1. This application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed challenging the summoning order dated 28th March, 2018 passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No.9, Agra in Complaint Case No. 6820 of 2017 (Smt. Ambika Singh Versus Utkarsh Rana & Others), under Sections 498-A, 323, 504, 506 I.P.C. and Sections 3/4 Dowry Prohibition Act, Police Station Khandoli, District Agra.
2. Heard Mr. Vivek Kumar Singh, the learned counsel for the applicants and the learned A.G.A. for the State.
3. The present application was heard on 5th July, 2018 and this Court passed the following order:
"In the present application, the arguments were heard on 5th July, 2018 and it was directed that the order shall be dictated in the Chambers. However, for some reasons, the order could not be dictated and the matter kept pending for orders.
While the present application was still pending, Application U/S 482 No. 13428 of 2016 (Gaurav Sharda And 3 Others versus State of U.p. And Another) was heard at length on 10th August, 2018 and the judgment was reserved. The issue involved in the present application is identical to the issue involved in Application U/S No. 13428 of 2016.
Accordingly, the order in the present application shall be passed after the delivery of judgment in Application U/S No. 13428 of 2016.
Since the passing of the order in the present application is being deferred by the Court itself, as an interim measure, it is provided that no coercive action shall be taken against the applicants till the delivery of order in the present application."
4. Criminal Misc. Application No. 13428 of 2016 (Gaurav Sharda & 3 Others versus State of U.P. & Another) has been decided by me vide judgment and order dated 14th November, 2018. However, one of the issues involved in the aforesaid criminal misc. application related to Chapter XIII Cr.P.C. But the aforesaid application has been decided without touching the said issue, as the principal issue arising out for consideration therein was whether in view of the settlement arrived at between the parties, which was also acted upon the criminal proceedings, could be continued in derogation of the said settlement. Consequently, the issue raised in the present application as to whether the Court at Agra has the jurisdiction to try the complaint filed by the opposite party no.2 or not, as per the mandate of law contained in Chapter XIII Cr.P.C., has to be considered independently irrespective of the judgement in the above mentioned criminal misc. application.
5. From the record, it transpires that the marriage of the opposite party no.2 Smt. Ambika Singh was solemnized with the applicant no.1 Utkarsh Rana on 12th February, 2016 at Agra in accordance with the Hindu Rites and Customs. Unfortunately, the relationship between the applicant no.1 i.e. the husband and the opposite aprty no.2 i.e. the wife became incompatible. It is the case of the opposite party no.2 that the applicant no.1 and his family members continuously tortured the opposite party no.2 for demand of dowry, which included a silver dinner set and Rs. 10 lacs in cash. According to the opposite party no.2 i.e. the wife, the applicant no.1 i.e. the husband in continuation of the harassment of the wife i.e. the opposite party no.2 dropped her at Agra on 29th February, 2016 i.e. just after 17 days of marriage, without any clothes or articles belonging to her. Faced with despair and destitution, the opposite party no.2 filed a complaint dated 10th October, 2017 in the Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Agra, which came to be registered as Complaint Case No. 6820 of 2017 (Smt. Ambika Singh Versus Utkarsh Rana & Others), Police Station Khandoli, District Agra. The statement of the complainant was recorded on 20th January, 2018 and the complainant supported the allegations made in the complaint. The complainant in support of her case further adduced P.W.1 Shiva Nand Singh and P.W. 2 Arvind Pratap Singh, who were examined under Section 202 Cr.P.C. on 16th February, 2018. Having undertaken the aforesaid exercise, the Magistrate concerned summoned the present applicants under Sections 498-A, 323, 504, 506 I.P.C. and Sections 3/4 Dowry Prohibition Act, vide summoning order dated 28th March, 2018. Feeling aggrieved by the said summoning order, the applicants have now approached this Court by means of the present application under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
6. It may be noted here that the applicant no.1 i.e. the husband has filed a divorce petition vide Petition dated 24th July, 2017 in the Court of the Principal Judge, Family Court, Ghaziabad for grant of a decree of divorce, as contemplated under Section 13 (1) (a) of the Hindu Marriage Act. The wife i.e. the opposite party no.2 has filed a petition dated 20th September, 2017 under the provisions of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 and also an application dated 18th September, 2017 under Section 125 Cr.P.C. claiming interim maintenance both at Agra.
