IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 2ND DAY OF JANUARY, 2019 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KRISHNA S.DIXIT WRIT PETITION No. 11221/2015(LA-RES) & WRIT PETITION Nos. 12883-889/2015(LA-RES) C/W WRIT PETITION Nos. 8216/2015, 48523-48524/2016(LA-RES) IN W.P. Nos. 11221 OF 2015 & 12883-889/2015:
BETWEEN:
HIS HOLINESS SRI SRI VIDYA PRASANNA THIRTHA SWAMAJI, PEETADHIPATHI, JAGADGURU SRI MADHWACHARYA MAHA SAMSTHANAM, SRI SAMPUTA NARASIMHA SWAMY, SRI SUBRAHMANYA MATHA, SUBRAHMANYA-574238.
SULLIA TALUK, DAKSHINA KANNADA, REPRESENTED BY ITS GPA HOLDER, SRI.S.R.PRASANNA.
… PETITIONER (BY SRI. H R ANANTHAKRISHNAMURTHY, ADVOCATE) AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, VIDHANA SOUDHA, DR.AMBEDKAR VEEDHI, BANGALORE-560001.
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY.
2. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER MANGALORE, DAKSHINA KANNDA DISTRICT-574238.
3. THE LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER MANGALORE, DAKSHINA KANNDA DISTRICT-574238.
4. KUKKE SRE SUBRAMANYA TEMPLE SUBRAMANYA-574238 SULYA TALUK, DAKSHINA KANNADA DISTRICT REPRESENTED BY ITS EX. OFFICER BY NINGAIAH … RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. B J ESWARAPPA, AGA FOR R1 TO 3; SMT. VAISHALI HEGDE, ADVOCATE FOR R4) THESE WRIT PETITIONS ARE FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE NOTIFICATION DATED 26.09.2013, VIDE ANNEX- D ISSUED BY THE RESPONDENT-2 AND NOTIFICATION DATED 18.10.2014 VIDE ANNEX-F ISSUED BY THE R-1.
IN W.P. NO. 8216/2015:
BETWEEN:
1. SMT PRABAVATHI W/O LATE SUBRAMANYA SHARMA AGED ABOUT 63 YEARS 2. VASANTHA SHARMA W/O LATE SUBRAMANYA SHARMA AGED ABOUT 41 YEARS 3. SMT. K.S. SAVITHA W/O K.G. MADHU AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS ALL ARE R/AT ADISUBRAMANYA SUBRAMANYA VILLAGE SULYA TALUK, D.K.DISTRICT -578238 4. SMT. KUSUMA W/O B.S. RAGHAVENDRA AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS R/AT DOOR NO.25, NARAYANA LAYOUT, 5TH MAIN ROAD, HOSKEREHALLI BSK III STAGE, BANGALORE-85 ... PETITIONERS (BY SRI. S V SHASTRI, ADVOCATE) AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF LAND ACQUISITION, M.S. BUILDING, BANGALORE-01 2. THE ASST. COMMISSIONER AND LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, PUTTUR, D.K.
DAKSHINA KANNADA DISTRICT-574238 3. EXECUTIVE OFFICER KUKKE SRI SYBRAMANYA TEMPLE, SUBRAMANYA-574238 SULYA TALUK DAKSHINA KANNADA DISTRICT REPRESENTED BY EXECUTIVE OFFICER SRI NINGAIAH AMENDED V.C.O. DATED 16.08.2017 (BY SRI. B J ESWARAPPA, AGA FOR R1 & 2;
... RESPONDENTS SMT. VAISHALI HEGDE, ADVOCATE FOR R3) THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE NOTIFICATION UNDER SECTION 4(1) OF THE ACT DATED 26.9.2013 VIDE ANNX-B, PERTAINING TO IN ITEM NO.35 & 36 AND NOTIFICATION UNDER SECTION 6(1) DATED 18.10.2014 PUBLISHED DATED 22.1.2015 VIDE ANNX-F IN ITEM NO.20 & 21, ISSUED BY THE RESPONDENTS, IN SO FAR AS IT RELATES TO SCHEDULE PROPERTIES.
