(Per : HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE JAYANT PATEL) All the applications are filed for condonation of delay in preferring concerned first appeals. Civil Application Nos. 4621 of 2012 to 4627 of 2012 are filed for condonation of delay for 824 days in preferring First Appeals (St.) No. 1036 of 2012 to 1042 of 2012. Whereas in the other group of Civil Applications Nos. 6425 of 2012 to 6434 of 2012 are filed for condonation of delay of 461 days in preferring First Appeal (St.) Nos. 1167 of 2012 to 1176 of 2012. As both the groups arise from the common judgement and award passed by the Reference Court in the concerned land reference cases for the acquisition of land at village Dabhoi, District Vadodara and common question are to be considered for both the groups, they are considered simultaneously too.
2. We have heard learned A.G.P. Mr. R.K.Dave in the group of Civil Application Nos. 4621 of 2012 to 4627 of 2012 and learned A.G.P. Mr.K.L.Pandya in the group of Civil Application Nos. 6245 of 2012 to 6425 of 2012. In order to see that the merits of the matter may not be frustrated merely on the ground of delay, we have also simultaneously heard both the Learned A.G.Ps on merits of the first appeals.
3. On the aspects of delay it appears that there is delay of 824 days in one group and 461 days in another group. Therefore, at the time when such a long delay in the matter is to be considered for exercise of the discretion for condonation of such a long delay, it would be appropriate to refer to the decision of the Apex Court in a case of Oriental Aroma Cheminal Industries Limited V. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation and Another reported in (2010) 5 SCC 459 whereby the Apex Court observed at Para - 14 to 17 as under :
"14. We have considered the respective submissions. The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The legislature does not prescribe limitation with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek remedy without delay. The idea is that evey legal remedy must be kept alive for a period fixed by the legislature. To put it differently, the law of limitation prescribes a period within which legal remedy can be availed for redress of the legal injury. At the same time, the courts are bestowed with the power to condone the delay, if sufficient cause is shown for not availing the remedy within the stipulated time.
15. The expression "sufficient cause" employed in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and similar other statutes is elastic enough to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice. Although, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in dealing with the aplications for condonation of delay, this Court has justifiably advocated adoption of a liberal approach in condoning the delay of short duration and a stricter approach where the delay is inordinate - Collector (L.A.) V. Katiji, N. Balakrishanan V. M. Krishnamuthy and Vedabai V. Shantaram Baburao Patil.
16. In dealing with the applications for condonation of delay filed on behalf of the State and its agencies/instrumentalities this' Court has, while emphasising that same yardstick should be applied for deciding the applications for condonation of delay filed by private individuals and the State, observed that certain amount of latitude is not impermissible in the later case because the State represents collective cause of the community and the decisions are taken by the officers/agencies at the slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from the table to table consumes considerable time causing delay - G Ramegowda V. Land Acquisition Officer, State of Haryana V. Chandra Mani, State of U.P. V. Harish Chandra, State of Bihar V. Ratan Lal Sahu, State of Nagaland V. Lipok AO and State (NCT of Delhi) V. Ahmed Jaan.
17. in the light of above, it is to be seen whether the respondents had offered any plausible / tangible explanation for the long delay of more than four years in filing of appeal and the High Court was justified in condoning the delay."
4. The aforesaid shows that when the delay is for a short period, lenient view may be taken, but in a case of delay for a long period strict view may be called for. If the facts of the present case are considered read with the explanation so submitted, it appears that in the first group of the matter, where the delay is of 824 days after the judgement was delivered on 30.09.2009, the certified copy was ready for delivery on 20.10.2009 and has been forwarded by the District Government Pleader on 1.11.2010. This shows roughly about one year time is taken for collecting the certified copy from the Court and thereafter, for forwarding the same. Not only that but after the sanction was granted by the Principal Secretary on 20.01.2011, the file was forwarded to the Legal Department and the Legal Department approved after a period of four months. Even thereafter, the appeal is filed on 9.4.2012. We are not at all satisfied with the explanation given at Para - 3, nor can be said as sufficient explanation to exercise the discretion for condonation of such a long delay of 824 days. In our view, if the facts as stated in Para - 3 of the application are to be considered and even if accepted as true, it cannot be said that the delay is sufficiently explained and therefore, we find that in view of the above referred decision of the Apex Court and more particularly observations made therein delay may not be required to be condoned.
5. In the second group of the application, more or less similar position remains. Even if the explanation as stated in Para - 3 of the application is considered, then also one year time is taken by the Government Pleader's office for collection of the certified copy, though it was ready for delivery in October 2009. After the Principal Secretary finalized and signed note on 22.1.2011, the Legal Department approved the same on 9.5.2011 i.e. after about more than four months. Appeal, thereafter, has been preferred as late as on 11.04.2012. Under the circumstances, we find that such a long delay of 461 days is not sufficiently explained and the delay may not be condoned.
6. As observed earlier in order to see that the merits of the matter may not be frustrated on the mere ground of delay, we have called upon the Learned A.G.P. concerned who appeared in the respective matters to address us on merits. If the merit of the respective appeals are to be considered, it appears from the impugned judgement of the Reference Court and more particularly at Para - 12 of the judgement, that the Learned Judge has relied upon the acquisition made and the decision of the Reference Court awarding the compensation at Rs.96/- per Sq. mtr. for the land located at very village Dabhoi and the another important aspect is that very judgement for awarding compensation at Rs.96/- per Sq. mtr. for the land in L.R.No. 805 of 1992 has been confirmed by this Court as well as by the Apex Court and copies of both the judgements are produced at Exhs. 19 and 20. It is not the case of the appellant that the judgements could not be applied since the lands were located at the different place or at different village but it is rather an admitted position that the land in question is located at village Dabhoi. It further appears from the judgement of the Reference Court, in the very Para - 12, that since the acquisition in the case where award was for Rs.96/- per Sq.mtr. was of the earlier period and there was difference of nine years, the Learned Judge has considered the appreciation at the rate of 10% per annum for the land at Rs.96/- per Sq. Mtr. and thereafter, arrived at the price of Rs.182.40/- per Sq. mtr. for the land in question under acquisition, but the claimants had demanded the compensation at Rs.150/- per sq.mtr., the Reference Court awarded the amount of compensation at Rs.150/- per sq.mtr. Under these circumstances, we find that if the Reference Court was guided by the aspect of compensation already awarded for other land located at the very village and the decision so confirmed by this Court and as well as by the Apex Court and has considered the appreciation at the rate of 10% per annum. Hence, it cannot be said that any error has been committed by the Reference Court. Under the circumstances, we find that when there is no merit in the concerned first appeal, no useful purpose would be served in taking too lenient view on the aspect of the delay and to consider the merit thereafter.
8. In view of the aforesaid observation and discussion, the present applications for condonation of delay are dismissed. First Appeal (St) Nos. 1036 of 2012 to 1042 of 2012 with First Appeal (St) Nos. 1167 of 2012 to 1176 of 2012, in view of the orders passed in the respective applications for condonation of delay, would not survive and accordingly shall stand disposed of.
(JAYANT PATEL, J.) (C.L.SONI,J) *f.kazi Top