7. Learned counsel for the applicants, Mr. Vivek Kumar Singh, in challenge to the impugned summoning order dated 28th March, 2018 has submitted that the Court at Agra has no jurisdiction to try the complaint filed by the opposite party no.2, as no cause of action has accrued at Agra nor the offence complained of, falls within the category of continuing cause of action as per the mandate of law flowing from the provisions contained in Chapter XIII Cr.P.C. In support of his submissions, he has placed reliance upon the judgments of the Apex Court in the cases of Y. Abraham Ajith & Others Versus Inspector of Police, Chennai & Another reported in (2004) 8 SCC 100 and Manish Ratan & Others Versus State of M.P. & Another reported in (2007) 1 SCC 262.
8. The case in hand has to be examined as per the mandate of law contained in Chapter XIII Cr.P.C. and Section 498-A I.P.C. For ready reference, the relevant portion of Chapter XIII Cr.P.C. i.e. Sections 177 to 186 and Section 498-A I.P.C. are quoted herein-below:
"177. Ordinary place of inquiry and trial Every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed.
178. Place of inquiry or trial
(a) When it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed, or
(b) where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another, or
(c) where an offence is a continuing one and continues to be committed in more local areas than one, or
(d) where it consists of several acts done in different local areas, it may be inquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas.
179. Offence triable, where act is done or consequence ensues When an act is an offence by reason of anything which has been done and of a consequence which has ensued, the offence may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction such thing has been done or such consequence has ensued.
180. Place of trial where act is an offence by reason of relation to other offence When an act is an offence by reason of its relation to any other act which is also an offence or which would be an offence if the doer were capable of committing an offence, the first-mentioned offence may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction either act was done.
181. Place of trial in case of certain offences (1) Any offence of being a thug, or murder committed by a thug, of dacoity, of dacoity with murder, of belonging to a gang of dacoits, or of escaping from custody, may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed or the accused person is found.
(2) Any offence of kidnapping or abduction of a person may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction the person was kidnapped or abducted or was conveyed or concealed or detained.
(3) Any offence of theft, extortion or robbery may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed or the stolen property which is the subject of the offence was possessed by any person committing it, or by any person who received or retained such property knowing or having reason to believe it to be stolen property.
(4) Any offence of criminal misappropriation or of criminal breach of trust may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed or any part of the property which is the subject of the offence was received or retained, or was required to be returned or accounted for, by the accused person.
(5) Any offence which includes the possession of stolen property may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed or the stolen property was possessed by any person who received or retained it knowing or having reason to believe it to be stolen property.
182. Offences committed by letters, etc (1) Any offence which includes cheating may, if the deception is practised by means of letters or tele- communication messages, be inquired into or tried by any Court within whose local jurisdiction such letters or messages were sent or were received; and any offence of cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction the property was delivered by the person deceived or was received by the accused person.
(2) Any offence punishable under section 494 or section 495 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed or the offender last resided with his or her spouse by the first marriage, [or the wife by the first marriage has taken up permanent residence after the commission of the offence.]
183. Offence committed on journey or voyage When an offence is committed whilst the person by or against whom, or the thing in respect of which, the offence is committed is in the course of performing a journey or voyage, the offence may be inquired into or tried by a Court through or into whose local jurisdiction that person or thing passed in the course of that journey or voyage.
184. Place of trial for offences triable together Where-
(a) the offences committed by any person are such that he may be charged with, and tried at one trial for, each such offence by virtue of the provisions of section 219, section 220 or section 221, or
(b) the offence or offences committed by several persons are such that they may be charged with and tried together by virtue of the provisions of section 223, the offences may be inquired into or tried by any Court competent to inquire into or try any of the offences.
