1 ® IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU ON THE 31ST DAY OF JULY, 2017 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAVI MALIMATH AND THE HON’BLE MR.JUSTICE JOHN MICHAEL CUNHA CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1190 OF 2010 BETWEEN:
MR.A.NIZAMUDDIN S/O LATE ABDULLA, AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS, R/O 1457, F-5TH CROSS, ANNANAGAR, CHENNAI – 600 010.
(BY SRI S.BALAKRISHNAN, ADVOCATE) AND:
STATE OF KARNATAKA BY MADIWALA POLICE ... APPELLANT INVESTIGATED BY CBI. ... RESPONDENT (BY SRI P.PRASANNA KUMAR, SPL.PP) ***** THIS CRL.A IS FILED UNDER SECTION 374(2) OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT DATE 14.09.2010/18.09.2010 PASSED BY THE SPECIAL JUDGE, XXXV ADDL.CITY CIVIL AND S.J., BENGALURU IN S.C.NO.643 OF 2003 – CONVICTING THE APPELLANT/ACCUSED NO.12 FOR THE OFFENCE PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 256, 259 R/W 120(B) OF IPC. THE APPELLNAT/ACCUSED NO.12 IS SENTENCED TO UNDERGO RIGOROUS IMPRISONMENT FOR FIVE YEARS AND PAY A FINE OF RS.10,000/- IN DEFAULT OF PAYMENT OF FINE HE SHALL UNDERGO FURTHER RIGOROUS IMPRISONMENT FOR THREE MONTHS-FOR THE OFFENCE PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 256 R/W 120(B) OF IPC. THE APPELLANT/ACCUSED NO.12 IS SENTENCED TO UNDERGO RIGOROUS IMPRISONMENT FOR FIVE YEARS AND PAY A FINE OF RS.10,000/- IN DEFAULT OF PAYMENT OF FINE HE SHALL UNDERGO FURTHER RIGOROUS IMPRISONMENT FOR THREE MONTHS FOR THE OFFENCE PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 259 R/W 120(B) OF IPC. THE ABOVE SENTENCE ORDERED TO RUN CONCURRENTLY EXCEPT THE SENTENCE IMPOSED FOR DEFAULT IN PAYMENT OF FINE. THE APPELLANT/ACCUSED PRAYS THAT HE BE ACQUITTED.
THIS CRL.A. COMING ON FOR HEARING THIS DAY, JOHN MICHAEL CUNHA J., DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
JUDGMENT Accused No.12, Sri.Nizamuddin, has preferred this appeal challenging the judgment dated 14.9.2010, passed by the Special Judge, XXXV Additional City Civil And Sessions Judge at Bengaluru, in S.C.Nos.643 of 2003, 352 of 2004 and 353 of 2004, insofar as convicting him for the offences punishable under Sections-256 and 259, read with Section 120-B of IPC and sentencing him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years and a fine of Rs.10,000/- for each of the above offences.
2. The outline facts leading to the appeal are as follows:
Accused No.1-Abdul Kareem Telgi was arrested in Crime No.545 of 2000 of Upparpet Police Station, Bengaluru city for the offences under section 255 to 266, 461, 463, 468, 471, 475, 420 of IPC read with Section- 120B of Indian Penal Code, on the allegations that he was involved in large scale manufacture, sale and circulation of fake stamps. He was lodged in Central Prison, Parappana Agrahara, Bengaluru as UTP No.4148.
3. The case of the prosecution is that despite being in prison, accused No.1 –Abdul Kareem Telgi continued his illegal activities of sale and circulation of fake stamps in different parts of the country like Delhi, Chadigarh, Chennai, Tiruchy and Hyderabad by entering into criminal conspiracy with his associates either contacting them in person in the Central Prison or by contacting them over mobile phones. Information was gathered to the effect that his associates that i.e., Accused No.2 Badruddin and Accused No.3, Rafi Ahmed were regularly visiting Bengaluru Central Prison on one pretext or the other and meeting accused No.1 to conspire for sale and circulation of fake stamps.
