been specifically stated that the Inspector has not intimated of having found any irregularity in the proceeding nor he had made any suggestion. Therefore, the entire question becomes academic for our present purpose.
7. It is also contended that a suit is pending before the civil court seeking injunction that the respondents may not terminate his service and that an interim order has been passed in the said suit. Despite such interim order, the petitioner's service has been terminated. Mr. Qadeer, however, contends that the interim order was for a limited period and it was not extended and the proceedings had been undertaken during the period when there was no injunction and the order of termination was issued on 1.11.1992 when there was no injunction operative. This fact is being disputed by Mr. Mandhyari. In such circumstances, the question as is confined in the suit itself which is kept open for being decided in the suit in accordance with law particularly as to whether the order of termination has been issued during the period when the interim order was operative : whether the proceeding was irregular or not or otherwise illegal. These questions are also involved in the said suit. The question of termination having not been agitated before this Court, the said question is beyond the scope and ambit of this writ petition and as such, this point is not being decided here in this case and all questions relating to the validity of the order of termination shall remain to be decided in the suit itself.
8. The observations made hereinbefore are all tentative for the purpose of deciding the present writ petition and shall in no way influence the decision in the trial court except to the extent of the question of approval, which is now a well settled principle of law by reason of the decision in the case of Shamshad Ahmad (supra), so long the said decision is not altered or overruled. However, the above proposition in my view, does not preclude the petitioner from challenging the validity of the enquiry proceeding and the order of termination through a suit and claim damages therefor or such relief as may be available to him under the law.
9. It is expected that the suit which was filed in 1992 may be decided as early as possible preferably within a period of one year from the date a copy of this order is filed before the learned trial court along with affidavit.
10. With the aforesaid observation, this writ petition is dismissed on the ground of pendency of the civil suit in which all points taken by the respective parties, which are hereby kept open, may be decided in accordance with law.