The relief sought for in this writ petition is for a direction to direct the respondents to regularize the petitioners' service.
2.The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the writ petitioners states that the writ petitioners were initially appointed as daily rated employees by the first respondent in the year 2005 and they are continuing fairly for a long period and therefore, their services ought to have been regularized by the respondents.
3.The learned counsel further informed this Court the respondents have prepared a seniority list of daily rated employees only for the purpose of regularizing the services. However, the list of seniority was not acted upon by the respondents. Therefore, the petitioners were constrained to move the writ petition seeking regularization of their services.
4.Appointment, regularization and permanent absorption cannot be granted against appointments made not in accordance with the recruitment rules in force. Admittedly, the writ petitioners were appointed as daily rated employees in the respondent office.
5.It is painful to observe that such false promises made by way of resolutions are provided to the last grade poor daily rated workers, and trusting the words of such resolutions passed by the Board of Directors, such daily rated employees are made to work for years together.
6. This Court is of the opinion that the attitude of the officials in this regard deserves to be deprecated.
7. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners informed this Court that the posts in which the petitioners are working are permanent sanctioned posts. Such being a position, the authorities competent are bound to fill up the posts in accordance with the recruitment rules in force. It is needless to say that all the petitioners, if they are qualified, eligible and suitable, then their cases are also to be considered and they must also be permitted to participate in the process of selection. This Court is of the view that even their long services in the organisation also shall be given some weightage. Contrarily providing false promises and allowing daily rated workers to continuing in service for years together, certainly amounts to unlabour practice and the actions of the officials in this regard is to be condemned.
8. In respect of the relief sought for by the writ petitioners, this Court has to consider the legal principles in this regard. Appointment, regularisation or permanent absorption can never be claimed as a matter of right. All appointments or permanent absorption or even regularisation must be done only in accordance with the recruitment rules in force. Back door entry in public employment can never be allowed by the competent authorities. The Honble Supreme Court also strongly condemned the attitude of the officials in appointing persons through back door. Equal opportunity in public employment is a constitutional mandate and all the citizens, who are eligible for public employment should be provided an opportunity to participate in the open competitive process and all the selection to the public post must be done in accordance with the rules in force.
9. Such being the legal principles to be followed in the matter of public employment, the authorities competent are not having any power to grant regularisation or permanent absorption in respect of irregular appointees. The Constitutional Bench of the Honble Supreme Court of India settled the legal principles in this regard in STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS. v. UMA DEVI (3) & ORS.[(2006) 4 SCC 1]. The relevant paragraphs are extracted hereunder:
5. This Court has also on occasions issued directions which could not be said to be consistent with the Constitutional scheme of public employment. Such directions are issued presumably on the basis of equitable considerations or individualization of justice. The question arises, equity to whom? Equity for the handful of people who have approached the Court with a claim, or equity for the teeming millions of this country seeking employment and seeking a fair opportunity for competing for employment? When one side of the coin is considered, the other side of the coin, has also to be considered and the way open to any court of law or justice, is to adhere to the law as laid down by the Constitution and not to make directions, which at times, even if do not run counter to the Constitutional scheme, certainly tend to water down the Constitutional requirements. It is this conflict that is reflected in these cases referred to the Constitution Bench.
10. When these matters came up before a Bench of two Judges, the learned Judges referred the cases to a Bench of three Judges. The order of reference is reported in 2003 (9) SCALE 187. This Court noticed that in the matter of regularization of ad hoc employees, there were conflicting decisions by three Judge Benches of this Court and by two Judge Benches and hence the question required to be considered by a larger Bench. When the matters came up before a three Judge Bench, the Bench in turn felt that the matter required consideration by a Constitution Bench in view of the conflict and in the light of the arguments raised by the Additional Solicitor General. The order of reference is reported in 2003 (10) SCALE 388. It appears to be proper to quote that order of reference at this stage. It reads:
1. Apart from the conflicting opinions between the three Judges' Bench decisions in Ashwani Kumar and Ors. Vs. State of Bihar and Ors., reported in 1997 (2) SCC 1, State of Haryana and Ors vs., Piara Singh and Ors. Reported in 1992 (4) SCC 118 and Dharwad Distt. P.W.D. Literate Daily Wage Employees Association and Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka and Ors. Reported in 1990 (2) SCC 396, on the one hand and State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Suresh Kumar Verma and Anr., reported in AIR 1996 SC 1565, State of Punjab vs. Surinder Kumar and Ors. Reported in AIR 1992 SC 1593, and B.N. Nagarajan and Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka and Ors., reported in 1979 (4) SCC 507 on the other, which has been brought out in one of the judgments under appeal of Karnataka High Court in State of Karnataka vs. H. Ganesh Rao, decided on 1.6.2000, reported in 2001 (4) Karnataka Law Journal 466, learned Additional Solicitor General urged that the scheme for regularization is repugnant to Articles 16(4), 309, 320 and 335 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, these cases are required to be heard by a Bench of Five learned Judges (Constitution Bench).