4. On collecting reliable information about the ongoing activities of accused No.1 and his associates in the Central Prison, Parappana Agrahara, Bengaluru, STAMPIT the investigating agency obtained necessary permission from the competent authority under Section- 5(2) of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 for intercepting clandestine communications between accused No.1 and his associates. The telephonic surveillance was mounted on various mobile numbers which were being used by accused No.1 and his associates. The audio cassettes containing the conversation together with the specimen voice samples of accused No.1 and his associates were sent to CSFL, CBI, New Delhi and it was confirmed that the voices recorded in the audio cassettes were of the same persons. The mobile phones (Samsung and Nokia) were recovered at the instance of Accused No.2, Badruddin on 18.10.2002. Accused No.1 was initially using the Nokia Handset and after he had access to the Samsung handset, he handed over the Nokia handset to Badruddin for his use. During investigation it revealed that accused No.1 was exclusively using four mobile numbers from these handsets:
(i) 98453-83006 (ii) 98450-28563 (iii) 98450-30697 (iv) 98451-23568 5. The accused persons were frequently changing the SIM cards resulting in change of mobile numbers. The analysis of the intercepted conversations between Accused No.1 and his associates revealed that Accused No.1 was monitoring and instructing his associates for running the fake stamp circulation across the country despite his confinement in the Central Prison. It also revealed that accused No.1 was given the status of a special security prisoner in the Central Prison and accused Nos.2 and 3 used to meet him regularly. Following the lead obtained from the conversations between accused No.1 and his associates, the accused persons were arrested and at their instance, large volume of fake stamp papers and seals and allied materials were seized at different parts of the country. Investigation having disclosed commission of offences punishable under Section-120B IPC, Sections- 256, 258, 259, 420 of IPC, Section-63(b) of Karnataka Stamps Act 1957, Sections 7, 12 and 13(1)(d) r/w. 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 and under Sections-3, 4 and 25 of Karnataka Control of Organised Crimes Act 2000, accused Nos.1 to 33, were sent up for trial.
6. The constituents of the charge relating to the present appellant are found in charge Nos.1 to 58. Charge No.1 is a comprehensive charge against accused No.1 to 27 and 31 to 33, under Section 120-B of Indian Penal Code. The substance of the accusations relating to the present appellant is that during the period when accused No.1 was lodged in the Central Prison between 22.04.2002 and 14.10.2002, accused No.1 came into possession of a mobile phone through accused Nos.2 and 3, who were given ingress to the special room where he was accommodated by accused Nos.32 and 33 viz., the officers of the Central Prison and accused No.1 contacted accused Nos.2 to 6, 14 to 19, 21 to 24, 26, 31 and others over mobile phone and also met accused Nos.2 to 6, 16, 26, 27, 31 and others in Central Prison, Bangalore and entered into conspiracy with them to carry on the business in fake stamps. The further accusations are that the appellant was the proprietor of M/s. Marina Services. He opened a current account in Punjab National Bank, Annanagar Branch, Chennai where cheques received by sale of stamps were credited and that he was selling fake stamps at the instance of accused No.1 during 2001-2002. It is further stated in charge No.1 that stamps worth more than Rupees 165 Crores were seized at many places in different parts of the Country and thereby accused Nos.1 to 27, 31 to 33 committed the offence under Sections 120-B, 256 and 259 of IPC.
7. In order to prove the charges against the appellant / accused No.12, the prosecution has mainly relied on the evidence of 146 witnesses, Exhibits – P1 to P580 and M.O.s – 1 to 231. The trial court considered this evidence in para 223 of the impugned judgment and has held that the charge of conspiracy as well as charges under Sections 256 and 259 of IPC have been proved against the appellant and consequently, sentenced the appellant as above.
8. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant Sri. Balakrishnan S. and learned Special Public Prosecutor, Sri.P.Prasanna Kumar and have perused the relevant material in relation to appellant No.12 with regard to the various contentions urged in the appeal.
