(Per : HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE N.V. ANJARIA) 1. The petitioners have prayed to issue a writ of mandamus for quashing and setting aside the notification dated 05.12.2010 issued under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1984 ('the Act', for sake of brevity). The parcels of survey numbers which included the lands of the petitioners in village Marua were acquired for the public purpose of Industrial Estate of Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation at Halol.
2. As per the case of the petitioners, Notification under Section 4 of the Act was issued on 02.10.2009 and published in Gujarati daily “Sandesh” which is annexed with the petition at AnnexureA (Page26). The Notification under Section 6 of the Act was published on 05.12.2010 in “Sandesh” and annexed at AnnexureB (page31 in the petition). It is the further case of the petitioners that before issuance of Notification under Section 6, an inquiry under Section 5A was held and they had submitted their objections in writing. In paragraph 5 of the petition, the petitioners, however, averred that they did not have the copy of such objections. It was contended in the petition that without taking into account their objections and without application of mind, the Notification under the Act was issued.
2.1 Learned advocate Mr. Sunil C. Patel for the petitioners assailed the validity of acquisition contending that in the present area of Halol Industrial Estate, 50% of the lands are vacant and yet the respondent No.4 had requisitioned more lands from the State Government for expansion of the industrial estate, as a result of which the petitioners were being deprived of their livelihood being earned from carrying on agricultural operations on the land.
2.2 It was next submitted by learned advocate that the mandatory requirement of the proviso (ii) of Section 6(1) of the Act was breached as there was a gap of more than one year between dates of Notification under Section 4 and Notification under Section 6 of the Act. It was contended that Notification under Section 4 of the Act was published in the newspaper on 02.10.2009 and Notification under Section 6 of the Act was published in the newspaper on 05.12.2010 which was in contravention of the mandatory provisions as Notification under Section 4 would lapse after period of one year and Notification under Section 6 published thereafter was incompetent in law.
2.3 In support of above contentions, reliance was placed on the decision in Devsharan and others vs. State of U.P. and others [2011 AIR SCW 1778] for the proposition that the concept of public purpose must be consistent with constitutional ethos, fundamental rights and directive principles and needs a harmonious reconciliation between various competing principles. It was submitted that the acquisition was bad in the facts of the case as it deprived the petitioners, who are agriculturists, of their agricultural lands.
2.4 Another decision in Devenderkumar Tyagi and others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others [(2011) 9 SCC 164] was pressed into service in support of the contention that, while issuing the Notification under Section 6, the time limit of one year was not observed and it was submitted that, in that decision, as the Notification under Section 6 was issued after expiry of one year period, it was quashed.
3. The respondent No.4 GIDC, the acquiring body, by filing affidavit in reply, inter alia, contended as under:
“….taking into consideration certain restrictions and the policy decision of the GIDC certain lands which are shown in the schedule of village Maruva have been dropped from the acquisition because, said lands are consisting either residential houses or residential societies or they were falling within the area of 300 mtrs. from the gamtel and therefore, the Regional Manager, GIDC, Vadodara had written letter to the General Manager (Land) for dropping certain lands from acquisition and a letter is also addressed by the Deputy Collector and Officer on Special Duty dated 18.11.2010 to the Deputy Secretary, Revenue Department regarding dropping of certain lands shown in the schedule.”
3.1 In the above view, the part of the grievance of the petitioners stood redressed as the survey numbers mentioned in the schedule annexed with the affidavit (at page 18) would be withdrawn from acquisition.
4. Of the twofold contentions advanced by learned advocate for the petitioners, the first contention questioning the legality of the acquisition in general and Section 6 Notification in particular is devoid of any substance in law, as learned advocate could not point out any contravention or non compliance of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, culminating into the final Notification under Section 6 of the Act. On the contrary, it is an admitted fact that the petitioners had lodged their objections.
5. In acquisition, the Government exercises power of eminent domain. Under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the procedure for acquisition is prescribed. If the procedure in law is followed and the notifications acquiring the lands are issued by the State Government have been satisfied on the need as well as on the public purpose of acquisition, the action could not be challenged on the spacious grounds as urged on behalf of the petitioners. Subsection (3) of Section 6 attaches finality to the acquisition proceedings by providing that the Notification under Section 6 is a conclusive evidence regarding the existence of public purpose. It is conclusive evidence for the need, the subjective satisfaction of the Government as well as in respect of public purpose for which the acquisition is made. As the Supreme Court held in AIR 1963 SC 151, there being no distinction between ‘conclusive evidence’ and ‘conclusive proof’, the issuance of Notification under Section 6 becomes a conclusive proof for the need and the public purpose involved in the acquisition.