2. On the other hand, Mr. M.C. Bhandare, learned senior counsel, appearing for the employees urged that such a scheme for regularization is consistent with the provision of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.
3. Mr. V. Lakshmi Narayan, learned counsel, appearing in CC Nos.109-498 of 2003, has filed the G.O. dated 19.7.2002 and submitted that orders have already been implemented.
4. After having found that there is conflict of opinion between three Judges Bench decisions of this Court, we are of the view that these cases are required to be heard by a Bench of five learned Judges.
5. Let these matters be placed before Hon'ble the Chief Justice for appropriate orders."
We are, therefore, called upon to resolve this issue here. We have to lay down the law. We have to approach the question as a constitutional court should.
12. In spite of this scheme, there may be occasions when the sovereign State or its instrumentalities will have to employ persons, in posts which are temporary, on daily wages, as additional hands or taking them in without following the required procedure, to discharge the duties in respect of the posts that are sanctioned and that are required to be filled in terms of the relevant procedure established by the Constitution or for work in temporary posts or projects that are not needed permanently. This right of the Union or of the State Government cannot but be recognized and there is nothing in the Constitution which prohibits such engaging of persons temporarily or on daily wages, to meet the needs of the situation. But the fact that such engagements are resorted to, cannot be used to defeat the very scheme of public employment. Nor can a court say that the Union or the State Governments do not have the right to engage persons in various capacities for a duration or until the work in a particular project is completed. Once this right of the Government is recognized and the mandate of the constitutional requirement for public employment is respected, there cannot be much difficulty in coming to the conclusion that it is ordinarily not proper for courts whether acting under
Article 226 of the Constitution or under
Article 32 of the Constitution, to direct absorption in permanent employment of those who have been engaged without following a due process of selection as envisaged by the constitutional scheme.
13. What is sought to be pitted against this approach, is the so called equity arising out of giving of temporary employment or engagement on daily wages and the continuance of such persons in the engaged work for a certain length of time. Such considerations can have only a limited role to play, when every qualified citizen has a right to apply for appointment, the adoption of the concept of rule of law and the scheme of the Constitution for appointment to posts. It cannot also be forgotten that it is not the role of courts to ignore, encourage or approve appointments made or engagements given outside the constitutional scheme. In effect, orders based on such sentiments or approach would result in perpetuating illegalities and in the jettisoning of the scheme of public employment adopted by us while adopting the Constitution. The approving of such acts also results in depriving many of their opportunity to compete for public employment. We have, therefore, to consider the question objectively and based on the constitutional and statutory provisions. In this context, we have also to bear in mind the exposition of law by a Constitution Bench in State of Punjab Vs. Jagdip Singh & Ors. (1964 (4) SCR 964). It was held therein, "In our opinion, where a Government servant has no right to a post or to a particular status, though an authority under the Government acting beyond its competence had purported to give that person a status which it was not entitled to give, he will not in law be deemed to have been validly appointed to the post or given the particular status."