9. The first and the main contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the Special Judge, XXXV Additional City Civil And Sessions Judge at Bengaluru had no jurisdiction to try the appellant / accused No.12 and therefore the entire trial is vitiated. It is the argument of Sri. Balakrishnan, the learned counsel, that the charges framed against accused No.12 and the evidence produced in support of the charges disclose that the appellant was the resident of Chennai; he was holding a valid stamp vending license issued by the Government of Tamil Nadu; he had established his business at Chennai in the name of “M/s Marina Services’ and held his bank account at Chennai. The case of the prosecution is that accused No.12 circulated stamp papers at Chennai. There is no evidence to show that at any point of time accused No.12 visited Bengaluru or any other part of Karnataka. It is also not the case of the prosecution that the appellant contacted either Telgi or any other associates while he was in jail or outside the jail at Bengaluru. No recovery has been effected from the possession of accused No.12. Therefore, no part of the offence alleged against the appellant having been taken place within the jurisdiction of Bengaluru Courts, the prosecution of Accused No.12 before the Special Judge, Bengaluru is wholly illegal and without jurisdiction.
10. The second limb of his argument is that, in respect of the very same allegation of dealings in fake stamp papers, an FIR was registered against the appellant in Chennai as RC No.4E of 2004 and thereafter the CBI filed a charge sheet against the appellant in C.C.No.35 of 2005 on the file of the Special Judge for CBI cases, at Chennai under the provisions of Sections 255, 256, 258, 259 r/w 120-B Indian Penal Code. Therefore, the prosecution of the appellant before the Special Judge at Bengaluru on the same set of facts and the consequent judgment of conviction is wholly without jurisdiction and hence solely on this ground, the impugned judgment in so far as this appellant is concerned is liable to be set-aside.
11. In reply, the learned Special Public Prosecutor submitted that the Principal charge framed against all the accused was one under Section 120-B of IPC. The basis for the said charge was that the main offence has taken place in the Central Prison within the jurisdiction of Bengaluru Courts. Though the execution of the object of the conspiracy was carried out beyond the jurisdiction of the Bengaluru Courts, yet the prosecution was initiated on the specific allegation that all the accused persons including the appellant herein acted in furtherance of the conspiracy hatched by Accused No.1. The sale of fake stamp paper was carried on by the appellant as co-conspirators on the instructions of accused No.1 and therefore, the Bengaluru Courts alone had jurisdiction to try the appellant. Even assuming that there was any doubt as to the jurisdiction to try the offences, Section 178 of Cr.P.C. envisages that when it is uncertain as to which of several local areas an offence was committed, the offence may be enquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another, or where an offence is a continuing one, and continues to be committed in more than one local areas.
12. It is the submission of the learned Special Public Prosecutor that in the instant case, the offence alleged against the appellant is a continuing one. In support of this argument the learned counsel has placed reliance on the decision rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of STATE OF JARKHAND vs. LALU PRASAD, @ LALU PRASAD, 2017 SCC online SC 551, wherein it is observed: “conspiracy may be general one or a separate one. There may be larger conspiracy and smaller conspiracy which may develop in successive stages involving different accused persons. Therefore, there can be separate trials on the basis of the law laid down in RAM LAL NARANG vs STATE (DELHI ADMINISTRATION)(1979) 2 SCC 322”. Further, referring to Section 219 of Cr.P.C., the learned Special Public Prosecutor has submitted that when a person is accused of more than one offence of the same kind committed within the space of 12 months from the first to the last of such offences, whether in respect of the same person or not, he may be charged with, and tried at one trial for, any number of them not exceeding three. Therefore, it is the submission of the learned SPP that the contention urged by the appellant does not oust the jurisdiction of the Bengaluru Court to try the offences in question.
13. On examining the rival contentions, we tend to agree with the submission of the learned Special Public Prosecutor. Undisputedly, the charges leveled against the appellant are that pursuant to the conspiracy hatched by accused No.1 and his associates from Central Prison, Bengaluru, accused No.12 acted in furtherance of the said conspiracy along with accused Nos.6, 7 and 9. There is no dispute as to the jurisdiction of the special court in Bengaluru to try the offences insofar as accused No.1 and other accused are concerned. It is a matter of record that out of 33 accused persons tried before the Special Court in Bengaluru, 17 have been convicted and except the present appellant all other accused have served the sentence in full and the appeals filed by them have been dismissed. Even accused No.1 has served the sentence and the appeal filed by him is being heard. None of the accused have questioned the jurisdiction of the Special Judge apparently for the reason that the Special Judge in Bengaluru has assumed jurisdiction against all the accused as the main offence has taken place within the limits of Bengaluru Courts.