185. Power to order cases to be tried in different sessions divisions Notwithstanding anything contained in the preceding provisions of this Chapter, the State Government may direct that any cases or class of cases committed for trial in any district may be tried in any sessions division :
Provided that such direction is not repugnant to any direction previously issued by the High Court or the Supreme Court under the Constitution, or under this Code or any other law for the time being in force.
186. High Court to decide, the case of doubt, district where inquiry or trial shall take place Where two or more Courts have taken cognizance of the same offence and a question arises as to which of them ought to inquire into or try that offence, the question shall be decided -
(a) if the Courts are subordinate to the same High Court, by that High Court;
(b) if the Courts are not subordinate to the same High Court, by the High Court within the local limits of whose appellate criminal jurisdiction the proceedings were first commenced, and thereupon all other proceedings in respect of that offence shall be discontinued.
"[498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.--Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.--For the purpose of this section, "cruelty" means--
(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or
(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.]"
9. In the case in hand, the complainant has clearly averred in her complaint that physical and mental cruelty was committed upon her for demand of dowry and in continuation of the demand of dowry, the husband forcibly dropped the complainant at Agra only in the clothes she was wearing. It is the admitted position that the wife i.e. the opposite party no.2 is not living with the husband i.e. the applicant no.1 after 29th February, 2016 as there is no denial of the aforesaid fact in the entire affidavit filed in support of the present application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. nor there is any pleading in the affidavit detailing the steps undertaken by the applicants to bring back the opposite party no.2 at her matrimonial home even though she left her matrimonial home on 29th February, 2016. As such, in the light of the facts noted herein-above and the allegations made in the complaint, the provisions of proviso (b) to the explanation offered to Section 498-A I.P.C. also requires consideration. Therefore, the act of the applicant no.1 in dropping the complainant-opposite party no.2 at Agra on account of her failure to fulfil the demand of dowry will constitute a continuing cause of action or not, in the given set of facts and circumstances as noted herein-above, is the question, which arises for determination.
10. The judgment of the Apex Court in the Case of Y. Abraham Ajith (Supra), which is a two Judges' judgment, considered the question of jurisdiction of the Court to try a complaint in respect of an offence complained of under Sections 498-A, 406 I.P.C. and Section 4 Dowry Prohibition Act. The following was observed in Paragraph Nos. 9 to 11:
"9."All crime is local, the jurisdiction over the crime belongs to the country where the crime is committed", as observed by Blackstone. A significant word used in Section 177 of the Code is "ordinarily". Use of the word indicates that the provision is a general one and must be read subject to the special provisions contained in the Code. As observed by the Court in Purushottamdas Dalmia v. State of West Bengal (AIR 1961 SC 1589), L.N.Mukherjee V. State of Madras (AIR 1961 SC 1601), Banwarilal Jhunjhunwalla and Ors. v. Union of India and Anr. (AIR 1963 SC 1620) and Mohan Baitha and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr. (2001 (4) SCC 350), exception implied by the word "ordinarily" need not be limited to those specially provided for by the law and exceptions may be provided by law on consideration or may be implied from the provisions of law permitting joint trial of offences by the same Court. No such exception is applicable to the case at hand.
10. As observed by this Court in State of Bihar v. Deokaran Nenshi and Anr. (AIR 1973 SC 908), continuing offence is one which is susceptible of continuance and is distinguishable from the one which is committed once and for all, that it is one of those offences which arises out of the failure to obey or comply with a rule or its requirement and which involves a penalty, liability continues till compliance, that on every occasion such disobedience or non-compliance occurs or recurs, there is the offence committed.
11. A similar plea relating to continuance of the offence was examined by this Court in Sujata Mukherjee (Smt.) v. Prashant Kumar Mukherjee (1997 (5) SCC 30). There the allegations related to commission of alleged offences punishable under Section 498A, 506 and 323 IPC. On the factual background, it was noted that though the dowry demands were made earlier the husband of the complainant went to the place where complainant was residing and had assaulted her. This Court held in that factual background that clause (c) of Section 178 was attracted. But in the present case the factual position is different and the complainant herself left the house of the husband on 15.4.1997 on account of alleged dowry demands by the husband and his relations. There is thereafter not even a whisper of allegations about any demand of dowry or commission of any act constituting an offence much less at Chennai. That being so, the logic of Section 178 (c) of the Code relating to continuance of the offences cannot be applied."