20. The decision in Dharwad Distt. P.W.D. Literate Daily Wage Employees Association & ors. Vs. State of Karnataka & Ors. (1990 (1) SCR 544) dealt with a scheme framed by the State of Karnataka, though at the instance of the court. The scheme was essentially relating to the application of the concept of equal pay for equal work but it also provided for making permanent, or what it called regularization, without keeping the distinction in mind, of employees who had been appointed ad hoc, casually, temporarily or on daily wage basis. In other words, employees who had been appointed without following the procedure established by law for such appointments. This Court, at the threshold, stated that it should individualize justice to suit a given situation. With respect, it is not possible to accept the statement, unqualified as it appears to be. This Court is not only the constitutional court, it is also the highest court in the country, the final court of appeal. By virtue of
Article 141 of the Constitution of India, what this Court lays down is the law of the land. Its decisions are binding on all the courts. Its main role is to interpret the constitutional and other statutory provisions bearing in mind the fundamental philosophy of the Constitution. We have given unto ourselves a system of governance by rule of law. The role of the Supreme Court is to render justice according to law. As one jurist put it, the Supreme Court is expected to decide questions of law for the country and not to decide individual cases without reference to such principles of law. Consistency is a virtue. Passing orders not consistent with its own decisions on law, is bound to send out confusing signals and usher in judicial chaos. Its role, therefore, is really to interpret the law and decide cases coming before it, according to law. Orders which are inconsistent with the legal conclusions arrived at by the court in the self same judgment not only create confusion but also tend to usher in arbitrariness highlighting the statement, that equity tends to vary with the Chancellor's foot.
43. Thus, it is clear that adherence to the rule of equality in public employment is a basic feature of our Constitution and since the rule of law is the core of our Constitution, a Court would certainly be disabled from passing an order upholding a violation of
Article 14 or in ordering the overlooking of the need to comply with the requirements of
Article 14 read with Article 16of the Constitution. Therefore, consistent with the scheme for public employment, this Court while laying down the law, has necessarily to hold that unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee. If it is a contractual appointment, the appointment comes to an end at the end of the contract, if it were an engagement or appointment on daily wages or casual basis, the same would come to an end when it is discontinued. Similarly, a temporary employee could not claim to be made permanent on the expiry of his term of appointment. It has also to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent, merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by the relevant rules. It is not open to the court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right. High Courts acting under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India, should not ordinarily issue directions for absorption, regularization, or permanent continuance unless the recruitment itself was made regularly and in terms of the constitutional scheme. Merely because, an employee had continued under cover of an order of Court, which we have described as 'litigious employment' in the earlier part of the judgment, he would not be entitled to any right to be absorbed or made permanent in the service. In fact, in such cases, the High Court may not be justified in issuing interim directions, since, after all, if ultimately the employee approaching it is found entitled to relief, it may be possible for it to mould the relief in such a manner that ultimately no prejudice will be caused to him, whereas an interim direction to continue his employment would hold up the regular procedure for selection or impose on the State the burden of paying an employee who is really not required. The courts must be careful in ensuring that they do not interfere unduly with the economic arrangement of its affairs by the State or its instrumentalities or lend themselves the instruments to facilitate the bypassing of the constitutional and statutory mandates.
44. The concept of equal pay for equal work is different from the concept of conferring permanency on those who have been appointed on ad hoc basis, temporary basis, or based on no process of selection as envisaged by the Rules. This Court has in various decisions applied the principle of equal pay for equal work and has laid down the parameters for the application of that principle. The decisions are rested on the concept of equality enshrined in our Constitution in the light of the directive principles in that behalf. But the acceptance of that principle cannot lead to a position where the court could direct that appointments made without following the due procedure established by law, be deemed permanent or issue directions to treat them as permanent. Doing so, would be negation of the principle of equality of opportunity. The power to make an order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before this Court, would not normally be used for giving the go-by to the procedure established by law in the matter of public employment. Take the situation arising in the cases before us from the State of Karnataka. Therein, after the Dharwad decision, the Government had issued repeated directions and mandatory orders that no temporary or ad hoc employment or engagement be given. Some of the authorities and departments had ignored those directions or defied those directions and had continued to give employment, specifically interdicted by the orders issued by the executive. Some of the appointing officers have even been punished for their defiance. It would not be just or proper to pass an order in exercise of jurisdiction under
Article 226 or 32 of the Constitution or in exercise of power under
Article 142 of the Constitution of India permitting those persons engaged, to be absorbed or to be made permanent, based on their appointments or engagements. Complete justice would be justice according to law and though it would be open to this Court to mould the relief, this Court would not grant a relief which would amount to perpetuating an illegality.