14. The rule regarding the place of inquiry and trial is contained in Section 177 Cr.P.C. As per this provision every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. In terms of Section 177 of the Code, in essence, it is the cause of action that determines the forum for initiation of the proceedings against the accused. In the case in hand the specific allegations are that the conspiracy has originated in the precincts of the Central Prison and all the accused persons including the appellant herein acted in concert to effectuate the said conspiracy operating from different parts of the country. Therefore, in our opinion, the proper place for trial of all the accused including the appellant is within the limits of Bengaluru Courts.
15. It is settled principle of law that the Court having jurisdiction to try the offence of criminal conspiracy has also jurisdiction to try the offences that took place in pursuance of the criminal conspiracy. This principle is engrafted in Section 179 Cr.P.C. which reads as under:-
“Offence triable where act is done or consequence ensues- When an act is an offence by reason of anything which has been done and of a consequence which has ensued, the offence may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction such thing has been done or such consequence has ensued.”
16. Dealing with this provision, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Sunitha Kumari Kashyap –vs- State of Bihar & Another, 2011 SCC 301, in para 8 has held thus:-
“From the above provisions, it is clear that the normal rule is that the offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. However, when it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed or where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another or where an offence is a continuing one, and continues to be committed in more than one local area and takes place in different local areas as per Section 178, the court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas is competent to inquire into and try the offence. Section 179 makes it clear that if anything happened as a consequence of the offence, the same may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction such thing has been done or such consequence has ensued.”
(underlining supplied) 17. In Banwarilal Jhunjhunwala & others vs Union on India & Another AIR 1963 S.C.1620 it has been held that a court is competent to try all the offences committed in pursuance of a conspiracy even though any or all other offences were not committed within its territorial jurisdication. In the light of the above legal and factual position, the contention with regard to the jurisdiction is liable to be rejected.
18. The fact that the business was carried on by appellant/accused No.12 in Chennai and the recovery was effected in Chennai is immaterial in deciding the forum for trial of the offences. Undeniably, the allegations against the appellant was that he was running the said business and was involved in sale and circulation of fake stamp papers as part of the conspiracy. The recovery is a piece of evidence to substantiate the conspiracy. The place of search or seizure is not a determining factor in fixing the forum for trial. Since the charge against the appellant is based on the conspiracy and the consequences that have arisen, therefore, there can be no manner of doubt that the jurisdiction in the instant case vests exclusively with the courts at Bengaluru where the conspiracy has taken place. Therefore, the first contention is rejected.
19. The second contention urged by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the appellant is tried and prosecuted on the same charges before the Special Judge for CBI Cases in Chennai and therefore the prosecution of the appellant before the Special Judge, Bengaluru, was bad in law. It is the submission of the learned counsel that the FIR was registered against the appellant herein in the Court of Special Judge, CBI Cases in R.C.No.4E of 2004 for the same offence and he has been tried and prosecuted before the Special Judge for CBI Cases in C.C.No.35/2005 arising out of above RC No.4E of 2004 for the offences under Sections 255, 256, 258, 259 r/w 120-B Indian Penal Code, therefore, the prosecution of the appellant is hit by section 300 of Cr.P.C. and Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India. Dilating on this point, the learned counsel submits that on similar charges, accused No.13 was also charged and tried by the Special Judge, CBI Court in Chennai and as he was convicted by the Chennai Court, considering this fact the court below has acquitted accused No.13 on the ground that accused No.13 could not be subjected to double jeopardy. It is the submission of the learned counsel that the case of the appellant stands on the same footing as that of accused No.13 and therefore even on the ground of parity, the prosecution against the appellant is entitled to be dropped and he is required to be set at large of the offences charged against him.
