(Per : HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE D.H.WAGHELA)
1. All the petitions are stated to be similar or identical, claiming the same relief of appropriate direction against the respondents holding that award dated 15.6.1999 made in favour of the petitioners was barred by limitation. It is also prayed that the respondent authorities may be directed to return the land as it is not used and utilized by the respondent GIDC, and it has remained unused even after more than 12 years. After arguing at some length, learned counsel sought permission to withdraw the petitions and when it was made clear that permission to withdraw the petitions will also be subject to cost, learned counsel has sought to argue only two contentions.
2. It was firstly argued that even as declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, "the Act") was first published in the Gazette on 19.11.1996, the awards were made on 15.6.1999. It was, however, conceded that the last date of publication in terms of provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 6 was 16.6.1997. It is also apparent from award dated 15.6.1999, annexed at Annexure-A to the petition, that it was made on the basis of consent of the petitioners and the petitioners had voluntarily and directly surrendered their possession even before making of award. Therefore, the other argument that possession was not taken over from the petitioners turned out to be false. Then it was argued that although paper possession was taken over and revenue entries in that regard were already made, in fact, the lands were not utilized for the purpose for which they were acquired. Learned counsel relied upon recent decision of the Apex Court in Tamil Nadu Housing Board v. L. Chandrasekaran (Dead) by LRs. and Others [(2010) 2 SCC 786] so as to rely upon the provisions of Section 48-B of the Act. When he was asked to read the provision, learned counsel submitted that no such provision was to be found as far as the law operating in the State of Gujarat is concerned. Learned counsel fell back upon the provisions of Section 48 of the Act, which could be invoked only in cases where possession had not been taken over. Ultimately, it was again submitted that the petitions may be permitted to be withdrawn with express liberty to make appropriate representation before the respondents and that without such liberty the proposed representation may not be duly considered by the respondents.
3. It is not the first group of cases of this kind which have been argued by the same learned counsel without any genuine interest in or study of the matter and such recourse to this Court obviously and undisputably causes waste of public time of the Court. Surprisingly, in such matters, including these matters, copies of the petitions are served upon the respondents in advance so as to invite some counsel for the respondent to appear. It leads to the inference of some unfair practice being adopted in fomenting vexatious or frivolous litigation at the cost of unwary petitioners, public resources and public time of the Court. Therefore, all the petitions are dismissed with cost quantified at Rs.1,000/- in each petition, which shall be paid by the petitioners to the Legal Services Authority at Ahmedabad within a period of one month.
4. Lastly, learned counsel Mr.Ramnandan Singh has urged to place on record his unconditional apology. In the peculiar facts of the case, as no notice is issued and the petitions are summarily dismissed at the threshold, names of none of the counsel or AGPs filing their appearance for the respondent shall be shown to have appeared for any of the respondent even as none of them have been called upon to argue.
5. It appears that the office or computer centre enters in advance names of the advocate who accept advance copy for the respondent and then, in several cases they seek adjournments for filing replies and affidavits in sur-rejoinder even before the Court issues notice for admission. It leaves some scope and room for manipulation of hearing before the Court and certainly interferes with the power of the Court to dispose of a matter at the threshold. This requires consideration for necessary direction on the administrative side. Hence, this order is directed to be placed before Honourable the Chief Justice.
(D.H.Waghela, J.) (G.B.Shah, J.) *malek Top