Court No. - 1
Case :- WRIT - C No. - 41738 of 2019 Petitioner :- Adesh Singh Yadav Respondent :- District Magistrate/ Collector, Bareilly And 5 Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Somesh Khare,Rajesh Kumar Yadav Counsel for Respondent:- C.S.C.
Hon'ble Ramesh Sinha,J. Hon'ble Ajit Kumar,J.
1. Heard Sri Somesh Khare, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Mangla Prasad Rai, learned counsel appearing for the respondent no.6, learned Standing Counsel appearing for respondents nos. 1 to 5 and perused the record.
2. The petitioner by means of this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has challenged the order dated 2.12.2019 whereby the District Magistrate has directed for holding the meeting of the house for considering the 'no confidence motion'.
3. The contention advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner is that in view of the provisions contained under sub- section 12 of Section 15 of the U.P. Kshetra Panchayat and Zila Panchayat Act, 1961, the District Magistrate fell in error in entertaining the motion of no confidence motion within a year of earlier notice of the no confidence motion as no confidence motion virtually stood carried out pursuant to the earlier of notice but for the judgement of this Court dated 16.10.2019 passed in Writ-C No.21 of 2019 whereby the notice inviting schedule of meeting of no confidence motion was held to be bad and the same could not take legal effect. He argues that reason assigned in the said judgement as 15 clear days notice provided for was not true and so also consequential action taken pursuant to the said notice was held bad but fact position was that date scheduled meeting was held and motion stood carried. The argument advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner is that even if liberty was given in the said judgement, legal effect of the motion carried could not be done away with in view of the language of sub section 12 in which the provision has been phrased and bar to a subsequent notice has been created. Thus he has argued that the action of the District Magistrate would amount to defeat the provisions as contained under sub-section 12 of Section 15 of the Act, 1961.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner has taken us to the provisions as contained under sub-section 12 of Section 15 of the Act in its entirety which is reproduced hereunder:-
"15. Motion of non-confidence in Pramukh or 3[x x x] – (1) A motion expressing want of confidence in the Pramukh or any 5[x x x] of a Kshettra Panchayat may be made and proceeded with in accordance with the procedure laid down in the following sub-sections.
(12) If the motion is not carried as aforesaid or if the meeting could not be held for want of quorum, no notice of any subsequent motion expressing want of confidence in the same Pramukh or 4[x x x] shall be received until after the expiration of 5[one year] from the date of such meeting.
5. From the plain and simple reading of the aforesaid provisions it is apparent from the language in which provisions have been phrased and so also the words clearly convey the legislative intent in providing for contingencies under which bar would operate. It is quite explicit that if motion is not carried out in the meeting scheduled under Section 15(3) of the Act, 1961 or the meeting could not be held for want of necessary requisite forum, the subsequent notice of any such no confidence motion would not be entertained until expiry of a period of one year from the date of such meeting which was earlier scheduled. Learned counsel for the petitioner has sought to urge that words and expression "if the meeting could not be held for want of quorum" cannot be read in conjuction with the words and expression "if the motion is not carried as aforesaid". And so, he argues, the factum of meeting held as per schedule the second contingency having happened, the bar would still be attracted. So what is virtually urged is that this Court even if granted liberty, in view of statutory bar, the second notice was not entertainable.
6. In our view the above argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is misplaced on two counts: (a) once the notice which is mandatory under Section 15(2) has been held to be bad and untenable the consequential action automatically gets rendered bad and is, therefore, not legally enforceable including the meeting even if already scheduled is held and concluded; (b) the contingencies referred to under sub section, may be having impact of the two contingencies of absolutely diverse situation but when under a judicial pronouncement a meeting is held bad on account of notice being bad, the language of section would not be interpreted to take away mandatory nature of sub-section 2 of Section 15 of the Act and to defeat a judicial verdict in this regard. The scheme contemplated under Section 15 makes meeting a consequential to the notice given under Section 15(3) provided mandatory requirement contemplated under Section 15(2) is met, otherwise notice is void for non compliance of mandatory provision and so it has the effect of rendering entire excercise under Section 15 as void ab initio. What is void is nonest meaning thereby never existed in the eyes of law so as to have any legal effect.
7. In view of the above, therefore, in our judgement dated 16.10.2019, it has been held that the notice itself was void, the consequential action also turned out to be void and non est and no legal effect to that be given to attract the bar created under Sub-Section 12 of Section 15 of the Act, 1961.
8. No other argument has been advanced. Writ petition is misconceived and is, accordingly dismissed.
(Ajit Kumar, J.) (Ramesh Sinha, J.) Order Date :- 17.12.2019 Gaurav