20. Opposing the above contention, the learned Special Public Prosecutor has referred to the very same decision in State of Jharkhand Through SP, CBI –vs- Lal Prasad @ Lalu Prasad Yadav, 2017 SCC online SC 551 and has emphasized that the Doctrine of double jeopardy is not applicable to the present set of facts, as the appellant is not convicted for the same offences by any other court other than the Special Court at Bengaluru. It is the submission of the learned counsel that if for any reason, the appellant is being prosecuted before the Chennai Court, it is for the appellant to invoke the said provision before the Chennai Court rather than seek to nullify the order of conviction passed by the court below. Apart from the above, the learned Special P.P. pointed out that the charges framed against the appellant in the instant case are distinct and separate from the charges framed before the Chennai Court and therefore the appellant is not entitled to invoke the bar contained in Section 300 Cr.P.C. With regard to the acquittal of accused No.13 is concerned, it is the submission of the learned Special Public Prosecutor that the offences in the instant case is spread over a period from 22.04.2002 to 14.10.2002, whereas, in the case of accused No.13, the charges against him in C.C.No.1 of 2008 were for a period much prior to the commencement of criminal conspiracy between accused No.1 and his associates. There was no incriminating material whatsoever to connect accused No.13 to the various charges framed against the accused. Therefore, during the course of trial, the CBI itself had sought to withdraw or drop the prosecution against accused No.13, but the Presiding Officer rejected the request. But ultimately for want of evidence, accused No.13 came to be acquitted. The case of accused No.13 cannot be compared with the case of accused No.12 and therefore even the principle of parity cannot be extended to accused No.12.
21. The contention urged by the learned counsel for the appellant in our opinion runs counter to the earlier contention advanced by him contending that the Courts at Bengaluru have no jurisdiction to prosecute accused No.12. The whole basis of Section 300 Cr.P.C. is that the first trial is conducted before a court of competent jurisdiction to hear and decide the case and to record the verdict of conviction or acquittal. The appellant while contending that the Court at Bengaluru has no jurisdiction to try the offences cannot at the same breath contend that he has been prosecuted before the Court of competent jurisdiction and thereby, he has been subjected to double jeopardy before two courts. Secondly, in order to invoke the rigors of Section 300 Cr.P.C., the appellant is required to show that he is tried and prosecuted for the same offence before two competent Courts. But, unfortunately, the appellant has not produced any material to show that he is tried and convicted for the same offence before two competent Courts on the same set of facts in two different courts. The argument is built up in vacuum without there being necessary material in this regard. Merely on the basis of the oral submission of the learned counsel, it cannot be assumed that the appellant has been tried and prosecuted or convicted for the same offences in two different courts. Even otherwise on fact, it is seen that the learned counsel has referred to certain observations made in the impugned judgment to contend that the other proceedings are pending against the appellant before the Special Judge in Chennai. Even assuming that the prosecution of the appellant is pending before the Chennai Court, undisputedly, the conviction suffered by him before this Court is the first conviction. In the absence of any material to show that the appellant has been convicted for the same offences by any Court other than Special Judge, Bengaluru, we do not find any merit even in this contention.
22. The third contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant is based on the merits of the case. It is the submission of the learned counsel that the evidence produced by the prosecution do not substantiate any of the charges levelled against the appellant and therefore, the conviction of the appellant for the alleged offences under Sections 256, 259 r/w 120-B Indian Penal Code is unsustainable and untenable in law.