IN W.P. Nos. 48523-48524/2016:
BETWEEN:
1. SRI A SUBRAMANYA RAO S/O A NARAYAN RAO AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS, RESIDING AT "SARADA NILAYA" NOORCHILA, SUBRAMANYA VILLAGE, PANJA HOBLI, SULYA TALUK DAKSHINA KANNADA-574 238 2. SMT. JANAKI W/O H.L.VENKATESH AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS, RESIDING AT "KUKKESHREE NILAYA" SUBRAMANYA VILLAGE PANJA HOBLI, SULYA TALUK DAKSHINA KANNADA-574 238 (BY SRI. S V SHASTRI, ADVOCATE) AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ITS SECRETARY LAND ACQUISITION, M.S.BUILDING, BANGALORE-560 001 2. THE ASST COMMISSIONER AND LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, PUTTUR, DAKSHINA KANNADA DAKSHINA KANNADA DIST-574 238 (BY SRI. B J ESWARAPPA, AGA FOR R1 & 2;
... PETITIONERS ... RESPONDENTS SMT. VAISHALI HEGDE, ADVOCATE FOR R3) THESE WRIT PETITIONS ARE FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE NOTIFICATION ISSUED UNDER SECTION 4[1] OF THE ACT DATED 26.9.2013 VIDE ANNEX-B, PERTAINING TO IN ITERM NO.13, 39, 37 AND 38 IN SO FAR AS IT RELATES TO SCHEDULE PROPERTIES; AND THE NOTIFICATION UNDER SECTION 6[1] OF THE ACT PUBLICATION DATED 22.1.2015 VIDE ANNEX-D PERTAINING TO ITEM NO.22, 23, 24 & 27 AS IT SCHEDULE PROPERTIES, AND THE FINAL AWARD DATED 8.8.2016 VIDE ANNEX-F.
THESE PETITIONS COMING ON FOR ORDERS THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-
ORDER In these writ petitions, the petitioners have sought for quashing of the acquisition of their lands, done vide Preliminary Notification dated 26.09.2013 followed by the final notification dated 18.10.2014 issued under the provisions of the erstwhile Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
2. After service of notice, the respondent officials have entered appearance through the Additional Government Advocate Sri. B.J. Eshwarappa. The petitioners at a later point of time got impleaded the respondent-Temple as a party to the proceedings vide order dated 16.08.2017 in W.P.No.11221/2015 and vide order dated 11.10.2017 in other connected writ petitions. The said temple is represented by Smt. Vaishali Hegde. The respondents have filed their Statement of Objections resisting the writ petitions.
3. Since common questions of law and facts are involved, these matters have been taken up for final disposal with the consent of learned counsel appearing on either side.
4. The respondent-Temple of the presiding diety Sri Subrahmanya at Kukke Town is an ancient temple of historical importance. Thousands of devotees throng the temple every day in vehicles and their number multiplies on special occasions. Temple too has a considerable income, which it spends for public purposes as well. Keeping all this in mind, the respondent-State Government to accord with the approved Master Plan of 1987 decided to widen the road and to provide other facilities to the devotees and others in public interest. Accordingly the acquisition in question has been done and the same is in challenge in these writ petitions.
5. The learned counsel for the petitioners laid the challenge to the acquisition on the following grounds:
(a) The 4(1) Notification dated 26.09.2013 at Annexure-D specifically mentions that the lands are required for the benefit of Kukke Sree Subramanya Devasthana; it is only in the Final Notification dated 18.10.2014 at Annexure-F, it is mentioned that the lands are required for the purpose of road making; therefore the acquisition is bad, there being no public purpose.
(b) The acquisition is bad inasmuch as the requirement of a Temple cannot ordinarily be construed as the one for public purpose; the State having been constituted under a secular Constitution is not justified in acquiring the land for the benefit of religious institutions at all, i.e., the respondent-temple.
(c) Under the provisions of law, at the most land may be acquired for the benefit of the Temple arguably by treating it as a local body and not otherwise; the respondent-Temple admittedly has paid about a sum of Rs.18 crore as compensation for the acquisition, which goes to show that it is the beneficiary of acquisition; thus the whole acquisition is incompetent.
(d) The petitioners did not have a reasonable opportunity of opposing the acquisition by participating in Section 5 Enquiry Proceedings inasmuch as they were never informed as to the extent of the land required and the purpose for which it is so required. Without these particulars the petitioners were in a disadvantageous position to effectively represent against the acquisition. Thus there is violation of principles of natural justice.
