7. In para 3 of the plaint, it was clearly alleged that since vacant land had been let out to the defendant, the provisions of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 did not apply to the facts of this case. In his written-statement, the defendant admitted this fact. I have not been able to find anything in the written-statement from which it might be inferred that the case of the defendant was that the provisions of Act XIII of 1972 applied to the facts of this case and as such, this plea was not open to the defendant at all. In the second place, the facts clearly show that the provisions of this Act were not applicable. The rent note dated 25th March, 1969 which is admitted by the defendant is Ex-1. It clearly provides that 750 sq. feet of vacant land had been let out to the defendant. It is true that this rent note permitted the defendant to raise temporary structure in the shape of a thach or tin-shed for the sake of his convenience and it was only after the defendant became the tenant that he raised such a temporary structure. This will not, however, convert the land let out to the defendant into a building. The defendant relied upon the case Shiv Govind Tiwary v. Additional District Judge, Kehri (1978 A.W.C. Page 89). The facts of this case were altogether different. In that case, a tin-shed was standing on the spot and was the subject matter of the tenancy. It was, therefore, held that the tin shed which was surrounded by pucca bricks could be used or residential purposes and the provisions of this Act would apply. In the second place from the evidence on record, it is amply clear that the shed raised by the defendant was purely temporary and had been constructed for the sake of his convenience at his own risk. I, therefore, conclude that the provisions of Section 29(a) of Act XIII of 1972 would not apply to the facts of this case.
8. We have then to see as to what was the purpose for which the tenancy had been created. The rent note Ex.1 clearly recites that the land in question had been let out to the defendant for the business of manufacturing boxes and trunks. According to the defendant this amounts to a lease for manufacturing purposes while according to the plaintiffs it was not so. It is also not denied that the defendant manufactured boxes on this land. The short question is whether making boxes would amount to a manufacturing process. I am inclined to agree with the respondent that it was so. The term 'manufacture' came up for elucidation in the case Sri Ishwar Sidhar v. Anup Lal Sharma (A.I.R. 1975 Calcutta page 174), where it was laid down that expression 'manufacture' purposes in Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is used in its popular sense and the word 'manufacture' implies a change and to constitute manufacture there must be such a transformation in the material that a new and different article must emerge having a distinctive name, character or use. It was further laid down in the case Allen Berry Engineers v. R.K. Dalmia (A.I.R. 1973 S.C. Page 425) that by the term 'manufacture' was meant a transformation into a new and different article which may be bought about by physical labour or skill or by mechanical power etc. If we keep this critarian in view, it will be found that making boxes would amount to manufacture ten sheets were converted into boxes by certain processes and a new article which was put to a different use came into being. In this connection, reference may also be made to the case Kali Kumar Sen v. Hari Dass Rai (A.I.R. 1969 Assam and Naga Land page 134), where it was held that making iron boxes amounted to manufacture. I, therefore, hold that the land per rent note Ex. 1 had been let out to the defendant for manufacturing purposes.
9. The third and the most important question, which arises is as to whether the tenancy in such a case could be determined by 30 days' notice as has been done in this case or was a notice of six months necessary for that purpose. The learned Munsif did not consider the terms of the lease Ex. 1. It recites that the vacant land had been let out to the defendant on payment of Rs.33.76 per month as rent for a period of five months ending 31.7.1969. In the next sentence, it is clearly provided that the defendant would remain in possession as a tenant from month to month. The first term of the lease provides that the tenancy of the defendant would be from month to month. It shall commence on the first day of every month according to Gregorian calender and shall end on the last day of that month. It will thus be notices that the tenancy despite being for a manufacturing purpose was from month to month. This was quite permissible in law as Section 106 clearly provides that the tenancy for a manufacturing purpose would be deemed to be from year to year in the absence of a contract or local law or usage to the contrary. In this case, there was a clear contract between the parties by which it was agreed that the tenancy of the defendant-tenant would be from month to month. The term of the lease expired on 31.7.1969, but the defendant continued to be in possession and it is admitted to the plaintiffs that rent had been paid upto October, 1972. It was said that the position of the defendant became that of a statutory tenant and according to the learned counsel for the appellants no notice was necessary to terminate his tenancy. Reliance was placed on the case Sardari Lal Vishav Nath v. Pritam Singh (A.I.R. 1978 S.C. Page 1518). In this case, the tenancy came to an end by efflux of time, but the defendant continued to be in possession under the protection of the Rent Restriction Act. In these circumstances, he was found to have become a statutory tenant and no notice u/s 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was necessary. In my view, the facts of the present case are some what different. Even after the expiry of the period of lease, the defendant continued to be in possession and the plaintiffs received rent for notice had been challenged by the defendant on this ground alone. Since it has been found that the defendant's tenancy could be terminated by serving one months' notice, his tenancy must be deemed to have been validly terminated and he was liable to be ejected........."
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