6. In Jage Ram and others vs. State of Haryana and others [AIR 1971 SC 1033], the following observations of the Supreme Court, also answers the contentions raised by the petitioners.
“ … That apart, the question whether the starting of an industry is in public interest or not is essentially a question that has to be decided by the Government. That is a socio economic question. This Court is not in a position to go into that question. So long as it is not established that the acquisition is sought to be made for some collateral purpose, the declaration of the Government that it is made for a public purpose is not open to challenge. Section 6(3) says that the declaration of the Government that the acquisition made is for public purpose shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose. Unless it is shown that there was a clolourable exercise of power, it is not open to this Court to go behind that declaration and find out whether in a particular case purpose for which the land was needed was a public purpose or not.”
7. As far as the reliance on decision Devenderkumar (supra) is concerned, in that case, notification under Section 6 was issued on 18.12.2007. The Notification under Section 4 was issued on 03.07.06 and was published in two daily newspapers on 04.07.2006. Subsequent to that publication, English translation of the said Notification under Section 4 was published on 05.01.2007. The Supreme Court held that when on 04.07.2006 the Notification under Section 4 was published in Hindi language in the newspaper having circulation in the locality where the land was situated, and the people being well conversant with Hindi in the locality concerned, amounted to ample compliance of the requirement of publication and the repeat subsequent publication in English version was unnecessary. It was, therefore and in context of such facts, held that it would not permit the authorities to extend the period of limitation envisaged in the proviso to Section 4(1) of the Act and the period of limitation commenced from 04.07.2006 only. Thus, the facts of that case were entirely different from those involved in the present case.
7.1 In the present case, it is clearly noticed that there is a due compliance of requirement of one year limitation contemplated in proviso (2) of Section 6(1) of the Act. It is evident from the notice and Rojkam (p. 107 and 108) produced with affidavit in reply of one Arjunsinh B. Rathod, Incharge Officer on Special Duty (LAQ) GIDC, Vadodara that the Notification/Notice dated 06.11.2009 under Section 4(i) of the Act was published on the notice board of village Marua gram panchayat on 12.11.2009 and the Rojkam was done. It is further evident from page 144 being a copy of Gujarat Government Gazette (extra ordinary) dated 03.11.2010 publishing the notification under Section 6 of the Act. It is therefore manifested from the record that the limit of one year for publishing declaration under Section 6 from the date of publication of Notification under Section 4 was not violated.
8. For the second contention of the petitioners, the law is settled. In Raambhai Lakhabhai Bhakt vs. State of Gujarat and another, [AIR 1995 SC 1549] the dictum of law on this point was laid in the following words.
“ It is seen that under Clause 2 of Section 6 the declaration shall be published within one year from the date of the publication of the Notification under Section 4(1). That Section clearly adumbrates that one year has to be counted from the date of the publication mainly in the Gazette or last of the dates of publication envisaged thereunder excluding the time during which further proceedings were stayed by the High Court. The last date is referred to as the date of the publication of the Notification to reckon one year. It would be seen that declaration under Section 6 was published within one year of the last of the dates of local publication under Section 4 (1), in view of the closeness of the publication of these in the Gazette.”
8.1 In Eugenio Misquita vs. State of Goa [(1997) 8 SCC 47], it was held that, it is now well settled that last of the dates in the series of publication made under Section 4(1) of the Act is the relevant date to reckon the starting point of limitation for the purpose of proviso to Section 6 (1) (ii) of the Act.
9. The acquisition being an exercise of power of eminent domain and the State Government having arrived at satisfaction on the need of the lands for public purpose and Notification under Section 6 being a conclusive evidence in law for such need and the satisfaction, in absence of any material aspect pointed by the petitioners to suggest the contrary, the Court would not entertain challenge to the acquisition proceedings in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution.
10. No other contention was canvassed. In view of above, and as no illegality, irrationality or procedural impropriety in the procedure of acquisition could be pointed out and no contravention of any of the provisions of the Act being noticed, no ground is made out warranting exercise of powers by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The petitioners being not entitled to any relief and a fair statement having been made on behalf of the respondents about withdrawing from acquisition the lands in vicinity of ‘Gamtal’, the petitions are dismissed in limine with no order as to costs.
[D. H. WAGHELA, J.] Amit [N. V. ANJARIA, J.]