11. However, subsequently in Ramesh and Others v. State of T.N, reported in [(2005) 3 SCC 507], which again is a two Judges' judgment, the Apex Court considered the earlier judgement in the case of Y. Abraham Ajith (Supra) and examined the case in the light of the facts and circumstances of that case alone. The Court came to the conclusion that in the background of history and the alleged acts, which according to the petitioner constitute the offences under Section 498-A and 406 were done by the accused mostly in Mumbai and partly in Chennai. As such, the Court held that the criminal court at Trychi had no jurisdiction to try the complaint.
12. Thereafter in Manish Ratan's Case (Supra), which is also a two Judges' judgment, the Apex Court considered the earlier judgements of the Apex Court itself in the case of State of Bihar Versus Deokaran Nenshi; (1972) 2 SCC 890 and Sujatha Mukerjee Versus Prashant Kumar Mukherjee; (1997) 5 SCC 30. The Apex Court explained its views in paragraph nos. 12-16, which are quoted herein-under:
"12. In State of Bihar v. Deokaran Nenshi and Another [(1972) 2 SCC 890], it was stated:
"A continuing offence is one which is susceptible of continuance and is distinguishable from the one which is committed once and for all. It is one of those offences which arises out of a failure to obey or comply with a rule or its requirement and which involves a penalty, the liability for which continues until the rule or its requirement is obeyed or complied with. On every occasion that such disobediance or non-compliance occurs and reoccurs, there is the offence committed. The distinction between the two kinds of offences is between an act or omission which constitutes an offence once and for all and an act or omission which continues, and therefore, constitutes a fresh offence every time or occasion on which it continues. In the case of a continuing offence, there is thus the ingredient of continuance of the offence which is absent in the case of an offence which takes place when an act or omission is committed once and for all."
13. In Sujata Mukherjee (supra) this Court held the offence to be a continuing one as specific allegations had been made against the husband that he had also gone to Raipur where the complaint was filed and had assaulted the appellant therein. It was in the aforementioned fact situation, this Court set aside the judgment of the High Court holding that the incident at Raipur was not an isolated event stating:
"3. At the hearing of these appeals, Mr Gambhir, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, has submitted that it will be evident from the complaint that the appellant has alleged that she had been subjected to cruel treatment persistently at Raigarh and also at Raipur and incident taking place at Raipur is not an isolated event, but consequential to the series of incidents taking place at Raigarh. Therefore, the High Court was wrong in appreciating the scope of the complaint and proceeding on the footing that several isolated events had taken place at Raigarh and one isolated incident had taken place at Raipur. Hence, the criminal case filed in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Raipur was only maintainable against the respondent husband against whom some overt act at Raipur was alleged. But such case was not maintainable against the other respondents."
14. This Court having regard to the peculiar fact situation obtaining therein held:
"We have taken into consideration the complaint filed by the appellant and it appears to us that the complaint reveals a continuing offence of maltreatment and humiliation meted out to the appellant in the hands of all the accused respondents and in such continuing offence, on some occasions all the respondents had taken part and on other occasion, one of the respondents had taken part. Therefore, clause (c) of Section 178 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is clearly attracted. We, therefore, set aside the impugned order of the High Court and direct the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Raipur to proceed with the criminal case"
15. Sujata Mukherjee (supra) was distinguished by a Division Bench of this Court in Y. Abraham Ajith and Others v. Inspector of Police, Chennai and Another [(2004) 8 SCC 100] where noticing the interpretation of the expression "cause of action", it was held that the expression "ordinarily" need not be limited to those specially provided for by the law and exceptions may be provided by law on consideration or may be implied from the provisions of law permitting joint trial of offences by the same Court. In that case the complaint itself disclosed that after 15.04.1997, the respondent left Nagercoil and went to Chennai and was staying there. Thus, having regard to the fact that all allegations according to the complainant took place at Nagercoil, it was held that the courts at Chennai did not have the jurisdiction to deal with the matter. It was held:
"This Court held in that factual background that clause (c) of Section 178 was attracted. But in the present case the factual position is different and the complainant herself left the house of the husband on 15-4-1997 on account of alleged dowry demands by the husband and his relations. There is thereafter not even a whisper of allegations about any demand of dowry or commission of any act constituting an offence much less at Chennai. That being so, the logic of Section 178(c) of the Code relating to continuance of the offences cannot be applied."
