JUDGMENT Ryves and Lyle, JJ.
1. The only point in this case is as to whether the suit is barred by limitation. The suit is one for foreclosure of a mortgage, dated the 4th of December, 1874. The mortgagee was in possession and received periodically profits in part satisfaction of the interest agreed upon in the deed. The first court held that these payments extended the period of limitation, applying the second paragraph of Section 20 of the Indian Limitation Act. On appeal, the learned District Judge came to the conclusion that the word "interest" in Section 20 means the whole of the interest due on a debt and that, therefore, as only part of the interest was paid on any particular date, held that Section 20 had no application, and dismissed the suit as barred by limitation. In our opinion "interest"in that section means the interest or any part of the interest due, and we agree with the first court that the suit is not barred by limitation. The rulings to which we have been referred [Kallu v. Halki (1896) I.L.R., 18 All., 295 Anwar Husain v. Lalmir Khan (1903) I.L.R., 26 All., 167] are cases of redemption of a mortgage. The latter case expressly distinguishes a suit for redemption from a suit brought by a mortgagee to enforce his remedy. We, therefore, allow the appeal, and, setting aside the decree of the lower appellate court, remand the appeal to that court with directions to readmit it on its original number in the register and dispose of the remaining issues according to law. The costs of this appeal will be costs in the cause.