45. While directing that appointments, temporary or casual, be regularized or made permanent, courts are swayed by the fact that the concerned person has worked for some time and in some cases for a considerable length of time. It is not as if the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature, is not aware of the nature of his employment. He accepts the employment with eyes open. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain -- not at arms length -- since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible. If the court were to void a contractual employment of this nature on the ground that the parties were not having equal bargaining power, that too would not enable the court to grant any relief to that employee. A total embargo on such casual or temporary employment is not possible, given the exigencies of administration and if imposed, would only mean that some people who at least get employment temporarily, contractually or casually, would not be getting even that employment when securing of such employment brings at least some succor to them. After all, innumerable citizens of our vast country are in search of employment and one is not compelled to accept a casual or temporary employment if one is not inclined to go in for such an employment. It is in that context that one has to proceed on the basis that the employment was accepted fully knowing the nature of it and the consequences flowing from it. In other words, even while accepting the employment, the person concerned knows the nature of his employment. It is not an appointment to a post in the real sense of the term. The claim acquired by him in the post in which he is temporarily employed or the interest in that post cannot be considered to be of such a magnitude as to enable the giving up of the procedure established, for making regular appointments to available posts in the services of the State. The argument that since one has been working for some time in the post, it will not be just to discontinue him, even though he was aware of the nature of the employment when he first took it up, is not one that would enable the jettisoning of the procedure established by law for public employment and would have to fail when tested on the touchstone of constitutionality and equality of opportunity enshrined in
Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
46. Learned Senior Counsel for some of the respondents argued that on the basis of the doctrine of legitimate expectation, the employees, especially of the Commercial Taxes Department, should be directed to be regularized since the decisions in Dharwad (supra), Piara Singh (supra), Jacob, and Gujarat Agricultural University and the like, have given rise to an expectation in them that their services would also be regularized. The doctrine can be invoked if the decisions of the Administrative Authority affect the person by depriving him of some benefit or advantage which either (i) he had in the past been permitted by the decision-maker to enjoy and which he can legitimately expect to be permitted to continue to do until there have been communicated to him some rational grounds for withdrawing it on which he has been given an opportunity to comment; or (ii) he has received assurance from the decision-maker that they will not be withdrawn without giving him first an opportunity of advancing reasons for contending that they should not be withdrawn [See Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions V. Minister for the Civil Service (1985 Appeal Cases 374), National Buildings Construction Corpn. Vs. S. Raghunathan, (1998 (7) SCC 66) and Dr. Chanchal Goyal Vs. State of Rajasthan (2003 (3) SCC 485]. There is no case that any assurance was given by the Government or the concerned department while making the appointment on daily wages that the status conferred on him will not be withdrawn until some rational reason comes into existence for withdrawing it. The very engagement was against the constitutional scheme. Though, the Commissioner of the Commercial Taxes Department sought to get the appointments made permanent, there is no case that at the time of appointment any promise was held out. No such promise could also have been held out in view of the circulars and directives issued by the Government after the Dharwad decision. Though, there is a case that the State had made regularizations in the past of similarly situated employees, the fact remains that such regularizations were done only pursuant to judicial directions, either of the Administrative Tribunal or of the High Court and in some case by this Court. Moreover, the invocation of the doctrine of legitimate expectation cannot enable the employees to claim that they must be made permanent or they must be regularized in the service though they had not been selected in terms of the rules for appointment. The fact that in certain cases the court had directed regularization of the employees involved in those cases cannot be made use of to found a claim based on legitimate expectation. The argument if accepted would also run counter to the constitutional mandate. The argument in that behalf has therefore to be rejected.
47. When a person enters a temporary employment or gets engagement as a contractual or casual worker and the engagement is not based on a proper selection as recognized by the relevant rules or procedure, he is aware of the consequences of the appointment being temporary, casual or contractual in nature. Such a person cannot invoke the theory of legitimate expectation for being confirmed in the post when an appointment to the post could be made only by following a proper procedure for selection and in concerned cases, in consultation with the Public Service Commission. Therefore, the theory of legitimate expectation cannot be successfully advanced by temporary, contractual or casual employees. It cannot also be held that the State has held out any promise while engaging these persons either to continue them where they are or to make them permanent. The State cannot constitutionally make such a promise. It is also obvious that the theory cannot be invoked to seek a positive relief of being made permanent in the post.
