Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Shreeprakash Singh, learned Standing Counsel for respondents 1 and 2.
The instant petition is directed against the order dated 22.8.2019 passed by the appellate authority under the provisions of Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, dismissing the appeal filed by the petitioner under Section 7(7) of the Act as barred by limitation. The petitioner has also prayed for a mandamus directing the Appellate Authority to condone delay of 190 days and hear the appeal on merits.
Indisputably, the claim of respondent No.3 registered as Suit No. PGA 17 of 2017 against the petitioner was allowed by order dated 17.12.2018. The petitioner challenged the order by filing statutory appeal under Section 7(7) of the Act. The limitation for filing appeal is sixty days from the date of receipt of order. The said period could be extended by sixty days if the appellate court is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal. Section 7(7) of the Act reads thus :-
"(7) Any person aggrieved by an order under sub-section (4) may, within sixty days from the date of the receipt of the order, prefer an appeal to the appropriate Government or such other authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government in this behalf :
Provided that the appropriate Government or the appellate authority, as the case may be, may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the said period of sixty days, extend the said period by a further period of sixty days:"
It is not disputed that the appeal was filed 190 days beyond the outer limit provided under the statute. Consequently, it has been dismissed on ground of limitation.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that delay of 190 days was a short delay which could have been condoned by exercising power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The view taken by the appellate court is highly technical.
Learned standing counsel, on the other hand, submitted that since the statute itself provides the limitation for filing an appeal and also specifies the period of which delay could be condoned, therefore, any appeal filed beyond the said statutory period, would be incompetent. He further submitted that since the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 is a complete Code in itself, therefore, the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act would not apply. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance on judgement of this Court in M/s. Kushang Security & House Keeping Private Limited vs. Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court and another, 2019 (8) ADJ 805.
The judgement in M/s. Kushang Security (supra) was rendered while interpreting Rule 7 of the Employees Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1997, wherein also appeal could be filed within sixty days from the date of the order and if the Tribunal is of the opinion that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring appeal within the prescribed period, it could be extended by a further period of sixty days. The court while interpreting the said provision held that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act would not apply as the Employees Provident Fund Act is a special law providing for rights and liabilities of the parties as well as the remedies and limitations for availing the remedy. While taking the said view, several identical provisions under the different Acts were also considered. The relevant observation by this Court wherein the law has been laid down, is quoted below :-
31. In view of the foregoing discussion, the legal position which emerges that in terms of Section 7-I (2) every appeal is to be filed in such form and manner, within such time and be accompanied by such fees, as may be prescribed. Rule 7 (2) of the Rules, 1997 provides for filing of the appeal within 60 days from the date of issuance of the order. The first proviso thereunder further stipulates that the Tribunal may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the prescribed period, extend the said period by a further period of 60 days.
32. It is thus seen that the EPF Act is a special law providing for institution of provident funds, pension fund and deposit-linked insurance fund for employees in factories and other establishments and in terms of the rules framed thereunder a certain period of limitation for filing an appeal having been provided for in clear terms and a further provision having been made for extension of such period only upto a specified time period and no further, the Appellate Tribunal would have no jurisdiction to treat within limitation, an appeal filed before it beyond such maximum time limit specified in terms of the statutory rules.
33. Moreover, in terms of the scheme and the intent of the provisions contained in the EPF Act it is seen that the legislature intended it to be a complete code by itself. As a consequence, even if the provisions of the Limitation Act may be held to have not been expressly excluded the principle of implied exclusion would apply in terms of the nature of the subject matter, the purpose and the scheme of the Act. The provisions contained under the Limitation Act, 1963 would therefore not be applicable for seeking extension of time beyond the statutory time period of 60 days from the date of issue of the notification/order, extendable by a further period of 60 days, upon the Tribunal being satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the prescribed period. The maximum period for filing the appeal would be thus 120 (60+60) days from the date of the issuance of the notification/order which is sought to be challenged."
Learned counsel for the petitioner is not in a position to distinguish the said judgement. This Court is of considered opinion that the law laid down in M/s. Kushang Security would apply with full force to an appeal filed under Section 7(7) of the instant Act. This Court is therefore of the opinion that the view taken by the appellate court in dismissing the appeal as barred by limitation does not suffer from any illegality so as to warrant interference by this Court. The petition lacks merit and is dismissed.
Order Date :- 26.11.2019 skv (Manoj Kumar Gupta, J.)