16. Yet again in Ramesh and Others v. State of T.N. [(2005) 3 SCC 507], Abraham Ajith (supra) was followed by this Court stating:
"In the view we are taking, it is not necessary for us to delve into the question of territorial jurisdiction of the Court at Trichy in detail. Suffice it to say that on looking at the complaint at its face value, the offences alleged cannot be said to have been committed wholly or partly within the local jurisdiction of the Magistrates Court at Trichy. Prima facie, none of the ingredients constituting the offence can be said to have occurred within the local jurisdiction of that court. Almost all the allegations pertain to acts of cruelty for the purpose of extracting additional property as dowry while she was in the matrimonial home at Mumbai and the alleged acts of misappropriation of her movable property at Mumbai. However, there is one allegation relevant to Section 498-A from which it could be inferred that one of the acts giving rise to the offence under the said section had taken place in Chennai. It is alleged that when the relations of the informant met her in-laws at a hotel in Chennai where they were staying on 13- 10-1998, there was again a demand for dowry and a threat to torture her in case she was sent back to Mumbai without the money and articles demanded.
12. Thus the alleged acts which according to the petitioner constitute the offences under Sections 498-A and 406 were done by the accused mostly in Mumbai and partly in Chennai. Prima facie, there is nothing in the entire complaint which goes to show that any acts constituting the alleged offences were at all committed at Trichy."
The said decisions are squarely applicable to the facts of the present case."
13. In the case of Sunita Kumari Kashyap Versus State of Bihar & Another reported in JT 2011 (4) SC 236, a Division Bench of the Apex Court again considered the question of territorial jurisdiction in terms of Chapter XIII Cr.P.C. in respect of proceedings under Sections 498-A and 406 I.P.C. The aforesaid Division Bench also referred to the judgments of the Apex Court in the case of Y. Abraham Ajith (Supra) and Smt. Sujata Mukherjee (Supra) but departed from the earlier view as noted herein-above. Paragraph nos. 6 to 11 of the aforesaid judgment are relevant for the issue in hand. Accordingly, the same are reproduced herein-below:
"6) Chapter XIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short "Code") deals with jurisdiction of the criminal courts in inquiries and trials. Sections 177-179 are relevant which are as follows:
"177. Ordinary place of inquiry and trial -. Every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed.
178. Place of inquiry or trial. (a) When it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed, or
(b) where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another, or
(c) where an offence is a continuing one, and continues to be committed in more local areas than one, or
(d) where it consists of several acts done in different local areas, it may be inquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas.
179. Offence triable where act is done or consequence ensues. When an act is an offence by reason of anything which has been done and of a consequence which has ensued, the offence may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction such thing has been done or such consequence has ensued."
6.1 From the above provisions, it is clear that the normal rule is that the offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. However, when it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed or where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another or where an offence is a continuing one, and continues to be committed in more than one local area and takes place in different local areas as per Section 178, the Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas is competent to inquire into and try the offence. Section 179 makes it clear that if anything happened as a consequence of the offence, the same may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction such thing has been done or such consequence has ensued.