23. On going through the material on record, we find overwhelming evidence in proof of the charges levelled against the appellant. The records reveal that upon the voluntary disclosure of accused No.6, the counterfeit stamps worth Rs.150,49,59,000/- were recovered from House No.51, Jayamahal Street, Sham Park View Apartments, Shenoy Nagar, Chennai-30 under Ex-P204 mahazar. The voluntary statement of accused No.6 is duly proved by examining PW-131-M.K. Ganapathy-Investigating Officer and the same is marked as Ex-P456. The counterfeit stamp papers recovered under Ex-P456 are marked in evidence as M.Os.71 to 83. It is proved in evidence by examining PW-55-Sri. Balasubramanyam and PW-57 Gnanam that the house from which the counterfeit stamp papers were recovered was occupied by accused No.6 and accused No.9. It is also proved in evidence that the seized stamps were counterfeit stamps by examining PW-122 Sri. R.K. Srivastav, who has issued his report as per Ex-P441 and Ex-P442. Ex-P204 is the mahazar whereunder the various seals of the bank and treasury which were used in the process of circulation of the stamp papers have also been seized and recovered. The evidence of PW-131 M.K. Ganapathy discloses that on comparison of the sample seals of the treasury and banks, the seized seals were found to be fake and counterfeit. To this extent, the evidence of PW-115 Syed Azgar Imam- Scientific Officer of Forensic Science Laboratory confirms the fact that the seals recovered under Ex-P204 were counterfeit seals. There is absolutely no reason to doubt the testimony of the above witnesses which are duly corroborated by the simultaneous recovery of the incriminating circumstances from the possession of accused No.6. It is also proved in evidence that during recovery of the counterfeit stamps M.O.79, two typed unregistered stamp papers containing the signature and seal of accused No.12 were recovered by the Investigating agency. This evidence shows that accused No.12 was hand in glove with accused No.6 in holding the stock of counterfeit stamps. The prosecution has also brought on record the incriminating conversation between accused No.1 and accused No.6. The intercepted calls between accused No.5 and accused No.26 go to show that they were also in concert with accused No.1 in holding the stock of counterfeit stamps, which was seized from the possession of accused No.6. Thus, there is reliable evidence in proof of inter-se transaction between accused Nos.1, 5, 6, 12 and 26 establishing the factum of conspiracy in holding huge stock of counterfeit stamps.
24. It is also established in evidence that pursuant to the voluntary statement of accused No.9, M.Os.97 -100, M.O.101 sample rubber seal and M.Os.102-117 rubber stamps seals and metal stamps seals and other records were seized under Ex-P309 mahazar. This is duly proved by examining PW-131 and the panch witness PW-83 Rajamutthu. PW-84 Karunakaran – the owner of the building has stated on oath that he let out said premises in favour of accused No.12, accused No.6 and accused No.9 on a monthly rent of Rs.4,500/- and accused No.12 used to pay the rent of the said premises regularly for a period of 3½ years. He has identified accused No.6, accused No.9 and accused No.12 before the Court. Though there is no rental agreement between accused Nos.6, 9 and 12 and PW-84, yet, the oral testimony of PW-84 is sufficient to hold that accused Nos.6, 9 and 12 were together holding the said premises on oral lease and huge cache of counterfeit stamps worth Rs.6,08,52,705/- have been recovered from the said premises, which is sufficient to hold that accused No.12 was equally a party to the transaction. This evidence has been elaborately and extensively discussed by the court below and has held that the above circumstances establish the complicity of accused No.12 in the alleged offence of holding fake stamp papers and circulating the same. The other evidence discussed by the trial court clearly establishes that these accused Nos.6, 9 and 12 have been dealing with fake counterfeit stamp papers pursuant to the conspiracy hatched by accused No.1 and his associates. In our opinion, the above evidence is sufficient to establish the charges against accused No.12 for the offences punishable under sections 256 and 259 and 120-B Indian Penal Code.
25. Section 10 of the Evidence Act, renders the above evidence relevant and admissible against the appellant. Section 10 of The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 reads as follows:-
“ 10. Things said or done by conspirator in reference to common design.—Where there is reasonable ground to believe that two or more persons have conspired together to commit an offence or an actionable wrong, anything said, done or written by any one of such persons in reference to their common intention, after the time when such intention was first entertained by any one of them, is a relevant fact as against each of the persons believed to so conspiring, as well for the purpose of proving the existence of the conspiracy as for the purpose of showing that any such person was a party to it.”
26. In the light of above factual & legal position, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that there is no direct evidence to prove the complicity of accused No.12 with regard to possession and sale of counterfeit stamp papers is liable to be rejected. From the nature of the offences alleged against the appellant, direct evidence of conspiracy cannot be expected.
27. Though an argument is advanced that the appellant was carrying on the business in vending the stamps legally by procuring the same from treasury, no circumstance have been brought on record either in the course of cross-examination of any of the prosecution witnesses or by way of his reply during his examination under section 313 Cr.P.C. to show that any of the stamps recovered from the premises belonging to the appellant were procured by him from the treasury by placing an indent. Under the said circumstances, the conclusion arrived at by the trial court especially in the light of the opinion given by the scientific analysts that all the stamp papers as well as seals seized in the proceedings were fake and counterfeit, no other view is possible except the view held by the trial court that the appellant was a party to the conspiracy and that he acted in pursuance of the larger conspiracy hatched by accused No.1 from the Central Prison.