(e) Although the acquisition proceeding was initiated under the provisions of the L.A. Act, 1894, by the time the Final Notification u/s. 6 was issued, The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereafter ‘the 2013 Act’) had come into force repealing the 1894 Act and therefore the acquisition could not have been continued under the provisions of the repealed Act.
(f) The acquisition is vitiated inasmuch as there was no due consideration of the version of the land owners in the enquiry who had contended that the lands in question were their only bread and butter; taking away these lands amounts to taking away the means of their livelihood and therefore violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India as interpreted by the Apex Court in Olga Tellis vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation, AIR 1986 SC 180.
6. Per contra, the learned Additional Government Advocate and the learned counsel for the respondent- Temple in unison refuted the above contentions either as factually untrue or as legally untenable even if they are assumed to be true.
7. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned counsel appearing for the opposing parties; I have perused the writ petition papers, the Statements of Objections and the Rejoinder/Counter filed by the parties.
8. The first contention of the petitioner that there is no ‘public purpose’ on which the impugned acquisition is founded appears to be too far fetched an argument. The text and context of the Preliminary Notification and the Final Notification leave no manner of doubt as to their being a ‘public purpose’, namely, the formation/widening of the road, the unhappy language employed therein, notwithstanding. These notifications if construed with common sense give a reasonable impression that the lands are required for the purpose of road making/road widening in terms of Master Plan of 1987 which has been approved by the Government acting through the Chief Minister himself. This plan is exhibited in the Court. Smt. Vaishali Hegde is justified in banking upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Sayyed Ratanbhai, (2016) 4 SCC 631 paragraphs 58 to 60. Therefore the first contention is rejected.
9. The second & third contentions of the petitioners that the land could not have been acquired for the benefit of the respondent-Temple is misplaced; the land is not acquired for the benefit of the Temple at all; no land is given to the Temple, not withstanding a huge amount of Rs.18 crore having been paid by the temple to the Government. The title over the acquired land is not with the temple, but lies with the Government itself.
Therefore the contention that in a secular State land cannot be acquired for religious purposes, fails. For the same reason, the other related contention that the acquisition can be done for the temple only if it is treated as a local body, again meets the same fate. Although many of the rulings cited by the petitioners were not relevant to the adjudication of the lis at hand, those which are pertinent have been adverted to infra.
10. The next contention of the petitioners that there was no due enquiry conducted by the LAO/SLAO and that they did not have a reasonable opportunity of participation in the enquiry, does not merit acceptance. The petitioners admittedly had filed their objections to the proposed acquisition, which have been considered in the enquiry. The objection that the price of the land is very high or that so much extent is not required or that the land is the only means of livelihood are not substantiated either in the enquiry or before this Court. Even otherwise also, those are the mattes that fall within the realm of executive decision. This Court cannot run the race of opinions in those matters, barring in just exceptions. No case is made out that falls within the exceptions. For inadequacy of compensation the remedy is elsewhere.
11. The last contention that after the issuance of the Preliminary Notification, the 2013 Act came into force repealing the 1894 Act and therefore by virtue of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, the acquisition proceedings could not have been continued, is thoroughly misplaced. There is nothing in the 2013 Act that invalidates an acquisition initiated under the 1894 Act except in the circumstances specified in Section 24 and that no case is made out pointing out the said circumstances.
12. The learned counsel for the petitioners although turned the pages of 2013 Act, could not substantiate their contention that the proceedings under the L.A. Act, 1894 automatically abated by the provisions in Chapter VI of the new Act r/w Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Smt. Vaishali Hegde, the learned counsel for the respondent-temple and the learned Addl. Government Advocate Shri B.J.Eswarappa are more than justified in pointing out that the compensation is being awarded in terms of the provisions of the 2013 Act, although the acquisition was commenced under the 1894 Act, which is now repealed.
13. In the above circumstances no other ground having been urged, these writ petitions are liable to be and accordingly are dismissed, as being devoid of merits.
However, the observations herein above made or the dismissal of these writ petitions do not come in the way of the petitioners staking their claim for compensation or its enhancement in accordance with law.
No costs.
Sd/- JUDGE Bsv