7) Keeping the above provisions in mind, let us consider the allegations made in the complaint. On 17.10.2007, Sunita Kumari Kashyap - the appellant herein made a complaint to the Inspector In-charge, Magadh Medical College Police Station, Gaya. In the complaint, the appellant, after narrating her marriage with Sanjay Kumar Saini, respondent No.2 herein on 16.04.2000 stated that what had happened immediately after marriage at the instance of her husband and his family members' ill-treatment, torture and finally complained that she was taken out of the matrimonial home at Ranchi and sent to her parental Home at Gaya with the threat that unless she gets her father's house in the name of her husband, she has to stay at her parental house forever. In the said complaint, she also asserted that her husband pressurized her to get her father's house in his name and when she denied she was beaten by her husband. It was also asserted that after keeping her entire jewellery and articles, on 24.12.2006, her husband brought her at Gaya and left her there warning that till his demands are met, she has to stay at Gaya and if she tries to come back without meeting those demands she will be killed. It was also stated that from that date till the date of complaint, her in-laws never enquired about her. Even then she called them but they never talked to her. Perusal of the entire complaint, which was registered as an FIR, clearly shows that there was ill-treatment and cruelty at the hands of her husband and his family members at the matrimonial home at Ranchi and because of their actions and threat she was forcibly taken to her parental home at Gaya where she initiated the criminal proceedings against them for offences punishable under Sections 498A and 406/34 IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the D.P. Act. Among the offences, offence under Section 498A IPC is the main offence relating to cruelty by husband and his relatives. It is useful to extract the same which is as under:
"498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty - Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation: For the purpose of this section, "cruelty" means-
(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or
(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand."
8) Similar allegations as found in the complaint in the case on hand with reference to the offences punishable under Sections 498A, 406/34 IPC were considered by this Court in the following decisions:
i) In Sujata Mukherjee (Smt) vs. Prashant Kumar Mukherjee, (1997) 5 SCC 30, similar issue was considered by this Court and found that clause (c) of Section 178 of the Code is attracted and the Magistrate at wife's parents' place has also jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. In the said decision, wife was the appellant before this Court and the respondents were the husband, parents-in-law and two sisters-in-law of the appellant Sujata Mukherjee. The gist of the allegation of the appellant, Sujata Mukherjee was that on account of dowry demands, she had been maltreated and humiliated not only in the house of her in-laws at Raigarh but as a consequence of such events, the husband of the appellant had also come to the house of her parents at Raipur and assaulted her. On behalf of the respondents therein, it was contended before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Raipur that the criminal case was not maintainable before the said learned Chief Judicial Magistrate because the cause of action took place only at Raigarh which was outside the territorial jurisdiction of the learned Magistrate at Raipur. A prayer was also made to quash the summons issued by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate by entertaining the said complaint of Smt Mukherjee. As the Chief Judicial Magistrate was not inclined either to quash the summons or to transfer the criminal case to the competent court at Raigarh, the criminal revision petitions were filed before the High Court, one by all the five respondents and another by four of the respondents excluding the husband presumably because there was specific allegation against the husband that the husband had also gone to Raipur and had assaulted the appellant and as such the husband could not plead want of territorial jurisdiction. Both the said criminal revision cases were disposed of by a common order dated 31.08.1989 by the High Court holding that the case against the husband of the appellant alone is maintainable and in respect of other respondents related to the incidents taking place at Raigarh, hence, the criminal case on the basis of complaint made by the appellant is not maintainable at Raipur. The said order of the High Court was challenged by the appellant-Sujata Mukherjee in this Court. It was submitted that it will be evident from the complaint that the appellant has alleged that she had been subjected to cruel treatment persistently at Raigarh and also at Raipur and incident taking place at Raipur is not an isolated event, but consequential to the series of incidents taking place at Raigarh. Therefore, it was contended that the High Court was wrong in appreciating the scope of the complaint and proceeding on the footing that several isolated events had taken place at Raigarh and one isolated incident had taken place at Raipur. This Court basing reliance on Section 178 of the Code, in particular clauses (b) and (c), found that in view of allegations in the complaint that the offence was a continuing one having been committed in more local areas and one of the local areas being Raipur, the learned Magistrate at Raipur had jurisdiction to proceed with the criminal case instituted in such court. Ultimately, accepting the stand of the appellant, this Court held as under:
"We have taken into consideration the complaint filed by the appellant and it appears to us that the complaint reveals a continuing offence of maltreatment and humiliation meted out to the appellant in the hands of all the accused respondents and in such continuing offence, on some occasions all the respondents had taken part and on other occasion, one of the respondents had taken part. Therefore, clause (c) of Section 178 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is clearly attracted."
