Court No. - 7
Case :- WRIT - C No. - 15079 of 2010 Petitioner :- Surendra Singh And Others Respondent :- State Of U.P. And Others Counsel for Petitioner :- S.K. Pathak,S K Pathak Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Anuj Kumar
Hon'ble Ajay Bhanot,J.
Heard Sri S. K. Pathak, learned counsel for the petitioners and learned Standing Counsel for the State. None appears on behalf of Gaon Sabha.
The petitioners were granted Pattas for construction of houses under Section 122(C) of the U.P. Zamidari Abolition and Land Reforms Act read with Rule 115(C) of the Zamidari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules, 1952. The lease deed was executed in favour of the petitioners on 18.02.1997 by the Land Management Committee.
The petitioners are poor persons belonging to the SC/ST and OBC category of citizens. The petitioners claim that they were entitled to the grant of Patta under Section 122(C)(3) of the U.P. Zamidari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The petitioners constructed their houses on the aforesaid plots after allotment of the Pattas. The Collector, Gautam Budh Nagar, cancelled the aforesaid Pattas on 26.03.2003. The petitioners filed a review application against the order dated 26.03.2003. The review application was dismissed by order dated 11.06.2003 on the grounds of non maintainability. The order dated 11.06.2003 however, records that the petitioners are very poor persons mostly belonging to the scheduled caste category of citizens. The petitioners have also constructed their houses on the aforesaid plots of land. On this count, the Collector, Gautam Budh Nagar directed the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Dadari to conduct the site inspection and submit a report with a view to grant benefit of the provisions of U.P.Z.A.&L.R. Act to the petitioners. However, no action was taken on the aforesaid directions of the Collector, Gautam Budh Nagar. Consequently, when the petitioners were threatened with eviction, the petitioners took the order passed by the Collector, Gautam Budh Nagar cancelling their lease in revision.
The revisional court dismissed the revision by order dated 18.01.2010 on the ground of delay and found that the application being barred by limitation. The revisional court overlooked the fact that the Collector had recorded that the petitioners were poor persons belonging to the majority of scheduled caste category of citizens. This fact remain undisputed.
Lack of correct legal advice, which was a cause for the delay, was occasioned in this case by acute poverty, social backwardness and illiteracy of the petitioners. The poverty, social deprivation and illiteracy are realities in our social life. Disadvantages accruing from such situation cannot be overlooked by the courts. These in themselves constituted valid grounds for condoning the delay.
Moreover, the Collector, Gautam Budh Nagar had directed that the case of the petitioners be revisited. No action was taken on the directions of the Collector, Gautam Budh Nagar. The petitioners had every reason to believe that the Collector's orders would be complied with and the entire case would be considered afresh. However, that was not to be. The delay who also caused due to non compliance of the orders passed by the Collector by the authorities. The petitioners cannot be faulted and penalized for such delay.
The purpose of laws of limitation is to ensure that the parties may remain vigilant to their cause and institute their claim in good time. The mandate of laws of limitation is not to shut the doors of justice to the parties or decline adjudication on merits. On the contrary it should be the constant endeavour the courts of law to adjudicate issues on merits and dispense justice on a substantive basis.
There is good authority to hold that the courts should adopt a liberal, pragmatic and a justice oriented approach matters of condonation of delay. Equally the courts should avoid a pedantic view and eschew servitude to procedure in such matters.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition V. Mst. Kati Ji and others, reported at 1987 (13) ALR 306 (SC) held as follows:
"The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting section 5 of the Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on "merits". The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the Legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the life-purpose of the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy."
And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:
1. Ordinarily, a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.
2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this; when delay is condoned, the highest that can happen is that a cause would he decided on merit after hearing the parties.
3. "Every" day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay ? The doctrine must be applied in a rational, common sense and pragmatic manner.
4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side can not claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.
5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by restoring to delay. In fact, he runs a serious risk.
6. It must be grapped that the judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so."
This view was fortified by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of N. Balakrishnan Vs M. Krishnamurthy reported at 1998 (7) SCC 123. The relevant portion of the judgment is extracted here under:-
"The primary function of a court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. Time limit fixed for approaching the court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. Law of limitation fixes a life-span for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and the wasted time would never revisit. During efflux of time newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a life span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. Law of limitation is thus founded on public policy."
In Smt. Prabha V. Ram Prakash Kalra reported in 1987 (Suppl.) SCC 338 the Supreme Court took the view that the Court should not adopt an injustice-oriented approach in rejecting the application for condonation of delay.
In Vedabai @ Vaijayanatabai Baburao Patil V. Shantaram Baburao Patil and others reported at 2001 (44) ALR 577 (SC) the Apex Court made a distinction in delay and inordinate delay observing as under:
"In exercising discretion under section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Courts should adopt a pragmatic approach. A distinction must be made between a case where the delay is inordinate and a case where the delay is of a few days. Whereas in the former case the consideration of prejudice to the otherwise will be a relevant factor so the case calls for a more cautious approach. "
In New India Insurance Co. Ltd. V. Smt. Shanti Misra reported at AIR 1976 SC 237, Hon'ble Court held that discretion given by section 5 should not be defined or crystallized so as to convert a discretionary matter into a rigid rule of law. The express "sufficient cause" should receive a liberal construction.
In Shakuntala Devi Jain V. Kuntal Kumari reported at AIR 1969 SC 575 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that unless want of bona fides of such inaction or negligence as would deprive a party of the protection of section 5 is proved, the application must not be thrown out or any delay can not be refused to be condoned.
In O.P. Kathpalia V. Lakhmir Singh reported in AIR 1984 SC 1744 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that if the refusal to condone the delay results in grave miscarriage of justice, it would be a ground to condone the delay.
Further Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Haribhai Lakhmanbhai Seedhav Vs. State of Gujarat and to others, 2009 (27) LCD 1645 has also held that the Court should not reject appeal/revision on the ground of delay and the same should be decided on merit.
Since the facts are not in dispute and complete record is before this Court, no purpose will be served by keeping this writ petition pending.
It is evident that the court below has taken pedantic view of the matter which has led to a miscarriage of justice.
The reasons cited in the order of Collector, Gautam Budh Nagar for the delay in filing application are genuine and backed by credible evidence. The petitioners cannot be faulted for the delay caused by the non compliance of the orders passed by the Collector by the authorities. The delay was liable to be condoned.
The order rejecting the revision passed by the Additional Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut, on the ground of delay and the application being barred by limitation, is in the teeth of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
Further on findings of facts the order dated 18.01.2010 passed by Additional Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut are perverse.
The revisional court misdirected itself in law. The order dated 18.01.2010 passed by the revisional court is arbitrary and unlawful and of no effect.
The delay in filing the revision is condoned and the Section 5 application is allowed. The order dated 18.01.2010 passed by Additional Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut is quashed.
Matter is remitted to the respondent no. 2, Additional Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut for fresh consideration.
It is open to the petitioners to raise any ground before the revisional court.
The writ petition is allowed.
Order Date :- 26.9.2019 Dhananjai