IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 7TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2019 BEFORE THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ALOK ARADHE WRIT PETITION NO.4463 OF 2017 (GM-RES) BETWEEN:
VAKIL HOUSING DEVELOPMENT CORPORATTION A COMPANY REGISTERED UNDER THE COMPANIES ACT 1956 HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICER AT NO.78, KORAMANGALA INDUSTRIAL AREA JYOTHI NIVAS COLLEGE ROAD KORAMANGALA, BANGALORE - 560 095 REP. BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR MR. M.A. VAKIL.
(By Smt. AATHRIA MENON, ADV., FOR Mr. GANAPATI HEGDE, ADV.,) AND:
M/S SOVEREIGN DEVELOPERS AND INFRASTRUCTURE LTD., A COMPANY REGISTERED UNDER THE COMPANIES ACT 1956 HAVING ITS OFFICE AT NO.16, II FLOOR, S.D.COMPLEX JALADARSHINI LAYOUT NEW BEL ROAD, BANGALORE -560 004. REPRESENTED BY ITS DIRECTORS PRAKASH KUMAR SINGH AND DEEPAKK KUMAR.
… PETITIONER (By Mr. HARISH KUMAR M.S. ADV.,) - - -
… RESPONDENT THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 & 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO QUASH THE IMPUGNED ORDER DTD:14.12.2016 [ANENXURE-A] ALLOWING I.A.NO.2 IN A.S.NO.75/2015 PASSED BY THE HON'BLE 42ND ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE AT BENGALURU [CCH NO.43] AND CONSEQUENTLY DISMISS I.A.NO.2 FILED UNDER SECTION 34 FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY FILED BY THE RESPONDENT & ETC.
THIS WRIT PETITION COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING IN ‘B’ GROUP THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-
ORDER Smt.Aathira Menon for Mr.Ganapati Hegde, learned counsel for the petitioner.
None for the respondents.
2. In this petition under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner inter alia seeks a writ of certiorari for quashment of the order dated 14.12.2016 passed by the Trial Court which application preferred by the respondent seeking condonation of delay has been allowed.
3. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner at length and have perused the record. Admittedly, the award was passed on 13.02.2015. It is also not in dispute that the parties received a copy of the award on 13.02.2015. The period of 120 days has provided under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for short) expired on 14.06.2015. However, the objection as filed on 14.06.2015 under Section 34 of the Act along with an application for condonation of delay on 18.06.2015. Thereafter, an application for condonation of delay was filed on 17.08.2016. the Trial Court by impugned order dated 14.12.2016 has allowed the application.
The relevant extract of Section 34(3) of the Act reads as under:
34 Application for setting aside arbitral award. — (1) Recourse to a Court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award in accordance with sub-section (2) and sub- section (3).
(2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the Court only if— Xxxxx Xxxxxx (3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal: Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter.
4. In view of the aforesaid relevant extract of Section 34(3) of the Act, it is evident that the Court has no power to condone the delay beyond a period of 120 days. In the instant case, the Trial Court has condoned the delay beyond the period of 120 days. The impugned order therefore suffers from jurisdictional infirmity. It cannot be sustained in the eye of law. It is accordingly, quashed and set aside. In the result, the objection preferred by the respondent under Section 34(3) of the Act also stands dismissed.
In the result, the petition is allowed.
Sd/- JUDGE SS