48. It was then contended that the rights of the employees thus appointed, under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, are violated. It is stated that the State has treated the employees unfairly by employing them on less than minimum wages and extracting work from them for a pretty long period in comparison with those directly recruited who are getting more wages or salaries for doing similar work. The employees before us were engaged on daily wages in the concerned department on a wage that was made known to them. There is no case that the wage agreed upon was not being paid. Those who are working on daily wages formed a class by themselves, they cannot claim that they are discriminated as against those who have been regularly recruited on the basis of the relevant rules. No right can be founded on an employment on daily wages to claim that such employee should be treated on a par with a regularly recruited candidate, and made permanent in employment, even assuming that the principle could be invoked for claiming equal wages for equal work. There is no fundamental right in those who have been employed on daily wages or temporarily or on contractual basis, to claim that they have a right to be absorbed in service. As has been held by this Court, they cannot be said to be holders of a post, since, a regular appointment could be made only by making appointments consistent with the requirements of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The right to be treated equally with the other employees employed on daily wages, cannot be extended to a claim for equal treatment with those who were regularly employed. That would be treating unequals as equals. It cannot also be relied on to claim a right to be absorbed in service even though they have never been selected in terms of the relevant recruitment rules. The arguments based on Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution are therefore overruled.
49. It is contended that the State action in not regularizing the employees was not fair within the framework of the rule of law. The rule of law compels the State to make appointments as envisaged by the Constitution and in the manner we have indicated earlier. In most of these cases, no doubt, the employees had worked for some length of time but this has also been brought about by the pendency of proceedings in Tribunals and courts initiated at the instance of the employees. Moreover, accepting an argument of this nature would mean that the State would be permitted to perpetuate an illegality in the matter of public employment and that would be a negation of the constitutional scheme adopted by us, the people of India. It is therefore not possible to accept the argument that there must be a direction to make permanent all the persons employed on daily wages. When the court is approached for relief by way of a writ, the court has necessarily to ask itself whether the person before it had any legal right to be enforced. Considered in the light of the very clear constitutional scheme, it cannot be said that the employees have been able to establish a legal right to be made permanent even though they have never been appointed in terms of the relevant rules or in adherence of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
50. It is argued that in a country like India where there is so much poverty and unemployment and there is no equality of bargaining power, the action of the State in not making the employees permanent, would be violative of
Article 21 of the Constitution. But the very argument indicates that there are so many waiting for employment and an equal opportunity for competing for employment and it is in that context that the Constitution as one of its basic features, has included Articles 14, 16 and 309 so as to ensure that public employment is given only in a fair and equitable manner by giving all those who are qualified, an opportunity to seek employment. In the guise of upholding rights under
Article 21 of the Constitution of India, a set of persons cannot be preferred over a vast majority of people waiting for an opportunity to compete for State employment. The acceptance of the argument on behalf of the respondents would really negate the rights of the others conferred by
Article 21 of the Constitution, assuming that we are in a position to hold that the right to employment is also a right coming within the purview of
Article 21 of the Constitution. The argument that
Article 23 of the Constitution is breached because the employment on daily wages amounts to forced labour, cannot be accepted. After all, the employees accepted the employment at their own volition and with eyes open as to the nature of their employment. The Governments also revised the minimum wages payable from time to time in the light of all relevant circumstances. It also appears to us that importing of these theories to defeat the basic requirement of public employment would defeat the constitutional scheme and the constitutional goal of equality.
10. The two judges of the Honble Supreme Court, subsequently in the case of SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, SCHOOL EDUCATION DEPARTMENT,CHENNAI v. R.GOVINDASWAMY AND ORS.[ (2014) 4 SCC 769] reiterated the legal principles enumerated by the Constitutional Bench and issued direction that the High Courts, in exercising of power under
Article 226 of the Constitution, will not issue directions for regularisation, absorption or permanent continuance, unless the employees claiming regularisation had been appointed in pursuance of a regular recruitment in accordance with relevant rules in an open competitive process, against sanctioned vacant posts. The equality clause contained in Articles 14 and 16 should be scrupulously followed and Courts should not issue a direction for regularisation of services of an employee, which would be violative of the constitutional scheme.