ii) In State of M.P. vs. Suresh Kaushal and Another, (2003) 11 SCC 126, again a Division Bench of the Apex Court considered the provisions of Section 179 with reference to the complaint relating to the offences under Section 498A read with Section 34 IPC, and the Court held as under:
"6. The above Section contemplates two courts having jurisdiction and the trial is permitted to take place in any one of those two courts. One is the court within whose local jurisdiction the act has been done and the other is the court within whose local jurisdiction the consequence has ensued. When the allegation is that the miscarriage took place at Jabalpur it cannot be contended that the court at Jabalpur could not have acquired jurisdiction as the acts alleged against the accused took place at Indore."
9) Mr. S.B. Sanyal, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents fairly stated that there is no dispute about the jurisdiction of the Court at Gaya insofar as against the husband, however, in respect of other relatives of the husband in the absence of any act at Gaya, the said Court has no jurisdiction and if at all, the wife has to pursue her remedy only at Ranchi. In support of his contention, he relied on a decision of this Court in Y. Abraham Ajith and Others vs. Inspector of Police, Chennai and Another, (2004) 8 SCC 100 in particular, paragraph 12 of the said decision which reads as under:
"12. The crucial question is whether any part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the court concerned. In terms of Section 177 of the Code, it is the place where the offence was committed. In essence it is the cause of action for initiation of the proceedings against the accused."
9.1It is true that Section 177 of the Code refers to the local jurisdiction where the offence is committed. Though the expression "cause of action" is not a stranger to criminal cases, in view of Sections 178 and 179 of the Code and in the light of the specific averment in the complaint of the appellant herein, we are of the view that the said decision is not applicable to the case on hand.
10) Mr. Sanyal also relied on a decision of this Court in Bhura Ram and Others vs. State of Rajasthan and Another, (2008) 11 SCC 103 wherein following the decision in Y. Abraham Ajith and Others (supra), this Court held that "cause of action" having arisen within the jurisdiction of the court where the offence was committed, could not be tried by the court where no part of offence was committed. For the same reasons, as mentioned in the earlier paragraph, while there is no dispute as to the proposition in view of the fact that in the case on hand, the offence was a continuing one and the episode at Gaya was only a consequence at the continuing offence of harassment and ill-treatment meted out to the complainant, clause (c) of Section 178 is attracted. In view of the above reason, both the decisions are not applicable to the facts of this case and we are unable to accept the stand taken by Mr. Sanyal.
11) We have already adverted to the details made by the appellant in the complaint. In view of the specific assertion by the appellant-wife about the ill-treatment and cruelty at the hands of the husband and his relatives at Ranchi and of the fact that because of their action, she was taken to her parental home at Gaya by her husband with a threat of dire consequences for not fulfilling their demand of dowry, we hold that in view of Sections 178 and 179 of the Code, the offence in this case was a continuing one having been committed in more local areas and one of the local areas being Gaya, the learned Magistrate at Gaya has jurisdiction to proceed with the criminal case instituted therein. In other words, the offence was a continuing one and the episode at Gaya was only a consequence of continuing offence of harassment of ill-treatment meted out to the complainant, clause (c) of Section 178 is attracted. Further, from the allegations in the complaint, it appears to us that it is a continuing offence of ill- treatment and humiliation meted out to the appellant in the hands of all the accused persons and in such continuing offence, on some occasion all had taken part and on other occasion one of the accused, namely, husband had taken part, therefore, undoubtedly clause (c) of Section 178 of the Code is clearly attracted."
14. Subsequently, the issue relating to the jurisdiction of the Court to try the proceedings arising out of an offence under Section 498-A I.P.C. was again considered by a two Judges' Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Amrendu Jyoti & Others Versus State of Chhattishgarh & Others, reported in (2014) 12 SCC 362. However, in the aforesaid judgment the earlier judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Sunita Kumari Kashyap (Supra) which took the contrary view was not considered. The Court observed as follows in paragraph nos. 7,8,9,10 and 11:
"7. Relying on the Judgment of this Court in Manish Ratan's case (supra), the learned counsel for the appellants contended that the offence in the present case cannot be considered to be a continuing offence, if any, and must be taken to have been complete at Delhi and no cause of action can be said to have arisen at Ambikapur. As must necessarily be, the application of law and the consequences must vary from case to case.