28. The plea of the appellant that he was a licenced stamp vendor is not in dispute. But it is established in evidence that the stamp papers seized from his possession were fake and counterfeit. In this context, only question that arises for consideration is “whether he had knowledge or reasons to believe that the stamp papers found in his possession were fake and counterfeit?” In this regard, a useful reference could be made to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of JOTI PARSHAD –vs- STATE OF HARYANA, AIR 1993 SC 1167, whereunder dealing with the similar situation, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:-
“Under the Indian Penal law, guilt in respect of almost all the offences is fastened either on the ground of “intention” or “knowledge” or “reason to believe”. We are now concerned with the expressions “knowledge” and “reason to believe”. “Knowledge” is an awareness on the part of the person concerned indicating his state of mind. “Reason to believe” is another facet of the state of mind. “Reason to believe” is not the same thing as “suspicion” or “doubt” and mere seeing also cannot be equated to believing. “Reason to believe” is a higher level of state of mind. Likewise “knowledge” will be slightly on higher plane than “reason to believe”. A person can be supposed to know where there is a direct appeal to his senses and a person is presumed to have a reason to believe if he has sufficient cause to believe the same. Section 26, I.P.C. explains the meaning of the words “reason to believe” thus :
“Reason to believe”- A person is said to have “reason to believe” a thing, if he has sufficient cause to believe that thing but not otherwise.”
In substance what it means is that a person must have reason to believe if the circumstances are such that a reasonable man would, by probable reasoning, conclude or infer regarding the nature of the thing concerned. Such circumstances need not necessarily be capable of absolute conviction or inference; but it is sufficient if the circumstances are such creating a cause to believe by chain of probable reasoning leading to the conclusion or inference about the nature of the thing. These two requirements i.e. “knowledge” and “reason to believe” have to be deduced from various circumstances in the case. In the context of the circumstances obtaining in the instant case namely that the appellant admittedly was a licenced stamp vendor and he was found in possession of counterfeit stamps, the explanation of the accused also becomes relevant and important in assessing and appreciating whether he had such knowledge or reason to believe that the stamps were counterfeited. Admittedly he used to purchase stamps from the treasury and all such transactions are duly recorded in the official registers. There is absolutely no material whatsoever to show that the counterfeit stamps were in fact purchased by him from the treasury. A bare allegation by way of an explanation by the accused- appellant that he purchased all the stamps including the counterfeit ones from the treasury appears on the face of it to be false, as he has neither produced registers maintained by him nor did he make even an effort to summon the treasury records. There is no material whatsoever even to probabilise such a plea. In these circumstances the only inference that can be drawn is that he had “knowledge” and “reason to believe” that the stamps which he had in his possession and which he was selling or offering to sell, were counterfeit ones. These ingredients of the two provisions of law are fully established.”
(underline supplied) Thus, on consideration of the various contentions urged in the appeal and on re-appreciating the entire evidence on record, we are of the firm view that the prosecution has established its case beyond all reasonable doubt. It is proved beyond pale of the doubt that the appellant was also a party to the conspiracy. The facts and circumstances discussed above clearly establish the ingredients of the offences under sections 256, 259 r/w 120-B Indian Penal Code charged against the appellant. Therefore, we have no hesitation whatsoever in confirming the impugned judgment holding the appellant guilty of the above offences. We find no reasonable ground to interfere with the well considered judgment rendered by the court below. The trial court has appreciated the evidence in proper perspective. The conclusion arrived at by the trial court does not suffer from any error of law or fact. We do not find any merit in this appeal. Accordingly, rejecting the contentions urged in the appeal, the appeal is dismissed. The impugned judgment of conviction and sentence insofar as the appellant is concerned is hereby confirmed. The appellant is directed to serve the remaining period of sentence as ordered by the court below.
29. The bail bond of the appellant/accused No.12 stand cancelled. Surety is discharged.
Appeal is dismissed.
SD/- SD/-
JUDGE JUDGE JJ/MN