11. In view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court of India, this Court cannot issue any direction to regularise the services of the employees who were not appointed in accordance with the recruitment rules during the relevant point of time and this being the principles to be adopted, the relief sought for by the petitioners to regularise their services in the regular or permanent post in the time scale of pay cannot be considered.
12. Even for issuing direction to consider the representation, this Court has to take note of the legal right and whether it is violated. Only in the event of establishing that the legal right of the petitioners have been violated, the Court will be in a position to issue any such direction to consider their claim by the competent authority. In the absence of establishing any semblance of legal right, no writ proceedings can be entertained nor any direction can be issued in the matter of regularisation of service. This Court is of the opinion that large number of young people of this country, on acquisition of higher qualification, are waiting for a long time to secure public employment, by putting hard labour, and by participating in open competitive process. If such method of regularization through Courts and other modes, which is not constitutionally valid, is undertaken, then the rights of those youths will be deprived and it will result in frustration amongst the young minds of this country. The constitutional Courts are duty bound to take care of the rights of all the citizen of this Great Nation, more specifically in the matter of public employments. Equal opportunity in public employment is a constitutional mandate and there cannot be any deviation in this regard by Courts.
13. Therefore, this Court is of the firm opinion that any leniency or misplaced sympathy in the matter of appointment, regularization or permanent absorption will create inequality amongst the eligible youths who are longing to secure public employment through open competition process.
14. The learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioners contended that the daily rated workers who are engaged after the writ petitioners were brought under regular establishment and their services are also regularized. Such being the position, the case of the writ petitioners also deserves to be considered on par with their juniors. However, such contentions require no further consideration in view of the legal principles enumerated by the Honble Supreme Court of India. Further, a wrong precedent cannot be adopted or followed in perpetuity and at some point of time, this Court is bound to correct such wrong doing of the authorities in the matter of appointment, regularization or permanent absorption.
15. It is informed to this Court that, in Pondicherry, large number of irregular or illegal appointments are made by the authorities. It is the duty of the Government to provide equal opportunity in public employments under the constitutional principles to the citizen by undertaking the process of appointment in accordance with the rules in force. When the authorities are indulging in such illegal practice of appointing persons in violation of the regular recruitment rules against a sanctioned or permanent post, then it is the duty of the Government to identify all such illegal appointments and initiate appropriate actions, including disciplinary action, against such officials, who committed the act of appointing employees illegally.
16. If temporary appointments are made against a sanctioned permanent post for long years, it will create an expectation in the minds of the employees that they will be regularised at one point of time. Such a scope for false promises, cannot be provided to the employees. This Court is of the opinion that this kind of practice by the State is an exploitation by the authorities. Thus, the State must put an end to this kind of activities and the employees undoubtedly will be of the opinion that by virtue of their long services, regularisation will be granted to them.
17. Now that the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India reiterated that High Court cannot grant regularisation in respect of irregular or illegal appointments. Certainly the States are also bound to follow the same. This Court takes this opportunity by directing the Chief Secretary to Government of Pondicherry, to issue suitable instructions/circulars/orders to all the authorities in this regard and prevent providing any illegal or irregular appointments in violation of the regular recruitment rules in force.
18. Equal opportunity in public employment is a constitutional mandate and the State authorities are bound to adhere the constitutional perspectives in this regard. State, being a model employer, cannot discriminate the eligible persons aspiring for public employment. Thus, this Court is of the opinion that an absolute transparency, equal opportunity and adherence of rules in force are to be adopted and followed by all concerned. Thus, no further adjudication needs to be undertaken in respect of the grounds raised in this writ petition. Accordingly, the writ petition stands dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is also dismissed.
19.The Registry is directed to communicate a copy of this order to the Chief Secretary to Government, Chief Secretariat, Goubert Avenue, Pondicherry 605 001.
22.11.2017 Speaking order Index: Yes.
Internet: Yes.
maya/Svn To
1.The Managing Director PAPSCO Union Territory of Pondicherry.
2.The Secretary Ministry of Social Welfare U.T.Pondicherry.
3.The Employment Officer Employment Exchange, Pondicherry.
S.M.SUBRAMANIAM, J.
Maya/Svn
4. The Chief Secretary to Government, Chief Secretariat, Goubert Avenue, Pondicherry 605 001 W.P.No.24492 of 2010 Dated : 22.11.2017