8. The core question thus is whether the allegations made in the F.I.R. constitute a continuing offence.
9. We find from the F.I.R. that all the incidents alleged by the complainant in respect of the alleged cruelty are said to have occurred at Delhi. The cruel and humiliating words spoken to the 2nd respondent/wife by her husband, elder brother-in-law and elder sister-in-law for bringing less dowry are said to have been uttered at Delhi. Allegedly, arbitrary demands of lakhs of rupees in dowry have been made in Delhi. The incident of beating and dragging the respondent no. 2 and abusing her in filthy language also is said to have taken place at Delhi. Suffice it to say that all overt acts, which are said to have constituted cruelty have allegedly taken place at Delhi.
10. The allegations as to what has happened at Ambikapur are as follows:
''No purposeful information has been received from the in-laws of Kiran even on contacting on telephone till today. They have been threatened and abused and two years have been elapsed and the in-laws have not shown any interest to call her to her matrimonial home and since then Kiran is making her both ends meet in her parental home. To get rid of the ill-treatment and harassment of the in-laws of Kiran, the complainant is praying for registration of an FIR and request for immediate legal action so that Kiran may get appropriate justice.'
11. We find that the offence of cruelty cannot be said to be a continuing one as contemplated by Sections 178 and 179 of the Code. We do not agree with the High Court that in this case the mental cruelty inflicted upon the respondent no. 2 ''continued unabated' on account of no effort having been made by the appellants to take her back to her matrimonial home, and the threats given by the appellants over the telephone. It might be noted incidentally that the High Court does not make reference to any particular piece of evidence regarding the threats said to have been given by the appellants over the telephone. Thus, going by the complaint, we are of the view that it cannot be held that the Court at Ambikapur has jurisdiction to try the offence since the appropriate Court at Delhi would have jurisdiction to try the said offence. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed."
15. Thus from the aforesaid it is apparent that the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Sunita Kumari Kashyap (Supra) took a contrary view in respect of an offence under Section 498-A I.P.C. and the place where the proceedings complaining the commission of an offence punishable under Section 498-A I.P.C. could be tried. The said judgment still holds the field as the same has neither been distinguished nor modified in the subsequent judgment in Amrendu Jyoti's case (Supra).
16. In the case in hand, the Court finds that the complainant was dropped by the husband at Agra in continuation of the harassment for demand of dowry. No effort was made by the applicant no.1 to re-establish the conjugal relationship in between the applicant no.1 i.e. the husband and the opposite party no.2 i.e. the wife before filing of the divorce petition in July, 2017. There is no material on the record to show that steps were taken by the applicants to bring back the opposite party no.2 to her matrimonial home. Consequently, proviso (b) to the explanation offered to Section 498-A I.P.C. stands clearly attracted in the present case. Thus, the cause of action to file the complaint at Agra will be available to the opposite party no.2 on account of the continued harassment of the wife for demand of dowry as she was dropped at Agra by her husband i.e. the applicant no.1 as the same falls within the category of continuing cause of action. Therefore, the ratio laid down in Sunita Kumar Kashyap's Case (Supra) shall squarely apply in the facts and circumstances of the present case.
17. In view of the distinguishing features of the present case as detailed herein-above and the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Sunita Kumar Kashyap's Case (Supra), the argument raised by the learned counsel for the applicants that the Court at Agra has no jurisdiction to try the complaint as all the acts of cruelty were committed at Ghaziabad, cannot be accepted. No other argument was raised by the learned counsel for the applicants.
18. For the reasons given herein-above, the present criminal misc. application fails. It is, accordingly, dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
(Rajeev Misra, J.) Order Date :- 27.11.2018 Sushil/-